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Superpower, hegemon, hyperpower, empire. Some of the labels used in the last years to 
describe the U.S. position and its behavior in the world. Whether it describes the political 
authority, military preponderance, economic prevalence, or cultural dominance of the 
United States, it is clear that it touches many aspects of peoples’ lives around the 
world—for better or for worse. But long before it was a world power, the United States 
had a sphere of influence, a backyard, or a regional empire in and around the Caribbean. 
The region to the south of the United States was long thought of as a proper place for 
American expansion and, at times, annexation was even considered. But these largely 
remained empty ambitions until the United States could claim a position of almost 
exclusive hegemony after the defeat of Spain and the demise of the Spanish empire in 
1898—a position that was strengthened when Europe all but committed collective 
suicide in 1914. 
Born of revolution itself, the United States became a status-quo power within the 
confines of its Caribbean sphere of influence. It opposed extra-continental threats on the 
basis of the Monroe doctrine of 1823, which has been characterized as America’s oldest 
foreign policy—even though it was not really effective until the end of the 19th century. 
The United States also opposed threats to the status quo emanating from the region 
itself: conflicts between the various states, civil wars, political and social revolutions, 
general misgovernment or financial irresponsibility. All these occurrences could 
jeopardize the lives and investments of American citizens in the region, the safety of the 
Panama Canal, or the prestige of the United States as a regional leader. 
In a word, from the 19th century onward, the United States desired and attempted 
to establish stability in its Caribbean sphere of influence—much like it would on a global 
scale after its rise to hegemonic status. Even while the United States could withdraw its 
influence from European affairs in the 1930s, no American leader challenged the basic 
need for peace and calm in the Caribbean. How that goal should be accomplished, 
however, has often been a question for debate. 
The question of how to achieve stability is intricately tied to the question of the 
political organization of the countries in America’s backyard. Except for the case of 
Puerto Rico, the United States has always declined to take direct control over the 
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nations of the Caribbean and Central America and to rule them as formal colonies—
although in practice, the sovereignty of these nations was often violated by the northern 
neighbor. Different forms of intervention were practiced by the United States throughout 
the twentieth century to end unrest, war, or revolution. During the early part of the 
century it was the Navy’s gunboats and Marines that did the job. And while this strategy 
was not entirely abandoned in the second half of the century, the CIA was often 
employed in that period on the presumption that it could handle matters more discreetly. 
But direct intervention was never the preferred approach, as it was a costly endeavor 
and rarely popular with domestic and foreign audiences. Besides, neither the Marines 
nor the CIA were equipped for long-term police duties: long-term stability could only be 
achieved if the American republics were properly governed. 
Therefore, American intervention was often aimed at or followed by what has 
become known as “regime change”. President Wilson’s insistence, for example, that 
Central Americans should “learn to elect good men” led to numerous Marine supervised 
elections in the region. In 1961 the CIA helped Dominican resistance groups assassinate 
President Rafael Trujillo—the “dictatingest dictator who ever dictated”—in favor of more 
liberal groups. And in the late 1970s, President Carter practiced a sort of reversed 
intervention by cutting all American assistance to the Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio 
Somoza Debayle, who was subsequently overthrown. Based on these three examples, 
American policy in the Caribbean could be said to be pro-democratic or at least anti-
dictatorial. Seemingly, Washington believed that popular governance was the best route 
to long-term stability.  
  One would be hard-pressed, however, to find any serious historian who argues 
that the United States has consistently labored in favor of democracy in its own sphere 
of influence. In fact, Washington has often been accused, as will be discussed at greater 
detail below, of “propping up” and supporting dictatorships in the region. The period of 
Wilsonian interventions was followed by an age of tyranny that featured some of the 
most notorious dictators of the Western Hemisphere. Washington’s support for Trujillo’s 
enemies is suspect, since it had earlier armed the Dominican regime with American 
weapons. The same goes for Anastasio Somoza, whose downfall was regretted by 
Carter’s successors in the Reagan administration. And in fact, it is Reagan’s support for 
old Somoza-men and various right-wing dictators in Central America and the Caribbean 
that is often taken to be representative of U.S. policy. Although the accusation that the 
United States consistently supports dictatorial proxies to maintain stability by force in its 
sphere of influence used to be associated with New Left historians, it had recently 
become a mainstream—together with the growing popularity of “Empire” to describe 
America’s role in the world 
This subject, the “use” of allied dictators to establish stability in the Caribbean 
sphere of influence, is the subject of this text. It is a subject that has been the source of 
animated and at times even emotional debate among politicians, policy makers, 
journalists and other commentators, but also among historians and political scientists. It 
is a question which, in a sense, cuts to the heart of America’s role in the world.  
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Framing the question: The Friendly Tyrants Dilemma 
In the late eighties the “Foreign Policy Research Institute”, an independent research 
institute based in Philadelphia, sponsored a three year research project designed to 
identify patterns in United States dealings with dictatorial allies. An impressive group of 
scholars, members of policy think tanks, and (former) government officials contributed 
case studies to this project. The result was a collection of papers that explores previous 
and contemporary cases of American policy toward friendly dictators and offers “policy 
primers” for future foreign policymakers. Dubbed Friendly Tyrants: An American dilemma, 
this publication probably represents the last such research project to be instigated while 
the Cold War was still in progress. It is also the first attempt ever made to describe the 
American experience with friendly dictatorships as a discrete research topic. While the 
questions and methods used in this collection are dated, it is still a good starting point for 
an exploration of the subject. 
The book focuses on dictatorial allies of the United States, or “Friendly Tyrants” as 
the editors have chosen to call them. As the subtitle announces, the existence of 
authoritarian allies poses a dilemma (i.e. insolvable problem) to the American 
government. That is to say, the nature of American political culture furnishes the 
prerequisites for the creation of a dilemma that may not exist when, say, the French or 
the British government is faced with a similar situation. In extremis, the dilemma exists of 
an impossible choice between a Realist and an Idealist approach to Friendly Tyrants. 
According to the editors, the Realist approach stipulates that policymakers should not be 
concerned about the internal policies of other states (in this case, the existence of a 
dictatorial government) unless such policies themselves present a threat to American 
interests. Assuming that the existence of a dictatorial government does not in itself pose 
a threat to the United States, it would be natural for Washington to recruit these 
governments as allies against states that do threaten American interests. The Idealist 
approach assumes that the United States—“a special nation, the paragon of 
democracy”—should not associate with dictators because they violate its standards of 
political behavior. Such statesmen should be punished for their abuses, not coddled or 
rewarded.1  
Any great power which finds itself in a dangerous world (as the United States did 
during the Cold War) would recognize that dictatorial governments are simply too 
numerous to be written off as potential allies, or at least, not if it “expect[s] to remain a 
great power for very long”. However, “[f]or Americans (and perhaps for Americans alone), 
pure realism is not realistic”.2 By this the editors refer to “the singular nature of American 
politics and nationalism”: 
From its creation to the present day, no other great power in modern history 
has had as large a moral dimension to its foreign policy as has the United 
States, and none has contended with the collision of moral scruples and 
                                                 
1  Howard J. Wiarda, “Friendly Tyrants and American Interests”, in: Daniel Pipes and Adam 
Garfinkle eds., Friendly Tyrants: An American Dilemma (Hampshire and London 1991), 3-20, 3-5. 
2 Wiarda, “American Interests”, 6. 
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raison d’etat to the extent that the United States has in its (so far) brief tenure 
as a great power.3 
These observations lead the editors to conclude that the so-called “rational actor model” 
does not apply to the study of United States foreign policy—at least not when Friendly 
Tyrants are involved. The “rational actor model” is a Realist hypothesis about the 
behavior of states in international politics. It postulates that a state, or government, may 
be regarded as a single unitary entity that will act “rationally” (i.e. it will not act against its 
“national interest” as defined in terms of strategy and geopolitics). The case studies in 
Pipes and Garfinkle’s publication show that Americans do not merely define their 
national interest in geopolitical terms but also in ideological terms (“Does this or that 
policy violate our morals and values?”). Therefore, it is possible for the United States to 
act “irrationally” (that is, in conflict with its strategic interests) when it chooses to prioritize 
its ideological interests. Or when it cannot pursue any coherent policy at all because of 
the irreconcilable conflict between strategy and ideology.4  
In short, the Friendly Tyrants dilemma raises the question of how the United States 
defines its interests and what these interests really are. Unfortunately, the book does not 
offer an answer; it simply raises the question. This is understandable, since the goal of 
this research project is to offer techniques to manage the Friendly Tyrants dilemma—not 
to solve it. Before and after the publication of Friendly Tyrants, however, many historians 
and political scientists have in some way dealt with this topic and they did come up with 
answers. Like Pipes and Garfinkle, they frame the problem in the Realism / Idealism 
debate. The following paragraphs evaluate their efforts.  
 
Classical Realism and Cultural Relativism, 1940s-1970s 
Historian Michael Joseph Smith characterizes the difference between European and 
American political thinking during the interbellum period as follows: “To move from [Max] 
Weber’s world of inexpiable conflicts and tragic ethical dilemmas to the progressive 
universe of interwar Anglo-American idealists is like leaving an uninterrupted 
performance of Wagner’s Ring Cycle for a civic meeting punctuated by communal 
singing of hymns by S.S. Wesley”.5 This situation would soon change, though. During 
the thirties American intellectuals became profoundly disillusioned with traditional 
philosophical and legalistic approaches to international politics that characterized 
Wilsonian policies. They feared that their country was naïve about the nature of 
international politics. Policymakers in the United States were blinded by normative 
assumptions about the world. They acted from the assumption that international politics 
should be like American politics (i.e. based on liberal democratic ideals) and ignored 
signs that suggested the opposite. In fact, the number of stable democracies in the world 
                                                 
3 Adam Garfinkle, “Friendly Tyrants: Historical Reckoning”, in: Idem, 221-251, 221. 
4 Such a policy paralysis occurred, for example, when the dictators of Cuba and Nicaragua, both 
longtime allies of Washington, were faced with Marxist uprisings in 1959 and 1979 respectively. 
Wiarda, “American Interests”, 12-17. 
5 Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge and London 
1986) 54. 
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had diminished dramatically since the First World War. It was feared that the 
dictatorships might hold the key to the future, because they had a more realistic 
understanding of politics. In any case, they were taking advantage of the naïve policies 
of Washington and their growing power was now a threat to the vital interests of the 
United States. If Washington was ever to gain the upper hand over the dictatorships, it 
had to come to terms with what international politics were like, not with what they should 
be like.6 
In this context Hans Morgenthau published the first edition of Politics among 
Nations7, a Realist account of foreign policy that would be acknowledged as the starting 
point of modern, “scientific” thinking on international politics in the United States.8 In 
subsequent years, “political realism swept the field (…) discussions of foreign policy 
have been carried on, since 1945, in the language of political realism—that is, the 
language of power and interests rather than of ideals or norms”.9 The Realism and 
cultural relativism of the well-known diplomat/historian George Kennan were important 
factors influencing post-war historiography.10 Kennan argued that a sober and detached 
analysis of the global balance of power, rather than moralistic concepts grounded in 
images of national greatness, should guide foreign policy decision-making. His argument 
about power politics was intractably tied up with his conviction that people could not 
really understand other cultures anyway. Morality was grounded in the national 
experience and if one tried to translate it to foreign policy it would only lead to 
misunderstandings and even conflicts with other nations. The universal language of 
power and national interest was the only solid base for foreign policy. Being realistic 
about international politics meant, according to Kennan, “that we will have the modesty 
to admit that our own national interest is all that we are really capable of knowing and 
understanding—and [we need to have] the courage to recognize that if our own 
purposes and undertakings here at home are decent ones, unsullied by arrogance or 
hostility toward other people or delusions of superiority, then the pursuit of our national 
interest can never fail to be conductive to a better world”.11 
                                                 
6 On American disillusion with normative frameworks and the fear that authoritarianism might be 
the wave of the future, see the still relevant study of Purcell: Edward A. Purcell, The Crisis of 
Democratic Theory. Scientific Naturalism and the problem of Value (Lexington 1973) especially 
Part III: 115-232. 
7 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for power and Peace (New York 
1948).  
8 For assessments of Morgenthau’s position as the “founding father” of modern political thought, 
see for example: Stanley Hoffmann, “An American Social Science: International Relations”, 
Daedalus. Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences Vol. 106, No. 3 (Summer 
1977) 41-61, there 44; Robert O. Keohane, “Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics”, 
in: Idem ed., Neorealism and its critics (New York 1986) 1-26, there 10-12; Jan Willem Honig, 
“Totalitarianism and Realism, Hans Morgenthau’s German Years”, in: Benjamin Frankel ed., 
Roots of Realism (London and Portland, OR 1996) 283-313, there 283. 
9 Keohane, “Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics”, 9. 
10  Many historians have commented on the significance of Kennan’s writings. Consult, for 
example: Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. foreign policy (New Haven and London 1987) 199-
200. 
11 George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago 1951) 103. 
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Kennan believed that “It seems to me unlikely that there could be any other region 
of the earth in which nature and human behavior could have combined to produce a 
more unhappy and hopeless background for the conduct of human life than in Latin 
America”. Therefore no state should be discriminated against because of its 
undemocratic practices: “our own political institutions [are] the product of a peculiar 
national experience, irrelevant to the development of other peoples”. From a realistic 
standpoint, Kennan argues, there is no reason for the United States to show greater 
regard for democratic governments in Latin America, since that would imply a certain 
amount of American responsibility for the continued good behavior of that state, which 
can only amount to a growing gap between our commitments and our capabilities”. On 
the other hand, the “international” posture of the Latin American states, particularly in 
regard to the Communist threat, did concern the strategic interests of the United States. 
And since Communism was an European ideology that was alien to Latin America, much 
like American democracy, Kennan felt that the United States could reasonably support 
states that were anti-Communist in their domestic and international policies, but 
regardless of their democratic or authoritarian nature. In fact, Kennan argues that: 
We cannot be too dogmatic about the methods by which local communists 
can be dealt with [by the Latin American governments themselves] (…) 
Where the concepts and traditions of popular government are too weak to 
absorb successfully the intensity of the communist attack, then we must 
concede that harsh governmental measures of repression may be the only 
answer; that these measures may have to proceed from regimes whose 
origins and methods would not stand the test American concepts of 
democratic procedure; and that such regimes and such methods may be 
preferable alternatives, and indeed the only alternatives, to further 
communist successes.12 
American historians in post-war decades generally accepted Kennan’s 
recommendations. They describe the United States as a “status-quo Power” and agree 
that its foreign policy should be guided by “the national interest”. Deviations from this rule, 
such as a foreign policy aimed at democratization, were considered dangerous, because 
they overstretched American responsibilities and alienated potential allies. The idea that 
the United States was a special nation—the guardian of democratic principles—and 
should disassociate itself from states that violated its political values, lived on among 
politicians, journalists, and other commentators, but would henceforth be mostly 
excluded from academic writings. Diplomatic historians regarded their Realist notions as 
part of their professional mystique: the one thing that set them apart from untrained 
observers. Indeed, the folly of American Idealism during the interwar years and the 
eventual triumph of Realism in postwar years became something of a founding myth for 
(the study of) modern U.S. diplomacy.13 
                                                 
12  “Memorandum by the counselor of the Department (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, 
Washington, March 29, 1950”, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) The United Nations; 
the Western Hemisphere (1950) 598-623, there 600, 607, and 613-618. 
13 Hoffmann, “An American Social Science”, 41-61. 
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Like so many other things, the Realist consensus began to be questioned during 
the Vietnam era. William Appleman Williams introduced the thesis that American foreign 
policy was based on the economic interests of domestic elites, rather than objective 
realities. While this new element in the discussion did not directly affect the academic 
discussion about friendly authoritarians, some historians did feel the need to explain the 
traditional position. In a 1972 book, historians G. Pope Atkins and Larman C. Wilson 
announce that, for the first time, they have examined the relationship between the United 
States and the Dominican regime of Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo “from the specific 
viewpoint of his having been a dictator”.14 It is not hard to see why this should be the first 
time that such a viewpoint has been adopted in an American study of diplomatic history: 
if “power”—and not “ideology”—is the principle that guides diplomacy, it would be 
nonsense to classify U.S. policy toward dictatorships as a discrete phenomenon worthy 
of academic attention. 
So why was this a good time to study U.S. policy toward dictatorship? Atkins and 
Wilson note the “severe and extensive criticism” of “the official United States attitude 
toward dictatorship and militarism in other American Republics”. Atkins and Wilson 
reveal that “we as authors could better satisfy our personal value preferences if we 
concluded that the United States has had a major role to play in furthering democracy in 
Latin America”. However, the authors argue that the logic of international relations 
conspired against the worthy intentions of ideologically inspired statesmen, and they 
also agree that U.S. foreign policy would be improved if it accepted such logic. 15 
Atkins and Wilson argue that the United States—a “major status-quo power”—has 
traditionally been concerned with political stability and the prevention of interference by 
extra-continental powers in Latin American affairs. At the start of the 20th century, the 
preferred means of promoting stability and of averting foreign interference in the 
Caribbean was direct military intervention and the subsequent supervision of local 
elections. At the time, American diplomats believed that the democratic procedures 
would bring stability to the Dominican Republic. Nonetheless, due to Latin American 
resentment of “Yankee imperialism”, the United States had to renounce its “right” to 
intervene during the 1920s. Therefore, Washington could no longer direct the internal 
developments in the Dominican Republic and could not be held responsible for the rise 
to power of Trujillo in 1931. However, American policymakers did accommodate to the 
regime because it was “conductive at least to temporary stability”.  
The latter policy was more realistic, because it accepted the fact that the local 
power balance favored Trujillo and his National Guard. Unfortunately, say the authors, 
democracy requires careful cultivation and can only be nurtured by internal leadership 
rather than external control. Moreover, the pro-democratic policies of the United States 
were focused on the procedures (such as supervised elections) and not on the 
substance of democratic processes. In the final analysis, the authors claim that 
                                                 
14  G. Pope Atkins and Larman C. Wilson, The United States and the Trujillo Regime (New 
Brunswick, NJ 1972) viii. 
15 Atkins and Wilson, The Trujillo Regime, vii-viii. 
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American democratic policy was “pursued in ethnocentric ideological terms”, while they 
state—in words echoing Kennan’s cultural relativism—that “democracy” and 
“constitutionalism” were “not relevant to the Dominican national experience”. Political 
developments in the Dominican Republic were, therefore, largely beyond the control of 
the United States. As the case of Trujillo demonstrates, it may not be possible to 
combine stability and the promotion of democratic principles: “It is difficult to prevent 
dictatorial or military regimes or even to bring about social and political change. By 
recognizing that there is no way out of this dilemma and that no solution exists in this 
regard, the Latin American policy of the United States would be more realistic and 
thereby improved”. The United States may have to tolerate the existence of dictatorships 
in its sphere of influence and may have to work with them as they are.16 
 
Anger and Revisionism, 1970s-1980s 
Atkins and Wilson were satisfied to dissociate their “personal value preferences” from a 
discussion on America’s relationship with Caribbean dictators. Whether accurate or not, 
they cultivated an image of professional distance. For many historians, particularly pupils 
and followers of Appleman’s thinking, such an attitude became untenable by the end of 
the 1970s. Historian James Dunkerley introduced his book on the “long war” in El 
Salvador on the note that ”it is the product not only of study and political conviction but 
also outrage”.17 He was certainly not the only one to feel this way, although he was one 
of the few serious academic researchers to be honest about it. American authors from 
the late 1970s onward found it increasingly difficult to hide a sense of indignation when 
they discussed their own country’s relationship with the Central American isthmus.  
Where did these feelings of anger, outrage, and indignation come from? The 
answer would easily cover an entire book, but it goes something like this: Beginning in 
the late 1970s, the governments and reigning economic and military elites of Central 
America faced serious challenges from leftist opposition groups. For the next ten years 
or so, much of the region was torn by brutal civil wars costing the lives of tens of 
thousands of people. Even today, many Central American country’s have yet to recover 
fully from that dark decade, which has become known, simply but suitably, as “the crisis”.  
The United States was deeply involved in “the crisis”. The Reagan administration 
acted on the assumption the leftist rebels and regimes in Central America were proxies 
of Cuba and the Soviet Union. Jeane Kirkpatrick, Reagan’s ambassador to the United 
Nations and one of the administration’s theorists, argued at the time that “to [the normal] 
patterns of political interaction [in Central America] there has been added in recent years 
the unfamiliar guerilla violence of revolutionaries linked to Cuba by ideology, training, 
and the need for support, and through Cuba to the Soviet Union.” This was considered a 
                                                 
16 Idem, 160-162. 
17 James Dunkerley, The Long War. Dictatorship and Revolution in El Salvador (London 1982) 1. 
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direct threat to the security of the United States.18 Hence, Washington supported the 
forces of reaction in Central America on every level: politically, financially, militarily, etc.  
Reagan’s policies were doubtlessly popular with those Americans who felt that 
Jimmy Carter’s posture in world affairs was one of, again in Kirkpatrick’s words, 
“continuous self-abasement and apology”.19 However, there were also many Americans 
who regretted the fact that their country was connected, though indirectly, with right-wing 
dictators and their death squads in Central America. Others feared that the United States 
were getting involved in complicated local wars from which it might be difficult to 
withdraw (“El Salvador is Spanish for Vietnam” was a popular slogan for buttons and 
bumper stickers in those days). Although the Reagan administration was unapologetic 
about its rhetorical support for right-wing groups in Central America, the extent to which 
it was involved in local struggles was long obscured from the scrutiny of Congress and 
the press, a situation that eventually led to the Iran-Contra scandal. 
While Americans of different political leanings found different reasons to support or 
oppose Reagan’s policies in Central America, many liberal intellectuals were outraged: 
first by the fact that human rights were being violated on unprecedented scale on 
America’s doorstep and second by Washington’s secret involvement in those events. 
Thus, Dunkerley remembers that on a sunny day in August, 1981, he picked up the 
afternoon newspaper, only to be confronted by a report on how “the armed forces of El 
Salvador were using guillotines to execute their prisoners”. He was struck by the fact that 
such procedures could not be the sole responsibility of the Salvadoran military, which 
had previously limited itself to random shootings of local peasants, but was “equally the 
product if the desk-ridden managers of ‘counter-insurgency’ employed in Washington (…) 
No doubt the compilers of those neat manuals on anti-guerilla warfare would be better 
pleased with operations that are undertaken under conditions of maximum hygiene in an 
abattoir than in the customary style of peasant violence”.20 
Much like in the case of Dunkerley, “the crisis” inspired a whole generation of 
researchers to uncover the causes of the barbarity that characterized the Central 
American scene for so many years. While American studies on Central America had 
been exceedingly scarce before, they mushroomed throughout the 1980s. Louis 
Goodman states that before the 1970s, “Central America was the subject of little concern 
for scholars, policymakers, or the general public in the United States. Few citizens could 
name any of the seven countries of the region; for policymakers major issues included 
keeping the Panama Canal free of silt and the price of bananas low; few scholars had 
researched the politics or societies of the region”. After the Sandinista revolt, however “a 
huge reassessment began. Central America became news. U.S. citizens started to read 
about the region on the front pages of their newspapers; policymakers evaluated the 
meaning of these changes for global political strategy; scholars began to build an 
                                                 
18 Jeane Kirkpatrick, “U.S. Security and Latin America”, Commentary 71:1 (January 1981) 29-40, 
there 34. 
19 Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Dictators and double standards”, Commentary  68:5 (November 1979) 34-
45, there 45. 
20 Dunkerley, Long War, 1-2. 
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inventory of research focusing on the region”.21 In fact, research on Central America 
branched out across the academic disciplines, but it also captured the interest of political 
scientists and diplomatic historians who set out to uncover the American role in the 
Central American tragedy. Some went all the way back to the 18th century, but for many 
others, the history of the 1930s seemed to hold the key to explaining contemporary 
events. This is not surprising, because in some ways, the violence of the 1980s 
appeared to be a reenactment of events in the 1930s. The Sandinista rebels who 
toppled Anastasio Somoza Debayle in Nicaragua, for example, got their name from the 
1930s rebel leader Augusto César Sandino, who was himself assassinated by Anastasio 
Somoza García, godfather of the Somoza dynasty. Likewise, the Salvadoran Frente 
Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional was named after the 1930s Communist 
leader Farabundo Martí. The latter was executed by the military regime of Maximiliano 
Hernandez Martinez, who had the dubious honor of having a right-wing death squad 
named after him in the 1980s. 
 
Throughout the 1980s, the Revisionists, as critics of the classical realist school have 
come to be known, loosely refer to Marxist theory in arguing that foreign policy is 
basically the assertion of domestic economic interests abroad. When they discuss 
American policy toward the Third World, Revisionist historians are often inspired by 
dependency theory: a thesis that was originally developed by Latin American scholars 
and posits that the major powers in the international system have used their economic 
strength to make Third World development dependent on—and subordinate to—the 
interests of those leading powers. What emerges from these new theories is an image of 
the United States as an imperialist nation which employs its power to enforce stability 
and order on the Third World to make it more susceptible to its unbridled economic 
expansion.  
Walter LaFeber, one of Appleman’s pupils, has applied the insights briefly 
described above to construct a new interpretive framework for the study of United States 
policy toward Central America. In his study Inevitable Revolutions, LaFeber attempts to 
prove that the American relation to its Central American neighbors was marked by a 
condition he calls “neodependency”. By the start of the twentieth century the United 
States had become the richest country in the region and benefited most from the existing 
economic system, so it had a vested interest in maintaining it. The poor masses of 
Central America—those who were exploited by the economic system—could only 
change their lot by revolting against it and thus against U.S. dominance. LaFeber 
assumes that, being faced with Central American revolts against economic injustice, 
Washington would always opt for the short-term solution of forcefully reasserting its 
dominance (which did not solve the deeper causes of revolution and therefore set the 
stage for future revolutions, hence the Inevitable Revolutions of the title), rather than 
taking its chances with radical changes that could produce long-term stability. This is 
                                                 
21 Louis W. Goodman et al., Political Parties and Democracy in Central America (Boulder et al. 
1990) 3. 
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where LaFeber’s model of “neodependency” fits in. The economic power of Washington 
was not adequate to put an end to revolutionary activity in Central America (rather, 
economic dominance caused this activity). Therefore, dependency theory, which focuses 
exclusively on economic power, is not adequate to explain the history of U.S.-Central 
American relations. Hence, LaFeber introduces “neodependency”, which posits that the 
United States did not want to govern the tumultuous Central American republics directly, 
but sought to control the region informally with the help of a system of economic 
dominance coupled to the occasional application of military and political power to end 
revolutions. By inserting military and political power into the interpretive framework, 
LaFeber believes that his theory is more adequate to explain the relationship between 
economic dependence and the periodical recurrence of revolution.22  
So were does dictatorship fit in? LaFeber argues that the American system of 
“neodependency” was in trouble during the late twenties. The military interventions 
ended because of congressional concerns about high costs and bad Public Relations, 
while economic dominance was weakened due to the Great Depression. In response to 
these problems, Washington instructed its Marine Corps to train National Guards in the 
Central American Republics which would maintain local order on the cheap and 
discharge the United States from having to intervene directly to suppress rebellions. 
These National Guards were initially expected to be nonpolitical institutions, but when 
the commanders of the Guards seized power through military coups, Washington readily 
accepted the dictatorial regimes they installed. In fact, these new military leaders, Carías 
in Honduras, Martínez in El Salvador, Somoza in Nicaragua, and Ubico in Guatemala, 
became an integral part of the “neodependency” system during Franklin Roosevelt’s 
administration. LaFeber maintains that “deals were easily struck” between Washington 
and the dictators because the former needed proxies to maintain the status quo while 
the latter needed U.S. recognition and access to the New York money market. Thus, the 
“United States (…) accepted, and soon welcomed, dictatorships in Central America 
because it turned out that such rulers could most cheaply uphold order. Dictators were 
not a paradox but a necessity for the system, including the Good Neighbor policy”.23 
Aside from occasional “tinkering”, this system was supposedly maintained until the time 
LaFeber wrote his book. 
 
From Post-Revisionism to Triumphalism, 1980s-1990s 
While Revisionism remains a strong current in the historiography, it had its origins and 
heyday during the years of soul-searching that followed the Vietnam War. During the 
1980s, though, Realism would reemerge to explore all that was strong and positive in 
American foreign policy. Some American historians grew tired with the repentant tone of 
Revisionism and the time had come, or so one historian put it, to do some “moral house-
                                                 
22 Walter LaFeber, Inevitable revolutions. The United States in Central America (New York and 
London 1983) 5-18. 
23 LaFeber, Inevitable revolutions, 19-83, particularly 64-69 and 81. 
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cleaning”.24  Jeane Kirkpatrick stated in a 1979 article entitled “Dictators and double 
standards” that “no problem of American foreign policy is more urgent than that of 
formulating a morally and strategically acceptable, and politically realistic, program for 
dealing with non-democratic governments who are threatened by Soviet-sponsored 
subversion”.25 Kirkpatrick’s remarkable argument represents the first thorough attempt at 
a Realist appraisal of America’s policy toward dictatorship, although many of her 
arguments had in some way been anticipated by earlier authors. 
Professor Kirkpatrick wrote her article to discredit the policy of the Carter 
Administration (1977-1981). President Carter believed that the rising tide of anti-
Americanism in the Third World was due to America’s flawed human rights policy. One 
of the remedies his administration offered was to denounce the traditional right-wing 
dictatorships that ruled much of the Third World and to seek common ground with the 
anti-dictatorial struggle of leftist revolutionary movements. Kirkpatrick believes that such 
a policy “ends up by aligning us tacitly with Soviet clients”26 and goes on to argue that a 
more realistic approach to traditional versus revolutionary regimes should guide United 
States policy. She states that traditional authoritarian governments leave intact existing 
allocations of wealth, power, and status and their repressive control over society is highly 
limited. Therefore, these regimes are “bearable to ordinary people”. Moreover, traditional 
dictators are known to permit limited contestation and participation and Washington 
could “effectively encourage this process of liberalization and democratization” provided 
that the internal political situation is stable and the change is gradual rather than 
revolutionary. In contrast, revolutionary movements, if victorious, are known to install 
modern totalitarian regimes and “they claim jurisdiction over the whole life of society and 
make demands for change that so violate internalized values and habits that inhabitants 
flee by the tens of thousands”. Therefore, Kirkpatrick believes that Carter employs 
“double standards” by opposing relatively benign and generally pro-American traditional 
autocrats and befriending Marxist revolutionaries who are likely to install brutal and pro-
Soviet tyrannies. A sound foreign policy should accept the “unpleasant fact” that it is 
morally and strategically acceptable to support traditional dictators in the face of a global 
totalitarian threat.27 
The significance of Kirkpatrick’s argument should not be underestimated. Her 
argument in particular and the Realist argument in general are still a widely accepted 
interpretation for U.S. policy toward dictatorship. A good explanation for the popularity of 
the Realist interpretation must surely be its elegance. Consider the next example, which 
                                                 
24 Mark Falcoff, “Somoza, Sandino, and the United States”, in: Mark Falcoff and Robert Royal 
eds., The continuing crises: U.S. policy in Central America and the Caribbean: Thirty essays by 
statesmen, scholars, religious leaders, and journalists (Washington 1987) 297-320, 299-301. 
25 Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorships”, 34. For the sake of clarity, all references to Kirkpatrick are to 
the 1979 article “Double Standards”. In a 1981 article, however, Kirkpatrick presents a variation 
on her original argument which is slightly more relevant to this text, since it specifically refers to 
U.S. policy in Latin America: Jeane Kirkpatrick, “U.S. security and Latin America”, Commentary 
71:1 (January 1981) 29-40. 
26 Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorships”, 41. 
27 Idem, 44-45. 
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is the most concise and elegant explanation for the American policy towards dictatorship 
ever put forward by a historian: In his 1997 book We now know, John Lewis Gaddis 
states that:  
[A] distinction Americans tended to make—perhaps they were more subtle 
than one might think—[was that] between what we might call benign and 
malignant authoritarianism. Regimes like those of Somoza [and] Trujillo 
might be unsavory, but they fell into the benign category because they posed 
no serious threat to U.S. interests and in some cases even promoted them. 
Regimes like those of Nazi Germany and imperial Japan, because of their 
military might, were quite another matter. Stalin’s authoritarianism had 
appeared malignant when linked to that of Hitler, as it was between 1939 and 
1941; but when directed against Hitler, it could come to appear quite 
benign.28 
 
The end of the Cold War had a profound impact on American thinking about foreign 
policy. Some of the most dramatic examples of this impact can be observed in the 
writings of Realist thinkers. Henry Kissinger, a Realist theorist and practitioner who was 
especially prone to mock Idealist visions during the Cold War, admitted in his 1994 book 
Diplomacy that Realism no longer sufficed as a framework for American foreign policy. In 
the absence of acute external threat, what was needed was an animating “vision” of 
America’s mission that lent coherence to the endeavor of foreign policy and gave the 
public a sense of “hope and possibility”. In effect, Kissinger was arguing for a more 
important role for Idealism in foreign policy.29 At that time it was not uncommon for 
Americans to be talking about “visions”, “ideas”, “ideals”, and “Idealism”. Most 
commentators agreed, however, that the United States had had an ideal, mission or 
vision all along. In fact, they believe that the American liberal democratic ideal was the 
winning weapon in the Cold War. Even if propositions on how, why, and to what extent 
this was so differed widely, the sense that American Idealism had triumphed over Soviet 
Realism was widespread. The influence of this “Triumphalism” was notable throughout 
the 1990s.30 
During previous decades, many scholars had assumed that the United States was 
less well-suited to “fight” the Cold War than the Soviet Union was, because its liberal 
democratic institutions did not allow secrecy, quick decision-making, the financing of a 
large standing army, or other measures that would presumably be necessary to win this 
conflict. When the United States did “win” the Cold War many scholars proposed that 
                                                 
28 John L. Gaddis, We now know. Rethinking Cold War History (New York 1997) 35. Brackets and 
italics are mine.  
29 Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York 1994) 835. The analysis is from John Gerard Ruggie, 
“The past as prologue?: Interests, Identity, and American Foreign Policy”, International Security 
21:4 (Spring 1997) 89-125, 92. 
30 Without attempting to feign exhaustiveness, the following list presents a sample of Triumphalist 
writings from a historian, a political scientist, a philosopher, and a foreign policy specialist: Gaddis, 
We now know; Tony Smith, America’s mission. The United States and the worldwide struggle for 
democracy in the twentieth century (Princeton, NJ 1994); Francis Fukuyama, The end of history 
and the last man (New York 1992); Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence. American Foreign 
Policy and how it changed the world (London 2001). 
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this was due to America’s liberal democratic system, not in spite of it. Political scientist 
Tony Smith, for example, argues that the United States defeated its ideological 
antagonists of the twentieth century—Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union—because its 
democratic system allowed it to accommodate class, gender, and ethnic diversity at 
home while it remained flexible enough to cooperate with other states. In his book 
America’s Mission, which has been quoted as a foremost example of the Triumphalist 
current in post-Cold War literature, Smith argues that Americans have always been 
aware of the importance of democracy to the international position of their country. At 
least, the “American idea of a world order opposed to imperialism and composed of 
independent, self-determining, preferably democratic states bound together through 
international organizations dedicated to the peaceful handling of conflicts, free trade, and 
mutual defense (a package of proposals that may be called ‘liberal democratic 
internationalism’) has been with us in mature form since the early 1940s”.31 
 
From the Constructivist challenge to Empire, 1990s-2000s 
In reaction to the Realist/Post-Revisionist portrayal of American diplomacy in terms of 
the “extended struggle between clear-eyed realists on the one side and fuzzy-minded 
moralists (…) on the other”, historian Michael Hunt argued in a 1987 book that such an 
approach is at least “incomplete” since it neglects the “deep and pervasive impact of an 
ideology with its roots in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries”. 32  In this case, 
“ideology” does not refer to the traditional Wilsonianism, but to the intellectual traditions, 
ideas, ideals, and worldviews of American diplomats. These topics became the objects 
of study for many diplomatic historians from the late 1980s forward and have been 
applied on several occasions to the study of American relations with dictators in its 
sphere of influence.  
Although the empirical study of American “Idealism” in diplomatic history shows the 
clear stamp of the methodology and themes of more traditional intellectual history, some 
influence from post-colonial studies, and particularly Edward Said’s concept of 
Orientalism and “othering”, are also in evidence. More generally, however, the interest of 
diplomatic historians in the topics advanced by Michael Hunt mirrored the rise of 
“Constructivism” in the political sciences. Constructivism is generally understood to be a 
“theory in which identities and interests are the dependent variable” and proposes that 
“people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meaning that the 
objects have for them”.33 This theory is not inconsistent with either Realism or Idealism. 
Clearly, like Idealism, Constructivism accepts the influence of “soft” (i.e. non-material) 
factors on international politics, even if it does not necessarily accept Idealism as an 
interpretive framework. How Constructivism relates to Realism can be illustrated with an 
argument by historian Lars Schoultz. Schoultz argues that the Realist concept of power 
                                                 
31 Smith, America’s mission, 3-33, esp. 7. 
32 Hunt, Ideology, 125 and 171. 
33 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics”, 
International Organization 46:2 (Spring 1992) 391-425, there 394 & 396. 
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politics goes far in explaining the nature of the relationship between the United States 
and the Latin American nations (it being a relationship between a great power and 
several very weak powers). But the fundamental difference between the arrogant policy 
toward, say, Peru and the respectful policy toward, for example, Denmark is a particular 
American “mindset” about Latin Americans. According to Schoultz, Washington’s inter-
American policy is (and always was) founded on “a pervasive belief that Latin Americans 
constitute an inferior branch of the human species”. Concerning U.S. “friendliness” 
toward Latin dictatorships, Schoultz notes that it “flowed naturally” from the belief that 
“Latin Americans were already undemocratic”. 34  Regardless of whether this last 
observation can stand the test of empirical research35, this example shows that, within 
the framework of Realism, the Constructivist attempted to improve our understanding of 
foreign policy, so that it becomes more than the interaction between featureless states, 
who’s only differentiating factor is, in Gaddis’ words, their “military might”.  
Historian David F. Schmitz accomplished the most complete restatement of the 
Friendly Tyrants Dilemma in constructivist terms. He criticized Smith for his one-sided 
treatment of American foreign policy. Using a Realist framework that recognizes the 
importance of rational calculation and strategic interests, Schmitz argues that: 
“[p]romoting human rights and democracy demands a toleration of instability and change 
in regions considered crucial to American business or defense, often leaving no clear 
choice between conscience and self-interest and making strong, stable right-wing 
dictators attractive to policymakers”.36 At the same time, however, he also rejects the 
notion that U.S. policy toward friendly dictatorships was “simply a matter of cynical 
realism or cold disregard for the peoples of other countries”.37 
Somewhat like Hunt, Schmitz wants to go beyond the “cynical realists” / “starry-
eyed idealists” dichotomy and uncover intellectual traditions, perceptions, and 
rationalizations in American foreign policy. According to Schmitz, the logic, rationale, and 
ideological justifications for American support of dictatorships were developed in the 
1920s. In that decade, American officials became concerned with the spread of 
(primarily) Bolshevik revolutions which occurred in the wake of the First World War and 
caused a full-fledged “Red-scare” in the United States itself. This “irrational fear” for 
Bolshevik revolutionary activities was coupled to a racist (or at least ethnocentric) 
believe that many peoples around the world were not yet ready to build stable 
                                                 
34  Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States. A history of U.S. policy toward Latin America 
(Cambridge and London 1998) iv, 315, and 346. 
35  Another historian, Frederick Pike, offers a different view when he notes that American 
diplomats in the 1930s were fascinated by social reformers in Central America. Arguing that the 
diplomats of the Good Neighbor era were influenced by a “counter-culture” of “cultural pluralism”, 
which momentarily allayed the influence of older stereotypes about “primitive peoples”, Pike 
notices a degree of sympathy among State Department officials for social and political 
experimentation in South America. See: Frederick B. Pike, The United States and Latin America. 
Myths and stereotypes of civilization and nature (Austin 1992) 277-281 and 304. 
36 David Schmitz, ‘Thank God they’re on our side.’ The United States and right-wing dictatorships, 
1921-1965 (Chapel Hill and London 1999) 3. 
37 Idem, 5. 
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democracies. Schmitz account is very close to Hunt’s on this count. Washington officials 
developed the view that democratic institutions in “politically immature” nations were too 
weak to withstand the onslaught of economic depressions and the global spread of 
revolutionary activity. Such a worldview led American policymakers to regard the rise of 
fascism in Europe with mild approval. Even if the Fascist ideology was antithetical the 
American values, at least it appeared to fit the German an Italian political traditions and it 
was strongly anti-Bolshevik. Furthermore, Washington officials were inspired by an idea 
which might best be described as “modernization theory avant-la-lettre”. This idea 
prescribed that authoritarian governments might be a necessary transition stage for 
backward nations that were developing into politically mature nations. Such a conception 
allowed Americans to believe that the support for dictatorial regimes did not conflict with 
liberal interest in the long run. 
In Latin America, American fears of revolution and conceptions of local political 
backwardness initially gave rise to “Wilsonian” interventions which were intended to 
install stable, economically responsible democracies backed up by American resolution. 
In the 1930s, however, such intervention became too costly and appeared to stimulate 
anti-American sentiments. Echoing the analysis of several other authors reviewed above 
Schmitz notes that the Roosevelt Administration started to rely on authoritarian 
governments—most notably in Cuba, Nicaragua, and El Salvador—because they 
preserved order, controlled radical reform movements, and protected American 
investments “while obviating the need for American intervention”.38 The immediate desire 
to install democracies was replaced with the long-term hope that local strongmen would 
serve as “modernizing” agents and would eventually clear the road to democratic 
development. 
The American rationalization for the support of dictatorship—which combined the 
fear of revolution with a racial / ethnocentric distrust of foreign democracies—had been 
institutionalized before the start of the Second World War, Schmitz argues. The “policy 
pendulum” did swing to support of democracy during this war, because dictatorship was 
increasingly associated with international aggression while American faith in liberal 
values was strengthened. However, with the start of the Cold War, old fears and trusted 
solutions reemerged. The Eisenhower administration was especially apt to work with 
authoritarian regimes and the local military in countries such as Greece, Spain, Iran, and 
Guatemala. But to the old fear of revolution and distrust of democratic experiments, a 
new variable was added: post-War American officials increasingly referred to dictatorial 
allies as members of the “free world”. This rhetorical devise created a blind spot for the 
internal policies of the “friendly tyrants”. Also, the new concept of “nation building”, which 
was grounded in scientific notions of “development”, encouraged the idea that the United 
States could direct authoritarian states to greater liberty while maintaining cordial 
relations with them. 
While American policy would “swing” around to support for democracy one more 
time—after Cuban dictator Batista had been ousted by Castro, the very type of 
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revolutionary leader he was supposed to prevent from gaining power—American support 
for authoritarianism continued beyond the 1960s and the justifications for such a policy 
remained remarkably similar. 39  In his concluding remarks Schmitz addresses the 
Triumphalists when he states that “American support for right-wing dictators 
demonstrates that the promotion of democracy was not a consistent, central goal of 
American policy throughout the century”. In fact, the support for dictatorship was often a 
central feature of American policy. And since American leaders often used moral 
appeals to gain public support for their policies, Schmitz finds reason to question the 
morality of U.S. conduct when it served the interests of despots. On the pragmatic side, 
Schmitz believes that support for authoritarianism did not serve the national interest 
because “[r]ight-wing dictators more often than not created political polarization in their 
nations that led to long-term instability and an anti-American sentiment that fostered 
radical nationalist movements and brought to power, in Cuba, Vietnam, Nicaragua, and 
Iran, among other nations, the exact forms of government the United States originally 
sought to prevent”.40 
 
Although it is impossible to predict in which direction the historiography will develop, or 
even in which direction it is developing, a full discussion on the subject cannot ignore the 
recent influence of post-colonial studies that is noticeable even in a traditional field like 
diplomatic history. That influence has manifested itself most clearly recently in the 
definition of the United States as an “Empire”. Naturally, the use of “Empire” as a model 
to explain America’s position in the contemporary world is not new: Revisionist historians 
used the term often in this context.41 However, Revisionists understood the term in a 
Marxist sense, while “empire” in post-colonial studies is understood as a 
cultural/linguistic concept. In very broad terms, it can be said that the modern definition 
of Empire originated from Edward Said’s concept of Orientalism. Like Said, who studied 
the subtle and persistent Eurocentric prejudice against Arabo-Islamic peoples and their 
culture (which was deemed both “other” and thus “inferior”), American historians of U.S. 
diplomacy are increasingly interested in the American perceptions of other cultures and 
the ways in which these perceptions influenced international relations. The 
representation of the “Other” as backward and inferior justified subordination of foreign 
countries and their economies to the American system as long as it was also included a 
parallel drive to “civilize” and “educate” them. 
The post colonial framework was applied to the study of U.S. Latin American 
studies in the collection Close encounters of empire. It is exceedingly difficult to (briefly) 
summarize how this particular collection of articles instructs our understanding of U.S.-
Latin American relations, since its editors purposely and justifiably allowed the 
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contributors some leeway in their approach to the subject. However, it can be said that 
the general purpose of Close Encounters is to explore the “contact zones” of “empire” 
which are not necessarily geographical locations but may “represent attempts at 
hegemony, but are simultaneously sites of multivocality; of negotiation, borrowing, and 
exchange; and of redeployment and reversal”. The collection goes on to explore several 
case studies were the United States and Latin America “encountered” each other, 
necessarily in a “power laden” context where “people, ideas, commodities, and 
institutions” were “received, contested, and appropriated”. For example, Lauren Derby 
contributed an article on chickens from high-yield poultry factories in the Dominican 
Republic. Local attitudes to the so-called gringo chicken, “which is of North American 
origin, is white, and eats imported feed, but lives in the Caribbean and is grown by 
Dominican producers”, could tell us something about how Dominicans construct their 
own national identity in a country dominated economically by the United States. 
Revealingly, gringo chickens had been held responsible for “causing AIDS, infertility in 
women, and impotency and homosexuality in men”.42   
However that may be, one study that is relevant to the current text that is linked to 
the Close Encounter project is Eric Paul Roorda’s The dictator next door.43 Roorda 
contributed an article to Close Encounters of Empire on the joint obsession of American 
and Dominican military men with the airplane. Almost simultaneously, he published his 
award-winning The dictator next door, which presents a very innovative approach to 
American diplomatic history.44 The book is a case study of Good Neighbor diplomacy. It 
analyses the relationship between Washington and the Trujillo regime in the Dominican 
Republic from 1930 to 1945. It underscores that American diplomats were sincere well-
wishers to democratic development in Central America but did not have the influence 
needed to actually direct political events in this region (this was especially so after the 
adoption of the Good Neighbor policy which explicitly renounced the American “right” to 
intervene in the affairs of the sister republics). From this situation sprang a policy 
dilemma which Roorda wishes to explore: “The formation of the Trujillo regime showed 
that a foreign policy based on the principles of national sovereignty and self-
determination, the Geist of the Good Neighbor policy, meant having to accept as 
                                                 
42 Gilbert M Joseph, “Close encounters. Toward a New Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American 
Relations”, in: Joseph et al., Close Encounters of Empire, Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-
Latin American Relations (Durham and London 1998) 3-46 and Lauren Derby, “Gringo Chickens 
with Worms. Food and Nationalism in the Dominican Republic”, in: Idem, 451-493. 
43 Eric Paul Roorda, The dictator next door. The Good Neighbor Policy and the Trujillo regime in 
the Dominican Republic, 1930-1945 (Durham and London 1998). A complete review of recent 
works on this subject should also include Schmitz, ‘Thank God they’re on our side’. For the sake 
of conciseness, though, a review of this book has been omitted here. 
44 Roorda, The dictator next door. Two earlier articles published by Roorda anticipate certain 
themes and subjects in this book: Roorda, “The Cult of the Airplane among U.S. Military Men and 
Dominicans during the U.S. Occupation and the Trujillo Regime, in: Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine 
C. LeGrand, and Ricardo D. Salvatore eds., Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural 
History of U.S.-Latin American Relations (Durham, NC 1998) 269-310; Roorda, “Genocide Next 
Door: The Good Neighbor Policy, the Trujillo Regime, and the Haitian Massacre of 1937”, 
Diplomatic History 20 (Summer 1996) 301-319. 
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gracefully as possible the nearby existence of regimes antithetical to the principles of 
peace and democracy”. 45  Throughout the 1930s, most American officials accepted 
Trujillo’s dictatorial rule or at least rejected the idea of direct intervention to promote a 
more liberal regime (which, according to Roorda, was a proposition supported by 
influential diplomats such as Sumner Welles).46 This situation would change at the end 
of the Second World War when Idealism was strong in the State Department. 
The innovative nature of Roorda’s analysis is to found in his insistence that 
individuals matter in foreign policy. The historical actors that Roorda analyzes include 
dictators, diplomats, military officers, lobbyists, journalists, and bankers and the author 
emphasizes that the cultural background of these individuals determined their outlook on 
the relationship between the United States and the Dominican Republic. This implies the 
existence of foreign policies, rather than the one coherent policy which is often 
presented in books that are inspired by the “rational actor model” or other Realist 
schemes. For example, the State Department was often at odds with the American 
military: the former promoting a cool and sometimes openly hostile stance toward the 
dictator, the latter assuming a cordial and congratulatory posture: 
For a naval officer, the quality of port facilities is a paramount consideration 
in judging the merits of a civilization; and for a Marine the cleanliness and 
orderliness of a place are similarly central in his evaluation. For such men, 
the physical achievements of the Trujillo regime outweighed any other 
consideration. The resident diplomats, on the other hand, counted the cost of 
the regime’s oppression and the dictator’s self-obsession against the value of 
the order and development he had fostered.47 
This difference in outlook meant that American diplomats were generally more 
concerned about the dictatorial aspects of Trujillo’s reign than their military colleagues 
who were generally approving of the Generalissimo’s policies. According to Roorda, this 
difference can be explained by the cultural background of the historical actors: the elitism 
of American diplomats was at odds with Trujillo’s populism while the dictator’s military 
training by American officers during the marine occupation of the Dominican Republic 
enabled him to correspond to American military representatives. During the 30s and 
early 40s, State Department criticism of Trujillo was curtailed due to the non-intervention 
policy and the over-arching foreign policy objective of hemispheric solidarity. At the end 
of World War II, however, anti-dictatorial sentiments ran high in the State Department 
and American officials became more overtly critical of Trujillo and other caudillos in Latin 
America. However, the effects of this new attitude were limited due to the relatively minor 
influence the United States could bring to bear on Trujillo. Moreover, American concern 
for democracy in Latin America was soon overshadowed by the Cold War. 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 Roorda, The dictator next door, 1. 
46 Idem, chapter 3. 
47 Idem, 173. 
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The next step 
The topic of American encounters with Central American dictatorships originally caught 
my attention because of the dramatic moral dilemma’s inherent in it: The public image 
that the United States cultivates—that of the immaculate city on the hill, the champion of 
democracy—presents a clear and immediate contrast to the stereotypical 
generalissimo—a common gangster clad in impeccable white uniform excessively 
adorned with medals and epaulettes who leeches on his poor and beaten people. Yet, it 
is well-known that Washington supported such leaders (some of whom fit the stereotype 
remarkably well) in various ways over the decades. The issue reveals that there are 
cracks in the white armor of the “paladin of democracy” and seems to suggest that by 
studying the problem, one could reveal something of the dark, true nature of forces that 
make up American foreign policy. 
In this sense, the literature on the subject does not disappoint. From the Realist’s 
rejection of “ethnocentric” influences in foreign policy via the Revisionist’s revelation of 
America’s cynical drive to empire to the post-colonialist’s dark ruminations about 
Washington’s dehumanizing of the Other, the topic of American encounters with 
dictatorship has provided many schools of thought with a convenient “empirical” case 
that could establish the supposed truth on the nature of U.S. foreign policies.    
In fact, the subject lends itself so easily to the Big Questions and the moral 
reflections on the nature of American actions that it is hard to reduce it to a human scale. 
One is tempted to typecast Americans who encountered foreign dictatorships in the role 
of a Machiavellian tactician or of an agent of empire. Not only does this approach 
obscure the role of individuals involved, it also decontextualizes it. In other words, the 
historical setting of the encounter is delegated to the background and the episode turns 
into a mere manifestation of colliding interests or imperial machinations. Many historians 
will instinctively sympathize with Robert Freeman Smith when he complained about the 
“high degree of order, coherence, and single-minded planning to U.S. actions regarding 
Latin America”. This leads to historical studies, Smith argues, that hardly refer to “what 
actually happened”. In one example, he cites a scholarly paper in which the American 
ambassador to Bolivia is represented as “the conscious agent of an imperial power 
implementing the master plan of domination”. Smith pleads for a revision of such 
accounts, which should reveal the totality of events, including the “emotions, ideas, and 
motives” of American diplomats. Smith believes that “the burden” of historical 
developments in Latin America, coupled with the “hopes, fears, ambitions, and 
frustrations” of American statesmen determines the nature of U.S. policy toward the 
sister republics: “[Those are] the characteristic[s] of actual people struggling in a real 
world. After all, that is the true nature of history”.48 
Although Smith’s complaints are aimed at the Revisionist school—of which he was 
himself an exponent—it is a good description of my own attitude toward much of what 
                                                 
48 Robert Freeman Smith ed., The United States and the Latin American Sphere of Influence. 
Volume 2—Era of Good Neighbors, Cold Warriors, and Hairshirts, 1930-1982 (Malabar, Florida 
1983) viii-ix. 
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has been written about American encounters with “friendly tyrants”. While it is in itself a 
convenient description of the terms in which the matter has been discussed, Pipes and 
Garfinkle’s concept of the “Friendly Tyrants dilemma” is fraught with assumptions and 
prescriptions about the “exceptional” nature of America that make it too cumbersome for 
empirical research. Naturally, the United States is hardly the only country which 
subscribes to an animating vision or political ideal: such concepts have played a 
significant role in the foreign policies of all nations. Therefore, it would not do to state 
that “[f]or Americans (and perhaps for Americans alone), pure realism is not realistic”. To 
be sure, the flaw is not with Americans themselves, but with insistence that abstract 
concepts such as Realism and Idealism determined their behavior. 
Classical Realism, while purportedly an “objective” and “scientific” approach to 
foreign relations, suffers from its own inclination to pass judgment on “starry-eyed” 
Idealists. Kennan rebelled against the “vision of national greatness” which he thought 
had guided U.S. foreign policy up to his own time; Atkins and Wilson argued that foreign 
policy was sometimes pursued in “ethnocentric ideological terms”; and Kirkpatrick 
chastised the Carter Administration for its “pious” worldview. When they imply that 
Realism is the superior theory, all these men and women are to some degree arguing 
what foreign policy should be like—not so much what the sources showed it was like. It 
should be obvious, therefore, that the classic school of Realism at least is no less 
normative than Ideology: it prescribes what foreign politics should be like, not what it 
always is or has been like.  
John Lewis Gaddis, who was informed more by modern “Neorealism”, reduces the 
entire subject to a single determinant: “military might”. However, such blatant 
reductionism turns foreign policy into something static (i.e. basically similar across the 
ages) and has little to offer to historians. Gaddis is rather superfluous in stating that 
“subtle” American statesmen distinguished between benign and malignant 
authoritarianism. For if “military might” is the only distinguishing factor between one 
authoritarian and another, he might just have stated that Americans made distinctions 
between benign and malignant states. After all, if the subject is put in these terms, why 
should a really powerful republic be any less malignant than a really powerful 
dictatorship? While a political scientist might be entirely satisfied with such a model 
based mainly on “power”—and may even deduct many interesting and relevant 
conclusions from it—a historian may well ask the question: “Is this all we want to know?” 
In the sense that Revisionism was inspired by anger, by the sense that there was a 
deep divide between the supposedly democratic nature of the United States and its 
terrorist tactics in the Third World, it can be interpreted as a Idealistic reaction to the 
Realists’ description of the world. And while it is good medicine against Classical 
Realism’s fetish for the status quo, it too suffers from a judgmental approach to the study 
of U.S. foreign policy. While LaFeber, for example, presents his concept of 
“neodependency” as something completely new, there is in fact little to set it apart from 
Realism. Like Realists, LaFeber assumes that American statesmen were motivated by a 
disinterested analysis of the national interest, even if he describes this national interest 
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as something fundamentally economic rather than political. His contention that political 
and military power are essential parts of the economically oriented dependency theory, 
produces a theory of “neodependency” which is almost indistinguishable from a Realist 
view which assumes that a state will mobilize all its sources of power to serve the 
national interest. What does set his interpretation of American foreign policy apart from 
classical Realists is not a rejection of the existence of power politics, but a rejection of 
the notion that power politics are a desirable trait of foreign policy. Rather than a policy 
of enlightened self-interest which promotes international understanding and stability, 
Realism becomes a policy of cynical selfishness which promotes economic empire-
building. He recognizes a cynical drive to empire which motivated American statesmen 
almost from the inception of the republic. According to LaFeber, this unity of purpose is 
the real source of American foreign policy; the Ideological rhetoric is merely a cover-up. 
The tone that was set in the 1980s still influences the terms in which America’s 
relations to Central American and Caribbean dictators are discussed. Considering that a 
large body of literature on the subject was produced in that decade—including many 
books that are now recognized pioneering works and classics in their field—this should 
come as no surprise. Thus, during the last decade or so, the assumption that 
Washington “propped up” dictators in Central America can still be found in many 
monographs. In some cases, the argument is rather stale—as in the case of Chomsky, 
who has not revised his view that Washington “always” backed military dictators in 
Central America since he picked up the subject in the early 1980s.49 But more frequently, 
the argument is mentioned almost in a nonchalant tone, a matter of common knowledge. 
Accordingly, Max Paul Friedman, in an impeccably researched and innovative study on 
the 1940s, carelessly notes that “throughout Central America and the Caribbean”, during 
the 1930s, “U.S.-backed dictatorships [were] fully able to maintain order on their own”.50 
Most recently perhaps, Brian Loveman repeated the same line in his grand history of U.S. 
Latin American affairs: 
Some U.S. objectives could be achieved (…) by installing “elected” 
dictatorship, buttressed by the constabularies created during the American 
occupation regimes. Such governments could be substituted for direct U.S. 
administration. So eventually Rafael Trujillo came to power in the Dominican 
Republic, as did the Somoza dynasty in Nicaragua, among other American-
supported tyrants.51 
More recent works such as those of Schmitz and Roorda that employ what I will 
call, for convenience’s sake, a constructivist approach point the way forward. While 
Schmitz acknowledges the importance of Washington’s geopolitical concerns, his 
argument that American policymaker’s views of les developed nations determined the 
method whereby American interests would be protected in the Third World (that is, by 
                                                 
49 Any book by Chomsky that deals with U.S. foreign policy in some way will do, but consult 
chapter 3. 
50 Max Paul Friedman, Nazis and Good Neighbors. The United States campaign against the 
Germans of Latin America in World War II (Cambridge 2003) 74. 
51 Brian Loveman, No higher law. American foreign policy and the western Hemisphere since 
1776 (Chapel Hill 2010) 242. 
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supporting right wing dictatorships) improves our historical understanding of American 
actions in that region. However, Schmitz’ work should also be seen in its proper context. 
Writing in the late 1990s, Schmitz explicit objective was to counter the rosy picture of 
U.S. foreign policy put forward by post-Cold War Triumphalism. Thank God they’re on 
our side is practically the mirror image of Tony Smith’s America’s Mission: While Smith 
intends to uncover a pro-democratic tradition in American foreign policy, Schmitz 
counters by showing that that policy often depended on the collaboration of right-wing 
dictators.  
The fact that Roorda identifies—at minimum—some measure of discomfort with 
dictatorial allies among American diplomats is rather exceptional. As shown above, 
many Revisionist historians found Americans only too willing to work with the Latin 
dictators. Roorda convincingly substantiates his findings by grounding them in a 
sophisticated analysis of the cultural background of American diplomats (although this 
theme should not be overstressed: Roorda does not focus exclusively on the State 
Department. This theme has been singled out in this review because it fits in well with 
the rest of this text). However, Roorda’s conclusions should also be put into perspective. 
One gets the impression that Roorda studied diplomats who fitted his ideal type more 
closely than those who did not. Avra Warren, United States representative to the 
Dominican Republic from 1942 to 1944, cultivated a cordial relationship with Trujillo, but 
does not receive as much attention in Roorda’s book as those who were considerably 
less friendly to the dictator (Ellis O. Briggs and Spruille Braden, for example). Warren 
was not the only American diplomat to be captivated by the charms of a Latin American 
caudillo. James B. Stewart, American representative to Nicaragua from 1942 to 1945, 
was reportedly on such good terms with president Somoza that the dictator scathingly 
referred to him as “my steward”.52 Ambassadors such as Warren and Stewart must have 
been largely ignored when Roorda wrote that in 1945-1946 “Spruille Braden and Ellis O. 
Briggs tapped fifteen years of ethical discomfort [among State Department officials] as 
they denounced the wartime alliance with Latin America’s strongmen”.53 Since Roorda’s 
case study ends in 1945, he can present the short-lived post-war American attacks on 
Caribbean dictators as the climax of fifteen years of discomfort. This picture might have 
been different if his case study ended in 1950. 
 
The works of Schmitz and Roorda are the immediate predecessors of this study, even if 
it is less ambitious in its scope. The deconstruction of foreign policy as practiced by a 
unitary, rational state into foreign policies, as achieved by Roorda, inspired the domain 
of the current study. I have chosen to study American ambassadors and ministers who 
actually met and interacted with foreign dictators. Current research on the topic of 
American policy towards dictatorship mainly focuses on political crises and abstract 
rationalizations of policy-makers in Washington. I propose that this focus can lead to a 
distorted view of the overall diplomatic contact between the United States and its 
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53 Roorda, The dictator next door, 230. 
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authoritarian antagonists. By focusing on the situation “on the ground”, I hope to 
reconstruct the day-to-day interaction with foreign dictators that set the tone for potential 
crises or alliances and to analyze the information American ministers sent to Washington 
and which influenced the views of the policy-makers. I propose that this approach will 
establish more securely the complex, nuanced, and historically contextualized interaction 
between the American Foreign Service establishment and dictatorships in Central 
America.  
While it is by no means unusual to identify and study specific actors in the conduct 
of American foreign affairs, such works as there are tend to take a biographical approach, 
or to study the inherent logic and dynamics of an institute or group as a whole. Cultural 
or post-colonial studies such as Close encounters of Empire have generally left the fields 
of politics and foreign policy for what they are to focus instead on arts, advertising, and 
animal husbandry. Only Roorda has applied the approach to actors in what is 
traditionally known as the field of international relations. The current study will focus on a 
relatively large group of American chiefs of mission—the personal representatives of the 
American president in foreign countries. In all, some 26 individuals spread over three 
countries and a period of twenty years will form the nucleus and centerpiece of this study. 
Most of them were not famous diplomats. Most have only been mentioned in passing, if 
at all, in any work of history. Yet, they represent the rank-and-file of the American 
Foreign Service: not the flashy ambassadors who served on London or Paris and have 
received acknowledgement for their work, but the men who worked in dangerous, 
unhealthful, and thoroughly unglamorous cities. As far as I know, the current text is the 
most extensive study of the background, worldview, and work of American Foreign 
Service officers serving abroad. Whether their behavior can indeed be classified as 
“imperial”, as the title of Close encounters of empire would suggest, is a question which 
will, for now, be left for the concluding chapter. 
While the next chapter will expand on the protagonists of this study, a problem of 
definitions does present itself with the definition of the antagonists: What, exactly, 
constitutes a “dictatorship”. It is a question that few historians who have tackled the 
problem of U.S. relations with such “friendly tyrants” have asked themselves. Naturally, 
there are formal definitions. Any dictionary will provide a concise list of characteristics. 
Organizations such as Freedom House employ quantifiable checklists to be able to 
distinguish between “free” and “unfree” states. But, as always, these definitions have but 
limited use to the historian because they are determined by contemporary 
understandings of what constitutes a dictatorship. What we now consider to be 
dictatorships might not have been experienced as such some decades ago. This 
problem is only compounded if we assume that different cultures have different 
conceptions of dictatorship and democracy. Furthermore, one could distinguish between 
relatively benign dictatorships and truly evil ones.  
One could devote a book length philosophical, anthropological, or linguistic 
analysis on this problem of what defines a dictatorship and still not come up with a 
satisfactory answer. Besides, such exercises are entirely beyond the scope of this text. 
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The solution to this problem of definition employed here is a simple one. Since this is a 
work of history that presumes to engage and improve upon other works of history, it will 
simply assume—at least for the moment—that those leaders who have been identified 
as dictators by historians are valid subjects for this book. 
This does not mean that the question of whether historical actors experienced a 
government as dictatorial or not is irrelevant. Indeed, it is perhaps the single most 
important question to be answered. While the formulation of the question of how U.S. 
diplomats dealt with “dictatorships” in the American backyard allows me to engage other 
historians who have written on the subject in these terms, I will leave it up to the 
historical actors themselves to “tell” us how they defined the governments in question 
and what this meant for their relation to them. A close reading of the political 
correspondence from American embassies will help establish not only whether American 
diplomats felt that they were dealing with a dictatorship, but also whether they believed 
that such a form of government was somehow desirable or appropriate at that specific 
time and in that specific place. This is one point where the decision to study the “men-
on-the-spot” will yield immediate results. 
I scaled down the domain of this research project to American ambassadors and 
ministers in the “dictatorial” nations of Central America during the years 1933-1952. 
While it is possible to treat the choice for this particular region as if it stands apart from 
the choice for this particular timeframe, these two matters are in fact inseparable. For 
now, it will, I hope, suffice to point out that American thinking on democracy and 
dictatorship during the Cold War (which is the focus of the best part of research on this 
topic) took shape during the thirties and forties: years which, under the influence of 
events such as the Great Depression and the rise and fall of right-wing dictatorship in 
Europe, saw a “crisis in democratic theory” in the United States. During this period, Latin 
America was the only region with which the U.S. had extensive diplomatic contact. In this 
context, it is of great importance to this research project to observe that most Central 
American nations went through a period known as the “era of tyranny”. While so-called 
“caudillos” (political bosses) reigned during most of these years, the first signs of 
democratic and socialist opposition were also visible. These subjects, and especially the 
question of how they were experienced by American diplomats, will be elaborated upon 
in chapters to come. 
Its has not been easy to find the proper balance between the largest, and 
presumably most representative, group of diplomats on the one hand and the 
manageability of the research project on the other. The sheer size of the archives of 
American Foreign Service, not to mention personal papers, published interviews, and 
(unpublished) memoirs, made a careful selection of embassies to be studied very 
important. Eventually, that selection was brought back to the embassies in Guatemala, 
El Salvador, and Honduras. The fact that U.S. relations with these specific countries are 
a relatively neglected subject was only of secondary importance to the making of this 
selection. The most northern and most southern republics of what is sometimes 
understood to be Central America—Mexico and Panama respectively—are actually part 
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of what geographers call North and South America. More importantly, however, Mexico 
is such a large and important country and so close the United States that, in terms of 
U.S. foreign policy, it is in a class by itself. Indeed, Mexican affairs were handled by a 
specific group of experts and officers in the American State Department. Panama was in 
a similar position as regards U.S. policy. Not because of its size or influence, but 
because of the all-important Canal. This leaves, from north to south, Costa Rica, 
Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, the countries that make up Central 
America proper. From this group, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras were selected 
for study, because they share long land borders as well as political institutions and 
economies. Historically, these three countries reverted to “dictatorship” almost 
simultaneously around 1930, thus presenting similar problems to a discreet group of 
American diplomats. Nicaragua and Costa Rica, which for reasons of history and 
geography stand somewhat apart from the northern countries, will nonetheless figure 
quiet prominently in some parts of the next chapters—Nicaragua in particular. 
While the analysis of the 26 ambassadors mentioned will roughly follow a 
chronological pattern, Chapter 1 will set the stage with an analysis of the ministers and 
ambassadors who served in Central America over the course of 20 years. The chapter 
will take the form of a qualitative analysis of the Foreign Service officer in Central 
America. There is, of course a real danger that this section will overlap with the 
chronological chapters that follow. However, there are some broad questions that can be 
answered in this chapter which do not concern the policy toward Central American 
dictators and military leaders directly, but do present a context which will be important to 
be able to understand to chronological chapters. Some these questions are: How did 
these men define their jobs? What did they think they were doing in Central America? 
How did these they define Central American politics and society? Who did these men 
associate with locally? Where did they get their information about Central America? 
The chronological narrative starts with chapter 2, which goes back to the late 
1920s and early 1930s. The choice for this starting point was an easy one: during the 
timeframe mentioned, new “dictators” came to power in all of the Central American 
countries except Costa Rica. They were Jorge Ubico in Guatemala, Maximiliano 
Hernandez Martínez in El Salvador, Tiburcio Carías in Honduras, and Anastasio 
Somoza in Nicaragua. All these leaders shared a progress-oriented ideology; a cynical 
dedication to democratic form unparalleled in any other dictatorship in the world; an 
opportunistically pro-American foreign policy; and very long breath. This generation of 
leaders figures prominently in the historiography of U.S.-Central American relations, 
because they were the “first” friendly tyrants in Pipes and Garfinkles’ conception and the 
archetypical proxies of American imperialism in the Revisionist narrative. While the 
historiography has already been discussed in general terms, chapter 2 will explore 
specifically, the question as to whether the United States installed dictatorships in its 
backyard. 
Chapter 1 
 
THE ENVOYS 
American diplomats in Central America, 1930-1952 
 
~The Envoys ~ 
 
 
A diplomat is a good diplomat if he serves 
his country well. He serves his country well 
if he plays a part, however humble in 
carrying out his country’s policies. His 
country’s policies (…) should be directed 
towards serving his country’s best interests. 
His country’s best interests should include 
not only its own freedom, liberty, peace[,] 
well-being, power, strength, and prosperity, 
spiritual and material, but also the freedom, 
liberty, peace, well-being, power, strength 
and prosperity, spiritual and material, of 
the world at large. 
 
~ Jefferson Caffery, n.d. 1 
 
 
 
The word “diplomat” probably carries different connotations for different people. Some 
may believe that the diplomatic corps is an elitist club made up of the scions of old-line 
American families who – adorned in their striped pants and silk hats – mingle with the 
refined and governing classes of distant lands to engage in endless intrigues.  Others 
may think that the ambassador is just another dreary bureaucrat who spends his days 
with the painstaking editing of political and economic reports—his only distraction being 
the malaria mosquitoes that infest his tropical post. As far as the American diplomatic 
corps in Central America was concerned, both images have some truth to them. At these 
subtropical posts we do find the flashy striped-pants-diplomat, the dull administrator, and 
any manner of person in between.  
The next eight chapters will feature some twenty American ministers and 
ambassadors who worked in Central America between 1930 and 1950. Despite the 
many individual differences between these men, there are some important similarities in 
the backgrounds and worldviews of the Foreign Service officers who worked in Central 
American at a given time. It is therefore possible to distinguish three “generations”, if you 
will, of envoys in the twenty odd years discussed here. While not every one of these 
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twenty diplomatists fits into this generational mold comfortably, there are enough broad 
similarities within each generation to justify this attempt at generalization. Furthermore, 
subtle changes in the make-up of the Foreign Service in Central America, from one 
“generation” to the next, offer important clues as to how the character of American policy 
toward the region changed over time and why this was so. 
 
1. THE GENTLEMAN DIPLOMATS, 1930-1935 
The first generation of diplomats to be discussed here, managed the difficult transition, 
around 1930, from an interventionist American policy to a noninterventionist policy. 
Throughout the early twentieth century, Central American treaties which were backed up 
by U.S. support provided grounds for interference if not outright intervention in isthmian 
affairs. In 1923, the State Department brokered the so-called Treaty of Peace and Amity 
between the Central American states. The Treaty itself was supposed to be an 
improvement on a similar Treaty that dated to 1907 and had also received enthusiastic 
support from Washington. One of the most important objectives of the Treaty was to 
prevent coups and revolutions by denying would-be rebels the fruits of their victory: 
Article 2 of the Treaty stipulated that any government that came to power through 
unconstitutional means would be denied diplomatic recognition by the signatories of the 
Treaty. The threat of non-recognition alone was intended to deter any coup attempt from 
getting started. Even though Washington declined to be a signatory to the Treaty, the 
State Department did make it the backbone of its policy on the grounds that it was in 
concert with the region’s own desire for peace and stability. Commenting on the 
perceived importance of the Treaty, Secretary of State Stimson noted in 1932 that:  
There can be no doubt in the minds of any impartial observer[s] that the 
treaties of 1907 and 1923 have been beneficial to the people of Central 
America. In the years prior to the adoption of these treaties revolution within 
and triumphantly from without were almost the yearly portion of the countries 
of Central America. The great danger always was that revolution in one 
country would lead to armed intervention in support of one side or the other 
on the part of the neighboring countries and that as so frequently occurred, 
general war would ensue. As a result of the 1907 and 1923 Treaties 
revolutions have decreased and not a single case of a general Central 
American war has occurred since 1907. The positive gain for Central 
America in the way of progress toward stability and orderly Government has 
thus been indisputable.2 
Throughout the 1920s, however, Washington also started to distance itself from its 
old interventionist policy and to treat its Southern neighbors with more respect. Already 
in 1928, then president-elect Herbert Hoover promised to halt the deployment of U.S. 
troops to Latin America. It was not until 1936, however, that Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull made a definite promise to end all forms of intervention and interference, even if the 
lives of U.S. citizens were endangered.3 Between 1928 and 1936, the evolution of an 
                                                 
2 Henry Stimson (U.S. Secretary of State) to Sheldon Whitehouse (U.S. Minister to Guatemala), 
November 23, 1932, PR El Salvador, Vol. 116, cl. 710: Political Relations. Treaties. 
3 See chapter 4, pages 127-129 
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unconditional non-intervention policy made slow and sometimes halting progress. State 
Department instructions on the non-intervention issue to its diplomatic representatives in 
Central America were not always clear and could even be contradictory (especially when 
one considers that U.S. Marines occupied Nicaragua throughout the 1920s and early 
1930s).  
While the Hoover administration moved away from intervention in Latin America, 
the State Department’s fanatic support for the 1923 Treaty and Stimson’s insistence that 
the Treaty should be used as a deterrent to—rather than a punishment for—any 
unconstitutional seizure of power provided a justification for unlimited interference in the 
internal affairs of Central America. Much like the U.S. Marines, who had served as the 
guarantors of free and fair elections in Nicaragua in 1932, the Treaty of 1923 made the 
U.S. legations in the northern Central American republics the guarantors of free elections 
and the protectors of constitutional governments, even if they were expected to 
accomplish their tasks without the benefits of armed assistance.4 
 
Between 1929 and 1935 the American legations in the northern republics of Central 
America were led by Sheldon Whitehouse in Guatemala, Warren Delano Robbins in El 
Salvador, and Julius Garache Lay in Honduras. Lay served throughout the period, but in 
El Salvador, Robbins was replaced in 1931 by Charles Boyd Curtis who was himself 
effectively replaced by Jefferson Caffery in that same year. Matthew Hanna took over 
from Whitehouse in 1933 and remained in Guatemala until 1936. While this generation 
formed a link between the Hoover and Roosevelt administrations, it was in the first place 
a product of many years of Republican rule in the United States. Named the “generation 
of gentlemen” by reason of their aristocratic or upper middle class backgrounds, these 
men shared a unapologetic believe in the superiority of Anglo Saxon elites and in the 
benign effects of American rule over lesser peoples. 
All of these men were born in the 19th century, with Lay being the oldest (1872) 
and Caffery the youngest (1886). Though not exactly amateur diplomats—since they all 
made a career in foreign affairs—they had all joined the service before it became a 
professional civil service in 1924. Concurrently, they all shared some of the 
characteristics of that “old school” generation. As far as their life stories can be 
reconstructed, it is clear that Whitehouse, Robbins, and Caffery were all scions of 
aristocratic families while Lay, Curtis, and Hanna came from somewhat more modest, 
upper-middle class families. Like many diplomats from their generation, Robbins and 
Curtis were schooled at Groton and Harvard. Whitehouse went to the no less prestigious 
Eton—where, it was said later, he acquired his distinctive accent and urbane manners—
and later attended Yale. Caffery, Lay, and Hanna had to make do without Ivy League 
educations. Caffery, whose family came from Lafayette, attended Tulane University. 
                                                 
4 On 1923 Treaties: Leonard, Central America, 80-83. Leonard characterizes the Treaties as the 
“high water-mark of constitutionalism”. According to Leonard, the Department’s conviction that the 
earlier and similar 1907 Treaties had provided stability was naïf. Such calm as existed was rather 
caused by a convergence of interests between the Department, U.S. businesses in the region, 
and local elites. See also: Findling, Close neighbors, chapter 4. 
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Lay’s father was an army officer who was transferred regularly and thus provided his son 
with private tutors. Hanna was a military man himself and had graduated with honors 
from West Point in 1897.5 
Caffery seems to have been the only one who entered the Foreign Service after 
examination. Whitehouse, Lay, Robbins, and Curtis started their careers in diplomacy as 
the private secretaries of established diplomats. Lay got a position at the consulate in 
Ottawa in 1889 through his father, who had been appointed consul-general there thanks 
to the intervention of Republican vice-president Levi Morton.6 Whitehouse, Curtis and 
Robbins became private secretaries of the ambassadors in London, St. Petersburg, and 
Lisbon respectively. All their mentors were political appointees of the Roosevelt and Taft 
administrations. Whitehouse doubtlessly obtained the most desirable position as the 
protégé of one-time Republican vice-presidential candidate Whitelaw Reid at the Court 
of St. James, the most prestigious of all American embassies. It was not unusual at the 
time that young men from wealthy families chose to join the diplomatic service. The 
excitement of travel and the idea of serving the country appeared more attractive than 
tending the family fortune. Family networks could be applied to obtain a secretarial 
position at some prestigious foreign post, so that their social lives need not suffer. For 
many, this would just be a temporary adventure, a great opportunity mingle with foreign 
dignitaries for a year or so. As Caffery later remembered, he joined the service “for the 
lard”.7 
As for Hanna, he joined the Service after a 26 year military career. After his 
graduation, Hanna was assigned to Cuba, where he served as an aide to American 
military governor Leonard Wood, who is probably best known for co-founding the 1st 
Volunteer Cavalry regiment, popularly known as the “Rough Riders”. Among other things, 
Hanna had the important task of reforming Cuba’s educational system in his function of 
Commissioner of Public Schools of Cuba from 1900 to 1902. After Cuba, Hanna 
continued to serve General Wood—who may have considered him a protégé—in several 
other capacities, but in February 1917 he made a career change: becoming an assistant 
at the American embassy in Mexico City. From that time on, Hanna’s career was on the 
fast track: He became minister in Managua after just 12 years in the Foreign Service (the 
average “career official” served at least 15 years before he was first considered for such 
a post).  
                                                 
5 On Whitehouse, see: Register (1933) 278; “Sheldon Whitehouse dies at 82; Career diplomat for 
26 years”, NYT (August 7, 1965) 21. On Curtis, see Register (1933) 151. On Robbins, see: 
Register (1935) 284; “Warren D. Robbins dies of pneumonia”, NYT (April 8, 1935) 19; “Robbins 
dead; N.Y. rites set for U.S. envoy”, TWP (April 8, 1935) 1. On Lay, see: Register (1934) 204; 
“Ex-Envoy J.G. Lay, Long in Service”, NYT (August 29, 1939) 20; “Julius G. Lay Dies at 67 in 
Massachusetts”, TWP (August 29, 1939) 21. On Caffery, see: Register (1950) 74; “Jefferson 
Caffery, Dean of Diplomatic Service, dies”, NYT (April 14, 1974) 48; “Envoy Jefferson Caffery 
dies”, TWP (April 17, 1974) D8. 
6 Henry E. Mattox, The Twilight of Amateur diplomacy: The American Foreign Service and its 
Senior Officers in the 1890s (Kent et al. 1989) 29-31. 
7 Robert D. Schultzinger, The making of Diplomatic Mind: the training, outlook, and style of United 
States Foreign Service officers, 1908-1931 (Middletown 1975); Caffery, “Adventures”, Caffery 
Papers, Box 69. 
THE ENVOYS 
 
 
31 
Why Hanna joined the Foreign Service and climbed the ranks so fast cannot be 
ascertained. His international experience in the army probably prepared him for such 
work (he appears to have been “glib” in Spanish and he had practiced his administrative 
skills as Commissioner of Public Schools in Cuba). But the clue to his successes in the 
service was, according to a State Department memorandum, “his intimacy with Henry 
Fletcher”. Henry Prather Fletcher was a prominent Republican (he would be Chairman of 
the Republican National Commission from 1934 to 1936). It is definitely plausible that he 
had a hand in Hanna’s promotions and he may even have been the one who invited 
Hanna to join the service. Hanna’s first assignment to Mexico coincides with Fletcher’s 
appointment as ambassador to that country. Also, Fletcher was under-secretary of state 
(the second-ranking official at the Department) when Hanna was called to Washington to 
serve as Chief of Mexican Affairs. Hanna’s only appointment to Europe in 1924 occurred 
while Fletcher was serving his country as ambassador to Belgium, Luxembourg, and 
Italy respectively. Hanna’s “personal intimacy” with Fletcher is probably due to his former 
acquaintance with General Wood. Wood himself had become a notable Republican – he 
was a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination in 1920, but lost out to 
Warren G. Harding. Wood’s friendship to Fletcher probably dates back further, however: 
they were both former “rough riders”.8 
 
Some evidence has survived of the fascinating lives these six men lived in the early 
twentieth century Foreign Service. Caffery, for example, wrote a lively, unpublished 
memoir of his diplomatic career that reveals little about American foreign policy, but does 
describe the “season” at the Swedish royal court; hunting expeditions with the Persian 
Shah; and the fine horses of a French prince, which he would take out for rides through 
the Bois de Bologne, together with Sheldon Whitehouse. The latter’s early experience in 
the Foreign Service is recounted in The New York Times: the social pages. He traveled 
Europe and indulged in New York’s social life; spending many a summer in Newport, 
attending society events, and joining elite Gentlemen’s clubs such as the Racquet and 
Tennis Club, the Huguenot Society, and the Sons of the Revolution. Matthew Hanna, 
probably from a less aristocratic family than Whitehouse, was introduced to European 
high society through the Foreign Service and eventually married a German baroness.9  
The fascination of American diplomats with European culture and high society 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century is well documented.10 American 
                                                 
8  Register (1935) 182-183; “Seven career men named as envoys”, NYT (December 6, 1929) 15; 
“Matthew E. Hanna, diplomat, is dead”, NYT (February 20, 1936) 20; “The Hoover week”, TM 
(Monday, December 16, 1929); Unmarked files (Long to Hull, February, 1933), New Mexico State 
Records Center and Archives, Santa Fe, New Mexico, Collection 1972-003: Elisha V. and Boaz 
W. Long Papers, Box 44, folder 109: Analysis of incumbents in Diplomatic Service, 1933. 
9 Caffery, “Adventures”, Caffery Papers, Box 69; “Matthew E. Hanna marries a Baroness”, NYT 
(April 29, 1925) 21. For a small sample of Whitehouse’s appearances on the social pages, see 
page 29, footnote 18, below. 
10 Wiel, A Pretty Good Club, especially 24-45; Schultzinger, The Diplomatic Mind, especially 3-11; 
Kenneth Paul Jones ed., U.S. Diplomats in Europe, 1919-1941 (Oxford and Santa Barbara 1981) 
passim. 
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diplomatic customs, protocol, and dress were modeled on those of Europe and American 
diplomats were fascinated by the social prestige and cosmopolitan elegance of their 
European colleagues.11 European courts and European high society were the favorite 
playing grounds of young diplomats like Whitehouse, Caffery, or Hanna. And while the 
American corps was acutely aware of the ideological distance between themselves and 
the European aristocracy—convinced as they were that the policies they represented 
were inspired by a democratic spirit12—in social terms the European elite was its point of 
reference. Historian Martin Wiel, for example, recounts the fascinating experience of one 
Arthur Bliss Lane who was a Foreign Service officer at the Polish court in the 1920s. 
Lane’s experiences are especially interesting because he shared his background and 
worldview with the six men discussed here; joined the service around the same time and 
for similar reasons; and was appointed to Central America, Nicaragua in his case, in the 
early thirties. American Foreign Service officers of the time, Wiel writes: 
…by choice and by temperament became honorary members of the Polish 
aristocracy. Lane, in particular, judged Warsaw as he judged [his native] New 
York—by the elegance and lavishness of the entertainments enjoyed by the 
idle rich.13 
The firm class distinctions of Europe appeared entirely natural to these men—just as it 
was natural that they should be part of its upper crust. 
All this is not to say that these young diplomatists did not have to work. They 
worked very hard and social functions were part of their job—sometimes a rather 
demanding part. It so happened, however, that the six men discussed here liked the 
service, whether it was despite or due to all the social obligations, and dedicated their 
lives to it. As these things go, they all slowly climbed the ranks during the early part of 
the 20th century, each of them serving as consul or secretary in several European and 
Latin American posts before they were given command of one of their own. By the late 
1920s and early 1930s, all six were apparently considered experienced enough to be 
promoted to the rank of minister. Interestingly, all six of them served their first tour as 
chief of mission in Central America and the Caribbean: For Caffery it was Salvador in 
1926; for Curtis the Dominican Republic in 1930; for Lay Honduras in 1930; for Robbins 
El Salvador in 1929; for Hanna it was Nicaragua in 1929; and for Whitehouse Guatemala 
in 1930.  
It is tempting, therefore, to conclude that the State Department wanted to test its 
young ministers in these backwater posts before sending them to more important posts. 
In fact, during the late 1920s many Foreign Service officers still looked upon Latin 
American tours as a demotion or as punishment duty. Hoover’s Under-Secretary for 
Latin American Affairs Francis White (born in Baltimore; patrician family; Yale graduate) 
was determined to change this mentality. In the context of a broader push to improve 
                                                 
11  David Paull Nickles, “US Diplomatic Etiquette during the Nineteenth Century”, in: Markus 
Mösslang and Torsten Riotte eds., The Diplomats’ World. A Cultural History of Diplomacy, 1815-
1914 (Oxford et al. 2008) there 287-316. 
12 Nickles, “Diplomatic etiquette” and Schultzinger The Diplomatic Mind, especially 6-7. 
13 Wiel, A pretty good club, 24-26. 
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U.S.-Latin American relations, White made sure that experienced career men were 
appointed to the Latin posts. Publicly at least, both Lay and Curtis were presented as the 
“bright young men” of the State Department when they were sent to Latin America.14 For 
the new chiefs themselves, while their new posts represented a promotion, life there was 
not always easy and it is safe to assume that most of them did their best to prove 
themselves and be transferred to more desirable posts. This sentiment is implicit, at 
least, in a letter from Matthew Hanna, then U.S. minister to Nicaragua, to Whitehouse: 
wishing Whitehouse a good vacation, Hanna noted that: “if something better comes your 
way and you do not return, I will rejoice with you”.15  
These men had led active social lives at the major metropolises of Europe, South 
America, and the United States so their transfer to cities like Tegucigalpa presented a 
significant change of pace. In a letter to Whitehouse, Lay complained that "as you can 
imagine there is no life in this place [Tegucigalpa], no congenial people…”. He asked 
Whitehouse if any of the European or Mexican diplomatic representatives in Guatemala 
would visit the inauguration of the new Honduran president so he could throw them a 
“stag diner” and have some “congenial people” to talk to.16 As for Whitehouse himself, 
Time magazine aptly described his promotion from counselor of embassy in Madrid to 
minister in Guatemala City as “a step up professionally, down socially”. 17  The only 
comfort was that Guatemala City was relatively close to Whitehouse’s native Newport, 
NY, where the Minister owned a mansion “with castle like turrets and surrounded by a 
high wall” where he would entertain up to 50 diner guests at a time during the summers 
of his three year tenure in Guatemala.18  Likewise, Robbins was named the “social 
mentor” (later Chief of Protocol) of the Hoover administration during his tour to Salvador. 
He regularly left the legation in the care of his chargé for extended periods, while he 
returned to Washington “for the season”.19 
 
An appreciation of the social backgrounds and diplomatic style of this generation of 
gentleman diplomats is vital for a thorough understanding of their encounter with Central 
America. These factors naturally influenced their views on the local social structure and 
how they thought they fit into it or at least how they positioned themselves in relation to it.  
It is extremely difficult to reconstruct a complete picture of the ministers’ social and 
professional network in Central America, since they did not leave any personal papers 
                                                 
14 Irwin F. Gellman, Good Neighbor diplomacy: United States policies in Latin America, 1933-
1945 (Baltimore and London 1979) 3-4; “The Presidency: The Hoover Week”, TM (December 16, 
1929). 
15 Matthew Hanna (U.S. Minister to Nicaragua) to Whitehouse, June 1, 1932, PR Guatemala, Vol. 
286, cl. 800: Nicaragua. 
16 Julius G. Lay (U.S. Minister to Honduras) to Whitehouse, January 13, 1933, PR Guatemala, 
Vol. 295, cl. 800: Honduras. 
17 “The Presidency: Practical idea”, TM (November 18, 1929). 
18 “Sheldon Whitehouse dies at 82; Career Diplomat for 26 years”, NYT (August 7, 1965) 21; 
“Dudley P. Gilberts are Newport Hosts”, NYT (August 25, 1931) 18; “Notes of Social Activities in 
New York and Elsewhere”, NYT (July 25, 1932) 12; “Republican Chiefs Feted in Newport”, NYT 
(September 11, 1932) 29; “Newport Greets President’s Wife”, NYT (September 2, 1933) 15. 
19 “Robbins dead; N.Y. rites set for U.S. envoy”, TWP (April 8, 1935) 1. 
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and diplomatic correspondence regularly omits the names of contacts and informants 
(probably for reasons of discretion and security, since the political reports were sent to 
Washington by airmail in plain text). Such information as there is does suggest, however, 
that as far as their political reporting was concerned, the U.S. ministers relied on a fairly 
small circle of acquaintances and contacts. 20  First of all, legation reports regularly 
mention conversations with “prominent American businessmen” as a source of 
information. And whenever the ministers discussed political matters with Central 
Americans, those tended to be their social or professional equals. The members of the 
government and military elite largely originated from the small local aristocracy and 
these were the people that U.S. diplomats met on an almost daily basis. The minister 
regularly mentioned the “better elements” or the local “society” in their reports and 
invariably sympathized with them. 
When it comes to the diplomatic style of this generation of ministers, the outside 
world, at least, regarded them as the “striped pants” variant of diplomatist. The six 
discussed here certainly belonged to that group. These were distinguished gentlemen of 
the old school. Coming mostly from socially high-standing families and having mostly 
attended prestigious private schools and universities, these were men who were very 
much aware of their social eminence. They were accustomed to seek out their social 
peers and deal with diplomatic problems “forcefully” and “effectively”: by direct 
negotiations with the people who mattered. As a legation secretary of Caffery later 
recalled: 
He [Caffery] realized that in any given community, (…) in any government, 
there are only a relatively small number of really powerful people; people 
who really call the signals and call the tunes. He always managed to 
establish a very, very close working relationship with such centers of power. 
That was his style. And when he wanted something done, when he wanted 
to persuade the government to go this way or that way, he would go quietly 
and talk it over with these people, whose respect he had already gained, and 
then he would persuade them. And more often than not, that government 
acted in a way that we considered constructive and responsible.21 
During the early 1930s many American officers combined a low opinion of the 
majority of Central Americans with a patronizing attitude toward what was believed to be 
an “intelligent” minority. Among the “drunks”, “hot-heads”, “criminals”, “riff-raff”, “cut-
throats”, communists, volatile banana-field laborers, and grafting politicians there were 
also those vaguely referred to as “the people”, “the intelligent voter”, or “the better 
element”. According to the American legations, this “better element” desired peace in the 
country’s national and international affairs, appreciated the importance of foreign capital 
and foreign political guidance, and abhorred radicalism. References to this vaguely 
                                                 
20 For example: Personal Memorandum for the Minister, November 19, 1928, PR El Salvador, Vol. 
106, cl. 844. A list of informers deemed reliable by the legation. Mainly businessmen, landowners, 
and foreigners. 
21 “Interview with Robert Corrigan January 21, 1988”, Frontline Diplomacy: The Foreign Affairs 
Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, CD-Rom: 
Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, the Netherlands (henceforth: ADST). Also see: Gellman, 
Good Neighbor diplomacy, 16. 
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progressive, though unidentified, constituency in Honduras, for example, were often 
used in the political reports: The legation believed, for example, that “the better people of 
both [political] parties” in Honduras wanted to live at peace with their neighbor 
Guatemala. Contrasting several radical, anti-American candidates for the congressional 
elections of 1930 to two more conservative and capable men, Lay insisted that “[b]oth 
these [latter] candidates have the respect of the intelligent voters of the capital and the 
general feeling here is that, if there is really a free election, they will be elected”. Lay also 
believed that “the people realize that if it were not for American capital to develop the 
banana industry, Honduras would become a wilderness". On the subject of foreign 
intervention, the Minister noted that “Hondurans on the North coast have the most 
pleasant and friendly recollections of the visits of our Marines to this country, especially 
in 1924”.22 
The relationship with the Central American elite was not unambiguous however. In 
many ways, the elitist outlook of American diplomats and of the Central American 
aristocracy seemed perfectly compatible: both admired the ways of European high 
society and were keen on imitating its outer forms and both were comfortable with the 
idea of elite rule. The Salvadoran and Guatemalan coffee barons and the Honduran 
rangers and plantation owners who constituted the local social and economic elites 
frequented golf clubs and joined European style gentlemen’s clubs; they followed Old 
World fashion and lived in French or Italian style mansions; they sent their children to 
European and American schools; a light skin and Spanish aristocratic heritage were 
highly prized. American diplomats socialized with the native elite at local country clubs 
like they would in any European capital. They also agreed with the aristocracy that it was 
entirely appropriate that they should have the land that the Indian masses were too 
indulgent to cultivate.23 Yet, an undertone of patronizing contemptuousness marked the 
American attitude toward the Central American ruling elite.   
Hidden away somewhat in the State Department “Lot Files” is a concise report on 
Salvadoran society and politics by Cornelius van H. Engert, who was a first secretary of 
legation in that country from 1925 to 1926.24 Somewhat of a rarity among the diplomatic 
                                                 
22 Lawrence Higgins (U.S. Chargé d’Affaires to Honduras) to Whitehouse, June 4, 1932, PR 
Honduras, Vol. 188, cl. 800: Honduras, January to June; Lay to the Secretary of State, Despatch 
102, November 2, 1930, PR Honduras, Vol. 170, cl. 800: Political Conditions; Lay to the 
Secretary of State, Despatch 399, February 4, 1932, PR Honduras, Vol. 187, cl. 800: 
Communism; Lay to the Secretary of State, Despatch 597, August 17, 1932, PR Honduras, Vol. 
188, cl. 800: Honduras, January to June; Lay to Thomas C. Wasson (U.S. Vice Consul to Puerto 
Cortes, Honduras), March 11, 1932, PR Honduras, Vol. 188, cl. 800: Honduras, January to June. 
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The Heritage of the Conquistadors. Ruling Classes in Central America from the Conquest to the 
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archives of the time, it offers a complete and integral study of Central American society 
by a U.S. diplomat and provides the clue to understanding the American position toward 
the local ruling classes. Engert rightly observes that the ideology of the local elite was 
strongly based on the concept of racial superiority over the Indian. While the secretary 
did not have a problem with that ideology as such, he did dispute that the Salvadoran 
elite’s claim to whiteness and European heritage put it on the same level as the 
American elite: No matter how “white” the local aristocrat might be he was not an Anglo-
Saxon. While the Spanish colonist, much like the American frontiersman, prided himself 
on his toughness and independence and considered it entirely natural that he should 
claim the land that the native Indian had never bothered to develop, the North American 
would not recognize this accomplishments. Rather than a southern version of the North 
American “self-made man”, Engert asserts that the “presence of [a] large Indian 
population” had the effect of lowering the standards of the ruling classes “by enabling 
them to live upon the toil of inferiors without doing any work themselves”. Combined with 
the racial intermingling with Indians, this lack of honest physical labor over time led to a 
degeneration of the upper classes, which “lost much of their energy and 
resourcefulness”. 
It is striking that while Engert’s analysis of the Mestizo and Indian classes is largely 
an abstract treatise, couched in what was at the time regarded as scientific language25, 
his reflections on the upper class seem very personal and are particularly venomous. 
Being the only class with which the secretary had any personal contact, he was clearly 
unable to dress a profound culture shock in neat, academic generalities. And so, Engert 
devotes six of fourteen pages of the introduction of his report on a diatribe against the 
Salvadoran aristocracy, which is laced with unfavorable comparisons to alleged Anglo-
Saxon traits and customs: 
From their Spanish ancestors, the upper classes have inherited vivacity of 
intellect, courage, and courtesy. Unfortunately, however, their intellect is apt 
to take the form of superficial cleverness rather than wisdom, common sense, 
or foresight; their courage becomes visionary audacity which causes them to 
attempt much more than they can accomplish and to start things they cannot 
possibly finish; while their courtesy loses itself in a maze of polite but artificial 
formalities and ceremonies, and they are often ignorant of the simplest rules 
of good breeding (…)  
The Spaniards were too impulsive, emotional, and excitable to hold 
deep convictions or to be sincerely attached to a cause or an ideal. Hence 
the lack of definiteness of aim, an absence of a sense of responsibility, and a 
                                                 
25 Such is evident, for example, in Engert’s attention for history and geography, which betray 
some erudition on these subjects. More striking to the modern reader would be his references to 
physical anthropology or so-called craniometry. He observed, for instance that the eyes of the 
Indian had a “Mongoloid tilt” and that the shape of their heads was “brachycephalic” (i.e. round 
and flat, as opposed to the allegedly long and thin skulls of the Caucasian races). Engert 
associated such features with impaired mental faculties. In all fairness, however, it must be noted 
that such observations were balanced with more realistic—though no less paternalistic—
reflections on the social-economic circumstances of the Indians: “no sincere effort was ever made 
to raise them economically or educationally and to offer them opportunities for improvement”. 
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disposition to shirk drudgery. A momentary enthusiasm is easily aroused but 
is as quickly followed by disillusionment at the sight of the first obstacles.  
This naïve impressionability is probably also responsible for their love 
of sonorous phrases. Eloquence comes so easy to them as to be almost a 
nuisance. Impassionate oratory and theatrical pathos seem to take the place 
of sound reasoning and calm reflection. And as one listens to their 
speeches—full of classical quotations, circumlocutions, and repetitions—one 
cannot help but feel that they talk faster than they think (…) 
Another characteristic is love of display. Their extravagance at feasts 
and festivals contrasts oddly with the parsimony of their daily life. Showiness, 
rather than thoroughness, seems to be the aim (…) The same is true of their 
somewhat overrated hospitality. The joys of simple and unostentatious 
entertaining are unknown to them. Every party must be either a fiesta or a 
banquete. 
Engert reserved similar contempt for the upper middle cases of politicians, military 
officers, and administrators, which were even less Anglo-Saxon then the landowners. 
This class, which tended to the practical affairs that the aristocracy could not be 
bothered with, was mainly Mestizo or Ladino, a “mongrel” race of Spanish and Indian 
ancestry. In fact, Engert seems to have preferred the Indian of “pure blood” whose 
biggest fault was the lack of thrift, but, being a “natural” race, had no serious defects. 
The Ladinos, by contrast, were “more cowardly, less honest, lazier, and more sensuous 
than the pure Indian” and were prone to heavy drinking and gambling. However, since 
the locals shared a “curious” tolerance of interbreeding, Engert observed that the 
Mestizo would eventually dominate Central America and comforted himself with the 
thought that, although they “lose some mental and moral qualities of the superior race”, 
they are at least “a step ahead of the Indian”. The improvement that Engert recognized 
was not so much in what he might have called the “moral” realm, as he rather 
appreciated the alleged docility of the Indian, but rather in the Mestizo’s inheritance of 
some of the white man’s ambition and foresight. Thus, “the Mestizo realizes that he can 
rise from the masses by his own efforts and thus makes him more purposeful and intent 
on accomplishment”. These inbred characteristics had created a middle class of Mestizo 
clerks, teachers, professionals, politicians, and soldiers: Professions that were frowned 
upon by the white upper classes but were mentally excessively demanding for the 
Indians. That such an overlap of racial and social hierarchy should be desirable, can be 
concluded from Engert’s assertion that the Mestizos “form a useful link between the 
‘aristocrats’ and the peons, who therefore understand each other much better than the 
same elements in neighboring countries were the middle class is not so large”. 
The sentiments expressed by Engert explain the American diplomatic corps’ 
attitude toward the “White” coffee barons and “Ladino” political rulers: the American 
minister mingled with them at social occasions and accepted as natural their rule of the 
Indian masses, but at the same time, he was superior to them. The minister took his 
place among the ruling classes of Central American as he would in any European capital, 
but he did not consider himself part of that group. Thus, men like Whitehouse and Lay 
adopted a patronizing attitude towards the affairs of Central America such as they would 
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not adopt towards the affairs of Europe. They easily assumed that they had to lead the 
local leadership. 
Taking some steps down on the social ladder, American ministers understood the 
local Indian populations to be essentially peaceful, if not passive, people. They lacked 
the mental capacities to comprehend political ideas or ideologies and concurrently, were 
not dissatisfied with their lack of political influence. If only enough land or food was 
available for the masses to survive, they would endure the basically feudal system under 
which they had toiled for many generations. Thus, according to Whitehouse, 
Guatemalans were a “very submissive people who are not easily incited to revolt”. 
Apparently lacking its own political agency, the people would need “strong men” to lead 
an uprising and, happily, such men did not currently exist in Guatemala. In El Salvador, 
legation officials agreed that the so-called mozo (Indian peasant) did not desire change. 
While a measure of social unrest was always evident, it was not serious. The legation 
considered that work was always obtainable in industrious, intensely cultivated Salvador. 
And even those who could not find work should be able to live off the land. Minister 
Robbins reported in 1931 that: 
Unemployment has this characteristic in Salvador, namely, that nobody need 
go hungry for it is easily possible to live on the country without money. 
Furthermore, there is no excuse for much unemployment here. One of the 
leading coffee-growers, Mr. James Hill, has informed me that he now 
requires 200 additional hands on his properties and is unable to obtain them. 
Thus, unemployment, hunger, and poverty were caused, according to Robbins and 
others, by “a want of desire to work”, and not by any social inequalities or economic 
problems.26 
Only Lay and the Honduran legation were somewhat more pessimistic about the 
essentially peaceful nature of the local masses of peasants. In fact, Hondurans, who 
were poorer, less obviously Hispanic, and more obviously Indian than people in the 
neighboring republics, were considered especially backward, hot-headed, prone to 
heavy drinking, and intellectually impaired: “[T]hey are naturally very credulous, having 
little critical faculty in their mental composition. When something is told them, they do not 
stop to ask themselves if it is plausible, reasonable or consistent with facts known to 
them, but as a rule accept the story in its entirety until denied or refuted". Hondurans 
were therefore easily excited, not because there was any reason to be, but because they 
lacked the ability for sober reflection. For example, first secretary Higgins more than 
once complained that Hondurans were led into a patriotic frenzy against Guatemala, 
because of wild and unfounded rumors about president’s Ubico’s designs for Central 
American domination: “These allegations, fomented by the press and falling on the fertile 
                                                 
26  William McCafferty (U.S. Chargé d’Affaires a.i. to Guatemala) to the Secretary of State, 
Despatch 218, November 13, 1930 (M1280, Roll 1, #1020); W.W. Scott (U.S. Chargé d’Affaires 
a.i. to El Salvador) to the Secretary of State, Despatch 236, March 22, 1930, PR El Salvador, Vol. 
104, cl. 800: Bolshevism; Harold D. Finley (U.S. Chargé d’Affaires a.i. to El Salvador) to the 
Secretary of State, Despatch 490, May 2, 1931, PR El Salvador, Vol. 111, cl. 800: Guatemala; 
Warren D. Robbins (U.S. Minister to El Salvador) to the Secretary of State, Despatch 468, March 
21, 1931, PR El Salvador, Vol. 112, cl. 800.B: Bolshevism. 
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soil of the medieval mind of the Hondurans, so prone to distrust and hatred of the 
foreigner, particularly when he is a neighbor and hereditary enemy, are on everyone’s 
tongue and sincerely believed by many”.27 
Lay himself believed that the Honduran Indian was a “very low type of Indian” and 
the attribute that was invariably ascribed to them was vindictiveness. When this trait was 
combined with easily available liquor, a dangerous situation developed: “The average 
Honduran”, noted vice-consul Stewart, “is fairly good-natured until he gets drunk and 
then he sometimes runs wild and resents any real or fancied insult with revolver or 
machete”. Whenever the American fruit companies had to lay off large groups of workers, 
they preferred to fire the Jamaican Negro laborers, because they were supposedly more 
peaceful and less prone to drinking than their Honduran counterparts. The legation 
agreed that this was a good way to prevent disturbances.28 
During the early Depression years, however, it was inevitable that the Indian 
masses would be touched by the economic letdown and this worried the American 
legations. Whitehouse feared that hunger and unemployment would cause Guatemalans 
to “join any movement which may promise to improve their condition”. In fact, it seems 
likely that Whitehouse did not just have “any” movement in mind, but the recently 
founded Partido Cooperatista. This party, Whitehouse claimed, was mainly made up of 
the “younger elements” of existing parties who objected to the current government’s 
inefficiency. While the Party’s appeals to the laboring and agrarian classes were voiced 
in “high sounding phrases”, the Minister seemed to agree with “many people” who 
believed that its proclamations were “nothing more than an effort to encourage 
radicalism and communism”.29 
It is this last issue that Whitehouse mentioned that worried him and his colleagues: 
not that the Indian masses would become a political force in themselves—as they were 
peaceful and did not desire change anyway—but that devious elements among the 
Mestizos or Creoles would take advantage of the Indians’ unemployment and general 
credulity. Due to the Depression many Honduran peasants and plantation workers, for 
example, faced the prospect of losing their land or their jobs. The American legation 
feared that large groups of Hondurans who had nothing to loose were prone to pillaging 
and burning, especially when opportunistic politicians or other “professional 
troublemakers” incited them. Such was the pretext for many “revolutions” in Honduras, 
                                                 
27 Higgins to the Secretary of State, Despatch 504, June 10, 1932, PR Honduras, Vol. 188, cl. 
800: Honduras, January to June; Higgins to the Secretary of State, Despatch 535, June 28, 1932, 
PR Honduras, Vol. 192, cl. 891: Public Press. 
28 Lay to the Secretary of State, Despatch 731, March 3, 1933, PR Honduras (SCF), Vol. 218; 
Higgins to the Department of State, Despatch 332, November 11, 1931, PR Honduras (SCF), Vol. 
216; Lay to the Department of State, Despatch 704, January 27, 1933, PR Honduras, Vol. 195, cl. 
715: Honduras-Guatemala; Warren C. Stewart (U.S. Vice Consul to Ceiba, Honduras) to Higgins, 
November 26, 1930, PR Honduras, Vol 172, cl. 850.4: Labor Strikes; Thomas C. Wasson (U.S. 
Vice Consul to Puerto Cortes, Honduras) to Lay, November 17, 1930, PR Honduras, Vol 172, cl. 
850.4: Labor Strikes; T. Monroe Fisher (U.S. Vice Consul to Tela, Honduras) to Lay, November 
20, 1930, PR Honduras, Vol 172, cl. 850.4: Labor Strikes; Lay to the Secretary of State, Despatch 
141, November 21, 1930, PR Honduras, Vol 172, cl. 850.4: Labor Strikes. 
29 McCafferty to the Secretary of State, November 13, 1930 (M1280, Roll 1, #1020).  
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the Americans believed. In a typical example, Lay warned the North Coast consulates in 
the autumn of 1930 that “this Legation is informed that unemployment on the North 
Coast during the past few months has greatly increased and that many desperate men 
out of work have recently been responsible for murders and outrages”.30 
In El Salvador, the mozos’ natural incapacity to grasp political concepts or even to 
form any kind of public opinion, the lack of unemployment and absence of any “need” to 
go hungry, implied that Salvador’s backward society was naturally insulated against 
modern political radicalism. While the existence of communism in El Salvador was 
acknowledged and taken seriously by the legation, there is no evidence that it was 
considered a force capable of effecting any social or political change as it had been in 
Mexico some years previous. Instead, it was communism’s potential for disorder, murder, 
rape, pillage, and destruction that was feared. However, communism was containable as 
it could only flourish when artificially implanted and cultivated by foreign agitators. As 
long as responsible army and police officers were willing to take “prompt and decisive 
action” against foreign elements, communism would not spread since the mozos were 
“not of the character to embrace Communism whole-heartedly”.31 
The fear for “Communism”, or any other kind of “radicalism”, at the American 
legations at this particular time should not be confused, therefore, with that which 
developed during the Cold War. communism was not defined, for example, as a global 
conspiracy directed by Moscow. Terms like “fifth column movement”, “totalitarian threat”, 
or “monolithic organization” had not entered the vocabulary yet. communist agitators 
were mainly described as opportunists whose only incentive was to still their thirst for 
blood. Hence, isolated “communistic” uprisings were not understood to be a direct 
political threat in the sense that their objectives were to overthrow the government and 
install a Bolshevik dictatorship. The objective was to “pillage and burn”. However, the 
unrest and financial drain accompanying a communist uprising could pose a significant 
threat to political stability.32 
Since any unrest among the campasinos was thought to have been caused by a 
discreet and limited group of (foreign) agitators, it could be controlled fairly easily. 
                                                 
30 Lay to the U.S. Consulates on the Honduran North Coast, November 13, 1930, PR Honduras, 
PR Honduras, Vol 172, cl. 850.4: Labor Strikes; Lay to the Secretary of State, Despatch 286, 
September 10, 1931, PR Honduras, Vol 179, cl. 800: Honduras (Continued); Stewart to Lay, 
October 20, 1930, PR Honduras, Vol. 170, cl. 800: Political Conditions; Higgins to the Secretary 
of State, Telegram 125, December 19, 1930, PR Honduras, Vol. 170, cl. 800: Political Conditions; 
Stewart to Lay, April 8, 1931, PR Honduras, Vol. 178, cl. 800:Honduras (Telegrams); Lay to the 
Secretary of State, Telegram 63, April 19, 1931, PR Honduras, Vol. 178, cl. 800: Honduras 
(Telegrams). 
31 Scott to the Secretary of State, Despatch 236, March 22, 1930, PR El Salvador, Vol. 104, cl. 
800: Bolshevism; Scott to the Secretary of State, Despatch 319, August 1, 1930, PR El Salvador, 
Vol. 104, cl. 800: Bolshevism. 
32 Local elites seem to have had a very similar understanding of what communism was: Héctor 
Lindo Fuentes et al., Remembering a massacre in El Salvador: The insurrection of 1932, Roque 
Dalton, and the politics of historical memory (Albuquerque 2007) 46, argues that Salvadoran 
elites in the 1930s did not have a well-developed idea of what communism was and used the 
term “communist” according “to the parlance of the day, when the word meant someone who was 
violent, immoral, against the law, contrary to the nation state, or lacking in Christianity”.  
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Government repression of strikes or other stirrings was deemed appropriate by the 
American legations. What was needed was “firm” or “purposeful” action by the 
government, untainted by “opportunistic” attempts to woo the labor vote. An interesting 
sidelight on this notion is that American officers often conceptualized a “firm” stand on 
labor in gender terms. Thus, former president Paz Barahona of Honduras, despite his 
democratic credentials, was considered an “old woman” in this regard. A local 
comandante on the North Coast of that same country who had wavered in his response 
to labor unrest was said to be lacking “manly” qualities. Americans defined leadership 
over the masses in macho terms. While there is no indication that they were looking for 
anything like a dictator, they never considered that the line between manliness and 
despotism might be very thin indeed.33 
 
2. THE ROOSEVELT APPOINTEES, 1935-1945 
One might argue that inter-American policy was the least of Roosevelt’s worries. His 
administration is best known for its handling of the Great Depression and its 
confrontation with fascism in Europe. Yet, inter-American policy played an important role 
in both these endeavors and Roosevelt is also remembered for his Good Neighbor policy, 
which has been classified an enormous success by many (but by no means all) 
American historians.34 
The Good Neighbor policy was a multifaceted attempt to win the trust and respect 
of America’s Latin American neighbors. Throughout the early decades of the twentieth 
century, American policy towards the south was characterized by unilateral military 
intervention and unbridled economic expansion, thus fostering the growth of anti-
American sentiment in the so-called “sister republics”. By the time Franklin Roosevelt 
entered the White House, the state of U.S. Latin American relations was thought to be at 
an all-time low. The new administration made valiant attempts to change this situation: It 
used a new official discourse that stressed mutual respect and inter-American solidarity 
and moved on to proclaim officially that the United States would never again violate the 
sovereignty of the Latin American republics. The marine contingents that occupied 
Nicaragua were withdrawn; the infamous Platt amendment of the Cuban constitution was 
abrogated; and the Central American Treaty of Peace and Amity, which had often been 
used as a justification for U.S. interference, was quietly shelved. As a reward, and as a 
measure of the success of the Good Neighbor policy, nearly all nations of the Western 
Hemisphere warmly supported the United States during the Second World War.35 
The Roosevelt administration felt that the appointment of envoys to the sister 
republics required extra care in the context of its Good Neighbor policy. It was not 
                                                 
33 Higgins, Notes on the Political Campaign in Honduras in 1923, n.d., PR Honduras, Vol. 188, cl. 
800: Honduras, January to June; Henry S. Haines (U.S. Vice Consul to Puerto Castilla, Honduras) 
to Lay, August 19, 1931, PR Honduras, Vol 179, cl. 800: Honduras (Continued). 
34 See chapter 5, footnotes 6 and 7. 
35 The classic account of the Good Neighbor policy is: Wood, The Making. Many other works 
cited throughout the current text will provide insights into the specifics of the Good Neighbor 
policy. 
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altogether satisfied with the state of the diplomatic corps when it took office. It proved to 
be difficult to find Foreign Service officers of the senior ranks who had not been tinged 
by the Republican patronage machine. At least with regard to Central America, 
Whitehouse, Curtis, Lay, and Hanna were all thought to be partisans of the Republican 
Party to some degree. Only Jefferson Caffery and Warren Delano Robbins—a first 
cousin of the new president as his middle name indicates—were not associated with the 
Republicans. The former had many years of active service ahead of him, serving, among 
other posts, in Cuba. The latter was promoted to Canada, but died unexpectedly of 
pneumonia in 1935. Whitehouse took charge in Columbia in 1933, but soon left the 
service for “family reasons”. Curtis had already been retired involuntarily. Lay left 
Honduras in 1935. He was considered “dead wood” by the incoming administration, but 
was eventually transferred to Uruguay, where he could serve out two more years in 
order to obtain full retirement benefits.36 
Whether it was due to the large amount of Republican protégés in the Service; the 
landslide election victory of 1936; the insistent plea for diplomatic perks from Roosevelt 
supporters; or even an attempt to give a personal touch to the Good Neighbor policy, the 
fact remains that from 1936 onward Democratic political appointees took over the 
Central American posts. Francis Patrick Corrigan, a Democrat from New York, was 
appointed to El Salvador in 1934; Fay Allen Des Portes of North Carolina was appointed 
to Guatemala in 1936; John Draper Erwin of Tennessee was appointed to Honduras in 
1937. Des Portes was replaced in 1943 by Boaz W. Long of New Mexico who was 
himself replaced by Edwin J. Kyle of Texas in 1945. The only career men to serve in 
Central America (including Nicaragua and Costa Rica) before the outbreak of the War 
were Leo Keena (Honduras, 1935-1937) and Robert Frazer (El Salvador, 1937-1942). 
From 1941 onwards, the Central American posts were slowly recovered for the 
professional service.37 
                                                 
36 William C. Bullit to R. Walton Moore, December 8, 1936, Franklin D. Roosevelt Office Files. 
Part III Departmental Correspondence. Microfilm: Roosevelt Study Center (henceforth: ROF), 
Reel 24, Frames 727-730; Franklin Roosevelt to the Acting Secretary of State, December 28, 
1936, ROF, Reel 24, Frame 731; Franklin Roosevelt to the Acting Secretary of State, December 
19, 1936, Reel 24, Frame 735; Memorandum for Judge Moore, December 19, 1936, ROF, Reel 
24, Frames 736-737 ; Unmarked files (ca. 1933), Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New 
York, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Papers, Official File 20: State Department, February to 
June, 1933; Unmarked files (Long to Hull, February, 1933), Elisha V. and Boaz W. Long Papers, 
Box 44, folder 109: Analysis of incumbents in Diplomatic Service, 1933; Interview with James 
Cowles Hart Bonright (February 26, 1986) ADST; Whitehouse to Franklin Roosevelt, November 
19, 1934, FDR Library, OF729: Sheldon Whitehouse, 1933-1938. On Curtis’ final weeks in the 
service, see chapter 3, pages 102-109. He seems to have retreated from public life after his 
retirement and does not turn up in the newspapers anymore.  
37 Register (1941) 107; Register (1942) 147, 179-180, and 192; Register (1946) 218; Register 
(1948) 291; Register (1950) 110. Incidentally, the diary of Leo Keena’s wife, Mrs. Joan S. Keena, 
was published in 1985. Regretfully, the diary is rather bland and deals mostly with the 
management of a legation household (although it is not particularly insightful or interesting on that 
count either). The addendum by Keena’s daughter, Ms. Manuela Keena, presents a far more 
interesting read, but does not deal with Foreign Service life. Joan S. Keena, On the Foreign 
Service merry-go-round (Elms Court et al. 1985). 
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Sheldon Whitehouse 
03-21-’30 / 07-23-‘33 Julius Lay 
05-31-’30 / 03-17-‘35 
Matthew Hanna 
10-28-’33 / 02-09-‘36 
Frank Corrigan 
04-30-’34 / 08-28-‘37 
Leo Keena 
07-19-’35 / 05-01-‘37 
Fay Des Portes 
05-22-’36 / 05-14-‘43 
Robert Frazer 
12-06-’37 / 10-31-‘42 John Erwin 
09-08-’37 / 04-16-‘47 
Walter Thurston 
01-14-’42 / 10-14-‘44 
Boaz Long 
05-19-’43 / 04-11-‘45 
John Simmons 
02-21-’45 / 07-01-47 Edwin Kyle 
05-08-’45 / 08-22-‘48 
Paul Daniels 
06-23-’47 / 30-10-‘47 Albert Nufer 
08-13-’47 / 07-16-‘49 Herbert Bursley 
05-15-’48 / 12-12-‘50 Richard Patterson 
11-24-’48 / 03-28-‘50 
George Shaw 
08-23-’49 / 04-25-‘52 
John Erwin 
03-14-’51 / 02-28-‘54 Rudolf Schoenfeld 
04-24-’51/ 10-19-‘54 
Angier Duke 
05-06-’52 / 05-21-‘53 
Charles Curtis 
05-06-’52 / 05-21-‘53 
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Aside from a difference in geographical origins—with greater emphasis on the 
South and the West rather than the North and East—the new Roosevelt appointees 
differed considerably from their predecessors at the Central American posts. Generally, 
the appointees were not from old, upper-class families; they had not enjoyed Ivy League 
or even university educations; and they lacked experience in professional diplomacy. 
Before they became diplomats, these men had had careers in business or the 
professions: Corrigan was a surgeon, Des Porters a politician, businessman, and farmer, 
Long a businessman, Erwin a journalist, and Kyle a scholar. What united them, of course, 
was their connection with the Democratic Party. None of the new ministers to Central 
America played a particularly important role in the Democratic Party, nor were they 
particularly close to members of the Roosevelt administration. Their political connections 
and their records as life-long supporters of the Democratic Party did, however, lead to 
their appointment to the Foreign Service. 
One interesting sidelight to these appointments should be mentioned: Des Portes, 
Erwin, and Kyle were from the traditional South. Long was from New Mexico. Corrigan, 
Keena, and Frazer were from the Northern states, but, as their names indicate, they 
were all of Irish stock. While it is unknown whether this played any part in their 
appointments to Central America specifically, the idea that Irishmen and Southerners 
would get along better with Latins appears to have been a common stereotype. The 
former were considered friendlier and less ostentatious than the formal and reserved 
Anglo Saxon type and thus better able to deal with the extravagant Latins. According to 
the Division of Latin American Affairs, the field posts needed men who took an interest in 
Latin culture and spoke Spanish; men who were progressive and forward-looking and 
sympathized with the region’s social and economic problems; men of independence and 
tact who had the courage needed to withstand the many pressures that might draw the 
United States into local politics. Lastly, Latin American duty demanded the “ability to get 
along with peoples whose customs, mentality and background often differ quite radically 
from our own”. According to the Division, men “with some Irish blood often meet this 
requirement as do Southerners who have no color prejudices”.38 
As to the professional backgrounds of the Roosevelt appointees, one can debate 
at length the merits of appointing politicians to the highest diplomatic posts abroad. The 
fact remains, as will become clear in the following chapters, that years of experience in 
foreign relations do not necessarily result in sound diplomacy. And from the standpoint of 
the Roosevelt administration, there were some advantages to the appointment of non-
career men. The very lack of experience of these men in American foreign relations was 
an asset in so far as they were untainted by Republican policies. It seems probable that 
                                                 
38 Trueblood, Memorandum on Qualifications of Officers specializing in Latin American Service, 
December 15, 1937, Lot Files, General Memoranda, Box 2, Folder marked General, Oct-Dec, 
1937. Incidentally, secretary Drew commented on Keena that: “He is a very nice person—quiet, 
unruffable, sense of humor. Being of Irish extraction he would be”. And on Corrigan he noted: 
“Am I prejudiced or back-patting or is there something about the Irish? They always seem to be 
smarter than other people and to have ‘a way with them’. You either hate them or love them”. 
Correspondence and early diary entries of Gerald A. Drew, 1919-1970, ADST. 
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many of these men were unfamiliar with the 1923 Treaty or the promotion of 
constitutionalism and they never mentioned gunboats or marines. Also unfamiliar with 
protocol and diplomatic etiquettes, their approach to legation affairs appears to have 
been relatively informal and they were more willing to engage the local press—an 
attitude conformant with the spirit of the Good Neighbor.  
Under normal circumstances, most chiefs of mission served at a single post for 
around three years. The ministers who were appointed to Central America around 1936, 
however, served an average of just over five years at their isthmian posts. Those 
appointed to Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras (i.e. Des Portes, Frazer, and Erwin) 
served an average of over seven years at these posts. Why this was so has apparently 
not been documented, although it is reasonable to assume that toward 1939 it was 
deemed desirable to have envoys in Central America who had already established a 
satisfactory working relationship with the local governments and who could be trusted to 
gain Central American cooperation for the U.S. policy of neutrality and, two years later, 
for the American war effort. However this may be, it can safely be said that due to their 
long tenures, the Roosevelt appointees played an important role in the development of 
U.S.-Central American relations. While some of their life-histories will necessarily be 
discussed in the context of chapters to come, an illustrative discussion of the first three 
appointees to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras follows below.  
 
Francis Patrick Corrigan was born in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1881. At the age of 25, he 
graduated from the local Western Reserve University with a medical degree. After that 
he went into surgery, which would be his vocation for the next twenty-eight years. He 
was a successful surgeon too: Some career highlights include his participation in the first 
successful blood transfusion in the United States; graduate work in Europe; and several 
official missions to Latin America intended to improve health care there. During the 
1920’s Corrigan served as director of surgery at several hospitals, but toward the end of 
the decade, he felt that it was time for a career change. By his own account, Corrigan 
had always wanted to join the diplomatic service and since, again by his own account, 
he was a life-long Democrat, he felt that Roosevelt’s election presented the right 
opportunity for him to enter that line of work.39 
There was no obvious reason for the new administration to be interested in 
Corrigan—at least there is no known record of important political work or campaign 
contributions from his side. It appears that he won his appointment to the legation of El 
Salvador in 1935 by single-minded determination. Corrigan’s personal papers at the 
Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, NY, document his personal campaign for a diplomatic 
post. The genial Irishman seems to have been acquainted with many people and he was 
definitely not shy about contacting them and recruiting them for his cause. 
                                                 
39 “Dr. Frank Corrigan Dies at 86; Retired Surgeon and Diplomat”, NYT (January 23, 1968) 39; 
Corrigan to Senator Robert J. Bulkley, January 17, 1933, Folder: Bulkley, sen. Robert J., General 
Correspondence, Box 2, Papers of Frank P. Corrigan, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, 
New York 
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Characteristically, he introduced himself to Robert Bulkley, Senator for Ohio at the time, 
by stating outright that “I am submitting my name [for appointment to a diplomatic post] 
only because I feel that by temperament, training and type of mind I might be of 
considerable and valuable use to President Roosevelt’s administration”.40 
Corrigan managed to convince many people in his personal network to back his 
campaign, but the administration’s initial answer was “no chance”. Corrigan kept at it, 
however, and, with Senator Bulkley and a small army of reputable Americans firmly by 
his side, his efforts were rewarded with the appointment to El Salvador. The only 
problem was that Corrigan had been aiming at least for Ecuador or one of the larger 
Latin American countries. Thus, a campaign for promotion was almost immediately 
initialized, with new letters of introduction and self-promotion going out to everyone who 
could help him. While he seems to have been aiming for a position as assistant 
secretary in the Department of State, Corrigan’s connections were not that good.41 
However, he did have a fairly successful career in diplomacy, which eventually included 
several ambassadorships and which extended into the postwar era.  
Though given to flattery somewhat, one cannot help but respect Corrigan for his 
strong and unapologetic sense of self-worth. It seems that he did not entirely 
overestimate his own abilities either: He quickly earned the respect of his secretaries at 
the Salvadoran legation—and it was never easy for a political appointee to win the favor 
of the younger career men—and Franklin Roosevelt reportedly considered him the best 
man to come into the service from the outside.42 
 
Fay Allen Des Portes, born on June 16, 1890, in Winnsboro, SC, was probably the son 
of an independent farmer or small plantation owner. He was educated at Clemson 
College and North Carolina Agricultural and Mechanical College, classified at the time as 
a school for the “industrial classes”. After graduation, Fay went into business in 
Winnsboro, trying his luck at merchandising, chemical production, and banking. He also 
owned a farm in his native Fairfield, which employed up to 400 black workers. From 
1926 to 1928, he served the Democratic Party in the South Carolina House of 
Representatives and subsequently in the South Carolina Senate from 1928 to 1933 
(both houses had been dominated by Democrats since the end of Reconstruction). On a 
national level, Fay Des Portes drew some minor attention because of his stance against 
                                                 
40  Corrigan to Bulkley, January 17, 1933, Folder: Bulkley, Sen. Robert J., General 
Correspondence, Box 2, Corrigan Papers. 
41  Patrick J. Cooney to James A. Farley, October 5, 1933, Corrigan Papers, General 
Correspondence, Box 4, Folder: Farley, James A.; Farley to Cooney, October 18, 1933, Corrigan 
Papers, General Correspondence, Box 4, Folder: Farley, James A.; R. Walton Moore to Corrigan, 
December 19, 1936, Corrigan Papers, General Correspondence, Box 7, Folder: Moore, R. 
Walton; Corrigan to Hull, March 20, 1937, Corrigan Papers, General Correspondence, Box 4, 
Folder: Hull, Cordell; Sumner Welles to Corrigan, June 4, 1937, Corrigan Papers, General 
Correspondence, Box 10, Folder: Welles, Sumner. 
42 Bulkley to Corrigan, June 3, 1937, Corrigan Papers, General Correspondence, Box 2, Folder: 
Bulkley, Sen. Robert J.. 
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prohibition and because he was a delegate to the 1932 Democratic National Convention, 
which nominated Franklin Roosevelt as the Democratic Party’s presidential candidate.43 
The Great Depression hit the Des Portes family hard, however. Life on the family’s 
farm was almost unbearable as Fay explained in a 1931 letter to his favorite cousin:  
“[t]he horrible part of the whole situation is these poor starving people here in 
our midst. The Banks can’t let the poor Negroes on the farm have anything to 
eat. I don’t know what is going to happen. I have about four hundred 
Negroes that are absolutely dependent on me as my two little boys but I can’t 
help them any more and God only knows what is going to happen to them. 
And what is happening to me is happening with every other farmer and 
landowner in the state”.44 
Fay’s health apparently broke under the strain of these economic difficulties, and he was 
committed to a sanitarium in the fall of 1932. 
It so happened, though, that the cousin Fay wrote to was the highly successful 
New York financier Bernard Baruch, who had close ties to the incoming Roosevelt 
administration. In 1933, Baruch, “in one of the rare instances he ever exerted influence 
in personal patronage”, wrote a letter to James Farley, Roosevelt’s former campaign 
leader who was virtually in control of the Democratic Party’s patronage machine, to 
advertise the abilities of his cousin Fay. FDR himself seems to have taken an interest in 
the case and was “delighted” to help out “Barney’s” cousin. Bernard Baruch’s biographer 
opines that “[w]hat happened was like the ending of a Fairy Tale. For Fay Allen Des 
Portes, a South Carolinian with something of the charm of his more famous kinsman, 
was whisked away from a dying cotton plantation to the genial climate and cultured 
official society of the Republic of Bolivia”, where he became the American chargé 
d’affaires.45 Some years later he was transferred to Guatemala to head his own mission. 
 
John Draper Erwin was born in Meador, Kentucky, on November 14, 1883. Next to 
nothing is known about his family, except that it had moved from Meador to Chattanooga, 
Tennessee—a major railway hub with some industries—when Erwin was still a little boy. 
One can speculate that his father was somehow involved in the railway industry, where 
John Erwin would also find his first employ. Young Erwin attended the local McCallie 
Prep School for some time and then switched to Baylor, also a pre-university school, 
where he graduated in 1908. In 1909, he joined the staff of the Chattanooga News as a 
reporter, which turned out to be his true calling in life.46 
Erwin was a lifelong Democrat and in 1913 he temporarily left journalism and 
moved to Washington D.C. to work for the Democratic Tennessee Senatorial delegation. 
He started out as a staff member of Senator John K. Shields but soon switched to the 
staff of Senator Luke Lea. Lea was a staunch supporter of President Wilson’s 
Progressive policies and, during the years that Erwin was in his service, he devoted 
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most of his energies to launching a federal investigation of the railroads and of political 
corruption in Tennessee.47 
Erwin’s decision to move to Washington, his home for the next 25 years, proved to 
be of major importance for his further career. After some five years on Senator Lea’s 
staff, he went back into journalism, as a Washington reporter for The Nashville 
Tennessean (which, as it happened, had been founded by Lea). During the next twenty 
years, he would also be connected with the Pulitzer brothers’ New York World and the 
Memphis based Commercial Appeal. Perhaps as a result of his work for Lea, Erwin’s 
major interest as a correspondent was political corruption. During the 1920s, he acquired 
some modest fame for his reporting on the Teapot Dome Scandal—arguably the United 
States’ biggest political scandal until Watergate. Together with a young attorney called 
Harry Slatterly, Erwin provided the Senate committee that studied the fraud case with 
leads that would eventually result in the arrest and imprisonment of Secretary of the 
Interior Albert Fall.48 
Despite his successful muckraking, Erwin was not exactly a national figure, but he 
was quite well-known in his own state as a member of the Tennessean press corps and 
as a former assistant to Tennessean Senators. It was particularly fortunate, in his case, 
that Roosevelt’s secretary of state, Cordell Hull, was also a Tennessean and something 
of an acquaintance of him. In 1937, with the support of the Tennessee delegation and at 
the insistence of Hull, Erwin was appointed minister to Honduras, his home for the next 
ten years.49 
 
The political appointees took widely different experiences, talents, and ideas 
(“idiosyncrasies” is a better term in some cases) to their new jobs as diplomats. Every 
one of them seems to have been keen to use some of that special talent to distinguish 
themselves from their peers in the professional service. Corrigan was always happy to 
apply his medical training. His initiatives along these lines ranged from personally pulling 
the bad teeth of his young secretaries to elaborating plans to improve the health of 
Foreign Service officers or sanitary conditions in the countries where he was posted.50 
Erwin, the muckraking journalist, was very sensitive to signs of official corruption and he 
was initially quite overwhelmed by what he perceived to be the abundant fraud and 
nepotism in Honduras.51 Des Portes was eager to sniff out Nazi sympathizers—though 
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he was not entirely out of step with his contemporaries in this regard.52 The fact that his 
mother’s family was Jewish (hence the Baruch connection) might have something to do 
with this. Kyle, the educator and agriculturalist, was “anxious to cooperate with the 
Government and the people of Guatemala in the development of their natural resources 
which are largely agricultural and in aiding in building a strong educational program”. 53 
Long, the diplomat and businessman, was always working out some scheme to 
develop the economies of Central America—be it by tapping sulfur from Nicaragua’s 
volcanoes or by introducing soy beans as a food staple in Guatemala. As a young man, 
Long joined the diplomatic service because he wanted to “do something” for the peoples 
in the south: “Our Government has a sacred duty towards them and should lead them 
towards a higher form of civilization by precept and example”. In one of his more prosaic 
descriptions of the white man’s duty, Long described how the Spaniards had broken the 
spirits of the Maya Indians and they now needed outside help to get back on their feet 
again. Referring to an old Maya legend, Long wrote that the “ship of dreams will come 
again to the stricken Indian nation, and salvation will be brought by the white-faced gods 
in the end”. His use of analogies when he talked about Central America are a gender 
historian’s dream: He once wrote friends that Nicaragua was “virgin country” that was 
“ripe” for development. Long had a very strong interest in the material improvement of 
the southern republics, which, he believed, required active American involvement 
because Latin peoples were too passive to do it themselves.54 By the time he took over 
the Guatemalan post, Long was singularly devoted to road building. As one of his 
secretaries wrote to his wife: 
Boaz is a character. Doesn’t know my first name yet. The most un-personal 
(or impersonal) man I have known. No interest whatsoever in people. Things 
and ideas yes. Over 60 but indifferent to discomfort. Completely egotistical 
but not offensive. Simply negative (…) I believe he neither likes nor dislikes 
anyone in the world, unless one should interfere with his consuming passion, 
which is road-building just now. Also mildly interested in soy beans. 
According to this same secretary, Long’s passion for roads even got in the way of his 
diplomatic duties: “He has stacks of mail. Does he look at it? Not even a peep. Roads, 
roads, nothing but ’em (…) Are you beginning to get the picture?”55  
The one thing that united these men was their very personal dedication to the 
Good Neighbor policy and its main champion, Franklin Roosevelt. Corrigan, for example, 
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confided in a letter to his president that he regarded the latter as a “social and economic 
savior”.56 Before the liberal Salvadoran press, Corrigan painted a picture of Roosevelt as 
“the highest summit of humanity of the present time, since he is nothing less than the 
‘Apostle of Democracy’”.57 Likewise, Des Portes propagated to the Guatemalan press 
the “true feelings” of Good Neighborliness entertained by the American government and 
was always sure to link those directly to President Roosevelt.58 Except for “impersonal” 
Long perhaps, the politicos attempted to embody the policy of their chief with a more 
informal, friendly, and welcoming attitude than their predecessors.59 Central Americans 
seem to have loved it. That, at least, is the impression conveyed by local newspapers, 
which, intriguingly, often mentioned the fact that Roosevelt’s appointees were not of 
Anglo-Saxon heritage: The Salvadoran periodical Diario de Hoy remarked on Corrigan 
that he “has never appeared to us of Saxon temperament. We find him a fluent talker, 
enthusiastic, witty, ironic”.60  
While their friendly, informal approach to diplomacy and their impulse to help the 
Latin neighbors were doubtlessly sincere, there was also a darker side to the attitude of 
the Roosevelt appointees. These diplomats hardly believed that the Central Americans 
were their equals. A patronizing attitude toward the southern neighbors seemed inherent 
in North American culture and did not leave the Good Neighbors untouched. The 
manifestation of these feelings did change over time, however. It was no longer 
acceptable during the Good Neighbor era, for example, to refer to the Latins in racist 
terms in diplomatic correspondence.61 Other terms were found, though, to express the 
American sense of superiority. Words were borrowed from anthropology, science, and 
even medicine that lent an air of objectivity to derogatory comments. Corrigan, the 
medical doctor, opined that Central Americans “are politically embryonic and still need 
obstetrical care lest they be born badly and grow up idiots”.62 When describing the 
difficulties of government in Honduras, Erwin liked to point out that some 75 percent of 
Hondurans were illiterate, while 55 percent were born out of wedlock—statistics that 
were doubtlessly intended as an illustration of low intellect and high irresponsibility 
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among the locals.63 Based on the well-established historical and anthropological views of 
the time, a report signed by Des Portes stated that: 
The Guatemalan Indian has preserved his customs, habits, dress, and 
manner of thinking from the time of the Spanish conquest to the present. He 
is, generally speaking, a product of the serfdom imposed upon him by the 
Spanish colonist and subsequent masters who have found it to their interest 
to keep him in that state. He is the dumb, half-slave, half-drudge of the large 
estate holders and can best be likened to the Chinese coolie whom he 
resembles in many outward ways notwithstanding their completely different 
cultures.64 
There is no evidence suggesting that the Roosevelt appointees expanded the 
legation’s circle of contacts or network of informants. In fact, in the context of Central 
American politics, Good Neighborliness led to restrictions in the ministers’ circle of 
acquaintances. With regard to the Central American side of the story, it should be 
remembered that by about 1935, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras were ruled by 
dictatorships. While civil liberties had never been very secure in the region, the regimes 
of the 1930s were better equipped than most previous regimes to positively repress the 
free press, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, etc. Many active opponents of the 
regimes were exiled or kept under surveillance. Newspapers and other periodicals that 
did not conform to political realities were soon closed down.65  
Since the American legations depended on personal contacts and newspaper 
publications for information, restrictions on civil liberties severely limited the diversity of 
sources on political life in the isthmian republics. Foreign Service inspection reports bear 
witness to this development: Already in 1935, Minister Hanna complained to the Foreign 
Service inspector that: 
…keeping informed concerning the internal political situation is a specially 
difficult problem because of the dictatorial nature of the existing Government. 
The surface indications are misleading. The press is submissive if not 
completely controlled. The sources of information customarily present in 
other capitals are lacking here. The conditions being as just stated, close and 
continual contact with a large number of people is absolutely essential if the 
Minister is to keep even fairly well informed (…) It is not practicable for him to 
do this effectively with the existing staff organization. 
Under these circumstances, Hanna claimed, the president of the republic “may be 
regarded as the principal if not the only source of authentic information”. Despite these 
assertions, the inspector chided the legation in Guatemala for depending too heavily on 
                                                 
63 It is not known where Erwin picked up this piece of “information”, but it was much used. For 
example: John D. Erwin (U.S. Ambassador to Honduras) to the Secretary of State, Despatch 
1322, August 21, 1944, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 19, Vol. 7, cl. 800: Honduras, August to 
December; Lt. Col. Nathan A. Brown, jr. (U.S. Acting Military Attaché to Honduras) to the Military 
Intelligence Division, Report 839, April 14, 1944, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 22, Vol. 13, cl. 850.4: 
Labor; Erwin to the Secretary of State, Despatch 1549, December 22, 1944, PR Honduras (SCF), 
Box 22, Vol. 13, cl. 850.4: Labor. 
64 Des Portes to the Secretary of State, Despatch 2067, August 22, 1941, PR Guatemala, Box 41, 
cl. 820.02: Nazi Activities. 
65 On the establishment of dictatorships, see chapter 4. 
Chapter 1 
 
52 
the press, while the Minister himself admitted that “sources of information provided by an 
opposition press do not exist” and “such items of information as appear in the local press 
(…) generally reflect the official point of view”.66 
The same situation was described in several other inspection reports throughout 
the 1930s and early 1940s. “As the press in Honduras is under a strict Governmental 
control at present information for political reports of value must be sought industriously 
through personal contacts. The political situation, as at present, lends itself to much 
speculation and widely varying rumors most of which have little definite basis other than 
aspirations and fears…”, according to Keena, 1935. 67  Some six years later, Erwin 
reported that: “The only difficulty experienced by this office in obtaining political 
information is a certain mistrust on the part of Hondurans opposed to the present 
Government in maintaining current contact with the members of the [Legation’s] staff”.  
And while contacts with people who were opposed or indifferent to the regime were 
“discreetly maintained”, the legation still depended most heavily on “sources of political 
information [from] within the Government”.68 Describing the one-sidedness of available 
sources, the legation in El Salvador noted in 1943 that: 
President Martínez is a de facto dictator and there is only one legal political 
party (the “Pro Patria”) permitted. Moreover, the mail, press and radio are 
strictly censored. The National Legislative Assembly is merely a rubber 
stamp, which automatically enacts all laws presented by the Government. 
Consequently there are no open opposition and criticism of the 
Government.69 
Although this subject will be further developed elsewhere, it should be noted that 
Good Neighbor diplomacy itself only made it more difficult for American diplomats to 
obtain information from alternative sources. The problem, as the State Department 
described it in 1944, was that of defining "the line where friendliness toward the 
government of an allied sister republic ends and friendliness toward a particular political 
regime begins". 70  That wisdom, however, was the product of some ten years of 
experience in Good Neighbor diplomacy. The distinction between a particular regime 
and a government or a people more generally was not so clear during the earlier years 
of the Good Neighbor. In the Central American context—that is, under a dictatorship—
the conceptual differentiation between government and regime was particularly 
problematic, because regimes never changed and everyone who was opposed to the 
regime was necessarily an enemy of the state. In this polarized political environment, the 
American legations could not very well maintain public contact with the opposition and 
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be on friendly terms with the government at the same time. And since the practical goal 
of the Good Neighbor was to obtain trade agreements and to build an alliance against 
extra-continental aggression, good relations with the powers that be were imperative. 
Hence the need for “discretion”, in Erwin’s words, whenever the legation dealt with 
persons that were not part of the political establishment. 
An additional problem was that the local regimes did everything they could to 
convey the impression that American friendliness and support was aimed at them 
specifically. While this subject will be further discussed in chapter four, the following 
incident is illustrative: On March 13, 1937, U.S. minister to Guatemala Fay Des Portes 
sent a brief telegram to the State Department: “Shall Legation fly flag Monday fifteenth in 
honor [unconstitutional reelection] President Ubico in office QUESTION MARK”.71 For 
the legation, this was indeed a major question mark. Its staff had witnessed how 
seemingly minor matters of diplomatic protocol were claimed by different groups in 
Guatemalan society, taken out of context, and redefined as tokens of American support 
for- or opposition against Ubico’s continuance in office. In 1936 for example, the State 
Department’s bureau of protocol had, on President Roosevelt’s behalf, drafted a politely 
worded reply to a personal letter from Ubico to the American chief, informing the latter of 
his reelection. The brief reply was pushed for all it was worth in Guatemala’s 
government-controlled press, which presented it as proof for a personal bond of 
friendship between FDR and Ubico. 72  In February 1937, however, the legation in 
Guatemala neglected to send Ubico a note of congratulations on his six year anniversary 
in office. Representatives of many American companies in Guatemala were also absent 
from the celebrations for various reasons, thereby feeding rumors that the United States 
did not sympathize with Ubico’s reign.73 
The peculiar Guatemalan art of claiming and representing symbols of U.S. 
affection, or lack thereof, was lost on Washington, however. Secretary Hull answered the 
legation’s request with an evasive telegram: “You should use your own judgment about 
flying the flag although if flags are being flown no reason is perceived why you should 
not act similarly PERIOD”.74 This answer represents the Department’s determination not 
to stand out in the Guatemalan political landscape—the United States would not 
interfere in local matters, period. Shortly thereafter, the legation informed the 
Guatemalan minister of Foreign Affairs that the Stars and Stripes would be flown in 
honor of Ubico’s second term.75 
This brief exchange of telegrams between the legation and the Department also 
illustrates U.S.-Guatemalan diplomatic relations over the following years: The State 
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Department was preoccupied with European affairs and content to leave purely Central 
American matters to the stewardship of the ministers who were expected to maintain the 
Good Neighbor Policy there. Under these circumstances, the day-to-day diplomatic 
relations between the United States and the isthmian republics were virtually reduced to 
the personal bonds between legation staff and local government officials. 
 
3. THE POSTWAR PROFESSIONALS, 1945-1952 
Taking the Central American region as a whole, the pattern of appointments during the 
war and the postwar years to the American diplomatic posts there seems to favor career 
men. Only in Honduras and Guatemala were political appointees kept on during the war 
years. The post-war years were almost entirely dominated by career men, although the 
politicos did make a comeback toward the end of Truman’s second term (a pattern which 
was also noticeable during the Roosevelt period) with four “deserving” Democrats 
appointed to Central America between 1948 and 1953. As was to be expected, only one 
of the latter men was carried over to the Eisenhower Foreign Service. 
The career officers who served in El Salvador during the War and after were 
Walter Clarence Thurston (1942-1944), John Farr Simmons (1944-1947), Albert Frank 
Nufer (1947-1949), and George Price Shaw (1949-1952). Toward the end of Truman’s 
second term, political appointee Angier Biddle Duke, the scion of a wealthy New York 
family, also served in Salvador, but was retired by the Eisenhower administration. In 
Guatemala, Edwin Kyle served until 1948, when he was replaced by Richard 
Cunningham Patterson, another appointee. When Patterson was declared persona non 
grata by the Guatemala authorities in 1950, he was eventually replaced with career 
diplomatist Rudolf Emil Schoenfeld (1951-1954). John Erwin ended his ten year tour in 
Honduras, involuntarily, in 1947 and was replaced by Paul Clement Daniels (1947). In 
that same year, Daniels was promoted to the Department and replaced by careerist 
Herbert Bursley (1947-1951). In 1951, Erwin made a comeback and was assigned to 
Honduras for another 3 years, until he was again forced into retirement by the 
Eisenhower administration. 
Aside from a dry account of the many posts they served in, little can be said about 
these career men. This is not because they are inherently less interesting than, say, Lay, 
or Hanna, or Corrigan, or Long. Doubtlessly, their extended travels around the world as 
young diplomatists made for very interesting lives. However, their names did not pop up 
in the social sections of major newspapers, as was the case with Foreign Service 
officers of old and wealthy families. Nor did they leave memoirs or personal papers, 
something many political appointees did because they had had long and colorful careers 
before they went into diplomacy and—or so it seems in many cases—because they 
generally had an inflated sense of self-importance than the careerists did. Also, they left 
less of a personal stamp on the reports produced at their posts.  
As a group and individually, the seven career officers who were appointed to 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras between roughly 1943 and 1952 seem rather 
unremarkable. They did not own “castle-like” mansions in Newport, like more aristocratic 
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diplomats did, nor had they engaged in interesting careers or made high-placed friends, 
like the political appointees. And while most of these careerists have not made it to the 
history books, these well-trained, dedicated professionals represent the rank-and-file of 
the postwar American Foreign Service. Except for Daniels (b. 1903), all were born in the 
closing years of the 19th century. Most of them originated from the northeast coast, 
although Thurston and Shaw were from Colorado and Kansas respectively. Business 
and Law were popular educations among these seven, but only Simmons and Daniels 
attended Ivy League schools. Generally speaking, they had finished their educations 
around 1910 and joined the Foreign Service thereafter—putting in many years of hard 
work at small posts before they reached the highest ranks of the Service.  
Daniels was the last to join the Service in 1927, the other six joined between 1910 
and 1920, while in their teens or early twenties. Unlike men like Whitehouse, they did not 
have the privilege of starting out as private secretaries. Instead, they all started out as 
clerks or consular assistants and slowly climbed the ranks within a service that was 
quickly professionalizing between roughly 1915 and 1925. They saw all the levels of the 
diplomatic establishment, serving in both the consular and diplomatic branches, but also 
at the Department in Washington. Around 1945, after having served in almost every rank 
in the diplomatic and consular branch of the Foreign Service and having seen many 
different countries in Europe and Latin America, these seven men came under 
consideration for promotions to the ambassadorial level. All were, to a greater or lesser 
extend, specialized in the Latin American region and, without exception, their first 
assignment as chief of mission was to a Central American post (except for Schoenfeld, 
who had earlier served in Rumania as chief of mission). This again suggests that these 
embassies were considered by the Department to be training grounds for new chiefs. 
Actually, if one includes the political appointees, all but three chiefs who served in 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras during the decade following the War were freshly 
appointed to the ambassadorial level. 
All seven career men had served a number of years in Latin America, notably at 
the executive levels of their post (consul, secretary, or counselor) during the Good 
Neighbor years. Thurston, Simmons, and Daniels had been assistant chiefs of the Latin 
American Division of the Department, with the first also serving as that division’s chief 
from 1930 to 1931. Although they remained in the Foreign Service, the War did not go 
by unnoticed for these men, all of them offering a humble contribution to the fight against 
fascism in some diplomatic or administrative capacity. Thurston served in Spain and the 
Soviet Union during the late 1930s and early 40s and had to evacuate his posts several 
times due to the advance of Axis armies. 76  Schoenfeld was the American chargé 
d’affaires to the exiled governments in London throughout the War. Simmons claimed 
that he had witnessed the rise of Nazism while he was stationed at the consulate in 
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Cologne during the early 30s. 77  Shaw, Daniels, and Bursley were involved in the 
coordination of American war measures in the Western Hemisphere, serving, 
respectively, as the Department’s assistant chief of Foreign Activities Correlation, chair 
of the American Coffee Board, and assistant chief of the Division of American Republic 
Affairs.78 
Whether the relative abundance of career appointments to Central America (as 
compared to the prewar period) was a matter of policy or coincidence is not clear. 
Several probable explanations come to mind, though these are merely educated 
guesses. First of all, the Truman administration may have found it prudent initially to hold 
back on the appointment of politicos, since a wholesale replacement of career men with 
Truman supporters would have provoked negative comments from the press and 
perhaps even accusations of nepotism from political opponents. Only when its mandate 
was confirmed in 1947 did the administration appoint more Democrats to diplomatic 
posts. Another reason to hold back on political appointments to Central America could 
have been the lack of interest in the region during the postwar years. While the isthmian 
countries were looked upon as a “front” for Good Neighbor diplomacy before the War, 
the region’s solid support for the American war effort seemed to imply that it was secure 
and pro-American. U.S. interest focused on Europe and Asia and the Truman 
administration would have had a hard time convincing its political appointees that a post 
in Central America was in any way desirable or interesting. It is also possible, however, 
to think of affirmative reasons to appoint career men to Central America during and after 
the War. Most importantly, the work of an ambassador had become considerably more 
complex since the prewar years. Embassies had been greatly expanded and needed to 
stay in touch with the new American agencies that were introduced to the region during 
the War and that remained there to execute the Point IV programs later. Furthermore, 
many new treaties and other international commitments were arranged during and after 
the War. Due to the many technicalities surrounding the negotiations for such 
commitments, Washington may have preferred to use the professionals at its disposal, 
although a politico would, of course, be able to lean on an expanded embassy staff. 
 
The period leading up to and including the first years of the Second World War brought 
some major practical changes in U.S. policy toward Latin America due to U.S. attempts 
to lead the Western Hemisphere through neutrality and war—objectives that came to 
overshadow all other concerns. For the Foreign Service, this meant a major change of 
pace, functions, and objectives in the daily management of legations (officially 
embassies from 1943 onward) in the other American republics. At the time, the State 
Department and its Foreign Service were actually among the smallest departments (in 
terms of personnel) in the executive branch of the American government. While the 
                                                 
77 Memorandum enclosed in Gerhard Gade (U.S. Chargé d’Affaires a.i. to El Salvador) to the 
Secretary of State, Despatch 2249, December 8, 1944, PR El Salvador, Box 99, Vol. XV, cl. 800: 
Salvador. 
78 Unless indicated otherwise, all the information on the professional lives of these men is from: 
Register (1950) 71, 377-378, 458, 463, and 504. 
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Second World War would accelerate the drive toward specialization within the Foreign 
Service, the allegedly positive effects of this development would not be felt at the posts 
for some time. During the War, U.S. posts were enlarged and reinforced with the arrival 
of cultural attachés, agricultural attachés, intelligence attachés, etc. Up to the first years 
of the War, however, the smaller posts in Central America still had to get by with two to 
four officers and a hand full of clerks. While the workload exploded from 1939 onward, 
additional staff was not forthcoming, because the State Department badly needed 
additional staff in Washington and in other countries that were more directly affected by 
the War. While a temporary “Auxiliary Service” was founded to help out with foreign 
affairs work, many experienced officers also volunteered for military services or were 
drafted into the army (the rules for exemption from service were very strictly applied and 
only the most experienced officers, or those with established families, were permanently 
excluded from the draft). 
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Figure 1: The U.S. Legation in Guatemala, ca. 1930 
The above diagram shows the structure of a typical U.S. Legation in Central America. 
This structure hardly changed throughout the 1930s, although the number of 
secretaries and clerks might vary at times. 
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Figure 2: The U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, ca. 1944 
The above diagram indicates the expansion of the duties and the personnel        
of  a U.S. Embassy during World War II 
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Also conspicuous during this period was a trend toward the professionalization of 
the Foreign Service and of the expansion and specialization of its tasks. While this 
development was barely noticeable before the War, it went into overdrive from 1939 
onward. The acute need for military cooperation, the expansion of economic warfare 
capabilities, the development of war-related resources, the coordination of the Nazi hunt, 
the intensification of cultural relations, the strengthening of local economies, etc, etc, 
brought to the Central American legations a broad array of experts in these fields. 
Military attachés, economic experts, legal attachés, and cultural liaison officers—almost 
all of whom needed their own clerks, typists, and messengers—swelled the ranks of the 
legation staffs. * And this was only in addition to the many new, war-related agencies that 
were continually popping up and, formally at least, fell under the jurisdiction of the 
American ministers.79  
The expansion of the staff of the American legation in Honduras is a fine 
illustration of this development. Around the beginning of the 1930s, the legation was 
staffed by the minister, one Foreign Service officer, and one to three clerks. Toward the 
end of the War, the staff had expanded to include two additional Foreign Service officers, 
two additional economic experts, and between seven and ten additional clerks. The size 
of the staff of the American embassy now exceeded, in fact, that of the staff of the 
Honduran ministry of Foreign Affairs! At the same time, the staff of the embassy in 
Guatemala, which performed several functions for the entire Central American region, 
had grown from roughly five employees in 1930 to well over twenty in 1944, because it 
also included legal, cultural, and commercial attachés and several special assistants. 
These numbers do not take into account the consular officers and military attachés and 
instructors, or employees of the Coordination Committee, Health and Sanitation Division, 
and Rubber Development Corporation, all of whom worked under the general direction 
of the American embassy in Guatemala during the War (see figures 1 and 2). 
The implication of this development was, of course, that, by the end of the War, 
there was not a single sector of Central American government, economy, and society 
that was not somehow connected with and influenced by the American embassies. Aside 
from the regular contacts between the embassies and important politicians and 
government officers, which is the traditional function of the American Foreign Service, 
the work of the embassies’ commercial and consular sections also affected the economy 
through export and import controls over products needed for the war effort; “blacklisting” 
of enemy enterprises and businesses; the building of public works such as the Inter-
American highway and the hospitals, sewers, and water purification plants of the Health 
                                                 
* This does not include the offices of the Consulates. Some of these specialists did not belong to 
the Foreign Service but to other Departments. The Department of Commerce had its commercial 
attachés. The Department of Justice its legal attachés (in Latin America, the legal attaché was 
often a F.B.I. agent who did intelligence work). The Departments of Army, Navy, and Air (later the 
Department of War and still later Defense) had their military and navy attachés. In Central 
America, one military attaché was usually accredited to all the Central American republics 
together and would be stationed permanently in Guatemala. During the War, however, every 
legation or embassy had its own military and/or navy attaché. 
79 See figures on pages 57-58. 
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and Sanitation Division; the diversification of agriculture through the Rubber 
Development Corporation and the Fruit companies; and the general management of the 
economy through the local Coordination Committees, which included local businessmen, 
bankers, and representatives of the Chambers of Commerce. The Central American 
security apparatuses (military, constabulary, police, and secret service) received training 
from- and exchanged information with the military attachés and the legal attachés—
mostly FBI agents. Cultural attachés managed exchange programs between Central 
American and American universities and research institutions, supported the work of 
local libraries and other cultural institutions, and provided “information” to local 
newspapers. Politicians, businessmen, police officers, soldiers, journalists and editors, 
university students and professors, agriculturalists, medical doctors, etc, etc. They all felt 
the American presence in some way or another. 80 
The expansion of the Foreign Service and its posts abroad was a product of the 
pressure and stress of war. While it may not have lived up to it in every sense, the 
makeup of the prewar Foreign Service was guided by the ideal that a democratic, anti-
colonial, and peaceful country like the United States did not need a large diplomatic 
corps. The latter was associated with secret deals, espionage, intrigue, and other such 
assorted skullduggery, which had plunged Europe into the First World War. The 
European powers used their expansive diplomatic establishments, it was believed, to 
facilitate international arms trafficking, colonial administration, and dissemination of 
propaganda. The United States, in contrast, could get by with a small corps of 
professionals and the occasional citizen diplomat (political appointee) to maintain 
peaceful relations and expand commercial connections with other nations. 
It is obvious, then, that it is not only the individual officers or the “type” of officers 
assigned to Central America that changed between 1930 and 1950, but that the Foreign 
Service itself went through some considerable changes during the period. While the 
expansion of the American Foreign Service is generally associated with the postwar 
period (which is true for Europe), American ambassadors in Central America had been 
struggling with a deluge of new tasks and specialists for some years. The experience 
was not always a happy one and did not always lead to a more efficient Service 
(although the measure of efficiency that one would ascribe to the embassies is, of 
course, dependent on the objectives that one would like them to achieve. In terms of 
paper output, for example, the efficiency of the Service was certainly enhanced after 
1939). Only toward the end of the period under discussion here did embassy employees 
                                                 
80  Cabot to the Secretary of State, Orginizational Report Guatemala, July 9, 1940, State 
Department Central File, Box 669; Drew to the Department of State, Orginizational Report 
Guatemala, State Department Central File, Box 669; Cousins to the Secretary of State, 
Orginizational Report Honduras, January 1, 1940, State Department Central File, Box 669; Erwin 
to the Secretary of State, Orginizational Report Honduras, June 26, 1944, State Department 
Central File, Box 669; Gade to the Secretary of State, Orginizational Report El Salvador, 
November 8, 1940, State Department Central File, Box 670; Gade to the Secretary of State, 
Orginizational Report El Salvador, June 22, 1944, State Department Central File, Box 670. These 
numbers also exclude employees without diplomatic functions such as guards, messengers, 
gardeners, cleaners, etc.  
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of all Departments come together under the coordination of the ambassador to produce 
joint reports (the so-called “Joint Weeka”). Before that time, conflict and confusion 
characterized the work of the enlarged embassies at least as much as coordinated 
efforts.81 
 
In conclusion, it should be noted that a healthy variety of Foreign Service officers served 
in Central America throughout the 1930s and 1940s. The region was not the exclusive 
reserve of clueless political appointees—though there were some of those—nor of 
particularly outstanding professionals—though there were some of those too. It is 
remarkable that many chiefs of mission in Central America were freshly appointed to that 
rank and that the administrations in Washington tended dump a relatively large number 
of appointees there after reelection. However, this is not necessarily a recipe for bad 
diplomacy. Inexperienced officers could offer fresh insights while the old hands, despite 
their experience, were sometimes woefully unable to deal with the peculiar 
circumstances they encountered at their isthmian posts. It is undeniable, for example, 
that careerist Matthew Hanna’s experience in the Dominican Republic led him to pursue 
a disastrous policy in El Salvador. It is also remarkable how insightful some of politico 
Frank Corrigan’s reports were when compared to the bland writings of professionals in 
neighboring republics.82 
Generalizations such as those presented in the current chapter can only go so far, 
of course. The following chapters will demonstrate that individual officers—because of 
there individual prejudices and experiences—had a profound impact both on the course 
of American policy and on the histories of the Central American republics. What if 
Sheldon Whitehouse had been assigned to El Salvador instead of Guatemala in 1929? 
Would General Martínez’ career have been cut short in 1932? And what if a professional 
diplomat had been assigned to Guatemala in 1945? Would the Guatemalan revolution 
have been better understood in Washington? 
It should also be stressed that the American posts in Central (and South) America 
seemed to be regarded as testing grounds not only for new chiefs of mission, but also for 
new policy and new forms of Foreign Service organization. Concerning policy, the 
nonintervention principle and the policy regarding disreputable governments should be 
mentioned.83 Regarding organization, it can be said that while the stereotype of the 
lonely officer plodding along at his mosquito infested post holds true for the 1920s, the 
American posts had become major organizations by the early 1950s (especially when 
                                                 
81 See chapters 6 and 7. 
82 Using a statistical analysis, one Phillip L. Kelly has attempted to prove that Latin America 
received ambassadors of poor caliber in the postwar decades. It is, of course, undeniable that the 
most talented officers went to London, Paris, or Berlin (or Brazil and Venezuela, as Kelly’s 
analysis also shows) but it remains impossible (for a historian) to scientifically measure the 
effectiveness of the training of these officers, let alone measure the “success” of their tenures in 
Latin America.  Besides, what would the measure of that success be?  Phillip L. Kelly, “The 
characteristics of United States ambassadors to Latin America”, Inter-American Economic Affairs 
30 (Autumn 1976) 49-80. 
83 See chapters 2 and 7. 
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compared to the diminutive size of some of the Central American government agencies). 
These developments, combined with the eccentricities of individual diplomats and the 
amazing twist and turns in Central American history, account for the high degree of 
complexity and richness of this topic that will (hopefully) be evident in the historical 
narrative that follows.  
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PROPPING UP DICTATORS? 
Caudillos come to power in Central America, 1930-1931 
 
~ Propping up dictators? ~ 
 
 
HONDURAS TORN BY REVOLT; 
 REBELS MARCH ON CAPITAL; 
  FEAR AMERICANS IN PERIL 
 
This headline, or a similar one, undoubtedly is 
familiar to most newspaper readers in the 
United States. And it has been for decades. 
You may substitute the name of some other 
Central American republic for that of 
Honduras, and the headline is just as familiar. 
Sometimes “bandits” replaces “rebels” – 
usually the difference is slight. 
 
~ Major General Smedley D. Butler, 1931
 
 
 
A revolt in Honduras in 1931 provoked General Smedley Darlington Butler to write a 
short article on his own experiences as a Marine involved in the U.S. intervention in 
another Honduran revolt in 1903. 1  Called “Opera Bouffe Revolts” the article was 
intended to amuse rather than to inform fellow Americans. If Butler is to be believed, 
revolutions in Honduras were a fairly easy-going affair, “friendly” even, and consisted 
mainly of local soldiers changing the color of their hat ribbons—a blue ribbon signifying 
support for the government and a red ribbon signifying support for the rebels. In fact, the 
General wrote, these ribbons were often two-sided, blue on one side and red on the 
other, to allow a quick and bloodless change of sides if the situation so demanded. In 
case of the 1903 revolution, Butler and his Marines only went ashore once: To pick up 
the U.S. consul in Trujillo—who was found cowering between the beams of the floor of 
his house, naked but for the American flag in which he had wrapped himself2—and to 
escort him to their ship “in a manner due his rank and station”. Shortly after this 
uneventful rescue operation, “this business of turning hat-bands inside out had become 
epidemic, with the result that the revolt was over”. 
                                                 
1  Smedley D. Butler, “Opera-Bouffe Revolts: What usually happens when the Marines have 
landed”, PR Honduras, Volume 181, cl. 891: Public Press. The article originally appeared in the 
magazine Liberty on October 10, 1931.  
2 Butler makes sure to point out that the American consul in this case was actually a native of 
Honduras. 
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Butler’s little chit on Honduran revolutions is part of a long American tradition of 
making fun of the southern neighbors and their unabashed tendency toward rebellion.3 
Having read the occasional O. Henry story or Time Magazine article on the “Banana 
Republics”, nothing in Butler’s writing must have struck the American reader as 
particularly incorrect. His explanation for the causes of Central American revolutions 
could have appeared to his readers as very nearly accurate: 
An ambitious local leader simply decided that the then president had had 
enough of public office and what goes with it and it was high time he be sent 
scampering away – with the ambitious local leader as the new president. 
That’s the reason for virtually all revolts in the Caribbean area. The names 
mean nothing. There have been too many presidents, too many insurrectos, 
and too many rebellions in that land for anyone to try to remember them. 
Indeed, American leaders had been calling upon the sister republics to stop their 
“chronic wrongdoing” and learn to “elect good men” at least since the start of the 20th 
century. More often than not, Marines were dispatched to add substance to these wise 
words and to enforce a measure of democratic development in the region. 4 To the 
contemporary who believed in the essential correctness of the didactic policies of the 
U.S. navy in the region, it must have been exasperating, as Butler wrote, to open the 
Sunday newspaper and read about another of the countless revolutions in the “American 
Balkans”. But things were about to change. 
Over the course of the late 1920s and early 1930s, the United States abandoned 
its practice of intervening militarily in Central America and the Caribbean. Almost 
simultaneously, brutal dictators came to power in that region and put an end to the 
seemingly insistent revolutions. The coincidence of these events inspired a common 
historical interpretation: That Washington used the new generation of Central American 
dictators as a cheap replacement for its Marines. In this chapter, it will be argued that 
this interpretation is a gross oversimplification of what actually happened. It will seek to 
demonstrate the confusion that accompanied America’s move away from armed 
intervention; will analyze how seemingly clear-cut policy objectives in Washington were 
often diffused by local diplomats; and will argue that even though American involvement 
in the events of the 1930s was considerable, the outcomes of such involvement cannot 
be directly linked to U.S. intentions for Central America.  
The focus of this and following chapters will be on the American diplomatic envoys 
in Central America who, in the absence of clear policy guidelines from Washington, had 
to fall back on their beliefs about the nature of the Latin Other and their personal relation 
to them. As it turned out, unlike historians who have the benefit of hindsight, these men 
had no idea that their actions would contribute to the establishment of at least 15 years 
of uninterrupted dictatorial rule in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. Instead, the 
men who came to power in this period appeared to the Americans to be honest and 
                                                 
3 For a short description of American representations of Honduras which are either satirical or 
idealized, see: Alison Acker, Honduras: The making of a banana republic (Boston 1988) 16-25. 
4 On U.S intervention and policy of coercive democratization during the early 20th century: Paul W. 
Drake, “From Good Men to Good Neighbors: 1912-1932”, in: Abraham F. Lowenthal ed., 
Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America (Baltimore and London 1991) 3-40. 
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progressive presidents who had come to power through free and fair elections: They 
represented, in short, a big step forward in Central American development. 
 
1. THE SOMOZA SOLUTION? 
Towards the end of the 1920s, there were several incentives for U.S. policymakers to 
discontinue the sending of Marines to Central America, as had happened so often in the 
past. Firstly, these interventions did not lead to any recognizable improvement in the 
stability of local governments. Secondly, such intervention, which sometimes required 
extensive periods of occupation and police duty, was costly and became especially 
unpopular with the budget-minded Congress of the Depression era. Thirdly, American 
public opinion turned against the interventions as part of the larger movement against 
war and imperialism during the isolationist years.5 Finally, the arrogance with which the 
United States policed the sovereign sister republics of Central America and the 
Caribbean met with increasing diplomatic resistance from other Latin American states. 
Latin Americans understood U.S. actions in that region to be a litmus test for its attitude 
toward the rest of the hemisphere. Thus, interventions in that region fed Southern 
suspicions about U.S. imperial designs, making it increasingly difficult for U.S. diplomats 
and businessmen to win the trust and cooperation of the Latins. High officials in the 
State Department began to wonder whether it was worthwhile to maintain a costly and 
ineffective interventionist policy in Central America that had the potential to endanger 
U.S. relations with the entire hemisphere. Accordingly, the Hoover and FDR 
administrations developed a new Latin American policy with non-interventionism as its 
backbone: The now famous Good Neighbor Policy.6 
During the same period, factional strife began to make way for strong, centralized 
states in Central America. For years, the isthmian republics had been largely dependent 
on the export of such items as bananas and coffee. Naturally, when international 
markets crashed after 1929, the export such luxury items was the first to suffer from the 
letdown of consumption in the industrialized nations. The slackening of exports was 
enough to push many rural communities into dismal poverty. While consequences 
differed in the various Central American countries, some social frictions developed 
everywhere. Though never serious enough to be a threat to the social order (except, 
perhaps, in El Salvador) the stirrings of the campesinos did scare the ruling economic 
elites enough to drive them into the arms of strongmen with military backgrounds. Thus, 
Jorge Ubico (1930-1944) was the first to establish a strong military regime in Guatemala 
and was followed in quick succession by Tiburcio Carías (1931-1948) in Honduras, 
                                                 
5 Incidentally, one of the more famous anti-war and anti-imperialist books to come out of this 
movement was entitled “War is a racket” and was written by none other than General, now retired, 
Smedley Butler 
6 Bryce Wood, The making of the Good Neighbor policy (New York 1961) 3-155; Thomas M. 
Leonard, Central America and the United States: The search for stability (Athens and London 
1991) 90-91; Gilderhus, Second Century, 71-108; Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States. A 
history of U.S. policy toward Latin America (Cambridge and London 1998) 290-315; Loveman, No 
Higher Law, 238-252. 
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Maximiliano Hernandez Martínez (1931-1944) in El Salvador, and Anastasio Somoza 
(1936-1956) in Nicaragua. In El Salvador, tensions between the landless and the 
landowners led to violent state repression. Yet violence was not the norm. The new 
governments in all countries combined authoritarian tactics with some form of 
nationalism, populism, social justice, and economic programs aimed at the masses. 
These tactics were evidently successful, since—like in the rest of Latin America and in 
Europe—populist authoritarians ruled until at least the end of the Second World War.7 
 
The fact that dictatorships were established in Central America after American Marines 
left the region raises an important question for historians: Is there a connection between 
these developments? More specifically: Did “these corrupt, repressive regimes (…) 
[come] into existence because of inadvertence or conscious design on the part of the 
United States?”8 Some historians have opted for the first interpretation: That there is a 
connection between the two developments but that it was inadvertent. During the post-
war decades, when Classic Realism held sway among American historians, the received 
wisdom was that starry-eyed American diplomats, imbued with Wilsonian idealism, had 
intended the U.S. Marines to export democracy to the Caribbean during the 1920s. 
When these democratic experiments failed and the Marines withdrew, local strongmen 
used the resulting power vacuum to install their own governments. In describing the rise 
to power of General Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, for example, historians 
Atkins and Wilson argue that this could not be otherwise.9 
A more popular interpretation, however, is that U.S. policy-makers in the early 
1930s were not ready to let the chips fall where they may after the departure of the 
Marines. To a more or less active degree, depending on the book one reads about this 
matter, U.S. policy makers identified and then supported local dictators who had the will 
                                                 
7 Dodd and Grieb tend to stress the modernizing aspects of the new regimes: Dodd, Carías;  
Grieb, Guatemalan Caudillo. In his preface, Grieb even notes that one purpose of his book is to 
nuance the overwhelmingly negative literature on Ubico. A very expansive German book on the 
Ubico regime discusses the accomplishments of the caudillo in minute detail: Stefan Karlen, "Paz, 
progreso, justicia y honradez": Das Ubico-Regime in Guatemala, 1931-1944 (Stuttgart 1991). A 
Guatemalan chronicle of presidents contains photographs of Ubico’s public works in the capital: 
Héctor Gaitián A., Los Presidentes de Guatemala. Historia y Anécdotas (Guatemala C.A. 2009) 
91-99. Many authors tend to weigh the negative aspects of increased repression against the 
positive aspects of economic development: Gilderhus, The second century, 73-78; Parkman, 
Nonviolent insurrection, 20; Morris, Caudillos Politics, 8-12; Weaver, Inside the Volcano, chapter 
4; Lewis, Authoritarian Regimes, 71. Some historians are largely negative in their judgment about 
the caudillos: Edelberto Torres Rivas, “Central America since 1930: An overview”, in: Leslie 
Bethell ed., The Cambridge History of Latin America. Volume VII: Latin America since 1930, 
Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean (Cambridge at al. 1990); Dunkerly, Long War, 31-34; 
Handy, Gift of the Devil, 90-97; ”De la Esperanza Democrática de Posguerra a la Crisis (1920-
1929)”, in: Víctor Hugo Acuña Ortega, Historia General de Centroamérica. Tomo IV: Las 
Repúblicas Agroexportatoras (Madrid 1993) 225-249 ; Victor Bulmer-Thomas, “La Crisis de la 
economía de agroexportación (1930-1945), in: Idem, 325-363 ; Argueta, Carías, passim, but 
especially 371-378.   
8 Mark T. Gilderhus, The second century. U.S.-Latin American relations since 1889 (Wilmington, 
DE 2000) 79. 
9 Atkins and Wilson, The United States and Trujillo, 151-164. 
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and the means to do the Marine’s job: Keep Central America stable and firmly within the 
U.S. sphere of influence. The English historian Jenny Pierce has fittingly described this 
supposed event as the “Somoza solution”, named after the most notorious dictator who 
came to power in this period. 10  While some realists have subscribed to this 
interpretation11, it is most often adopted by those who whish the expose the dark nature 
of U.S. imperialism in the Caribbean—that is, by Revisionist historians. 
There are many variants of the “Somoza solution” hypothesis—and by no means 
have all of these deal with Anastasio Somoza—some decidedly more sophisticated than 
others. The general argument is that when the United States was forced to withdraw its 
Marines from the Caribbean in the early 1930s, Washington officials devised an 
inexpensive plan to keep order in America’s backyard without involving U.S. troops. 
Before they withdrew, the Marines trained and armed national constabularies that would 
keep the peace in the Caribbean republics. Washington readily tolerated that the chiefs 
of these national armies took command over their governments after the Marines had left 
and throughout the 30s and 40s it would depend on these dictatorial proxies to do the 
job the United States Marine Corps used to do.12 
Similarly—but from a constructivist angle—David Schmitz argues that U.S. 
policymakers from the 1920s onward believed that “Non-Western European people were 
(…) incapable of handling the difficult demands of democratic rule”. Thus, it was easy 
and quite natural for Washington to accept and support the rise of dictatorial rule in 
Central America. “American officials resolved the contradiction between nonintervention 
and allowing self-determination and the desire for stability by supporting Somoza”. 13 
Perhaps most recently, Brian Loveman argued in his concise monograph on U.S.-Latin 
American relations that, during the 1930s, “some U.S. objectives could be achieved (…) 
by installing “elected” dictatorship, buttressed by the constabularies created during the 
American occupation regimes. Such governments could be substituted for direct U.S. 
administration. So eventually Rafael Trujillo came to power in the Dominican Republic, 
as did the Somoza dynasty in Nicaragua, among other American-supported tyrants”.14 
                                                 
10 Jenny Pearce, Under the eagle: U.S. intervention in Central America and the Caribbean (1982) 
20-25. It is by no means a generally accepted term, but will be used here as a convenient 
shorthand. 
11 Gaddis, We now know, 35. 
12 Brian Loveman and Thomas Davies, The politics of antipolitics: The military in Latin America 
(Lincoln 1978) 7-8; Karl Bernmann, Under the Big Stick. Nicaragua and the United States since 
1848 (Boston 1986); Michael L. Krenn, U.S. policy toward economic nationalism in Latin America, 
1917-1929 (Wilmington 1990) 64-65 and 148-149; Blachman and Sharpe, “The transitions”, in: 
Lious W. Goodman et al. eds., Political parties and democracy in Central America (Boulder, Colo, 
1992); Peter H. Smith, Talons of the eagle. Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American relations (New York 
and Oxford 1996) especially chapters 2 and 3; Schoultz, Beneath the United States, 271; Max 
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Some proponents of the Somoza solution theory have taken their claims to the 
extreme of arguing that Washington actively and consciously identified the men who 
should lead Central America after the departure of the Marines and then helped them to 
acquire and hold dictatorial powers for decades to come.15 Such an argument both 
underestimates Central Americans’ capacity for self-determination and overestimates 
Washington’s capacity to dictate events in other countries. Frederick Weaver 
convincingly argues, for example, that “it is historically inaccurate, analytically misleading 
and patronizing to attribute too much influence to external forces” and concludes that 
“the very real importance of foreign influences has to be understood in the context of 
Central American nations’ internal dynamics”. Moreover, the Central American rise of 
dictatorship was part of a world-wide, post-war and post-depression development that 
brought to power militaristic and authoritarian governments across the globe, including 
countries where the United States had no influence over internal events at all.16 Many 
specialists in Central American history and politics (as opposed to diplomatic history) 
have described the rise of Central American dictatorship as a factor of largely local 
developments in the political, social, and economic life of the region.17 Even if a measure 
of U.S. influence in all these developments cannot be denied, the rise of the caudillos 
was a much more complicated process than a case of basically “propping up” dictators. 
Hence, the most sophisticated elaborations of the Somoza solution hypothesis 
suggest that there was a convergence of interests between U.S. policy makers and 
Central American dictators around 1930. Walter LaFeber, for example, argues that the 
United States maintained a system of economic dependency backed up by 
politico/military might in Central America since the beginning of the 20th century. Rather 
than consciously install dictatorships in the early 1930s, Washington easily accepted the 
rise of the caudillos and started to support them, because they fitted the pre-existing 
system so easily and would eventually become integral parts of it. “Deals were easily 
struck” between Washington and the dictators because the former needed proxies to 
maintain the status quo while the latter needed U.S. recognition and access to the New 
York money market. Thus, the “United States (…) accepted, and soon welcomed, 
dictatorships in Central America because it turned out that such rulers could most 
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cheaply uphold order. Dictators were not a paradox but a necessity for the system, 
including the Good Neighbor policy”.18 
Despite the elegance with which this interpretation synthesizes a wide array of 
sources on American foreign policy over a period of many decades, there are several 
problems. The Somoza solution hypothesis presupposes a determination and single-
mindedness in U.S. policy that is difficult—if not impossible—to find at the micro-level. 
The U.S. legations’ handling of the elections that brought two caudillos to power do not 
in any way conform to the “Somoza solution” hypothesis. It is important to bear in mind 
that—in contrast to later historians—none of the American ministers in Central America 
had any way of knowing that the men who were elected to office in the early 1930s 
would build up dictatorships that were unprecedented, in terms of the reach of their 
power and the length of their rule, in Central American history. Neither did any of the 
legations show an interest in establishing local dictatorships. Indeed, around 1930 all the 
legations in Central America were determined to have free and fair elections. Rather 
than propping up dictatorships, the organization of local elections under the tutelage of 
the American legations was considered the most effective way to assure stability in the 
region. 
 
2. THE ELECTIONS OF THE EARLY 1930S 
Between 1930 and 1932, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras were al set to have 
presidential elections. The elections in Guatemala and Honduras produced two 
presidents—General Jorge Ubico and General Tubircio Carías—who have been 
identified by historians as the sort of authoritarian leaders who were part of the “Somoza 
solution” for Central America. Salvadorans elected one Arturo Araujo to power. This 
leader has been largely ignored by historians because he was removed from power by a 
military coup after a couple of months in office. The circumstances surrounding Araujo’s 
election, however, are perfectly in line with events in Guatemala and Honduras. 
 
2.1 Ubico wins in Guatemala 
When minister Sheldon Whitehouse arrived in Guatemala, the country was ruled by 
General Lázaro Chacón of the Liberal Party. Chacón had been president since 1926, 
when he was elected by a margin of 250,000 votes over his opponent from the 
Progressive Party: Jorge Ubico. As the Depression set in, however, things went downhill 
for Chacón. His administration was unable to deal with the economic difficulties and it 
suspended constitutional guarantees several times to deal with disturbances and plots. 
Whitehouse himself was convinced that Chacón would not last if his administration was 
unable to deal with the economic difficulties of the country. In his reports to Washington, 
Whitehouse expressed his “devout” hope that American bankers could float a loan to 
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help the Guatemalan government to stabilize the internal situation.19 The minister also 
had high hopes for United Fruit Company (UFCO) plans to built a modern port on 
Guatemala’s Pacific coast.20 He was quickly disappointed.  
On July 9, Whitehouse ruefully admitted that “Chacón has none of the qualities of 
a president”. In fact, the president lacked “firmness” and “his intelligence is so limited 
that he is unable to understand anything of the problems of government”. Whitehouse 
reported to Washington that Chacón’s cabinet ministers were plotting against their chief 
and against each other while the opposition in the National Assembly was exploiting the 
confused situation to defeat any proposal that had the potential to strengthen the 
government. Among such proposals were a foreign loan and the UFCO contract to build a 
Pacific port, exactly those projects that Whitehouse believed to be essential. The 
minister denounced the “ludicrous” criticism leveled at the proposals in the assembly and 
blamed “political passions” from obscuring the merits of both plans. Unless the president 
would show “unexpected firmness” in the near future, Whitehouse was pessimistic that 
he would be able to “finish his (…) term in peace”.21 
Despite Whitehouse’s pessimism about the future of the Chacón regime, its end 
came unexpectedly. In fact, Guatemala’s government fell apart in December 1930—
while minister Whitehouse was vacationing in Florida. Admittedly, the event that pushed 
Guatemala over the edge could not have been foreseen. President Chacón reportedly 
suffered from a stroke on December 13 and presidential power was temporarily invested 
in a presidential designate, as prescribed by the Guatemalan constitution. 
The political situation took another turn three days later. In the afternoon of 
December 16, the chargé d’affaires of the American legation, William McCafferty, was 
startled by gunfire in the streets. He quickly sent a telegram to Washington: “A revolution 
apparently started at 4 p.m. today (…) I believe it is a revolt of the Army against the 
Government”. As it turned out, several army leaders had been planning a revolt against 
Chacón—who they believed was to blame for their declining influence in politics—for 
some time and they now used the president’s incapacitation as a pretext to declare that 
the caretaker government was unconstitutional. After some confused days of fighting 
and negotiating, one General Manuel Orellana, the leader of the revolt, had himself 
elected provisional president by the National Assembly.22  
“We are not amused”, yelled a Time Magazine header when it reported on the 
Orellana coup.23 Indeed, the legation and the State Department agreed at an early date 
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that Orellana’s reign was unacceptable in the light of the 1923 Treaty.24 In Guatemala, 
the job at hand was to put the government back on a constitutional basis while avoiding 
the appearance of direct intervention. This job fell to Sheldon Whitehouse who hastily 
returned from his vacation.  
The first thing Whitehouse did when he came back was to devise a plan to put the 
Guatemalan government back on a constitutional basis. The eventual arrangement was 
to have Chacón resign his presidency. Orellana would then have to resign his 
“provisional” presidency as well, as he was technically only Chacón’s replacement. Upon 
Orellana’s elimination, the National Assembly would elect new designates to the 
presidency (since the former designates were either dead or had resigned). The First 
Designate to the Presidency would automatically become provisional president and call 
for new presidential elections. As Whitehouse admitted, there were some constitutional 
roadblocks in his complicated scheme, but “no one would make any difficulty about it”.25 
Naturally, Orellana and his companions did create difficulties and the second task 
was to get the General to work along. On December 24, Whitehouse decided to have a 
chat with him. Happily, the minister’s experience in France and Spain made him “rather 
good” at “personal encounters with Latins”.26 Whitehouse quite bluntly told Orellana that 
Washington’s decision not to recognize him was “final” and that further discussions were 
“futile”. He then outlined the plan he had construed to put Guatemalan government on a 
“sound” constitutional basis. Some days later, Orellana came around to the fact that the 
Americans would not accept him and decided to play along. On December 29 Chacón 
resigned the presidency under the watchful eye of Whitehouse, who was present at the 
official ceremony, while negotiations on the election of a provisional president were 
under way.27 
Throughout the whole encounter with Orellana, the American minister attempted to 
maximize the power of his office by requesting special assistance from Washington. 
Quite unexpectedly, as it would appear, he was told by his superiors that the non-
intervention policy posed new limits on his actions. Citing the possibility that Orellana 
may cause trouble for a future provisional president, Whitehouse requested that an 
American war vessel be sent to the Guatemalan coast. He even suggested that the 
captain of the ship come ashore with a few officers and pay his respects to the eventual 
provisional president to strengthen the latter’s position.28 One day later, the minister was 
kindly informed by his superiors that such action would not be contemplated unless it 
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was to protect American lives and property. In fact, the initial draft of the answer to 
Whitehouse was a very terse cable stating “I [Stimson] am not convinced that a warship 
is necessary under present conditions. Please continue to report”. 29  Somewhat 
defensively, Whitehouse answered that he did not “mean to imply that it would be 
necessary to send any forces to the Capital, but merely that the presence of a warship in 
port would have a quieting effect”.30  
Nearly everyone at this time was somewhat confused over what non-intervention 
should mean. Orellana was no exception. Even though he decided to play along with the 
schemes of the American minister, he was definitely not convinced that all the talk about 
legality and elections was sincere. When Whitehouse had the General over at the 
legation to discuss the future of Guatemala, the latter was surprised to hear that none of 
the revolutionaries should join the future provisional government and that the new 
provisional president should not meddle in the planned elections. Orellana chose to 
ignore the first statement, but could not hide his surprise over the second one. Did the 
minister really want free elections, he asked. Whitehouse wrote the Department that he 
“naturally replied in the affirmative”. For the General, who had been pushed around by 
the Americans for several days, it was probably hard to believe that they would now 
hand over all power to the people.31  
But Whitehouse was sincere in his insistence that all constitutional and democratic 
procedures should be followed during the elections. It is true that the American minister 
hardly respected Guatemalan politics. He believed that the Guatemalan people were 
basically passive while their “representatives” in the National Assembly were all too 
easily swayed by political passions. He also scoffed at the prevailing influence of corrupt 
opportunists, military men, and “political crooks” in Guatemala.32 He nonetheless thought 
that the American policy of discouraging revolutions and promoting constitutional 
procedures had a “moral benefit to Central America”. Such benevolent effects would be 
lost, however, “if we content ourselves with a sham”.33  
As one Guatemala expert has argued, the field of potential candidates for the 
presidency that Whitehouse’s scheme allowed for was extremely limited. In the eyes of 
many Guatemalans, former collaborators of Chacón were discredited by the inefficiency 
and corruption of that regime. Members of the revolutionary forces under Orellana were 
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told by Whitehouse that they were barred from the elections. The only realistic candidate 
that stood a chance to be elected was General Jorge Ubico.34  
Whitehouse and his colleagues at the legation certainly did not regret the strong 
position of the General. In fact, the legation had considered Ubico a likely and desirable 
future president even before minister Whitehouse arrived in Guatemala.35 Whitehouse 
himself was no less impressed by the merits of the General. Some of the characteristics 
that stand out in the way the legation described Ubico were his honesty, his efficiency, 
his pro-American standpoints, and his strength of character. No less important was the 
legation’s belief that Ubico had a very large popular following. There is no denying that 
the American legation had substantial reasons to trust and like Ubico. His honesty and 
efficiency were evident from his governorship over the Guatemalan department of 
Retalhuleu. The General’s popularity was evident from several public demonstrations in 
his favor during the turbulent month of December 1930. Lastly, Ubico himself sought to 
actively ingratiate himself with the Americans by visiting the legation to give witness to 
his distaste for rebellions and his active support for the U.S. position.36  
When Whitehouse argued on December 28 that the U.S. could not afford to 
content itself with “a sham” in the upcoming Guatemalan elections, he was not yet 
certain that Ubico would actually be elected. There is no evidence to suggest that the 
American legation gave any inappropriate support to Ubico’s campaign. Neither would 
that have been necessary, as it was soon clear that he was the only candidate. The 
political vacuum that allowed Ubico’s ascendancy to the presidential palace was clearly 
caused by Whitehouse’s scheming, but there is no reason to assume that the minister 
realized the implications of his actions as far as Ubico’s rise to power was concerned. So 
while it is clear that Whitehouse was not “propping up” a dictatorship, it is interesting to 
see how the he reconciled the fact that Ubico was the sole candidate to the presidency, 
with his earlier insistence on free elections. 
Throughout the months of January and February, Whitehouse argued to his 
superiors in Washington that Ubico would have been the winner in a hypothetical 
contested campaign for the presidency: “In spite of the fact that he is the only candidate, 
there is very little doubt but that General Ubico is the choice of the large majority of the 
people of Guatemala”. 37  Such widespread enthusiasm for Ubico, according to 
Whitehouse, was a reaction to “utter incapacity and widespread dishonesty of the 
Chacón administration”. In contrast to earlier presidents, Ubico was regarded as a man 
of “absolute honesty, of intelligence and ability” and as the only man capable of “bringing 
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order out of chaos”.38 It is striking that the minister described Ubico as the exact opposite 
of Chacón, who was portrayed by the legation as inefficient, incapable, corrupt, and 
ignorant. Conversely, Ubico was described as capable, strong, and intelligent. One of his 
more outstanding qualities, one that Whitehouse stressed on almost every occasion, 
was his honesty. The minister approvingly reported that one of Ubico’s campaign 
promises was to disclose all his possessions at the beginning of his term (something that 
the General actually did), so that a comparison could be made when he left office.39 If 
there was anyone who was not looking forward to Ubico’s presidency with “any too great 
joy”, Whitehouse opined, that would be because he was “crooked”.40 Another major point 
to Ubico’s credit was his pro-Americanism (which was probably also regarded as 
evidence for his intelligence). Ubico told Whitehouse that “it was impossible to ignore the 
fact that Guatemala needs the cooperation of North Americans to solve satisfactorily the 
many problems which are essential for the progress of the country”.41  
By the end of January 1931, Whitehouse looked forward to Ubico’s presidency 
with careful optimism. His only major concern was that the old political crooks would try 
something to “remove General Ubico to a better world”. This, he expected, would lead to 
“utter chaos”. If Ubico would be able to “fill out his term”, the minister believed that he 
would “leave Guatemala a prosperous little country”.42  This statement suggests that 
Whitehouse expected Ubico to fill out his term and then leave the presidency. Such 
expectations were justified by Ubico’s own promise that he would change Guatemala’s 
electoral law to prevent “old abuses” that enabled the government to remain in power 
“against the popular will”. This, according to Whitehouse, would remove “one of the 
principle causes of revolution”, making Guatemala a more stable country.43  
After Ubico was, inevitably, elected, Whitehouse rejoiced that the General would 
be an excellent, and therefore atypical, Guatemalan president. Despite the special 
conditions under which the General would be elected, Whitehouse did not doubt that 
Ubico was the choice of the people. Neither did the minister believe that the General 
would abuse his power to enrich himself or to stay in power. At least as far as 
Whitehouse was concerned, Jorge Ubico was the honestly elected head of state of 
Guatemala. He did not use the word “dictatorship” for months to come.  
 
Toward the end of 1932, after Ubico had been in power for some months, the U.S. Army 
Attaché in Guatemala, one captain Harris, reported that the Ubico administration 
represented a “truly (…) radical innovation for Guatemala”. The captain mainly quoted 
Ubico’s honesty and efficiency in support of this claim.44 There is every indication to 
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believe that the legation agreed with the attaché on the revolutionary (in the sense of 
progressive or innovative) nature of the Ubico administration.  
In part, the American perception of the revolutionary quality of Ubico’s 
administration was due to his official policy of government honesty. minister Whitehouse 
was very prejudiced about the sobriety and honesty of Guatemalan politicians. He and 
his colleagues at the legation appreciated that, much like them, Ubico was “disgusted” 
with the corruption of his predecessors.45 When Ubico was sworn into the presidency, he 
had an American accountant’s firm make an inventory of his possessions. In that way, 
his wealth at the end of his term could be compared with that at the beginning of his term. 
The president expected his subordinates to do the same and in April 1931 he introduced 
the Law of Honesty (Ley de Probidad) to fight corruption in government circles.46 While 
these measures undoubtedly caused some resentment in a country where “gratuities” 
were considered an acceptable addition to the low wage of many civil servants, the 
legation may have been too quick in identifying opponents of Ubico as disgruntled 
grafters. For example, in August 1931, Whitehouse admitted that two men who had 
recently been accused of graft were political enemies of Ubico and hence, many people 
felt that the official stress on honesty was “nothing more than an attempt to discredit and 
eliminate political opponents”. However, said the minister, “[o]fficial dishonesty and theft 
were so widespread and had so many ramifications during the preceding administration 
that it will be virtually impossible to punish all alike. The action of the government will 
certainly engender a spirit of resentment and revenge among politicians who feel 
themselves discriminated against and this may cause them to engage in subversive 
activities”.47  
A second point that characterized the Ubico administration, according to the 
legation, was his “strength”, “effectiveness”, “firmness”, “energy”, etc. One cannot 
escape the impression that these terms, which are commonly used to describe Ubico in 
many reports, sometimes act as euphemisms for the more authoritarian aspects of his 
rule. While the American legation under Whitehouse rarely (if at all) went so far as to 
suggest that Ubico’s “firmness” bordered on the authoritarian, the army attaché in the 
same period did admit that Ubico was also “violent”, “ruthless”, “harsh”, and even 
“autocratic”. 48  However, neither the legation nor the military attachés regarded this 
aspect of Ubico’s rule, whether it is described as “strong” or “autocratic”, as a weakness. 
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In fact, when compared to Whitehouse’s evaluation of Chacón, the minister appreciated 
the fact that Ubico got things done. For example, Whitehouse felt that it was a good 
thing that Ubico “dominated” the Legislative Assembly, since it enabled the General to 
enact “good legislation”. Among such legislation were measures to balance the budget, 
fight corruption, or to sign a contract with UFCO, so that the modern port that Whitehouse 
had been lobbying for since the Chacón days could finally be built.49  
Whitehouse believed that Guatemala needed a “strong” leader and that Ubico 
“undoubtedly has the interests of the country at heart”. The minister ignored the 
possibility that the centralization of power that was taking place under Ubico could lead 
to undesired outcomes. Six months after Ubico was elected to office, Whitehouse for the 
first time (and apparently the last) admitted that “because of [Ubico’s] strong and 
dominating character and his violent temper (…) the fear is expressed that in time he will 
become a dictator”. However, the minister wrote, Ubico was handicapped by the 
economic depression and financial difficulties and if he were just given some more time, 
“a decided improvement in the Government will be brought about”.50  
A last point which was greatly appreciated in Ubico’s mode of administration was 
his progressivism. The greatest innovation in this field was that Ubico did not only 
develop the capital—as his predecessors had done—but also the backward and 
neglected countryside. The president’s public works projects reached the countryside 
and he took a personal interest in the well-being of the Indian communities. Early on, the 
General made it his habit to visit the provinces on annual inspection trips. During those 
trips, Ubico inspected roads and other projects, dispensed personal justice during mass 
audiences with the locals; and checked the books of his jefes politicos (the military 
governors of the provinces). Trough these visits, the General obtained “first hand 
information concerning the problems, difficulties and abuses in the outlying sections” and 
this made “an excellent impression on the people of the provinces” who in the past had 
been prone to “support revolutionary movements against the Government in the more 
favored capital city”.51  
 
2.2 Araujo wins in El Salvador 
The smallest of all the Central American republics, El Salvador was also one of the 
richest and most developed countries in the region, thanks to its prosperous coffee 
plantations. The republic was often said to be ruled by only “14 families” representing the 
most powerful coffee barons. These “14 families” were in reality an invention of the U.S. 
press, although there were some 60 families that could be said to dominate the country’s 
economic life. The reins of government were in the hands of a single family, known as 
the Quiñónez-Menendez dynasty. While the politicians from this dynasty were looked 
down upon as parvenus by Salvador’s aristocratic coffee planters, the family did make 
sure to favor the coffee interests and was therefore benignly tolerated by the capitalist 
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sections. By the late 1920s, however, the family was under some pressure to open up 
the political leadership to contenders from other families. Then president Alfonso 
Quiñónez Molina, who was pressured by the U.S. legation to quit his plans for 
continuance in office in light of the 1923 Treaty, decided in 1927 to hand over the 
presidency to one Pío Romero Bosque. The latter was a protégé of president Quiñónez 
and was expected to merely serve as a front for the continued political dominance of 
Quiñónez-Menendez family. However, in an amazing volte-face, Romero Bosque turned 
against his former protectors almost as soon as he was installed in the presidential 
palace. But instead of setting up a ruling dynasty of his own, he announced his absolute 
determination to have free and fair elections when his term ended in 1931.52 
Initially, the American legation did not sympathize with President Romero’s plan for 
free elections. Throughout the early part of 1930, chargé William W. Schott was skeptical 
about the whole affair: 
The longer one observes the progress of the present experiment in “free 
suffrage” the more apparent become the difficulties which it must encounter 
in this country of an extremely high percentage of illiteracy and an utter lack 
of public opinion and political capacity. Republicanism fits the situation rather 
than democracy and the direction of the administration must be held in the 
hands of a few. Unfortunately, the few have been politicians, with little 
interest taken by the land-owners and capitalists.53 
Hence, Schott preferred to see a bigger role for the “cultured gentlemen” of the 
aristocracy who controlled the economic life of the country and were talking constantly 
about necessary reforms and progress. Schott regretted to report however that these 
men were not united or organized and that “thus far, they have displayed little courage or 
initiative or public spirit, to crystallize their thoughts into actions”. There was one wealthy 
coffee grower, Arturo Araujo, whose “dream” it was to be swept into office by a wave of 
popular enthusiasm, but that dream was easily crushed by Schott: “…the masses are not 
sufficiently politically minded to create a general popular opinion—it does not exist”.54 
As the campaign for the presidency progressed throughout 1930, a confusing 
array of candidates popped up: Old-school caudillos, landowners, diplomats, and army 
Generals. Many of them were experienced Salvadoran politicians who were not 
accustomed to, and did not recognize the necessity for, rallying the voters. Instead, by 
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complicated maneuvers that had been perfected over decades of political infighting, they 
attempted to get enough support from influential interest groups to force the president to 
pick one of them as the next official candidate for executive office.55 It is this side of the 
political picture that Schott reported to Washington, but he did regret that the campaign 
resolved solely around personalities and not around any sort of momentous cause.56 The 
chargé resolutely refused to report seriously on the popular campaign of Araujo, who 
“has persisted in an absurd and dangerous campaign to draw the masses. He spreads 
the doctrine of division of property, and he is reported to have offered cabinet positions 
to laborers [!]”.57 
In September of that year, chargé Schott was relieved by minister Robbins, who 
returned to Salvador after an extended absence.58 With this change of personnel, the 
line of reporting of the legation immediately softened. For one, Robbins considered it 
possible that Salvador might have a “semblance” of free elections if the president 
refrained from forcing through his own candidate in the last minute.59 Furthermore, the 
minister started reporting the chances of some of the candidates, if free elections were 
held.  
Initially, Robbins was not favorably impressed with the field of candidates that had 
formed during the previous months. Both military candidates, General Maximiliano 
Hernández Martínez and General Antonio Claramount Lucero, enjoyed some respect 
and support outside of the army, but they were not leadership material according to the 
U.S. minister. Of the four civilian candidates, only Araujo and Alberto Gomez Zarate 
seemed to take their campaigns seriously, but the former had squandered his support 
from the property owners by his stand on labor matters while the latter did not strike 
Robbins as a particularly strong man. In all, “there is not much to choose from, and each 
[candidate] is, I think, the equal in ability to the present incumbent [i.e. rather bad]”. 
Solely for this reason, Robbins suggested that he would follow a policy of not “showing 
favoritism for any candidate”, and to limit himself to advising president Romero Bosque 
on steps to be taken to assure orderly and fair elections for all candidates.60 The State 
Department, which favored non-intervention for the sake of broader policy considerations, 
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naturally informed its minister that such a policy would be acceptable, although it did not 
educate Robbins on its changing policy guidelines.61 
In the months following, Robbins kept to his pronounced policy, even if his reports 
started to show a slight bias towards Araujo. Robbins acknowledged that the latter was 
very popular with the poor and had the best chances of winning a fair election.62 Despite 
Araujo’s wooing of the labor vote, the minister may have been comforted by Araujo’s 
announcement that his government would be one for the people (not by the people) and 
that it would favor equal distribution of work (not of property).63 In the end, Robbins 
deemed any kind of social overturn or radical revolution unlikely anyway. Perhaps 
indirectly referring to Araujo’s background, the minister noted that: “I cannot help but 
believe that in this very thickly populated country where practically every acre of land is 
owned by rich and poor, there is not much chance of a revolution for the reason that 
there are too many property owners who have much to loose”.64 Ignoring the chances of 
social unrest, Robbin’s policy of ensuring relatively free and fair elections focused on two 
stumbling blocs: The intentions of the military and those of President Romero Bosque. 
Robbins regarded the threat of a military coup as greater than that of a social 
revolution. 65  The capital’s chief of police also seems to have been alive to such 
possibility. Interestingly, the chief believed that the United States would help El Salvador 
protect itself against its own armed forces and asked Robbins whether he could arrange 
to have a U.S. cruiser and bombing planes from Nicaragua stand by in case of trouble. 
While Robbins considered this “rather a large order”, he did request the authority from 
the State Department to call upon such forces in case of an army rebellion in El 
Salvador. 66  The Department was, of course, quick and thorough in disabusing its 
minister of the notion that he had the authority to summon these forces: Under no 
circumstance would bombing planes be sent to Salvador and a war vessel could only be 
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dispatched on orders from Washington if American lives and property were in direct 
danger.67 
Whether Robbins understood how unusual his request was in the context of 
broader policy is not clear (his initial request was rather nonchalant in tone). Anyway, it 
did not temper his resolution to discourage any ill-considered military move, although he 
did change tactics, now opting for diplomacy over gunboats. Following the Orellana 
military coup in Guatemala, Robbins counseled the Department to withhold recognition 
from the Orellana regime so that events in Guatemala would not have a negative effect 
in Salvador. 68  Some days later, the minister even requested permission to publicly 
declare that the United States would abide by the Treaty of 1923.69 This alone, the 
embassy hoped, would discourage any plotters from moving against the government. In 
January, Robbins noted that the example of American policy toward Guatemala was of 
great help, since the Salvadoran military clique would doubtlessly have committed a 
coup if Orellana had been recognized.70  
  
Up to the start of the elections, Robbins distrusted Romero Bosque and became very 
concerned that the president would reverse course and “railroad through” his own 
candidate at the last moment.71 One week before the elections, Robbins got personally 
involved and went to have a talk with the president “and in very strong terms urged him 
to do his utmost to have constitutional elections”. Combining strong terms with flattery, 
the minister “went so far as to say that [this] would make Salvador famous”.72 Even on 
the eve of the elections, Robbins was “very much in doubt” that president Romero would 
allow the chips to fall where they may. He was still convinced that Araujo made a good 
chance to win the elections—his chances had even improved somewhat since one of the 
military candidates, Hernández Martínez, had joined his ticket as the vice-presidential 
candidate.73 However, Salvadoran law determined that if a presidential candidate did not 
get more than 50% of the vote, the National Assembly would determine the winner.74 So 
even if Araujo did receive a plurality of votes, the game was not over yet.  
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On January 12, three anxious days of voting started. The sale of liquor was 
prohibited75 during the voting days and soldiers armed with machine guns patrolled the 
streets of the capital.76 President Romero, instead of meddling in the elections, attended 
a high mass to pray for peaceful elections.77 On the second day of voting, there was a 
minor crisis when the populist General Claramount called on his colleagues in the army 
to reject the elections and call for a constitutional convention. The chief of police 
immediately informed the American legation about this development and Robbins again 
requested that the Department send a war vessel to Salvador.78 Even though Robbins 
made no mention of American lives being in danger, the Department this time decided to 
send a cruiser to Corinto, which is in Nicaraguan waters but close enough to Salvador to 
employ swiftly in case of trouble.79 As it turned out, the ship arrived when the crisis was 
already over. Fortunately, Salvador’s many Generals did not have the stomach for a 
revolution at that time and Claramount eventually decided, in a somewhat melodramatic 
move, to offer his sword to the president in submission.80 
In the end, Araujo did get most votes, but not a majority. This meant that the 
National Assembly would choose a winner from the top three candidates. Happily, 
Araujo and his allies also secured 39 out of 42 seats in Salvador’s Assembly (the 
elections for national deputies had occurred at the same time as the presidential 
elections). The number two candidate, Gomez Zarate who had the support of the 
wealthiest families in Salvador, was not ready to roll over and surrender, however. He 
and his financial backers gathered an army more fearsome than Claramount’s 30 odd 
General friends: A team of lawyers who would dispute the procedures of the election.81 
Faced with this challenge to his imminent victory, Araujo anxiously told minister 
Robbins that he could not stand for the behavior of his supporters if the outcome of the 
elections was contested.82 Even though Robbins was not charmed by Araujo’s implied 
threats, he was anxious that Salvador’s first truly popular elections—which, incidentally, 
he believed would reflect favorably on his own track record in Salvador—would end in 
civil strive. Thus the minister stepped in: 
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On [Araujo] leaving me at three, I sent for a representative of Gomez Zarate 
and merely said to him, without mentioning that Araujo had been to see me, 
that I thought it would be a disaster to the country, after reports of free and 
square elections had been broadcast over the world that these reports 
should be disproved by a demand for recount or an accusation of fraudulent 
elections. I further suggested that I thought it would be far better to try and 
get together with Araujo. He replied that the Zaratistas were willing to do this 
to which I merely replied that I was very glad. 
Both factions took due notice: The next day, Robbins’ mere suggestions had been 
followed up and correctly executed. 83  On February 10, the National Assembly 
unanimously elected Araujo president without intervention from his opponents.84 
Despite his earlier pessimism, Robbins was now quite pleased about the 
elections—and about himself. After congratulating the president, the chief of police, and 
the Salvadoran people in a newspaper article85, the minister turned his attention to the 
State Department, which, in his opinion, had not shown adequate appreciation for the 
historic events in El Salvador. Somewhat to the minister’s distress, the world at large 
remained oblivious to events in Salvador. Therefore, he wrote personal letters to his 
contacts in the Department that reveal a lot more about his interpretation of the elections 
than his carefully worded political reports do. To Michael McDermott, the Chief of the 
Division of Current Information, Robbins wrote that not one word about the “historic” 
elections in Salvador had appeared in the American press, and that the only explanation 
could be that the “young man” at the Salvador desk had “obviously” been “asleep at the 
switch”. The minister hoped that Mac would be a good friend and play this up for all it 
was worth. In a “Dear Francis” letter to the assistant secretary of state, Robbins noted 
that free and untrammeled elections had “literally (…) not happened before in the history 
of Central America” and that he took “a little pride” in making it happen. If the elections 
were given some publicity, it would show the people of the United States that Salvador 
was “progressing” while it would give Salvadorans some “confidence in themselves”.86  
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Aside from a “particular pride in seeing these elections going so smoothly”, 
Robbins also felt “a considerable satisfaction in seeing Araujo elected”.87 Despite his 
earlier admonition that the legation would not show favor to any candidate, Robbins 
revealed after the elections that Araujo had always been a “friendly and frequent guest” 
of his post.88 While the minister may have had his own reasons for portraying the future 
head of state as a good friend of the legation, Araujo’s recourse to the legation during 
his run-in with the Zarate faction seems to confirm that he was not shy about visiting the 
Americans. 
Robbins was quite optimistic about the future of Salvador after its “historic” election. 
Araujo seemed to him “frank” and “honest” and had made a point of advertising his 
friendship to the United States before the minister on several occasions.89 The new 
president also vehemently denied that he was a communist, as was rumored during the 
campaigns.90 Robbins himself explained that Araujo’s supporters on the countryside may 
have made promises to the peasants that Araujo never authorized. Many peasants 
expected the coming of the millennium after Araujo’s election and may have been led to 
believe that the lands of their masters would be divided among the workers by the new 
administration. Robbins notes that although Araujo anxiously sought the rural votes, it is 
unlikely that he ever promised land reform, since he was a rich landowner himself and 
would be financially devastated by such a move.91 
Robbins’ enthusiasm about Araujo’s election in El Salvador was premature, 
however. The new president proved unable to deal with the economic and social 
dislocation that characterized the global Depression.92 Not one year passed before he 
was toppled by a “revolutionary directorate” of young army officers. The directorate soon 
put General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez in power. While the General was initially 
considered a puppet of the directorate, he quickly and remorselessly built his own power 
base and stayed in power until 1944.  
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2.3 Carías wins in Honduras 
“Honduran political history through the late 19th and early 20th centuries is such a welter 
of confusion that it is tempting to avoid analysis and present, instead, a satiric panorama 
of tinpot Generals playing musical chairs.” This, at least, is the opinion of Honduras’ 
most sympathetic American chronicler.93  Indeed, by the early 1930s the situation in 
Honduras was very unsettled. Divisions in the ruling Liberal Party; the worldwide 
Depression; the growing power and economic dominance of the American fruit 
companies; and numerous revolts by local political bosses all conspired to upset the 
political and economic life of the republic. To the officers at the American legation, these 
conditions seemed inherent to the land and its people, rather than determined by any 
external factors. “When rumors of an impending revolutions (…) do not circulate”, 
commented the legation’s first secretary, Laurence Higgins, “there is cause for 
wonderment. They are indeed an almost chronic and constant feature of the political life 
in Honduras”.94 
From 1930 onward, the contending parties of Liberals and Nationals (also known 
by their party colors: The Reds and the Blues) were sizing each other up for the 
presidential elections in 1932. Between 1930 and 1932, there were two important 
stepping stones on the way to the presidential palace: The elections for the National 
Assembly in 1930 and the municipal elections in 1931. Somewhat to the surprise of the 
American legation, the Liberal president of Honduras, Vicente Mejía Colindres, allowed 
both elections to be free and fair and the National Party won both of them.  
It is not entirely clear why president Mejía Colindres allowed the elections to be 
free. Granted, he himself, as well as his predecessor, had won the presidency after 
somewhat free elections, but due to Honduras’ “doble vida” of a nominally democratic 
system combined with a party system based on patronage, both those elections had 
been violently contested by those who couldn’t obtain lucrative government positions. So 
in the Honduran context, what was necessary to win an election and to actually win the 
presidency was not just a majority of votes, but also a power base anchored in solid 
patronage network (there was some overlap in these two factors, but the strength of 
one’s patronage network was not necessarily determined by numerical strength). Mejía 
Colindres himself seemed to have lost his own power base by 1930. Both the Nationals 
and a rival group in his own Liberal Party were now pressuring him to allow free 
elections.95 
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Lay’s loose definition and benign vision of intervention, coupled with his patronizing 
attitude toward Hondurans, seem to have had the effect of emboldening him to assume 
an active role in the 1932 elections. He was determined to make sure that whoever won 
the elections did so by means of “votes rather than bullets”. 96 As far as shorthands go, 
this was a fair representation of the State Department’s policy of abiding by the 1923 
Treaty. However, Lay’s conception of the American role in bringing about a peaceful and 
fair election was an activist’s one. 
During the 1932 presidential elections, there were two candidates from whom the 
legation might have chosen a favorite: The National Party’s candidate was Tubircio 
Carías. The Liberal Party was represented by the leader of its “radical” wing: Ángel 
Zúñiga Huete. It should be noted that neither of them was an Arturo Araujo. Both of 
these men were traditional rulers of the caudillo type and both had in the past used 
violence when they believed it suited their interests.97 In terms of politics, it is undeniable 
that the State Department preferred the conservative and pro-American National Party. 
The Liberal Party, especially its radical wing under Zúñiga Huete, was considered too 
pro-labor, anti-United Fruit, and even anti-American. Moreover, the Department 
appreciated Carías’ cooperation in the U.S. led negotiations during the presidential 
elections of 1924 and the dignified acceptance of his loss of the 1928 elections.98 Zúñiga 
Huete, on the other hand, was considered an opportunistic labor agitator and was 
vaguely remembered for his alleged role in the “machine gunning” of Carías voters in 
1924.99 
For the man on the spot, however, the lines between good and bad were not so 
clearly drawn. Julius Lay did not acknowledge any serious ideological difference 
between the Liberal and National Parties and considered the presidential election to be a 
simple contest between the “ins” and the “outs” (though both presidential candidates 
could be considered “outs” at this particular time). The minister naturally judged the 
contenders by the supposed merits of their personal characteristics instead of their 
ideological backgrounds. To Lay and his secretaries, Carías seemed to represent all that 
was backward in Honduras: The General always seemed uncomfortable at official 
occasions, he was a bad public speaker, and during his campaign he did not stir from his 
plantation in rural Zambrano. Being unfamiliar with the situation outside the capital, the 
legation had no way of knowing that Carías was building an impressive patronage 
network since at least 1924 and Zambrano was a perfect location from where to manage 
it. To the Americans, his campaigning techniques seemed rudimentary when compared 
to those of his competitor. Moreover, Carías was somewhat of an outlandish appearance: 
He was a very large man—said to be able to break a rifle in two with his bare hands—
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sporting a haystack mustache and having dark, brooding eyes. Carías’ rustic 
appearance led Lay to believe that “his blood is probably mostly Indian and he evinces a 
good proportion of the characteristics of the Honduran Indian, who is a very low type of 
Indian”. Concurrently, the minister deducted that Carías was not a very intelligent 
man.100 
Zúñiga Huete’s campaign, on the other hand, consisted of a rather busy schedule 
of speeches and other public appearances in Honduras’ major towns and commercial 
centers. He even used airplanes and movies to reach as many people as possible. The 
Americans considered his campaign quite “modern” and assumed that it would win him 
many votes. Moreover, Zúñiga Huete thought he had a realistic chance to win the 
elections “the hard way”: By a plurality of votes. Being so close to the presidency, he 
was not prepared to risk loosing it to meddling yanquis. So, as the presidential 
campaigns progressed, Zúñiga Huete toned down his pro-labor and anti-UFCO rhetoric, 
thereby disappointing many laborers but gaining some of the company’s trust in return. 
He also made a point of visiting the American legation to advertise his peaceful 
intentions. These efforts bore fruit: In a candid letter to Whitehouse, Lay admitted that 
“there are many here who fear [Zúñiga Huete’s] radical and dictatorial methods if he 
should become president, but he is an intelligent and forceful character and has learned 
much in the last few years and I am not so sure that he would not be an excellent 
president for Honduras and treat American interests with consideration.”101 
It is remarkable that Lay never confessed his reappraisal of Zúñiga Huete to the 
State Department. Perhaps he was not sure that his superiors would accept his analysis, 
since the Liberal leader was generally known in Washington as a trouble maker. It 
seems fair to conclude, however, that minister Lay had no real favorite in the presidential 
elections of 1932. His behavior during the elections, as it has been recorded in the 
legation’s archives, also appears free of any intentional partiality. But despite being a 
fairly neutral player in the events of 1932, Lay was anything but a passive bystander. He 
was very much interested in ensuring free and fair elections in Honduras.  
Judging that president Mejía did not have the strength of character, or even the 
intelligence, to control all the facets of government policy, the U.S. legation under Lay 
claimed a central role in the conduct of state. Assuming that the Honduran state needed 
secure borders, friendly neighbors, and internal peace to even have a shot at free 
elections, the legation played a part in the obtainment of these objectives that went far 
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beyond a mere mediatory role. From 1930 to 1932, it pushed the Honduran government 
to negotiate border agreements with Guatemala and Nicaragua; had its own personnel 
inspect the borders with Nicaragua to insure that it was adequately guarded from 
incursions by Sandinista troops; and took on a coordinating role during two armed 
rebellions, one led by the Indian leader Gregorio Ferrara and the other by the disgruntled 
National Party caudillo Díaz Zalaye, giving orders to local Honduran commanders 
through its network of consulates.102 
The official campaign for the Honduran presidential elections in October, 1932, 
began in earnest in March of that year. President Mejía Colindres proved himself to be 
an honest proponent of free and fair elections throughout the whole ordeal, but despite 
his efforts, the months leading up to the election proved tense. One source of worry was 
a minor uprising on Honduras’ North Coast, but an even more serious problem was the 
distrust between the contending parties. The Liberal Party controlled the executive arm 
of the government, which included the regional offices of the jefes politicos who were in 
charge of keeping order during the elections. While president Mejía was adamant that 
elections should be free and fair, not all Liberals agreed with him and there was some 
suspicion that the local governors would coerce voters into support for Zúñiga Huete. On 
the other hand, the National Party controlled the municipal authorities, which organized 
the actual voting, giving the Liberals their own reasons to suspect fraud during the 
upcoming elections. While both parties were fully convinced that they enjoyed majority 
support among the populace, both also expected that the other would cheat them out of 
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a fair election victory. Therefore, they were at the same time running an election 
campaign and arming their followers in case the opposing party committed fraud. A 
particularly ominous sign, in the Honduran context, was that Zúñiga Huete ordered large 
quantities of red lint for the production of hatbands.103  
Julius Lay, in the meantime, was royally fed up with the “bitter mudslinging” and 
“partisan attacks” that characterized the campaigns. The uprising in the North was 
beyond his capability to understand, as he could not grasp how its leader could be so 
“unpatriotic” as to start trouble during the election season. He also regretted that the 
contending parties focused on mutual suspicions rather than the “real issues” and found 
that their reciprocal accusations were “petty” and “childish”. While the minister respected 
Mejía Colindres’ effort to have free elections and was also convinced of the latter’s 
sincerity, he believed that the president lacked “severity”. As Lay saw it, the “childish” 
presidential hopefuls needed a firm, fatherly hand to ensure that they would be on their 
best behavior during the elections. He also believed that the lofty end of free elections 
justified the means by which that goal was accomplished. But president Mejía was a 
much too mild-mannered man to provide such guidance. “It is unfortunate that the 
Government has not proven itself strong enough“, Lay reported to the State Department, 
“to accomplish many of the aims for which the Legation has striven”.104 
This last remark hints at the depth of the involvement of Lay’s legation in the 
elections. Having found Mejía Colindres willing but, in Lay’s opinion, unable to control 
the strong forces unleashed by the election campaigns, the minister decided that the 
American legation should be the enforcer of order and the guarantor of untrammeled 
elections. And so, throughout 1932, Lay and the legation’s secretary, Laurence Higgins, 
appeared regularly at the president’s desk with friendly, if somewhat insistent, advice. In 
turn, both Zúñiga Huete and Carías were regular guests of the legation, doubtlessly in 
an effort to manipulate the favor of those meddling yanquis, but in no position to ignore 
Lay’s counsel unless they were willing to risk American displeasure.105 
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Lay’s actions in favor of the elections ranged from his insistence that the 
candidates publish a statement on their peaceful intentions to his coordinating role in the 
containment of the North Coast uprising. Much was also accomplished by legation 
secretary Higgins who, in his own words, played an “instrumental” role in preventing the 
establishment of general martial law, which Mejía Colindres thought necessary to fight 
the North Coast uprising—and which would have made fair elections an unlikely event. 
Also, the secretary cajoled the president into decreeing a general disarmament of the 
population, which was in conflict with Honduran law and was unlikely to be enforced by 
the country’s badly armed police force anyway, but which, again in Higgins’ terms, would 
have a benign effect on the country’s stability. As the campaigning season neared its 
climax and both parties seemed ready for a fight, Lay managed on October 28—one day 
before the voting started—to convince both Carías and Zúñiga Huete to instruct the 
Nationalist municipalities and the Liberal governors to ensure free election. To Lay’s 
regret, however, neither candidate instructed his followers to accept the outcome of the 
election.106 
On October 29, three anxious days of voting started. Expecting trouble, many of 
the well-to-do of Tegucigalpa left the country like rats would a sinking ship. Having 
picked up rumors that the National Party was not at all sure of victory at the voting boots 
anymore and was preparing to fight, Lay had requested two weeks before that a 
“planeload of Marines” be sent to Tegucigalpa to protect the legation. Having consulted 
the legation’s archives, the minister was under the impression that this was normal 
procedure, but Stimson telegraphed him that the Department was “highly reluctant” to 
honor his request unless American lives were in actual danger. Until such time, the best 
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that resident Americans could do was to go the way many of their rich Honduran 
neighbors had gone, viz. out of harm’s way.107  
In the end, the elections went along smoothly, except for the “more or less usual 
choppings and killings due to excessive drink among the lower classes”. To Lay’s 
considerable astonishment, Carías won the elections by a large margin. Since the 
attendant elections for Congress also brought in a large National majority, there was no 
(legal) way that the Liberals could prevent the inauguration of the new president. Faced 
with utter defeat in a fair contest, Zúñiga Huete had no choice but to be a good sport and 
accept the outcome. To Lay’s relief, he told his followers to do likewise.108 
Some days after the elections, Lay sent in a report with his analysis of the 
elections. Of the factors that Lay identified as having promoted free elections (which he 
characterized as a “most extraordinary turn of events”) the majority was the work of the 
legation: The pre-election statements of good-will by the candidates; stricter adherence 
to the gun laws; and an unusually firm attitude on the side of Mejía Colindres. 
Correspondingly, reported Lay, many people felt that “somehow” the legation was 
responsible for the peaceful elections. Not surprisingly, then, the minister felt that fear for 
non-recognition or American intervention in case of a revolution were the most important 
enablers of this recent exercise in democracy. Though no intervention had been 
contemplated by the Department, Lay recounts that the showing of a film portraying 
American naval maneuvers in a Tegucigalpan theatre days before the elections had 
started the rumor that an American aircraft carrier was actually in Honduran waters and 
ready to intervene. While Lay admitted that such an event “at first blush must appear 
trivial”, yet “in a country as small and primitive as this and with a population so 
impressionable and credulous [it] may have been of real importance”. Anyway, the mere 
specter of American intervention “had an undeniably salutary effect” on local passions.109 
When the elections turned out to be a resounding success, minister Lay, much like 
his colleagues in Guatemala and Salvador, made sure his seniors in Washington 
understood the central role he played in this local victory for democracy. As a reflection 
of the importance that local actors ascribed to the legation’s responsibility for the 
elections, President-elect Carías visited Lay to thank him for his good works. Only after 
Carías made this official call on the legation did he visit the presidential palace to confer 
with President Mejía Colindres. Lay forwarded articles from the Liberal Press lauding his 
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actions in favor of Honduran democracy and some effusive congratulations from the 
consulates. “It is pleasing for me to hear”, Lay wrote the Department in a faux-humble 
tone, “that my efforts to secure peaceful elections are considered fruitful”.110 The minister 
optimistically reported that the latest elections represented “an extension of democracy 
in Honduras”. He praised Zúñiga Huete for his graceful acceptance of the results, 
opining that this would improve the latter’s chances for the 1936 elections. All-in-all, the 
successful experience in electoral politics would bring “another four years of peace” to 
Honduras.111  
Unfortunately for Lay, the rosy picture he painted was not entirely accurate. In fact, 
it was not accurate at all. Two weeks after the elections, the government barracks in San 
Pedro Sula, a Liberal stronghold, were attacked and taken by surprise. This turned out to 
be the opening shot in a country-wide uprising by Liberal military leaders who could not 
accept the recent victory of the National Party. In line with the fine Honduran tradition of 
providing dramatic sounding names even to the most insignificant skirmish, the fighting 
that took place in late 1932 was later dubbed the “Revolution of the Treacheries” 
because, as the American Naval Attaché reported, Hondurans felt that there was no 
legitimate reason to revolt.112 
However this may be, minister Lay surely felt betrayed and he was not willing to 
have the Liberals snatch defeat from the jaws of his recent democratic victory. Things 
did not look particularly bright, though. Honduras did not have an army in the usual 
sense of the word: Rather, both political parties had their own militias. Since it was the 
Liberal militias that revolted, President Mejía Colindres had no troops to put down the 
revolt. Thus, the legation immediately instructed the President to work with the National 
militias and may have been instrumental in brokering a deal between Carías and Mejía 
Colindres to fight the rebels. Also, and despite having suffered a rebuff of a similar 
request during the elections, Lay pressed the Department to send weapons to Honduras 
to protect the constitutional government, arguing that “timely foreign aid (such as 
supplying arms to the Government) in suppressing the rebellion would be greatly 
preferable to letting things drift until the presence of foreign armed forces on Honduran 
soil might become necessary”. At first, the Department was non-committal, claiming that 
it did not even have the antiquated ammo and weapons requested by the Honduran 
government. Eventually, however, Francis White decided to send some much-delayed 
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policy instructions the Honduran legation: “I think the situation in Honduras is different 
now from what it was in 1928 when we did supply the Honduran government with certain 
military supplies. I think it much sounder on the whole that we should keep out of such 
transactions and that is our policy at present”.113 
Aside from an insistent lobby for arms, which was eventually unsuccessful, 
legation reports give the impression that Lay was deeply involved in the coordination of 
resistance against the rebels. Apparently without the Department’s knowledge or 
concurrence, he urged his colleagues in Guatemala City and Managua to negotiate a 
deal whereby the Honduran government would intern political exiles from Guatemala 
and Nicaragua if the governments in those countries would control the movements of 
Honduran revolutionaries within their borders in return (Honduran insurgent troops made 
free use of the uncontrolled borderlands between Honduras and its neighbors). Acting in 
line with general U.S. policy, Lay also asked Whitehouse to make sure that Ubico did not 
provide his Liberal brothers in Honduras with arms. And while Lay never admitted that he 
was in any way involved in the defense of the constituted authorities in Honduras, his 
reports during the revolt do suggest that the leaders of the National army, Carías and his 
running-mate Abraham Williams, regularly visited the legation and received advise from 
the minister. In the end, Lay’s efforts were fruitful: After a month and a half of fighting, 
the National militias defeated the Liberal insurgents. Although President Mejía Colindres 
was completely dependent on Carías’ troops throughout the ordeal, he was kept in 
power until February 1, 1933, when he duly handed over the presidential sash to 
Carías.114 
 
In the end, the legation in Honduras was not as enthusiastic about Carías as 
Whitehouse was about Ubico. In 1932, when the legation was still basking in the 
success of the election that it helped bring about, Lay reported that “[t]his Legation 
should be able to get anything it asks for from the new Administration, Congress and 
Supreme Court except money”.115 Such a favorable analysis, however, was not due to 
Carías’ helpfulness. Unlike Ubico, Carías had a more easily recognizable Indian 
appearance (at least in the eyes of the legation). As Lay himself opined: “his [Carías’] 
blood is probably mostly Indian and he evinces a good proportion of the characteristics 
of the Honduran Indian, who is a very low type of Indian”. In a fuller explanation of this 
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statement that contains all the classic stereotypes of the Indian, Lay explained that 
Carías: 
…is stubborn and unforgiving, easily aroused to anger or resentment, has 
little education, and has never been outside of Central America. On the other 
hand he is a natural gentleman, generous, kindly, courteous, and hospitable, 
a good husband and parent, a patriotic citizen (…) Carías is, I believe, not 
intelligent, and he is powerfully influenced by the ignorant prejudices of his 
race, nationality and class, viz. Honduran Indian campesino [peasant]. But 
he is an honest man, an upright man, loyal to his friends, principles and party, 
and devoted to his relatives (too much so for some of them are thoroughly 
bad characters. 
Furthermore, Carías was not a good “socializer” or “mixer” and did not seem comfortable 
at society events.116 He had little in common with Lay who liked dinners and cocktail 
parties as much as the next diplomat, had traveled extensively, and felt himself to be a 
cosmopolitan member of the highest rungs of society. Unlike Whitehouse and Ubico, 
who were both “cultured gentlemen” and seemed to get along very well on a personal 
level, Carías and Lay never became close. 
Carías himself was seen as a “figurehead”, a fatherly figure whom the Indian 
masses could relate to:  
He is a great popular figure, trusted and venerated by hundreds of thousands 
of peons who have never seen him, a Hindenburg to the ignorant soldiers 
who fought under him in the revolutionary war of 1924 (…) His principal role 
in the present government is to command popular respect and support. One 
man no matter how much of a figurehead can accomplish this in a country 
where politics is a matter of personalities rather than programs or principles.  
The substance of government, meanwhile, would be left to the Cabinet, which was 
“conspicuously superior” to that of Mejía Colindres and formed a “more progressive and 
enterprising government than the last”. The legation centered its attention on Finance 
Minister Julio Lozano Díaz, whose job it was to recover the finances of the 
government—which was almost bankrupted during the heydays of the Depression.117 
It is not strange, therefore, that the legation’s hopes never focused on Carías, but 
rather on the more cosmopolitan and highly educated gentlemen in his government. 
These, the legation believed, would provide Honduras with an efficient and honest 
government and four years of much needed peace and stability. A government, in short, 
that could stand a careful comparison with Ubico’s government. If such a government 
would turn out to be stern, Lay believed that it would “not be a despotism of one man, for 
reasons above stated, but an autocratic government directed by the group in President 
Carías’ entourage; and what Hondurans will lose in their personal liberties (liberties that 
degenerated into license under Mejía Colindres) they will gain in greater protection to life 
and property, more efficiency and honesty in the public services”.118 
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3. THE UBICO SOLUTION 
If a name were to characterize American policy in Central America during the period 
around 1930—when the U.S. engaged a measured withdrawal from military intervention 
while its representatives continued to manage elections in Central America—it should be 
the “Ubico solution”.  
Ubico and Carías established strong, dynamic, and repressive dictatorships in the 
five to six years following their elections. This process was completed around the middle 
of the decade, when they both suspended the constitutional prohibition against 
reelection in their respective countries. Ubico would rule Guatemala until 1944 and 
Carías presided over Honduras until 1948. In the historiography, both leaders are 
represented as part of a group of dictators who came to power around this time. In 1932, 
General Martínez came to power as the result of a military coup against Araujo and 
Anastasio Somoza established his rule in Nicaragua in 1936. 119  The only place in 
Central America where constitutional and fairly representative government survived was 
traditionally liberal Costa Rica. Together, Ubico, Carías, Martínez, and, of course, 
Somoza are considered by many historians to be the beneficiaries of Washington’s 
“Somoza solution” policy. But this interpretation of events in Central America and 
Washington’s role therein is anachronistic and simplistic. 
The Somoza solution hypothesis is anachronistic because Ubico and Carías were 
not considered dictators at the time. Neither were they deemed to be of the same class 
as Martínez and Somoza. First of all, Martínez was regarded as an outcast by American 
diplomats when he came to power in 1932. Somoza had to wait another four years 
before he could realize his ultimate ambition to become president of his country. From a 
1931 perspective, therefore, the governments of Guatemala and Honduras were not part 
of a dictatorial bloc. Taking into account developments on the entire isthmus, the 
elections of Ubico and Carías were seen in conjuncture with the elections of Arturo 
Araujo in El Salvador and Juan Sacasa in Nicaragua. All of these elections were thought 
to be remarkably fair and free, thus representing a victory for American policy and a big 
step forward in the political development of Central America. 
All the American legations in Central America in the early 1930s reported that free 
and fair elections had been held there and that the region was now undergoing, in the 
words of Military Attaché Harris, a “radical innovation” in honest and efficient government. 
In this context, it is of particular interest to quote here at some length a State Department 
study on Latin America, which offered to its readers Washington’s interpretation of its 
legation’s reports. 
Compiled by the Division of American Republic Affairs for the use of the American 
delegates to the International Conference of American States at Montevideo in 1933, the 
study in question reached the highest echelons of the State Department, including the 
new Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, who led the mission.120 The section on Nicaragua is 
                                                 
119 See chapters 3 and 4 of this text. 
120  Division of American Republic Affairs, “Latin America: Politics and Government. Political 
Résumé for the Use of Delegates to the 7th International Conference of American States, 
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particularly informative. While Nicaragua presented a special case because it had 
undergone U.S. military occupation from 1909 to 1933 (with an interlude of 3 years 
beginning in 1925), it also represented to the Department the highest hopes of what 
could be achieved under American tutelage.  
Just before the report was finished, U.S. Marines were withdrawn from Nicaragua 
by preannounced plan and as part of a larger drive to remove the vestiges of 
intervention from Central America and the Caribbean. However, Marines supervised the 
Nicaraguan presidential elections as recently as 1932—a victory for Juan Bautista 
Sacasa—leading to a felicitous outcome: “For the first time in the memory of 
Nicaraguans, the government in power, both president and Congress, is known to 
represent the freely manifested will of the Nicaraguan people”. Following the elections 
and the withdrawal of the Marines, the report announced in a victorious tone: “The 
present generation of Nicaraguans are initiating what is to them a new experiment in 
self-government”. 
The importance attached by the Department to the holding of free and fair 
elections is evident from its argument that “one of the principal reasons, or pretexts, for 
revolt in Nicaragua, that is, the desire to overthrow a government illegally or illegitimately 
exercising power, has disappeared”. And although old rivalries in Nicaragua still 
presented an obstacle to the “valiant and sincere attempt [of Nicaraguans] to govern 
themselves”, at least they had the benefit of the “impartial and restraining assistance of 
the American Legation”. 
The factors present in the Department’s evaluation of Nicaraguan politics in 
1933—that is, an unprecedented experiment in self-government; stability through 
periodic elections; and the importance of American “assistance” short of military 
intervention—also dominated its view of Guatemalan and Honduran politics. In Honduras, 
the fact that Carías’ election to office was free and fair, was considered “a tribute to the 
political progress which Honduras had made in the past decade”. And even though the 
administration of the country depended mainly on the “better element” in the 
government—primarily the “especially competent” minister of Finance—Carías himself 
was thought to have a quieting effect on Honduras because he was “respected for his 
courage, equanimity and political honesty”. Thus, the Department ventured to predict 
that: 
If General Carías is able to complete his administration peaceably, and there 
are no present indications that he will not, and particularly if he is able to 
guarantee fair elections at the end of his term in office, Honduras will have 
made more progress during the present and the preceding two 
administrations than it has made during any equal period in its political 
history, and a long step will have been taken toward the development of true 
institutions and the elimination of the influence of the chronic revolutionary 
type. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Montevideo, 1933”, Lot Files, Studies on Latin America, Box 20, folder marked Montevideo 
Conference, 1933. 
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Since Sacasa was thought to be somewhat on the soft side and Cariista Honduras 
was still considered the most backward country in the region, the government of Jorge 
Ubico in Guatemala was held in the highest regard by the State Department. In 1933, 
when there was no reason to assume that Ubico would continue in power past his legal 
term, the State Department stressed the semi-democratic circumstances under which 
the General had come to power: “Despite the circumstance that he was not opposed by 
any other candidate, usually an ominous sign in Central America, there appears to be no 
doubt that General Ubico was the choice of a large majority of the articulate people of 
Guatemala”. Citing Ubico’s honesty, energy, intelligence, and ability, the Department’s 
report rejoiced that “President Ubico has fulfilled his promise to give Guatemala an 
improved administration” by balancing the budget and enforcing government honesty. 
Thus, in 1933, the Department regarded Ubico as “the outstanding leader of Central 
America”. 
A remarkable aspect of the American interpretation of the new regimes in Central 
America is perhaps that the local U.S. ministers easily combined their demand for 
electoral politics with respect for what would now be regarded as authoritarian policies. 
So while Whitehouse argued that Ubico was the choice of the “great majority” of 
Guatemalans, he also respected the General’s “forcefulness” and complete command 
over the country’s legislative and judiciary. Lay was satisfied that he had set Honduras 
on the road to democratic progress, but also observed that the Carías regime would 
have authoritarian qualities. Robbins believed that the election of Araujo in El Salvador 
was a historic event, but he was also relieved to report the new president could “break 
some heads” if the need arose. The American ministers perceived a need for “forceful” 
and “effective” government because they felt that Central Americans needed a stern 
hand to guide them toward progress. Chacón, Romero Bosque, and Mejia Colindres 
were considered too weak to deal with the economic and social problems of the Great 
Depression. In the Lay’s words, the advantage of a strong-armed government at that 
point was that “what Hondurans will lose in their personal liberties (liberties that 
degenerated into license under Mejía Colindres) they will gain in greater protection to life 
and property, more efficiency and honesty in the public services”.121 
American diplomats were not naïve: They knew that the newly elected presidents 
of Central America were tough hombres. It may seem odd that they were confident that 
Ubico and Carías would submit to honest elections toward the end of their legal tenures. 
Others seem to have been less optimistic, as Whitehouse admitted when he reported 
that “the fear is expressed that in time he [Ubico] will become a dictator”. The important 
thing here is to realize that the ministers did not know that non-intervention—non-
interference even—would be the backbone of U.S. policy by 1936. Although they never 
admitted so much, it is reasonable to assume that they expected the next elections in 
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador to be supervised by a strong U.S. minister, as 
they had led the early 1930s elections. The multiple requests for armed intervention that 
have been noted in previous paragraphs demonstrate that the diplomats under 
                                                 
121 Idem. 
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discussion here had no idea which way the wind was blowing. They could not have 
known that the Department’s tolerance for interference would be drastically reduced by 
1936. Nor could they have, for this development required a change of administrations 
and a thorough reevaluation of policy in Washington. As far as Whitehouse, Robbins, 
and Lay could see, a paternalistic legation was a fixed element in Central American 
politics and would ensure that these “tempestuous little countries” remained committed 
to constitutional government. 
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DEFEAT IN EL SALVADOR 
One caudillo defies the American legation, 1931-1934 
 
~ Defeat in El Salvador ~ 
 
 
One of a group of Central American dictators 
supported by the United States, Martínez had 
won notoriety by presiding over the 1932 
Matanza (“massacre”), a slaughter of some 10-
30,000 peasants while US and Canadian naval 
vessels stood offshore and US Marines were 
alerted in Nicaragua. “It was found 
unnecessary for the United States forces and 
British forces to land”, US Chief of Naval 
Operations Admiral William V. Pratt testified 
before Congress, “as the Salvadoran 
Government had the situation in hand.” 
Martínez was granted informal recognition at 
once on the grounds of his success in “having 
put down the recent disorders” (State 
Department), with full recognition following 
in 1934 in defiance of an agreement with the 
Central American states that military dictators 
were not to be recognized without free 
elections… 
 
~Noam Chomsky, 1987 1  
 
 
 
During the 1980s, El Salvador was the scene of one of the most horrid civil wars the 
region had ever witnessed. Over a period of 12 years, the U.S.-backed military 
government battled leftist guerillas of the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación 
Nacional (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front or FMLN), resulting in an estimated 
death toll of 75,000 people. The semi-official death squads, the members of which were 
often recruited from American-trained army and security divisions, were particularly 
notorious. One such group called itself the Maximiliano Hernandez Martínez Brigade, 
which was responsible for the assassination of Marxist as well as moderate Christian 
Democratic politicians. The Reagan administration supported the military regime of El 
Salvador with money and weapons throughout its tenure, due to the alleged connections 
between the FMLN and the Marxist regimes of Nicaragua and Cuba. 
                                                 
1 Noam Chomsky, Turning the tide. U.S. intervention in Central America and the struggle for 
peace (2nd ed.: Boston 1987) 43-44. 
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Throughout the 1980s the situation in the rest of Central America was not much 
different from that in El Salvador: Revolutions, civil wars, death squads, and mass 
killings characterized this period, which became known simply as the “Central American 
Crisis”. Due to the very controversial involvement of the United States with extreme 
rightist regimes and groups during the Crisis, historical inquiries into the nature of U.S. 
involvement in Central America—which had been exceedingly rare before—
mushroomed during the ‘80s. Not surprisingly, many historians who dealt with U.S.-
Salvadoran relations turned their attention to the early 1930s: That is, the time of 
Farabundo Martí and Maximiliano Hernandez Martínez, the people after which the later 
Marxist coalition and right-wing death squad were named.2 
Hernandez Martínez became president of El Salvador in 1931, after a military coup 
had ousted Araujo. Some six weeks after this event, a large peasant uprising broke out 
in western El Salvador under the nominal leadership of Farabundo Martí, the founder of 
the Salvadoran Communist Party. Martí was quickly arrested and executed and the 
uprising was crushed within a matter of days. But that was not the end of it: For weeks 
after the end of the revolt, Salvadoran army units scoured the countryside, killing anyone 
who was suspected of being involved in the uprising. Estimates of the numbers killed 
range from 10,000 to 40,000. 3 
Thus, the rise to power of Martínez takes a special and particularly damning place 
in the narrative of the “Somoza solution” interpretation of U.S.-Central American relations. 
The current chapter will nuance that interpretation of the events of 1932, arguing that 
during the two year period in which the Martínez regime went unrecognized, no special 
concern was voiced either by the legation or the Department over the communist 
menace in El Salvador. Instead, the Americans fretted over Martínez’ open defiance of 
American power by clinging to office rather than going the way Orellana had gone some 
years earlier. In the end, the decision to recognize the General was a negative one: It 
demonstrated that even though the United States was infinitely more powerful than El 
Salvador on a global scale, Martínez was the master of his own little piece of the globe 
where the Americans could not touch him. Especially since the United States labored 
under the self-imposed restrictions of the Good Neighbor. 
 
  
                                                 
2 See introduction, pages 8-11. 
3 The classic account on the slaughter is: Thomas P. Anderson, Matanza. The 1932 “slaughter” 
that traumatized a nation, shaping US-Salvadoran policy to this day (2nd edition: Willimantic, CT, 
1992). Anderson notes that official documents on the event were all destroyed by the Martínez 
regime, but, having consulted local sources, believes that 8,000 to 10,000 victims should be a 
reasonably accurate number (174-176 and 186). Researchers still disagree about the death toll, 
however: Booth et al., Understanding Central America, 47 & 96, etimates 30.000 deaths. Lindo 
Fuentes, Remembering, 40, states that estimates range from 10.000 to 30.000 but that there are 
no records to establish the exact number. Using numbers from the British legation and other local 
observers at the time, Gould and Lauria-Santiago, To rise in darkness, 233-234, states that 
10.000 deaths seems a reasonable estimate. Dunkerly, The long war, 29, notes that a minimum 
of 10,000 and a maximum of 40,000 people were killed, but that 30,000 is the number most cited. 
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1. WHILE THE NAVY WATCHED 
The “Matanza”, as the slaughter of 1932 came to be known, was largely a Salvadoran 
affair, but it is undeniable that the United States shares some of the responsibility for the 
severity of Martínez’ reaction to the uprising. Looking back at the event through the lens 
of the 1980s, many historians are particularly harsh in their judgment of U.S. actions in 
the 1930s. Noam Chomsky is a case in point and offers a representative account of the 
Matanza and of American involvement in it. Describing Martínez as “one of a group of 
Central American dictators supported by the United States”, Chomsky implies that 
Washington sent its naval vessels to Salvadoran waters to help the regime repress the 
supposedly communist uprising. That American intervention was ultimately unnecessary 
is beside the point, because the intention to intervene in itself serves to underscore the 
fact that Washington supported brutal anticommunist dictators whenever it could. 
Besides, Chomsky continues, Martínez was rewarded for putting down the revolt. Before 
the Matanza, the United States had refused to recognize Martínez, much like it had 
refused to recognize the Guatemalan regime of General Orellana, because his rise to 
power was the result of a military coup, thus violating the 1923 Treaty of Peace and 
Amity. After the Matanza, however, Washington extended “informal recognition” to 
Martínez, followed by outright recognition two years later—an act that, in practice, 
destroyed the “agreement with the Central American states that military dictators were 
not to be recognized without free elections”. 
There are alternatives to the interpretation that Chomsky advanced in 1987, but 
many textbooks on U.S.-Central American relations adopt, in a “matter of fact” tone, the 
view that the United States supported Martínez during and after the 1932 uprising.4 
Many serious monographs also touch on the subject. Somewhat cryptically, Historian 
Ralph Woodward claims that American ships were dispatched to Salvadoran waters 
during the Matanza to “assist in averting any Communist revolution”.5 James Dunkerley, 
a British specialist in Salvadoran history, writes with more confidence that the 
“Salvadoran armed forces master-minded and effected the counter-revolution [Matanza] 
by themselves although they had confident expectations of outside [U.S.] support should 
things go wrong”.6 Walter LaFeber notes that “the bloodbath (…) changed the mind of 
Washington officials about the general [Martínez]. Before the slaughter, the State 
Department had been adamant about non-recognition [but] in a 1932 announcement the 
U.S. granted Martínez informal recognition”.7 Professor Phillip Dur argued in 1998 that 
although the United States had “acted on principle” by not recognizing Martínez in 1931, 
“the eruption of a communist-tainted rural rebellion in January 1932 changed the whole 
aspect of things”. And although Washington had to wait two years before it could shelve 
the 1923 Treaty and recognize Martínez, the ultimate legacy of the episode was that “for 
                                                 
4 Black, The Good Neighbor, 84-85; Pierce, Under the Eagle’s Wing, 20-25. Barry and Preusch, 
Central America Factbook, 200. 
5 Woodward, Nation Divided, 97. 
6 Dunkerley, The Long War, 30. 
7 LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, 75. 
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several decades [thereafter] realism took priority over idealism in US foreign policy and 
acceptance became the habitual response to non-communist dictatorships in Latin 
America”.8 
Most recently David F. Schmitz, in his study on U.S. policy toward right-wing 
dictatorship, elaborated on the thesis that Martínez’ brutal repression of a rural uprising 
led to immediate U.S. recognition: 
Responding to what the State Department viewed as a communist revolt in 
January 1932, the United States would informally recognize the government 
of General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez because he was seen as 
necessary to stability and anticommunism in the region.9 
However, there is no known document that directly links the recognition of Martínez with 
a concern for communism—not on the Department level, not on the legation level. The 
conclusion that such a link must exist only makes sense as part of a larger argument that 
the United States supported right-wing dictatorships in Central America as a matter of 
policy. That conclusion has been debunked in the previous chapter. Hence, it makes 
sense to revisit the sources and to reinterpret them from a perspective that ignores, as 
much as possible, our knowledge of the events of the 1980s and focuses on the (limited) 
knowledge and intentions of historical actors. The picture that emerges from this 
reinterpretation may be counter-intuitive as far as the relations of power between El 
Salvador and the United States were concerned: While the weak did what they could, 
the strong suffered what they must. 
 
2. COUP 
In November 1931, a new minister arrived in San Salvador: Charles Boyd Curtis. Curtis’ 
last tour of duty was in the Dominican Republic where he found himself in the midst of a 
revolution that brought to power Rafael Trujillo—eventually one of the most hated tyrants 
of the hemisphere. Curtis was personally involved in the negotiations that led to the end 
of the revolution: He brokered a deal between the government and the rebel forces that 
included a new provisional government and future elections. While the State Department 
was satisfied with this outcome, cooperation between Washington and the legation 
during the revolt was not smooth. Despite standing instructions to the contrary, Curtis 
cajoled the warring factions into an understanding by threatening to call in the U.S. 
Marines. After a settlement was reached, Curtis did everything he could to prevent that 
General Trujillo got elected to the presidency. Trujillo, chief of the Dominican army, had 
switched allegiance to the rebels during the revolt—an unforgiveable act of treason in 
the eyes of Curtis. Washington explicitly opposed its minister’s campaign against Trujillo, 
however. Quoting its nonintervention policy, the Department informed Curtis that it 
                                                 
8 Phillip F. Dur, “American diplomacy and the rebellion of 1932 in El Salvador”, Journal of Latin 
American Studies 30 (February 1998) 95-119, there 119. 
9 Schmitz, ‘Thank God’, 57. Further elaborated on pages 117-118 below. 
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“desires you to know that it expects to recognize Trujillo or any other person coming into 
office as a result of the coming elections”—which is exactly what ultimately happened. 10  
Curtis’ mission in the Dominican Republic was not a failure, however. Even 
thought his behind-the-scenes attempt to block Trujillo’s rise to power failed, his public 
role in preventing a major battle between the government and the rebels was a personal 
victory. According to the American press, the minister had single-handedly prevented 
major bloodshed, loss of American lives and property, and American intervention in the 
island republic. The New York Times reported that the peaceful solution to the revolt was 
partly attributable to “the good offices of the American Minister, Charles B. Curtis, who 
brought the conflicting parties together. It is the first time in Dominican history that such a 
political dispute has been handled without bloodshed”.11 Around the same time, The 
Washington Post claimed that “the people [of the Dominican Republic] have the United 
States to thank” for continued peace and added that ”Charles B. Curtis, American 
Minister, has been the dominant factor in straightening out the dispute without serious 
disturbances and loss of life”.12  From Secretary Stimson, Curtis received a letter of 
commendation for his services in the Dominican Republic. Other members of the 
Foreign Service sent personal letters of congratulation to the Minister as well. 
Nevertheless, Curtis’ tenure in the Dominican Republic must have been a strenuous 
experience, especially because the revolt was quickly followed by a devastating tropical 
storm. When the diplomat was transferred to El Salvador, the Washington Post ventured 
to predict that it was “altogether probable” that “Mr. Curtis’ new post will offer less 
excitement”.13 This was not to be. 
Not one month after his arrival, while the Minister was still settling in, a revolution 
broke out in Salvador that caught the legation and the Department completely off guard. 
Although Araujo’s popularity had been dwindling for some time, the direct cause of the 
revolution seems to have been that the government was unable or unwilling to keep 
payment of the salaries of its officers up to date. As far as the legation could ascertain 
after the events, it was the young officers of the Zapote fortress and the barracks of the 
capital that started a revolt in the evening of December 2. President Araujo, whose 
official residence was directly across the street from the revolting infantry barracks, left 
town “almost as soon as the first shot was fired”. After some halfhearted attempts to 
raise troops and put up a fight, the President crossed the border to Guatemala on 
December 4. By that time, Vice-President Maximiliano Hernández Martínez had taken 
over the government.14 
                                                 
10 Eric Paul Roorda, The dictator next door: The Good Neighbor Policy and the Trujillo regime in 
the Dominican Republic, 1930-1945 (Durham 1998) 31-62. 
11 “Dominican Rebel becomes President”, NYT (March 2, 1930) 9. 
12 “Two little Republics”, TWP (March 2, 1930) S1. 
13  “New minister named to El Salvador; Oriental dispatches rumor transfer of Japanese 
ambassador to China”, TWP (August 9, 1931) S1. 
14 Curtis to the Secretary of State, Despatch 21, December 5, 1931, PR El Salvador, vol. 111, cl. 
800: Salvadoran Revolution. For historical descriptions of the coup, consult: Anderson, Matanza, 
71-88; Dunkerley, Long War, 18-31; Williams and Walker, Militarization, 19-20.  
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In the meantime, Curtis dutifully implemented the strategy that had made him a 
hero in the Dominican Republic. He tried to prevent general bloodshed and attacks 
against American lives and interests by making sure that the revolution developed as 
smoothly as possible, regardless of who won. Shortly after the shooting started, the 
Minister occupied himself with visits to the different barracks and forts, trying to organize 
a cease fire. By the time Curtis got everyone to stop shooting and start talking, the 
President had long left town and the last resisters were about to surrender to the 
rebels.15 
Curtis seems not to have cared which party turned out on top in the revolution, 
because he regarded both as equally bad. His first analysis of the Araujo administration 
concluded that it was “weak, inefficient and lacking in much ability to govern”. Shortly 
after the revolution, Curtis repeated at greater length that:  
President Araujo unquestionably showed a high degree of incompetence. 
While he displayed no great sagacity in the matter of appointments, his 
handling of the Government finances exceeded all his other mistakes. (…) It 
seems certain that within a short time the Government would have been 
bankrupt even if it had stopped payments on its one large loan and all of its 
small ones.  
Even before the revolution, the Minister had predicted that financial difficulties of the 
government “might easily provoke an entirely different [political] situation over night”. 
Thus, Curtis believed that the government would have gone down even if the army had 
not acted. The personal flaws of the President sealed the fate of his administration once 
a revolution started: “In character he [Araujo] was both obstinate and vacillating (…) The 
revolution was successful primarily because of his obstinate refusal to believe that he 
had lost any of the great popularity which he enjoyed at the time of his election to the 
Presidency”.16  
In light of his evaluation of the Araujo administration, there is no reason to assume 
that Curtis felt any incentive to save the doomed government during the revolution. On 
the other hand, he had no reason to promote the cause of the rebels either. During and 
right after the revolution, Curtis concluded that the “[g]uiding lights in the revolution are 
officers who at the moment appear to be incapable and whose only idea is to destroy 
[the] Government of President Araujo”.17 At first, says the Minister, the revolution was 
directed by the younger officers: “youngsters for the most part of strongly Indian blood 
                                                 
15 Charles B. Curtis (United States Minister in San Salvador) to the Secretary of State, Telegram 
97, December 3, 1931; PR San Salvador, Vol. 111, cl. 800: Salvadoran Revolution; Curtis to the 
Secretary of State, Telegram 98, December 3, 1931; PR San Salvador, Vol. 111, cl. 800: 
Salvadoran Revolution; Curtis to the Secretary of State, Telegram  100, December 3, 1931; PR 
San Salvador, Vol. 111, cl. 800: Salvadoran Revolution; Curtis to the Secretary of State, 
Despatch 21, December 5, 1931; PR San Salvador, Vol. 111, cl. 800: Salvadoran Revolution. 
16 Curtis to the Secretary of State, Despatch 21, December 5, 1931; PR San Salvador, Vol. 111, 
cl. 800: Salvadoran Revolution; Curtis to the Secretary of State, Despatch 11, November 19, 
1931; PR San Salvador, Vol. 111, cl. 800: General Conditions. Incidentally, this section was 
censured in FRUS. 
17 Curtis to the Secretary of State, Telegram 98, December 3, 1931; PR San Salvador, Vol. 111, 
cl. 800: Salvadoran Revolution. 
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and with the appearance of being little more than half-witted”. Only later was a 
revolutionary directorate formed with the participation of two senior officers who “appear 
to be men of some sense and capacity”. But the majority of the Directorate was still 
made up of juniors of whom “the most that can be said is that they appear to be the least 
worthless of those lieutenants who were the known and apparently the actual organizers 
of the revolution”. When the Directorate appointed Vice-President Martínez to succeed 
the President, Curtis still assumed that the latter would be a figurehead for the junior 
officers and that the General “has been allowed to take no action without its [the 
Directorate’s] approval”. “Of such a Government it seems impossible to expect much”.18  
Although Curtis’ stated purpose was to prevent bloodshed and although he had no 
reason to prefer one faction over the other, he himself admits that his efforts to negotiate 
a truce during the revolution had the side effect of aiding the rebels. By the time that 
Curtis got involved in the revolution, the President had already fled the capital and the 
rebels controlled the city, “which history shows”, the Minister commented, “probably 
means final success”. From that moment on, the rebels only needed to dig in and thus 
had “more to gain by the delay” offered by Curtis’ armistice than the President and his 
troops had. When the armistice expired, Araujo had already retreated far to the west of 
the country and was preparing to cross the border to Guatemala.19  
In the meantime, Curtis’ reports on the revolution had reached the highest 
echelons of the State Department and they were not well received. While Curtis’ 
handling of the crisis was, strictly speaking, correct as far as United States policy and 
international law in the rest of the world were concerned, Central America presented a 
special case in light of the 1923 Treaty.  
Curtis’ reports from Salvador did not mention the Treaty at all. For the first time on 
December 4 (while Araujo was well underway to the Guatemalan border), Secretary 
Stimson telegraphed Curtis that the “Department assumes that you have made it amply 
clear to leaders of the revolution that the policy of this Government is to be guided by the 
provisions of the 1923 Treaty regarding the non recognition of governments coming into 
power through revolution”. 20  Some hours later, Stimson reminded Curtis that the 
Department still considered Araujo the constitutional president of Salvador and acidly 
                                                 
18 Curtis to the Secretary of State, Despatch 21, December 5, 1931; PR San Salvador, Vol. 111, 
cl. 800: Salvadoran Revolution. Incidentally, this section was censured in FRUS. On Curtis’ 
assumption that Martinez was at most a collaborator of the revolutionaries, and not a very 
enthusiastic one at that, also see: Curtis to the Secretary of State, Telegram  100, December 3, 
1931; PR San Salvador, Vol. 111, cl. 800: Salvadoran Revolution; Curtis to the Secretary of State, 
Telegram  105, December 5, 1931; PR San Salvador, Vol. 111, cl. 800: Salvadoran Revolution; 
Curtis to the Secretary of State, Telegram  108, December 6, 1931; PR San Salvador, Vol. 111, cl. 
800: El Salvador; Curtis to the Secretary of State, Telegram  109, December 6, 1931; PR San 
Salvador, Vol. 111, cl. 800: El Salvador; Curtis to the Secretary of State, Despatch 26, December 
15, 1931; PR San Salvador, Vol. 111, cl. 800: El Salvador.  
19 Curtis to the Secretary of State, Telegram  97, December 3, 1931; PR San Salvador, Vol. 111, 
cl. 800: Salvadoran Revolution; Curtis to the Secretary of State, Telegram  100, December 3, 
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added that “the Department is confident that you appreciate the importance of refraining 
from any action which might be misinterpreted as favoring the revolutionary party”.21 The 
next day, Stimson requested a report on Martínez’ role in the revolt (participation would 
debar him from recognition) and again urged Curtis to explain the 1923 Treaty to the 
military faction.22 Only after this third, rather anxious, plea from the Secretary did Curtis 
reveal that he regretted to “have to report that I did not bring [the Treaty] to the attention 
of the revolutionary leaders until the success of the revolution was already certain”. In 
fact, evidence from the legation’s files indicates that Curtis had not brought up this issue 
at all and would not do so in the future. His initial justification for this oversight was that:  
Anyone who saw the utterly irresponsible youths with whom I had to deal in 
the beginning, and whose opinions on all subjects except the resignation of 
President Araujo were as far apart as the two poles, and who saw the almost 
endless discussion whether an armistice should last for three hours or only 
two, would appreciate my reasons for forming the opinion that it was futile to 
mention this subject and that nothing should be mentioned which was not 
absolutely essential to the obtaining of an agreement on the subject of the 
armistice.23  
After he made some more rambling reports, Curtis finally admitted that “[j]ust what 
exactly the Treaty of 1923 means is not clearly understood by me”.24  
Not only did Curtis bungle the handling of the revolution itself, he also 
strengthened Martínez’ position because of his misinterpretation of Department 
instructions. Stimson’s telegrams to Curtis stressed the importance of the Salvadoran 
constitution and the 1923 Treaty. What the Department wanted was to prevent anyone 
who was remotely suspect of participating in a revolution, as Martínez most certainly was, 
from attaining the presidency in Central America. Only in that way, the Department 
believed, could revolts and wars in Central America be prevented in the long term. Curtis, 
who lacked the long term and broad view of U.S. Central American policy, naturally took 
Department instructions literally. He concluded from his instructions that it was not 
Martínez who posed a problem; it was the military Directorate that had placed him in 
power and continued to exist as a rival to the authorities after Martínez took the 
presidency.25 The Minister believed that what was necessary to make the government 
                                                 
21  Stimson to Curtis, Telegram 57, December 4, 1931; PR San Salvador, Vol 111, cl. 800: 
Salvadoran Revolution. 
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Vol 111, cl. 800: Salvadoran Revolution. 
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constitutional and acceptable under the 1923 Treaty was to have the revolutionary 
military Directorate abolished. Curtis set out to accomplish this goal—with great success.  
On December 11, the Minister reported that he:  
had conversations almost daily with persons in a position to bring this matter 
to the attention of General Martinez; I availed myself of a call made upon me 
by (...) members of the Directorate (...) to make clear to them the desirability 
of the disappearance of their body; and I yesterday informed (...) [the 
Minister of War] of my opinion that every indication of even a possibility that 
the Directorate was influencing the actions of the Government of General 
Martinez ought to be avoided.  
In addition, Curtis urged the Minister of War to transfer former members of the 
Directorate to distant posts after the dissolution of that body, so that there could be no 
suspicion that the dissolution was not genuine.26 When the Directorate did dissolve the 
next day, Curtis started to refer to the Martínez regime as the “constitutional” 
government, in stead of “de facto” government, which would have been the more 
appropriate term from the standpoint of U.S. policy. The legation’s traditional sources, 
the capital’s upper classes, local media, government employees, and high-ranking 
military officers, all sang the gospel of the Martínez regime and bashed the former 
Araujo administration. As far as Curtis could see, Martínez was the choice of the “great 
majority” of Salvadorans and the army controlled the country in a peaceful manner. 27 
 
Curtis’ actions would cost him his post and his career: Though just in his early fifties, 
Salvador was to be Curtis’ last assignment. As it became clear to the Department that 
Curtis had lost control over the situation as far as U.S. policy was concerned, it moved 
quickly to replace the senior officers of the legation with more reliable men. On 
December 5, William J. McCafferty, an officer with six years of experience in Central 
America and Mexico, was designated second secretary of the legation. Ten days later, 
Jefferson Caffery, an expert in Central American relations, was assigned to Salvador as 
a “special adviser”, but in practice quickly took over charge of the legation. While Curtis 
nominally remained chief of mission until 1932, he was placed on the sidelines as soon 
as Caffery arrived. Almost immediately, Caffery told Martínez and his Foreign Minister in 
no uncertain terms that they would never be recognized by the United States. It is 
                                                                                                                                                 
Salvadoran government understood it—since the Salvadoran Congress had made some hazily-
worded amendments to Article 2, which debarred revolutionary leaders from the presidency and 
since Martínez’ actual participation in the revolution could not be established. Most in-depth 
accounts by historians tend to agree that Martínez did not take part in the revolution or at least 
permit that his participation cannot be definitely established. Anderson, Matanza, 188; Parkman, 
Nonviolent Insurrection, 18; Williams and Walker, Militarization, 19-20. 
26 Curtis to the Secretary of State, Despatch 25, December 11, 1931, PR El Salvador, vol. 111, cl. 
800: Salvadoran Revolution. 
27 Curtis to the Secretary of State, Despatch 27, December 15, 1931, Curtis to the Secretary of 
State, Despatch 25, December 11, 1931, PR El Salvador, vol. 111, cl. 800: Salvadoran 
Revolution; Curtis to the Secretary of State, Despatch 28, December 15, 1931, PR El Salvador, 
vol. 111, cl. 800: Salvadoran Revolution; Curtis to the Secretary of State, Despatch 26, December 
15, 1931, Curtis to the Secretary of State, Despatch 25, December 11, 1931, PR El Salvador, vol. 
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indicative of Curtis’ handling of the crisis that both were genuinely surprised by the 
news.28 Although Caffery rivaled Whitehouse, nemesis of the Orellana government, in 
vigorousness, his task was made practically impossible by Curtis’ previous errors.  
In the days after his arrival, Caffery reported that the Martínez regime was “daily 
growing stronger.29 The “better elements” in Salvador had already thrown their support 
behind the Martínez regime (in following dispatches, Caffery confuses this support by the 
better elements with support by the entire people).30 The National Assembly, which was 
still made up entirely of Araujo supporters, had lost much of its credibility when its leader 
fled the country.31 There were still the former presidential candidates of the campaign of 
1930-1931 who pushed the legation to replace the current government with one of them, 
but the military faction definitely opposed such a move and, more importantly, the 
Department and the legation were not willing to back a specific individual for the 
presidency: Policy had moved too far in the direction of non-intervention for the level of 
commitment such a move required. In other words, Caffery had no-one to turn to aside 
from officers of the army, who had firmly established its control over the country before 
Caffery arrived.32 
Caffery was sent to Salvador as a trouble-shooter. His job was to save the 1923 
Treaty and U.S. policy in the region by finding anyone who could reasonably be 
recognized according to the rules of the Treaty. His job was not to save the Salvadoran 
republic or civilian control over it. The Department considered the long-term objective of 
peace and stability—which the Treaty had provided so far—more important to Central 
American progress and development than the question of who ruled El Salvador. 
Therefore, Caffery had no qualms about turning to the military for help: In the short term, 
it was the only institution that could reasonably be expected to deliver a president. 
It was not easy to find an alternative to Martínez in the army. The capable higher 
officers had joined Martínez’ government and were therefore barred from recognition if 
they should become president. The only group inside the army that had any measure of 
organization and influence apart from the Generals was the revolutionary military 
Directorate. Caffery tried to rally this group behind his plan to form a recognizable 
government, but quickly found that it had been disbanded and its members dispersed 
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throughout the country by Martínez, who, Caffery reported while gracefully omitting 
Curtis’ name, “had been made to believe that it would lead to prompt recognition”.33 
After some two weeks of tough words, negotiations, and public statements, Caffery 
finally convened a group of young officers whom he presumed were the leaders of the 
revolution. 34  These young men struck Caffery as friendly and conciliatory and they 
seemed ready to accept his solution; which was to have a new National Assembly (not 
dominated by Araujo supporters) elected and then have that assembly elect three new 
presidential designates who would not be debarred from recognition. The young officers 
would then have to force Martínez out so that one of the designates could assume the 
presidency.35  
This plan, although the only one that had any chance of success, considering 
Martínez’ strong position, was rife with complications from the start: Salvadorans in 
general felt that the United States was forcing its will on a small nation; the strongest 
groups in the capital supported Martínez; the latter had some reason to argue that his 
government was constitutional and that he had done everything Curtis had told him; the 
younger officers refused to commit to Caffery’s plan in writing; and finally, this group 
itself admitted that it might not be strong enough to force Martínez out when the time 
came.36 In this light, it is remarkable that Caffery trusted his new friends to execute “the 
plan”. But Caffery seemed anxious to leave Salvador and told his superiors that the 
young officers had “a real understanding of what they should do”. Despite pleas from the 
Department that he stay a little while longer, Caffery left in early January. 37 Curtis was 
told to leave some days later and the legation was left in the hands of second secretary 
William McCafferty. In this respect, Martínez’ ability to hang on to power was perhaps 
due as much to Curtis’ lack of experience in Central American policy as it was to 
Caffery’s haste to negotiate a wobbly deal and leave. 
 
3. SLAUGHTER 
The Department was confident, throughout the first half of 1932, that it could dislodge 
Martínez from the presidency as it had dislodged presidents before. This task was left to 
McCafferty, but even before the chargé could go to work on the plan, Salvadoran history 
took a sharp turn for the worse.  
Uprisings in the Salvadoran countryside had been endemic at least since the 
administration of Romero Bosque. There was a brief lull during the 1930 presidential 
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elections as the country’s poor peasants entertained some hope that Arturo Araujo 
would improve their lot. As it became clear, however, that Araujo was unable or unwilling 
to engage in substantial land reforms, new uprisings started in 1931. At the time, 
minister Robbins felt that Araujo should act energetically against the demands of the 
poor—for which he had no sympathy—and eventually expressed his satisfaction that the 
government had sent out the mounted Guardia Nacional to “break some heads”. 
Araujo’s increasingly repressive measures to deal with rural uprisings did not have the 
effect that Robbins apparently thought they would have. In fact, it led to a complete 
breakdown of trust in the government and the radicalization of the campesinados. This 
situation was further exacerbated when the military took over the government and on 
January 23, 1932, a major rural uprising started in western El Salvador.38 
The course of the 1932 uprising, as well as the question of whether it was led by El 
Salvador’s Communist Party, has been adequately analyzed elsewhere.39 Suffice it to 
say that the revolting peasants, who were armed mainly with sticks and machetes, were 
quickly subdued by Salvador’s well-organized army and rural police. The quelling of the 
uprising was just the beginning, however. Fearing that the uprising was a communist 
attempt to destroy the Salvadoran government as well as its capitalist classes, the 
Martínez regime reacted with utmost severity. In the weeks following the end of the 
uprising, machine gun squads scoured the countryside, randomly killing anyone of 
Indian appearance. The coffee planter class chipped in by forming its own Guardias 
Civiles, which ruthlessly pursued alleged participants of the revolt. Although there are no 
written sources that record the numbers killed during the uprising and ensuing slaughter, 
historians estimate that the peasant rebels killed some 50 to 100 people (including 
government soldiers) while the army killed some 10,000 to 30,000 civilians in response. 
Whatever the exact numbers may be, it is clear that the Matanza, as it came to be 
known, represented the “single worst episode of state suppression” in the history of Latin 
America up to that time.40 
It is undeniable that the legation under chargé McCafferty shared a certain 
responsibility for the ferocious intensity of the Matanza. The chargé was shocked by the 
unexpected uprising. Throughout the weeks of negotiations with Martínez, the legation 
had practically ceased paying attention to events on the countryside, even as violence 
there was increasing throughout the month of December 1931. Also, McCafferty easily 
accepted the consensus among rich Salvadorans that the uprising was communist-
inspired. The chargé did ask Washington to send American war vessels to Salvadoran 
waters and to maintain that presence for some time, because it would “have the effect of 
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allaying the present feeling of panic among the people but would also undoubtedly 
prevent the de facto authorities from relaxing their repressive measures”.41 
It would not be accurate, however, to argue or to imply that the sending of 
American warships was akin to American anticommunist interventions in Central 
America during the Cold War. Neither was it intended to save the Martínez regime. In 
order to properly understand the American reaction to the uprising in 1932, the context 
of the early 1930s (rather than the Cold War) is important. How did the American 
legation perceive the uprising and how was it portrayed to Washington? What would 
likely have happened had U.S. Marines been deployed in El Salvador? 
Considering the first question, it is important to note that the legation’s perception 
of the uprising and the subsequent slaughter was completely one-sided. McCafferty 
allowed himself to be misinformed about the true events that occurred on the Salvadoran 
countryside. There is no evidence at all that the chargé ever made a thorough inquiry 
about the uprising and the subsequent slaughter, let alone that he ever left the capital to 
see the results of the Matanza himself. Neither is there any evidence that McCafferty 
ever considered investigating the matter after the fact, nor did the Department ever ask 
him to. Instead, the legation’s informers in this case came from the same limited pool of 
local notables that the legation always tapped for political or economic news.42 
Blindly accepting the consensus among Salvadoran aristocrats, McCafferty felt 
that the massacres on the countryside were the work of communists rather than the 
government. As far as the isolated executions in the capital itself—which claimed the life 
of Farabundo Martí who was later dubbed a martyr and a folk hero—were concerned, 
McCafferty believed that the Martínez regime was reluctant to carry these out but had 
been forced to act by the capitalist classes. The highest death toll that McCafferty ever 
reported, and which he believed should be ascribed to the communists in any case, was 
a rumored 4,800 deaths. The chargé reported that this was probably a gross 
exaggeration.43  
The description of the uprising as “communistic” should be understood within the 
context of early twentieth century El Salvador. The divide between the “white” coffee 
barons and the “Indian” peasants was particularly evident in El Salvador and the upper 
classes were mortally afraid of the “restlessness” of the masses. Ancient believes about 
the “savagery” of the Indians combined with vague notions that communist agitators 
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were continually trying to incite a class war—taken literally as a war—among the 
peasants. Salvadoran aristocrats did not conceive of a “communistic” uprising among the 
Indians in geopolitical terms (an attempt by Moscow to expand its sphere of influence) 
but in terms of plunder, rapine, and murder. Bloodthirsty Indians, incited by too much 
alcohol and foreign agitators, were thought to be intent on the slaughter of their social 
betters so that the latter’s lands and properties could be taken. American diplomats, 
especially those who had spent many years among the Latin American upper classes, 
tended to subscribe to this particularly apocalyptic interpretation of “communistic” 
uprisings, routinely quoting the communists’ thirst for plunder and murder, rather than 
the designs of Comintern.44 
Against this background, it should be easier to understand the utter panic in San 
Salvador when the rural uprising was in full swing. During the climax of the uprising, wild 
rumors about savage hordes of Indians advancing on the capital circulated. The 
Salvadoran coffee barons, many of whom lived in San Salvador rather than on their 
estates, were in acute fear of their lives—imagining that everyone in the capital would be 
slaughtered if the insurgents were not pushed back.45 
Panic among the locals inevitably touched the foreign colonies. In the 
characteristically understated tones of a diplomatic report, McCafferty later informed his 
superiors that “[d]ue to the extremely dangerous situation which existed at the time, 
many usually calm and sober minded persons became most excited regarding the rapid 
turn of events”.46  According to the American chargé, the Italian and the British ministers, 
the latter being a landowner himself, completely lost their heads, inevitably causing a 
panic among their compatriots as well. With evident pride, McCafferty reported that the 
“American colony in the capital behaved admirably throughout the difficulties and their 
conduct in the face of danger compared most favorably with that of certain natives and 
other foreigners”.47 Even though the chargé would not admit that he had ever been in 
real fear himself, it is clear from his reports that he shared the locals’ nightmarish 
anticipation of what would happen in the capital if the insurgency was successful: 
The sanguinary intent of the Communists, which strangely enough did not 
seem as in the usual case to require the stimulus of alcohol, was shown in 
numerous gory and lustful attacks. Women were raped and then butchered, 
others had their breasts cut off, and men were so hacked by machetes that it 
was impossible to identify their corpses. Houses were ransacked and others 
completely destroyed. Shops were looted of all their stocks.48 
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Against this backdrop, the British and the Italian envoys pleaded with McCafferty 
for American intervention and the chargé obviously agreed that such a move was 
necessary, since he relayed the request to Washington. The primary reason for 
McCafferty’s request, therefore, was a very real and acute fear for the safety of local 
Americans and other foreigners. In this context, it would be hard to imagine that the 
American legation refused to make a request for armed assistance, or that the State 
Department would reject it. How would the American public and world opinion at large 
react if it became known that American, British, and Italian women had been “raped and 
butchered” and the men hacked to pieces in the streets of San Salvador while the U.S. 
Navy idled at nearby Panama? Thus, American ships were duly dispatched—
accompanied by Canadian vessels. And while there are no sources to document the 
decision making process in Washington, there is no obvious reason to assume that 
Secretary Stimson—who carried ultimate responsibility for the sending and withdrawal of 
the ships—ever considered that the ships should be used for anything except the 
evacuation of foreigners. It is clear that Stimson was anxious to withdraw the ships as 
soon as any danger to foreign lives seemed past.49 
The uprising in western El Salvador lasted a mere 48 hours and by the time 
American ships arrived in Salvadoran waters, the danger to foreign lives and property 
appeared to be past. No American marines set foot ashore, although British marines 
made a brief landing.50 The question remains what would have happened had American 
intervention proceeded. Would American soldiers have fought “communist” rebels? 
Would they have saved the Martínez regime? One can only speculate, but it is 
informative that the Martínez regime actually felt less secure with the arrival of the 
American navy. Considering the fact that the Americans had opposed him almost from 
the start and the fact that Marine landings in previous decades had always been 
followed up by elections and a change of administrations, there is no reason to assume 
that Martínez would have considered American intervention during the uprising helpful or 
supportive. This does not mean that the United States does not bear some of the 
responsibility for the Matanza. As Lindo-Fuentes et al. have pointed out, Salvadoran 
authorities tried to prevent American intervention because they believed that it would be 
the end of their rule. This fear for American intervention was one ingredient in the mix—
which included physical fear of the insurgents—which led the Martínez to lash out 
against the insurgents “like a wounded animal” and contributed to the apocalyptic nature 
of the event. 51  
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After initial panic died down, the Americans very quickly forgot about the uprising. Both 
the legation and the Department were evidently satisfied that the revolt had ended 
without loss of American life and property. Despite their physical nearness to the 
slaughter, American diplomats remained blissfully unaware of the fact that the Matanza 
was a singularly apocalyptic event that would haunt Salvadoran society for decades to 
come. Perhaps due to the very unprecedented scale of machine gun killings, they could 
not have known. Thus, McCafferty was satisfied to limit his reports on the massacre to 
the “gory and lustful” atrocities committed by the communists.52 
While the local elites flocked to Martínez as their protector, McCafferty was not 
about to let his resolve sway. While the chargé respected Martínez’ “cool and collected” 
attitude during the uprising, he also made sure that the President knew that American 
policy had not changed. As the machine guns were still bursting and American ships 
were still in Salvadoran waters, McCafferty spelled out again the pre-uprising policy of 
the United States to Martínez, even if it was in a little more respectful tone: 
I informed the de facto authorities that there is not the slightest animus 
against Martinez personally on the part of the United States Government but 
that as has been already made clear the decision regarding the non 
recognition of his regime is the only possible decision which can be reached 
in view of the provisions of the 1923 Treaty.53 
The suppression of the 1932 uprising made McCafferty’s job more difficult, however. 
General Martínez’ internal political position was enormously strengthened. The 
Americans were well-aware of this fact, but the Department still had some hope that 
Martínez’ hold on the reins of power would slacken over time and that there would be 
another chance to convince him to step down. This turned out to be a mistake. In the 
end, it was the United States that would have to give in. 
 
4. DEFIANCE 
After the initial alarm that accompanied the 1932 uprising, McCafferty quickly reasserted 
U.S. determination to face down Martínez. In the next five to six months, the chargé and 
the General engaged in a test of willpower, with McCafferty pressing for an immediate 
change of governments and Martínez skillfully delaying the matter. Granted, the United 
States did recognize that a solution to the constitutional problem in El Salvador had to 
include the army. But this was also the basis of Caffery’s position, so McCafferty’s 
negotiations with high military officers did not represent a change of policy due to the 
Matanza. Schemes suggested by Salvadoran authorities to get around the spirit of the 
1923 Treaty were rejected out of hand. While Washington was willing to accept 
continued military dominance in El Salvador, it would not compromise the Treaty. 
Martínez had to leave the presidency.  
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This was unacceptable to Martínez. All his efforts in the months following the revolt 
were aimed at maintaining his position. The President’s most-used argument to convince 
McCafferty that he was irreplaceable was to present himself as a bulwark against 
communism. But while the Salvadoran aristocracy readily accepted this logic, the U.S. 
legation and Department were not so easily duped. Although American diplomats 
acknowledged that they had underestimated the strength of communism, they 
considered that it was stamped out effectively by Martínez’ repression. In other words, 
as far as the United States was concerned, Martínez’ very thorough handling of the 
uprising had obsoleted him. So when Martínez first employed what would become his 
government’s favorite spiel—arguing that he could not reorganize his government or 
step down due to the risk of another communist uprising—McCafferty countered that, if 
anything, the repression of the uprising had made the reorganization of the government 
easier: 
[General Martínez] spoke at length on the seriousness of the recent 
communistic movement and its effect on the neighboring countries and 
intimated that it would be disastrous at the present time to have a change of 
executive. I told him that all indications were that the communistic menace 
had been suppressed at least for the time being and that I did not believe a 
solution of the present political situation would be difficult if the provisions of 
the 1923 Treaty were followed in reorganizing the Government.54  
McCafferty repeated this argument frequently and it must have become clear to Martínez 
at some point that his anti-communist credentials got him nowhere.55 
Recent research has demonstrated, however, that anticommunist rhetoric and 
repression were only two facets of Martínez’ campaign to solidify and legitimize his 
power. Others were his cooptation of the army into politics; the establishment and 
expansion of a new political party, Partido Pro Patria, which served as a patronage 
network to the new president; and a many-sided popular program to obtain the 
allegiance of the Indian masses. An indication of the effectiveness of Martínez’ political 
maneuvers is the curious fact that the very Indian communities who suffered the full 
horror of the Matanza in 1932 were the last defenders of the regime against an urban 
middle-class uprising in 1944.56 
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 Martínez had ample time to strengthen his position, because he had duped 
McCafferty with a line of arguments that was much more subtle than his anti-communist 
rhetoric. To establish a stable follow-up government, the wily General argued, it was 
necessary to unite all the important players behind the de facto government. Only then 
could it guarantee a smooth transfer of power to a diplomatically recognizable 
government that would have the support of “the people”. In other words, Martínez 
argued that he needed more power before he could safely rescind it. McCafferty was led 
on by this and other delaying tactics for several months. With regard to the General’s 
growing domination over the army, for example, the chargé reported on April 16 that: 
Martinez has strengthened his position by his recent appointments of 
absolutely loyal officers as chief of Police and Chief of the Guardia. He 
apparently intends to secure complete control of the army by breaking the 
power of the young military officers who have been causing him much 
apprehension recently by their threatening attitude. If he succeeds in his plan 
it will be easier for him to reorganize the Government to admit of recognition. 
I believe he still intends to step aside but it has been difficult for him to do so 
because of the many dissensions in the army.57 
Only by the end of April, 1932, did the legation and the Department realize that they 
were being played for time and credible excuses for further delays began to run out. 
When Martínez ingeniously argued that he could not resign in May, because “that was 
the Communist month”, an exasperated Acting Secretary Castle wondered “what excuse 
General Martínez will find not to resign in June”.58 
Of course, once he was strong enough, Martínez did not step down. After five 
months of negotiations, Martínez decided that he would forego a compromise with the 
Yankees. In June, despite earlier promises to the contrary, the General announced that 
he would serve out Araujo’s term without seeking recognition. Both the legation and the 
State Department had been anticipating this move for several days so it did not come as 
a complete shock. The realization that Martínez had simply been playing a cat and 
mouse game with them for months did, however, deeply annoy the American diplomats. 
Quite unaccustomed to successful resistance to American power, the legation and the 
Department had always assumed that Martínez was just a particularly pig-headed leader 
of the Orellana type who would have to capitulate to American wishes in the end.59 
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Washington’s reaction to Martínez’ announcement that he would forego 
recognition led David Schmitz to conclude that the American government extended 
“informal recognition” to the Salvadoran General after June. This conclusion, which was 
also put forward (but not substantiated) by other researchers, requires exploration. There 
are two main arguments for the conclusion that Washington recognized Martínez 
“unofficially”: Firstly, Washington was grateful for the General’s repression of the 
communist uprising. Secondly, the State Department did not escalate its resistance 
against Martínez after the latter announced that he would remain in office in defiance of 
American wishes. In fact, the American legation in San Salvador remained open—be it in 
the hands of a chargé rather than a minister.60 
With regard to the first argument, it is noteworthy, as Schmitz argues, that Stimson 
wrote in his diary on January 25, 1932 (two days after the start of the uprising), that the 
“communistic revolution in Salvador (…) produces a rather nasty (…) problem, because 
the man who is president and who is the only pillar against the success of what seems to 
be a rather nasty proletarian revolution is Martínez, whom we were unable to recognize 
under the 1923 rule”. However, this statement in itself recognizes the continued primacy 
of the 1923 Treaty over any immediate concern for the communist danger. Furthermore, 
by June, 1932, any initial sympathy for Martínez had been eroded by his defiance to 
American wishes. In a report to McCafferty of June 14, Under-Secretary Francis White 
explained the feeling in the Department: “We had perhaps felt a little pity in the past that 
we could not recognize Martínez who had handled the outbreak so well, but that feeling 
had now vanished in view of the fact that apparently Martínez was a man whose word 
could not be relied upon. I was therefore inclined to take the position that it was a 
fortunate thing for us that we had not been able to recognize anyone who would appear 
to be so unworthy”.61 
Concerning the second argument, it is true that escalating the pressure on 
Martínez was hardly considered. This decision should be seen in the right context, 
however: Measures beyond mere non-recognition had never been necessary before and 
if applied now, would smack of intervention, thus endangering all the good will the 
Hoover administration had been able to build on its non-intervention policy in Latin 
America. Simply accepting defeat and extending outright recognition to the Salvadoran 
regime also seemed out of the question, because it would wreck U.S. policy in Central 
America, which had been based on the principle of non-recognition of revolutionary 
governments since 1907. Thus unable to seek Martínez’ downfall due to the effect this 
would have on broader Latin American policy and unable to recognize him due to 
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Central American policy, the State Department implicitly decided that the best 
Salvadoran policy was to have no policy at all. Perhaps there was some hope that 
Martínez’ hold on the reins of power would lessen over time and that there would be a 
second chance to convince him to step down.  
Lastly, it is entirely unclear what “informal” or “unofficial” recognition might mean in 
practice. By definition, extending diplomatic recognition is a public act—as is withholding 
recognition. It would take another 18 months (and a change of administrations) before 
Washington finally recognized Martínez. What could the Department hope to gain by 
recognizing Martínez informally but not officially? The continued reign of Martínez in 
defiance of Washington’s official and well publicized policy of non-recognition could only 
hurt the prestige of the United States. If the object of alleged de facto recognition was to 
bolster an anti-communist regime, it is unclear why outright recognition was not 
considered. After all, if communism was so dangerous, then why let 2 years pass 
between the 1932 uprising and recognition? Even Joseph Stalin received official 
diplomatic recognition well before Martínez did. 
In fact, the State Department made it clear to Martínez on several occasions 
throughout 1932 and 1933 that any type of informal relationship or cooperation was out 
of the question. And while McCafferty remained in Salvador during these long years to 
collect information and look after American economic and financial interest, he was 
careful not to associate himself with the regime. The poor chargé got stuck in El 
Salvador for two years: From Caffery’s departure in January, 1932, to Washington’s 
eventual recognition of the Martínez regime in January, 1934. His status was uncertain: 
He represented his country before a government that, officially, did not exist. He could 
not be promoted or transferred without raising the impression that U.S. policy toward 
Martínez had changed. The usual perks that made diplomatic life worth while – the 
banquets, the social prestige, the mingling with local dignitaries – were off limits for the 
young chargé. The locals, who had been driven into Martínez’ arms after the 1932 
uprising, considered McCafferty’s presence as a symbol of unwanted U.S. interference 
in their politics. McCafferty could not join official festivities as his attendance would imply 
recognition of the local political situation (although his diplomatic colleagues from the 
other Central American states, which also refused to recognize Martínez, were less 
conscientious on this point). Even the usual visits to the local country- or golf clubs were 
out-of-the-question, since the chargé would inevitably be seen there rubbing shoulders 
with high government officials.62 
The following eighteen months were hard on Martínez too. McCafferty reported on 
several occasions that Martínez felt very anxious about the continued state of non-
recognition—especially when it became evident that the FDR administration was seeking 
                                                 
62 McCafferty to the Secretary of State, Despatch 244G, January 31, 1933, PR EL Salvador, Vol. 
122, cl. 800: General Conditions; McCafferty to the Secretary of State, Despatch 364G, October 
20, 1933, PR EL Salvador, Vol. 122, cl. 800: General Conditions; McCafferty to the Secretary of 
State, Despatch 366G, November 4, 1933, PR EL Salvador, Vol. 122, cl. 800: General Conditions. 
DEFEAT IN EL SALVADOR 
 
119 
a rapprochement with Stalin, but continued to ignore him63—and went out of his way to 
please the yanquis on every occasion. American businesses received preferential 
treatment from the Martínez government. The latter also cleaned up its act by instituting 
financial conservatism, government honesty, minor social programs, and all the other 
policies that earned the Ubico government a good reputation with the Americans. In fact, 
McCafferty opined that “the principal reason for the present good administration in El 
Salvador is the non-recognition of the United States and (…) General Martinez and his 
collaborators hope that if they can demonstrate their ability to govern in an efficient 
manner, they will in time obtain recognition from the American Government".64 While this 
was probably stretching the point, it is clear that Martínez’ behavior was not that of a 
man who felt secure in the knowledge that the United States unofficially recognized his 
regime. 
 
Only after the Roosevelt administration had been in office for some months did it 
become clear that the policy not to recognize undesirable regimes would have to be 
revised some time in the context of the non-intervention policy. The Central America 
situation itself also provided impetus for the Americans to come to terms with Martínez. 
Being signatories to the 1923 Treaty, the Central American neighbors of El Salvador 
were required to act as if the Martínez regime did not exist. Washington tried to make 
sure that they acted as such, but in a region were internal politics rarely stopped at the 
border, this proved to be impossible. First of all, the continued existence of the Martínez 
regime in defiance to U.S. policy was an inspiration to all ambitious politicians throughout 
Central America who could not gain the presidency by fair and democratic means. In 
Guatemala, Whitehouse reported that the Orellana faction now regretted that it had 
given in to American wishes so easily and appeared to be plotting a return to the 
presidential palace. In Honduras, Zúñiga Huete was said to have remarked that U.S. 
recognition was not a necessity any longer and this may well have influenced the 
decision of the Liberal Party to rebel after its defeat in the 1931 elections. In Nicaragua, 
President Juan Bautista Sacasa feared the ambitions of General Somoza, who’s 
appetite for power was undoubtedly wetted by Martínez’ seizure of power. In general, 
American diplomats feared that Martínez’ example undermined the ability of elected 
governments to deter coups and thus threatened the entire region’s stability.65 
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Then there was the division caused by the existence of the Martínez regime 
between the Central American states and even between those countries and the United 
States. President Ubico, who himself had come to power due to the opening that the 
1923 Treaty had given him, pronounced himself to be a staunch supporter of the 
selfsame treaty almost immediately after the December 2 coup in Salvador. Also, the 
General clearly wanted to endear himself to Washington by presenting himself as a loyal 
supporter of its regional policy. But while American diplomats appreciated Ubico’s 
support, his enthusiasm for the campaign against Martínez sometimes proved to be 
embarrassing. Ubico (rightly) opined that a passive policy of mere non-recognition would 
not bear fruit and pushed the Americans to employ an economic boycott or unspecified 
“harsher measures” against the Salvadoran General. Such proposals were rejected out-
of-hand since, even if they were effective in Salvador, they would endanger U.S. policy 
in the rest of Latin America. American qualms about more rigorous actions against 
Salvador annoyed Ubico and hurt American prestige in Guatemala, where, Whitehouse 
reported, people felt that Martínez had “put something over on the United States”.66 
 Carías’ position was ambiguous. On the one hand, Honduras traditionally 
supported the 1923 Treaty because it seemed to be effective in quieting regional 
conflicts of which the Republic—its territory having served as the battlefield of Central 
America on many occasions—was often the only true looser. On the other hand, when 
Carías was fighting the War of Treacheries and was dreadfully low on ammo, Martínez 
was the only one who was willing to send him a couple of cases of lead.67 Martínez, of 
course, was only too eager to make new friends, and although Carías paid for the 
Salvadoran ammo in cash and made it clear that an ammo-in-exchange-for-recognition 
deal was out of the question, the Honduran General henceforth seized on every 
opportunity to show his “unofficial” feelings of friendship for Martínez. In Nicaragua, 
internal intrigues forced Sacasa to abide by the 1923 Treaty, as mentioned before, but in 
Costa Rica public sentiment was entirely in sympathy with Martínez. Costa Rica and 
Salvador had long shared some mutual feelings of respect due to their relatively 
progressive governments and economies and the Ticos could not help but admire 
Salvador’s lone defiance of the Colossus of the North. Besides, Costa Rica was a nation 
of independent farmers who were shocked by the 1932 “Communist” uprising.68 
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It should have been clear to the Roosevelt administration that it only stood to loose 
from a continuance of Hoover’s policy toward Martínez. When Costa Rica and El 
Salvador jointly announced in 1933 that they would abrogate the 1923 Treaty to clear 
the way for a renewal of diplomatic relations, the State Department decided to cut its 
losses and salvage what it could. One thing that needed salvaging was the United 
States’ tattered prestige. It could not capitulate to Martínez outright. And while the details 
of the diplomatic wrangling that preceded final recognition of the Salvadoran government 
are murky, it seems clear that the United States pushed Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, and Costa Rica to jointly extend recognition to Martínez. After the Central 
American states had taken the initiative, Washington could claim that it would honor the 
wishes of its regional friends by making amends with Martínez: The whole procedure 
was thus presented as a mark of respect for the self-determination of the Central 
American republics and as a great victory for the Good Neighbor. 
The State Department also wished to salvage what it could of the 1923 Treaty. 
Costa Rica and El Salvador had already made it clear that they wished to rid themselves 
of the Treaty, but it might still be upheld in the case of Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua. Discussions on the recognition of Martínez started at the middle level of the 
State Department in October, 1933, where it was recognized that the 1923 Treaty was 
already weakened, whether or not the Salvadoran government was recognized or not. 
The plan developed to have the three Central American countries that still upheld the 
1923 Treaty, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, recognize the Martínez regime and 
at the same time announce that they would uphold the Treaty among the three of them. 
The United States would recognize Martínez some days later on the grounds that it 
supported the effort made by the Central American states themselves to further friendly 
relations. In fact, none of the Central American governments were consulted on this plan 
until January, 1934: The United States would lead the entire effort behind the scenes, 
but wished to uphold the impression that the initiative lay with the sister republics and 
merely had the “sympathetic interest” of the State Department.69 
The plan was eventually supported by Sumner Welles—who had first hand 
experience with the ineffectiveness of non-recognition during his recent mission to 
Cuba—and the Undersecretary effortlessly got F.D.R. and Hull on board, both of whom 
seemed rather uninterested in the details of the issue. What followed was a brilliant 
episode of diplomatic doubletalk, in which the State Department told the Central 
Americans what to do while piously upholding the impression that it had no intention to 
intervene in their politics. Juan Bautista Sacasa of Nicaragua was chosen as the one 
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who would “take the initiative” in suggesting the plan to his colleagues in Honduras and 
Guatemala. There is some reason to assume that Sacasa was chosen to make it clear to 
Somoza that the 1923 Treaty still applied to Nicaragua. In any event, Acting Secretary 
Phillips wrote Minister Lane that it had come to his attention that the Central American 
states themselves would “in fact be glad to extend recognition” to Martínez. In the light of 
this feeling among the Central American states, Phillips suggested that Sacasa, Ubico, 
and Carías “might desire to reach an agreement more or less in the (…) terms” that the 
Acting Secretary outlined to the Minister.70 
It turned out that both Sacasa and Carías were indeed glad to follow up on the 
Department’s suggestions, but Ubico was not. The latter considered El Salvador in 
General and Martínez in particular as rivals to a position of regional leadership that 
Ubico coveted for Guatemala in general and himself in particular. Furthermore, the 
General had faithfully supported the U.S. non-recognition policy toward Martínez and 
now felt embarrassed that his supposed friend changed course so unexpectedly.  Last 
but not least, Ubico felt that the Department should have chosen him, not Sacasa, to 
take the initiative in this plan. Some pressure from the American legation was needed to 
convince Ubico that he was in fact glad to recognize Martínez on his own initiative. On 
January 25, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua jointly recognized the Martínez 
regime and at the same time announced that the 1923 Treaty would remain in effect 
between the three of them. The United States followed suit two days later, presenting 
the move not as the Martínez victory that it was, but as the sovereign wish of the people 
of Central America and “an important step in the establishment of normal, friendly 
relations among all the nations of America”.71 
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5. LESSONS NOT YET LEARNED 
In 1934, a Central American conference was held in Guatemala to discuss the future of 
the Treaty of Peace and Amity in the light of recognition of General Martínez.72 While 
Matthew Hanna, the U.S. minister to Guatemala, devoted a respectable amount of 
political reports to the conference, the event has never been recorded in the history 
books. The reason for this “oversight” may well be that, in light of later events, the 
conference was a patently useless exercise in pious declarations on the side of Central 
American leaders. Hanna took it quite seriously, however. And if nothing else, his reports 
of the conference demonstrate what he and his colleagues had not yet learned from the 
defeat in El Salvador. 
Ubico gave it all he got. Perhaps still smarting from fact that he was not chosen to 
lead the negotiations that resulted in the recognition of Martínez, he was determined to 
demonstrate his credentials for regional leadership during the conference. The delegates 
of the other Central American nations were welcomed with parades by Guatemala’s 
finest military units; a twenty-one gun salute; prosaic speeches on Central American 
unity; and, for good measure, a 30,000 man march through the streets of Guatemala, 
courtesy of Ubico’s Liberal-Progressive Party. “The size of the parade and its manifest 
devotion to President Ubico must have made a strong impression on the visiting 
delegates”, according to Hanna’s dry account.73 
While the State Department had made clear its intention not to get involved in the 
conference74, Hanna believed that it could well direct the future of the region. While the 
conference was in fact a product of the breakdown of the 1923 Treaty, Hanna somehow 
hoped that it could be the beginning of greater Central American unity, stability, and 
prosperity. The minister took it upon himself to coach the Nicaraguan delegation and, 
“without being too specific”, lectured it on the possibility “that the Conference might see 
fit to set up machinery for assembling similar conferences at regular intervals or 
whenever circumstance appeared to make this desirable, and thus establish the Central 
American Conference as a recurring institution”.75 
After about a month of negotiations—enlivened by some more diners, concerts, 
and receptions that “added to the spirit of good fellowship”—the conference ended. The 
new “Treaty of Fraternity”, as the decisions of the conference were officially known, 
established that the Treaty of 1923 would remain in effect between Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua and added new articles on the arbitration of international 
conflicts and extradition. Reflecting on the outcome of the conference, Hanna somewhat 
                                                 
72 Lane to the Secretary of State, January 26, 1934, PR El Salvador, Vol. 128, cl. 710 Political 
Relations. Treaties; Edward Lawton (U.S. Chargé d’Affaires a.i. to Guatemala) to the Department 
of State, January 27, 1934, PR El Salvador, Vol. 128, cl. 710 Political Relations. Treaties. 
73 Matthew Hanna (U.S. Minister to Guatemala) to the Secretary of State, Despatch 89, March 16, 
1934, PR El Salvador, Vol. 128, cl. 710 Political Relations. Treaties. 
74 Hull to the U.S. Legations in Central America, January 31, 1934, PR El Salvador, Vol. 128, cl. 
710 Political Relations. Treaties. 
75 Hanna to the Secretary of State, Despatch 94, March 17, 1934, PR El Salvador, Vol. 128, cl. 
710 Political Relations. Treaties. In lieu of Department instructions on this subject, Hanna did add 
that “the idea was a purely personal one”. 
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ironically noted that the fact that it had taken place without American guidance was a 
major step ahead: “[The delegates] manifestly feel that this conference marks the 
beginning of a new order of things in the political relations of the Central American states, 
and that they have established a foundation for greater stability in Central America on 
which future conferences may be build.”76 
While Hanna cautioned that the Conference did not “necessarily” mark “the 
beginning of a millennium for Central America”, his reports on this event do indicate that 
he and his colleagues continued to labor under the assumption that international treaties 
combined with behind-the-scenes direction from the U.S. legations would determine the 
future of Central America. Ubico, Carías, and Somoza, meanwhile, recognized what the 
real “new order of things” would be. As Kenneth Grieb concludes in his classic account 
on Martínez’ rise to power: 
…the successful defiance of the United States by Martínez ushered in a new 
era in Central American politics, making possible the rise of a new series of 
dictators. So long as the United States remained unwilling to resort to force, 
any strong-willed leader could seize office and retain it. Nearly all incumbent 
isthmian regimes immediately took advantage of the opportunity to 
perpetuate themselves in power.77 
While Washington had some hope that it could keep the caudillos tied down by the 1923 
Treaty, the latter recognized that, when stripped of American determination to back it up, 
the Treaty was just a scrap of paper. While the development towards a noninterference 
policy was completed in Washington, Ubico and Carías were building their armies, 
closing down newspapers, exiling opponents, and packing the National Legislations with 
supporters. They were ready to extend their terms in power. 
 
                                                 
76 Hanna to the Secretary of State, Despatch 134, April 14, 1934, PR El Salvador, Vol. 128, cl. 
710 Political Relations. Treaties. 
77 Grieb, “The United States and the rise of General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez”, Journal of 
Latin American Studies 3:2 (November 1971) 151-172, there 172. 
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THE STUDENT AND THE MASTER 
Strongmen become dictators, 1934-1936 
~ The student and the master ~ 
 
 
¿Qué mi importa el buen vecino?  
 
~ Juan Bautista Sacasa, 1936 
 
 
 
Early in 1936, Arthur Bliss Lane, the U.S. Minister to Nicaragua, was set to be 
transferred to the Baltic States. One afternoon, he discussed his farewell speech with the 
President of the Republic, Juan Bautista Sacasa. The president asked Lane whether he 
could mention in his speech that the United States supported constitutional government 
in Nicaragua. Sensing a trap, Lane answered diplomatically that he could mention U.S. 
interest in peace in the region and the progress that had been made under Franklin 
Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy in recent years. At this point the Nicaraguan president 
got “very hot” and exclaimed: “What do I care about the Good Neighbor?”.1 
Much like Ubico and Carías, Sacasa was elected to office in 1932 in a contest that 
was deemed one of the fairest the country ever witnessed. The American role in this 
election was larger, and certainly more evident, than that in the Guatemalan and 
Honduran elections: U.S. Marines had occupied the Central American Republic since 
1928 and had supervised the presidential elections there. An indication of the fairness of 
the elections, despite foreign meddling, was that the winner, Juan Sacasa, was a former 
rebel General who had spent years fighting the Marines. In Washington, U.S. 
policymakers congratulated each other for their open-mindedness in recognizing a rogue 
caudillo as the president in one of the sister republics. And as we have seen in Chapter 
2, the State Department victoriously announced in 1933 that “[f]or the first time in the 
memory of Nicaraguans, the government in power, both president and Congress, is 
known to represent the freely manifested will of the Nicaraguan people”.2 
So why did Lane find it necessary, in 1936, to avoid mention of U.S. support for 
constitutional government? Why was Sacasa so disappointed in the Good Neighbor? 
The answer, as far as Nicaragua is concerned, is that Sacasa’s election had depended 
on U.S. intervention on behalf of constitutional government in 1932. Since that time, 
however, the U.S. carefully moved away from intervention – a move which was 
completed under Franklin Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor. Although this was not evident at 
first, the Good Neighbor would eventually renounce interference as well as outright 
military intervention: meaning that American diplomats in Latin America would refrain 
                                                 
1 Lane to Corrigan, July 22, 1936, Arthur Bliss Lane papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale 
University Library, Yale University at New Haven, Connecticut (henceforth Lane Papers), Box 63, 
Folder 1126. 
2 See chapter 2, pages 94-96. 
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from any action that could be seen as an attempt to influence local politics, even if it was 
to support democracy. This is why Lane would only commit his government to a 
completely non-offensive policy of supporting peace. 
The problem for Sacasa was that he had a mortal enemy in Nicaragua. Only a 
couple of years before, Nicaragua, much like Honduras, had no professional, centralized 
army organization. Instead, partisan militias battled each other for political influence. 
North American observers opined that this situation did not bode well for free elections. 
Therefore, U.S. Marines trained a Guardia Nacional which was to be a nonpartisan 
constabulary with a single mission: to protect Nicaragua’s constitutional government. At 
the time of the founding of the Guardia, the then-government together with then-minister 
Matthew Hanna selected as the chief of the new organization one Anastasio Somoza–a 
charming fellow who spoke excellent English. Unfortunately, Somoza turned out to be 
something less than a non-partisan protector of the Nicaraguan constitution. After the 
Marines had left Nicaragua in early 1933, he remorselessly pursued the presidency 
together with his Guardia. By the time Lane was writing his farewell speech, both the 
presidential palace and the Guardia headquarters were heavily armed and fortified and 
ready for final battle.3 
Because the Guardia inherited a virtual arms monopoly from the Marines, there 
was little that Sacasa could do, in a military sense, to save his presidency. His only hope 
was that the U.S. would step in to salvage his administration, but this was exactly what 
Good Neighbor Roosevelt had promised not to do. Minister Lane himself was certainly 
not immune to Sacasa’s entreaties on behalf of democracy and against a military 
dictatorship that would certainly follow a Somoza coup. Opining that the Guardia was 
“pseudo-fascist” and “militaristic” and certainly inconsistent with American ideals, the 
Minister complained to a friend in the State Department that:  
[T]he people who created the G[uardia] N[acional] had no adequate 
understanding of the psychology of the people here. Otherwise they would 
not have bequeathed Nicaragua with an instrument to blast constitutional 
procedure off the map. Did it ever occur to the eminent statesmen who 
created the GN that personal ambition lurks in the human breast even in 
Nicaragua? In my opinion it has been one of the sorriest examples on our 
part of our inability to understand that we should not meddle in other people’s 
affairs.4   
In the end, Somoza proved himself an astute enough politician not to “blast” his way into 
the presidential palace. But, using the Guardia as his power base, he did become his 
nation’s chief executive—just weeks after Lane left Nicaragua. His ascendancy 
confirmed an important lesson that local politicians had taught the Americans earlier: 
after many years of elections under U.S. tutelage, power was to be the new kingmaker of 
Central America. The students became the masters. 
                                                 
3 This general overview is based on Crawley, Somoza and Roosevelt, Clark, Diplomatic Relations, 
Flacoff, “Somoza”, and Walter, The Regime. 
4 Lane to Beaulac, July 27, 1925, Lane Papers, Box 61, Folder 1102. 
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The current chapter will discuss the era of “continuismo”–a Spanish word which, in 
this context, refers to the illegal continuance of power of a government beyond its 
constitutional term. Somoza’s rise to power in Nicaragua presented only the endpoint of 
a learning process for the American diplomatic establishment. Beginning with Ubico, all 
the Central American presidents had themselves “reelected” around 1935, despite 
constitutional limitations on presidential terms in all of these republics. This event 
challenged U.S. diplomats’ perception of the local rulers as simply “strong” men who had 
come to power with the explicit or implicit consent of the people. After the successful 
continuismo campaigns in Central America, there was no question that these rulers were 
dictators. Much like Lane, U.S. diplomats in the region had some difficulty accepting this 
new fact. Most, if not all, of them assumed that continuismo would not meet with the 
approval of the State Department. However, the State Department valued its policy of 
non-intervention and the Good Neighbor much too highly to be willing to discard it in 
favor of supporting honest elections in Central America. This was not always easy to 
accept for the local diplomats who were as yet innocent of the rigidity of the Good 
Neighbor policy.  
 
1. THE GOOD NEIGHBOR AND NONINTERVENTION 
Throughout the years of Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency, the Good Neighbor policy 
came to have many meanings. It started with a fairly cryptic reference in Roosevelt’s first 
inauguration address, where the new president announced that his foreign policy would 
be based on the principle of the good neighbor: “the neighbor who resolutely respects 
himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others”. While no special 
mention was made of Latin America at first, the Good Neighbor policy eventually 
became synonymous with Washington’s inter-American policy. Exactly what that policy 
was, changed over time. During Roosevelt’s first term, foreign policy was mainly left to 
the devices of the State Department while the president focused on the causes and 
effects of the Great Depression at home. The Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, an ardent 
Believer in free trade, focused on improving economic relations with the rest 
hemisphere—which lead to the negotiation of several new trade treaties. After 1936 
however, the president himself began to take the lead in Latin American policy: 
attempting to forge a hemisphere-wide political alliance against the threat of Fascism 
emanating from Europe. 
But before any new economic or political relationship between North and South 
could be formed, old wounds needed attention. Many of the neighbors to the south of the 
United States felt that the “colossus of the north”, as it was sometimes called, had been 
overbearing and arrogant in its dealings toward them over the past decades. A 
systematic campaign of public diplomacy and cultural outreach was one of the 
responses of the Roosevelt administration. Activities in this field ranged from high-
worded speeches by equally high-placed American leaders, up to and including the 
President, during numerous inter-American conferences to Washington’s successful 
attempts to enlist the cooperation of Hollywood companies in producing more favorable 
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stereotypes of Latin Americans. While effective in themselves, these “public relations” 
efforts could easily have come to naught if Washington’s lofty words were not somehow 
backed up by deeds—or rather, the lack thereof.5 
That is why, regardless of the great variety of initiatives that made up the Good 
Neighbor, the non-intervention principles was always considered as the backbone of 
Washington’s policy, both in the United States and in Latin America. Some discussion 
will always be current among historians about who was responsible for the introduction 
of the important principle. It is obvious that the Hoover administration was well underway 
to establish non-intervention as a fixture of its Latin American policies. But there were 
inconsistencies in the Hoover policy, such as the continued occupation of Nicaragua, 
among other nations, and the employment of the American navy when American lives 
were thought to be in danger, such as during the Matanza. It is also plain that diplomats 
at Latin American posts, men such as Whitehouse or Lay, had not yet internalized the 
principle of nonintervention.6 
So whatever grounds had been cleared during the Hoover years, it was up to the 
Roosevelt administration to finish the job and to make nonintervention a consistent and 
unbreakable standard. In terms of high diplomacy, that job was completed by 1936. 
Already at the inter-American Conference at Montevideo in 1933, Secretary Hull 
promised that the United States would abide by the nonintervention principle. However, 
the language of the that statement was somewhat vague on the issue of the protection 
of American lives and interests in the other American republics, creating a loophole that 
might leave the United States free to take action when its nationals were considered to 
be in danger. However, at the Pan-American Conference of 1936, Hull made a more 
definite statement which, theoretically at least, closed the door on U.S. intervention once 
and for all.7 
There still remained an issue of day-to-day diplomacy, however. In principle, the 
concept of nonintervention had been something of a diplomatic dogma at least since the 
1648 Peace of Westphalia, which established the modern concept of state sovereignty. 
The same principle had been recognized by the United States government shortly after 
its independence—a fact that is easily overlooked when studying the history of U.S.-
Latin American relations. But regardless of any formal training that a U.S. diplomat might 
have received on this point, the reality was that intervention in the “backward” states of 
Latin America was considered quite appropriate, especially when it was dressed up in 
the language of a civilizing or democratizing mission. Especially during the first decades 
of the twentieth century, the U.S. navy had been so busy in the Caribbean that requests 
for Marines from the American Legations and Consulates in the region had become a 
                                                 
5 Many books quoted in these references offer some insight on the Good Neighbor policy. For a 
general introduction, Wood, The Making, passim, Jablon, Crossroads, passim and Gilderhus, 
Second Century, Chapter 3, are recommended. Also see Chapters 5 and 6, both section 1, below. 
6  Wood, The Making, 123-135; Gilderhus, Second Century, Chapter 3, especially page 73; 
Schoultz, Beneath the United States, 293-296; Gellman, Good Neighbor Diplomacy, 3-29. 
7 Gilderhus, Second Century, 78; Schoultz, Beneath the United States, 304-305. 
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matter of course, not to be given much though to. 8 Thus, there was a very real risk that 
everything the State Department had tried to accomplish at inter-American conferences 
would be undone by careless officers in the field. For the Good Neighbor policy to be a 
success, Washington needed to educate its diplomats about the need to refrain from any 
sort of intervention or even interference. This job the State Department took upon itself 
only after considerable delay and confusion. 
 
2. THE CONTINUISMO CAMPAIGNS 
By the early 1930s, the Central American nations all had a long, if not entirely successful, 
history of republican government. Like so many other republics, those of the American 
isthmus regarded the development of a despotic government, either by a single person, 
a family dynasty, or an oligarchy, as their main existential threat. Hence, Central 
American constitutions allowed for short presidential terms, generally four years; listed 
strict limitations on appointment or election to office of two or more family members, 
even if it was to consecutive governments; and absolutely prohibited presidential 
reelection. Some constitutions included an additional obstacle to the ambitious caudillo, 
determining that any changes to the constitutional articles on reelection would not 
become effective until new general elections had taken place and a new government 
had been installed. 
These constitutional obstacles were not always effective, but they had survived a 
century of political strive in Central America. Additionally, the 1923 Treaty boosted the 
prohibition against reelection by denying diplomatic recognition to unconstitutional 
governments. The latter did not only include regimes that came to power illegally, but 
also those that remained in office unconstitutionally. In this context, the United States 
had intervened several times during the 1920s to prevent Central American presidents 
from clinging to power, most notably in Nicaragua, but also in El Salvador where 
American actions led to Romero Bosque’s election.  
At the same time however, an epidemic was developing in the Caribbean and 
swept Cuba and the Dominican Republic, promising to infect Central America next. The 
name of the new disease was continuismo. Its symptoms have been catalogued by 
Russel Fitzgibbon: 
Continuismo (…) is the practice of continuing the administration in power in a 
Latin American country by the process of a constitutional amendment, or a 
provision in a new constitution, exempting the president in office, and 
perhaps other elective officials, from the historic and frequent prohibition 
                                                 
8 Wood states that it “should not be surprising that a certain sense of the normality, and even 
propriety of calling on the Marines, should have persisted beyond 1920, independently of the 
nature of the formal justification for such action; it was a habitual, nearly automatic response to 
‘disturbed conditions’ or ‘utter chaos’ in a Caribbean country”. Wood, The Making, 5. Gorden 
Connell Smith argues that “the Marines had been used to frequently as to seem, to the United 
States, part of the natural order of things”. Gordon Connell-Smith, The United States and Latin 
America. A Historical Analysis of inter-American Relations (London et al. 1974) 146-147. 
Chapter 4 
 
130 
against two consecutive terms in office. The precise form of the constitutional 
change may vary—the general pattern is simple and uniform.9 
Continuismo was employed by the Cuban dictator Gerardo Machado in 1928 and the 
Dominican regimes of Horacio Vásquez and Rafael Trujillo in 1928 and 1934. The 
spread of this practice had been watched closely from Central America, but, due to U.S. 
involvement in the elections of the early 1930s, had not looked especially promising. 
That is, until Martínez was recognized in 1934. 
During the negotiations that surrounded El Salvador’s return to the American fold, 
Washington made it clear that it supported the “initiative” taken by Guatemala, Honduras, 
and Nicaragua to maintain the 1923 Treaty among themselves. Officially, the treaty was 
maintained for another year or so, but those gifted with political acumen already 
considered it a dead letter. In January 1934, Ubico told the Legation that he did not 
“understand how President Sacasa and the Department can feel that the Treaty is not 
being violated [by recognizing Martínez]” and chargé Lawton opined that the 
“Guatemalan Government would not take a new or modified treaty very seriously”.10 It 
should not be surprising, then, that Guatemala would be the first of the Central American 
republics to be touched by the continuismo epidemic. 
 
2.1 Continuismo in Guatemala 
Charge of the legation in Guatemala was transferred from Whitehouse to Matthew 
Hanna in July 1933. Hanna plays an important role in the “Somoza solution” narrative, 
because he was the United States minister to Nicaragua from 1929 to 1933—that is, the 
period when Marines left the country and Anastasio Somoza became chief of the 
Guardia Nacional. It is undeniable that Hanna played an important role in Somoza’s 
selection as Guardia chief in 1932: the two were good friends and the minister believed 
that Somoza was the most capable candidate for the job. Concurrently, Hanna signed 
the agreement which made Somoza the most powerful man—in military terms—of 
Nicaragua. Not surprisingly, then, Hanna has been reviled in the historiography as the 
man who cleared the ground for the Somoza dictatorship. 
This is not a fair assessment of the minister. Somoza’s appointment as Guardia 
chief was due as much to the political realities in Nicaragua as it was to Hanna’s 
involvement. For example, the list of candidates for the top position in the Guardia was 
compiled by Juan Sacasa, president-elect at the time and also Somoza’s uncle. The final 
decision on who would be selected from Sacasa’s list fell to Hanna and to Nicaraguan 
President José Moncada, Somoza’s cousin. The political leaders of Nicaragua, therefore, 
were as much in favor of Somoza’s appointment as Hanna was. Moreover, the political 
situation in Nicaragua around Somoza’s appointment was so complex, that it would have 
been impossible for Hanna to foresee that the former was to install a military dictatorship 
four years later. Arguing that he did would be the same as saying that Sacasa could 
                                                 
9 Russel H. Fitzgibbon, “Continuismo: The search for political longevity”, in: Hamill, Caudillos, 
210-217, there 211. 
10 The Chargé in Guatemala (Lawton) to the Acting Secretary of State, January 19, 1934, FRUS 
1934, Vol. V: The American Republics, 241-243. 
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have foreseen this event. Since Sacasa was the one who was ultimately disposed from 
the presidency by Somoza, this seems highly unlikely. 
Rather than an agent of the Somoza solution, Hanna was one of the officers in the 
Foreign Service who was best acquainted with the Good Neighbor policy and its stress 
on nonintervention—thanks to his experiences in Nicaragua. He was still the U.S. 
minister to Nicaragua around the time of the 1933 Montevideo Conference, where 
Secretary Hull promised his Latin American colleagues that the United States would 
forego military intervention. From a public relations point of view, it was pertinent that 
U.S. policy in Nicaragua was entirely in agreement with the nonintervention principle 
around the time of the Montevideo Conference. American Marines left the isthmian 
republic only months before and unless American policy toward that country was beyond 
reproach, the Latin delegations in Montevideo would not take Hull’s promises seriously. 
Therefore, Hanna was thoroughly briefed on the non-intervention principle and he would 
take these lessons with him to Guatemala.11 
  
Around this time, Washington and the Legation still considered Ubico a legitimate ruler 
and assumed that he would transfer power to another elected president in 1936.12 The 
prevailing image of the Guatemalan caudillo was represented in a State Department 
information bulletin, which, judging by its style and content, appears to be a summary of 
Foreign Service reports issued by Whitehouse and Hanna. The bulletin argues that the 
history of Guatemala was marked by “numerous coups d’état”, “several wars”, and 
“heavy-handed dictatorships”. This situation, says the leaflet, changed when Guatemala 
subscribed to the Treaties of 1907 and 1923. The last Treaty in particular allowed 
American minister Whitehouse to elbow Orellana out of office, after which Ubico was 
elected. The General was the “obvious choice” for the “articulate people of Guatemala” 
(in contrast to the large Indian population, whose way of life had remained essentially 
the same as that of their “pre-Columbian ancestors”) who flocked to Ubico because he 
was a man of “honesty, intelligence, and energy” while his predecessors were “corrupt” 
and “incapable”. During his tenure in office, continues the leaflet, Ubico took effective 
measures to battle the Depression and he freed the Indian from the “system of debt 
servitude” which tied them to their landlords indefinitely. The General had plenty of 
enemies and sometimes employed high-handed disciplinary actions, but this was mainly 
due to his honesty and anti-corruption measures. While Ubico himself was “well off” and 
could “afford to be an honest man” he had to keep his less affluent subordinates in line 
with “rigid discipline”. “The established of a strong and honest government, following a 
                                                 
11 A good discussion on Hanna’s portrayal in the historiography is in Andrew Crawley, Somoza 
and Roosevelt. Good Neighbor diplomacy in Nicaragua, 1933-1945 (Oxford 2007) 19-22. Also 
see page 7-71 for a good analysis of American involvement in the rise to power of Somoza. Also 
see footnote 3 above and Chapter 8, section 1, and Chapter 9, section 2.1, below. 
12 Hanna to the Secretary of State, Despatch 402, October 30, 1934, (M1280, Roll 1) Political 
Affairs 1174; Hanna to Ubico, February 13, 1934, PR Guatemala, Vol. 311, cl. 800.1: Chief 
Executive; Hanna to the Secretary of State, Despatch 533, February 15, 1935, PR Guatemala, 
Vol. 311, cl. 800.1: Chief Executive. 
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weak and corrupt one, cannot be accomplished without arousing discontent on the part 
of self-seeking interests” and in this context an “undercurrent of opposition” did develop 
against Ubico. While some of Ubico’s more heavy-handed measures against the press 
and the opposition were criticized by the Department, it still believed that it had put 
Guatemala on a sound footing with its support for the 1923 Treaty and was as yet 
unwilling to come to terms with the ominous events taking place in Guatemala. 13   
Shortly after Martínez received diplomatic recognition in 1934, Ubico began to 
solidify his position with a view on continuing in office after the end of the legal term in 
1936. Hence, the circumstances in Guatemala at the time Hanna first encountered Ubico 
were very different from Whitehouse’s initiation into Guatemalan politics. On September 
12 of 1934, the government dramatically revealed an extensive plot aimed at 
assassinating Ubico with a bomb. The plot was genuine, but it also offered a unique 
chance for Ubico to rationalize the solidification of his control over the nation. In the 
aftermath of the discovery of the plot many prominent military and political leaders (some 
of whom came from Ubico’s own party) were arrested, exiled, or even executed for their 
alleged involvement.14  
Hanna sent a cable to the State Department on September 12, reporting that an 
official announcement had been made of a “communistic plot to overthrow the 
Government by assassination and establish a reign of terrorism”.15 The following days 
and weeks several arrests and executions took place while the government and the 
controlled press kept hammering on the theme of Communist terrorism and the “vigorous 
but just” government action that had prevented it.16 
Hanna’s reports in this period are somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, he 
seemed to have been willing to go along with the official story, since it conformed with 
earlier reports on anti-government plotting (reports that Ubico probably made sure the 
minister would receive) and with his own prejudices. On the communistic nature of the 
plot, Hanna declares that “there would seem to be some evidence that the leaders of the 
recent abortive plot (…) were playing on the [sic.] criminal instincts of the masses in 
holding out to the latter the promise that, if the plot should succeed, they could commit 
all kinds of outrageous acts”. On the other hand, Hanna, who was after all a very 
experienced officer, remained skeptical about the official government position and 
seems to have been confused by the many contradictory rumors. He remembered that 
                                                 
13 Department of State, Information Series 89, August 3, 1935, (M1280, Roll1), Political Affairs 
1240. 
14 Grieb, Guatemalan caudillo, 117-118. 
15 Hanna to the Department of State, Telegram 56, September 12, 1934, M1280, Roll 1, 1148. 
16 Hanna to the Department of State, Despatch 402, October 30, 1934, M1280, Roll 1, 1174. 
Hanna to the Secretary of State, Despatch 362, September 29, 1934, M1280, Roll 2, 814.00B/24; 
Hanna to the Secretary of State, Despatch 364G, September 29, 1934, M1280, Roll 2, 814.00 
General Conditions/82; Hanna to the Secretary of State, Despatch 406G, October 31, 1934, 
M1280, Roll 2, 814.00 General Conditions/ 83; Hanna, Memorandum for Mr. O’Donoghue, 
September 25, 1934, PR Guatemala, Vol. 305, cl. 800: Guatemala. Plot against President Ubico; 
Hanna to the Secretary of State, Telegram 7, September 27, 1934, PR Guatemala, Vol. 305, cl. 
800: Guatemala. Plot against President Ubico; Hanna, Memorandum, September 28, 1934, PR 
Guatemala, Vol. 305, cl. 800: Guatemala. Plot against President Ubico. 
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the Guatemalan government was “extremely, if not almost fanatically, fearful of 
communistic influence”, while “other well informed observers seemingly feel that there is 
little or no true communistic sentiment in the country”.17  
One of the effects of this episode was that Hanna became more sensitive to the 
dictatorial aspects of Ubico’s reign. Several weeks after the bomb plot was revealed, 
Hanna admitted that the nation was “completely under the domination of the executive” 
and that the latter’s reaction to the conspiracy was “ruthless” and “drastic”. At this point, 
Hanna was not sure whether the fear that Ubico inspired in his opponents would work to 
his benefit, as “Guatemalan history furnishes abundant evidence that the force of a long 
harbored and carefully nurtured desire for revenge eventually becomes so impelling as 
to give little or no heed to the risks involved”.18 Also, and for the first time, Hanna made a 
report on the spectacular public celebrations surrounding Ubico’s birthday on November 
12. In hindsight, it is obvious that such celebrations were part of the developing “cult of 
personality” which surrounded the Guatemalan caudillo. Concerning Ubico’s 53rd 
birthday celebration (which lasted for three days and involved the whole nation in public 
celebrations and parades), Hanna pronounced the suspicion that the government 
planted the many laudatory stories about Ubico in the local press. Ignoring the official 
stance that all celebrations were completely spontaneous and voluntary, the minister 
also stated that “[p]erhaps having in mind the recent attempt against [Ubico’s] life, 
officials of the Government, private individuals and the press appeared to vie, each with 
the other, in offering homage to the President”.19 
In February 1935, Hanna learned from an informant that plans were underway to 
amend the constitution. One of the articles that was on the list to be updated was Article 
66, which limited the presidential term to six years and prohibited the president from 
succeeding himself. However, even at this advanced state of planning for Ubico’s 
continuance, Hanna still believed that the correct constitutional procedures would be 
followed and that, therefore, “Article 66 could not be amended (…) in time for President 
Ubico to succeed himself”. Although Hanna seems to have thought that the planned 
amendments to the constitution were of minor significance, he did foresee that “public 
discussion of [the] project (…) will give rise to suspicions and possibly to charges of an 
ulterior motive”. It seems probable, even though he did not state this explicitly, that 
Hanna did not believe that Ubico had “ulterior motives”. If any movement was underway 
to continue the latter in office, Hanna believed that it would originate from the “many 
persons who form a part of this administration or who profit in other ways through their 
connections with it”.20  
Hanna’s reluctance to come around to the fact that Ubico was preparing for a 
second term seems hard to explain. Rumors were rife inside Guatemala and the papers 
of the Legation show that Hanna could have been aware of discussions about Ubico’s 
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plans for “reelection” in the Guatemalan exile communities in Costa Rica and New 
York.21 However, American Legation officials from minister down in both Guatemala and 
Costa Rica believed that the “emigrado politicians” should not be taken too seriously: 
they were a common appearance in Central America, where the “outs” were forever 
“disgruntled and bitter toward the ‘ins’”. Some of these exiles were even described as 
“pathetic”. Hanna himself was no more sympathetic to the exile community than his 
predecessor Whitehouse had been.22  
While Hanna was not a naïve man, and may have had his doubts about Ubico’s 
intentions for the future, he and his colleagues had great difficulty re-creating their image 
of Ubico in the face of evidence which suggested that the General had no intention to 
leave the presidential palace. Ubico and his supporters were, of course, working towards 
his continuance in office. They had been for years. The plan was to organize a 
Constitutional Assembly to consider some minor changes to the constitution. When the 
Assembly convened, it would be flooded with “spontaneous” petitions from thousands of 
citizens all over the country calling for the continuance of Ubico. At the same time, the 
government-controlled press would start a propaganda campaign in favor of Ubico and 
his many accomplishments. In face of the widespread “popular” clamor, Ubico would 
“reluctantly” announce his willingness to forgo plans for a quiet retirement and to 
continue serving his country. However, he would do so only if a special plebiscite 
demonstrated that it was the unanimous will of the people that he remained as their 
president for another term of six years. Winning such an election would be no problem in 
a country where voters were required to sign their ballots with their names.23  
 
From Ubico’s perspective, the internal situation seemed to be fairly well covered. The 
press was government-controlled; the army appeared to be loyal and appreciative of 
government support (especially because dissident officers were eliminated after the 
1934 bomb plot); thousands of people in the capital—from the upper classes down to the 
lower classes—depended on government patronage and jobs; the business community, 
both foreign and local, was pleased with the peace and stability that the administration 
offered; the isolated Indian communities in the countryside could be cajoled or forced 
into submission; etc., etc. To deal with some of the more stubborn elements in the 
opposition, the Ubico administration still used the 1934 bomb plot and the specter of 
communist terrorism as a rationale to arrests hundreds as late as May 1935.24 
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The international scene, however, was not so secure. The anxiousness of the 
Ubico administration over the potential international reaction to his intended continuance 
is demonstrated by his extreme sensitivity to reports about him in the international press. 
For one thing, Ubico expressed his great dissatisfaction with the reporting of U.S. 
newspapers. During late 1934, for example, The New York Times published several 
stories dealing with the alleged revolutionary upheavals in Guatemala. Although the 
reports had some nucleus of truth to them, since the situation in Guatemala had been 
tense after the revealing of the bomb plot in September, it exaggerated the extent of 
unrest in the country. 25  The Guatemalan Chief of Protocol protested the 
Times‘ publications, as did the Guatemalan envoy in Washington. The affair was 
eventually settled when The New York Times printed a correction.26 Minister Hanna 
generally agreed that such “irresponsible” press accounts were damaging inter-American 
solidarity, but was otherwise somewhat surprised about Ubico’s interest in what the 
foreign press had to say about him. He lectured the Foreign Minister, Dr. Skinner Klee, 
about the need to relax the strict censorship and to provide proper official information to 
the international press, so that the world would not remain ignorant of the “splendid 
administration of President Ubico”.27  
Despite Ubico’s frequent run-ins with the American press over the years, his 
“special irritation” was reserved for the Costa Rican press.28 Costa Rica was the most 
liberal Central American state at the time and it tolerated a considerable degree of press 
freedom. Many of Guatemala’s political exiles settled in the country because of its liberal 
atmosphere and they used the local press to vent their anger for Ubico. To Ubico’s mind, 
these “diatribes” in the Costa Rican press could only exist because the local government 
actively supported them in a conscious effort to insult the Guatemalan Head of State. As 
a result, relations between Costa Rica and Guatemala steadily soured. At one point, an 
official rupture in diplomatic relations seemed eminent.29 Perhaps remembering Ubico’s 
reaction to the bomb plot, Hanna warned the Department that the General’s patience 
was stretched to a “breaking point” by the Costa Rican affair. And since he was a man of 
"great energy and decision", Hanna believed that Ubico may be expected to "act with 
vigor" if, in his "exasperation", he should be guided by "the more violent impulses of his 
character".30 
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To prevent such an outburst the U.S. became involved in mediation attempts 
between Guatemala and Costa Rica. After weeks of frustrating negotiations, the 
American legations in Guatemala City and San José got the two contending 
governments to agree that they would exchange diplomatic envoys to bring about an 
improvement in their relations. Since both countries were unwilling to take the first step—
and in that way imply guilt—a complicated scheme was eventually set up whereby the 
governments would exchange telegrams at exactly the same moment. 31  When, on 
March 7 of 1935, the Guatemalan Foreign Minister told Hanna that the plan for a 
simultaneous exchange of telegrams was also unacceptable and went on at great, great 
length about the insults that had appeared in the Costa Rican press, Minister Hanna—
who had shown himself to be an extremely patient and tactful diplomat—finally exploded. 
Not yet aware of Ubico’s delicate maneuvers toward continuismo, Hanna exclaimed that 
he found it "difficult to understand a mentality that attached so much importance to 
newspaper criticism". As an example, Hanna suggested that Hitler would have to break 
off relations with nearly every country in the world if he were to take foreign newspaper 
criticism so seriously. Perhaps to soften this comparison, Hanna subsequently 
suggested that Mexican newspapers also regularly criticized the U.S. government. 
Somewhat frustrated, Hanna told the Foreign Minister that he had worked hard to 
contradict the unjustified stories about Ubico among his colleagues from the U.S. and 
other countries, especially those stories dealing with Ubico's meddling in the affairs of 
his neighbors. If the Guatemalan government did not accept the current plan, Hanna 
threatened, "I very much [fear] that I would not be able in the future to express myself 
with the same clarity and conviction concerning the sincerity of this Government's 
desires and aims with respect to its Central American neighbors". After the interview with 
the Foreign Minister, Hanna went to the Legation’s offices and dictated a very terse letter 
to Ubico to express his disappointment over the whole affair.32  
The next day, Hanna was received by Ubico personally. As Hanna explained that 
the U.S. would not back any Guatemalan demand for Costa Rica to apologize for 
alleged injustices, the Caudillo interjected that “the relations of Guatemala with the 
United States throughout its entire history probably entitled it to greater consideration 
than would be shown to Costa Rica when measured by the same standard”. Having re-
found his former composure, Hanna tactfully ignored this remark and got Ubico to agree 
to the—somewhat silly—plan to exchange telegrams with Costa Rica on a fixed date, but 
at a time of his own choosing. While Ubico at first jokingly remarked that both Costa Rica 
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and Guatemala would wait until midnight to send their telegrams, he must have 
eventually decided that he needed his friends: on March 20 at 11 o’clock in the morning, 
the Guatemalan government informed its Costa Rican counterpart that a new minister 
would be sent to the sister republic. One hour later, the Costa Ricans answered with 
their own telegram.33  
 
While the hostility between Guatemala and Costa Rica cooled down (temporarily), the 
real shake-up in Central America was yet to come. In early April of 1935, Ubico’s plans 
for continuance in office went into effect. On April 6, Hanna reported that the national 
Legislative Assembly had convened to consider several amendments to the constitution. 
While the article that touched upon the limits of Presidential terms (Article 66) was not on 
the agenda, several petitions calling for a second term for Ubico were circulating the 
country. When the petitions were finally handed to the Assembly, Hanna understood this 
to mean that Ubico would definitely “be continued in office for a second term”.34 Hanna 
quickly resigned himself to the fact that Ubico “has definitely decided to continue in the 
Presidency and [he will not] be restrained from doing so by either national or 
international influences”.35  
It should not be surprising that Hanna thought that he could not come between 
Ubico and his objectives. As minister to Nicaragua, he had been thoroughly briefed on 
the nonintervention principle and he had also witnessed Martinez’ victory over U.S. 
resistance from close by. Furthermore, no-one inside Guatemala seemed to be willing to 
stand up to Ubico. Hanna recognized that the expressions of support that Ubico was 
receiving were not as spontaneous as his supporters claimed. In fact, people were 
apathetic to what was going on. After many decades of personal rule and continuismo, 
Guatemalans had few illusions about their leaders.36 Besides, people were not on the 
whole opposed to Ubico: The “average man” appreciated the advantages of Ubico’s rule. 
In Hanna’s more immediate circle, the foreign business community hoped that six more 
years of Ubico would bring six more years of “comparative security”. The diplomatic 
community viewed recent events as the outcome of world-wide “economic and political 
chaos”. Most diplomats were content to stay on the sidelines and to regard Ubico’s 
scheming as “a matter of internal politics which Guatemala itself must determine”.37 By 
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late April, nearly everyone in Guatemala accepted Ubico’s continuance in power as a 
“fait accompli”.38  
While Hanna came to accept the fact Ubico would continue in office and counseled 
a neutral stand for the United States, this does not mean that he positively supported 
that plan. He shared some of the fears of the locals that “the end of it all will be a 
dictatorship and violence to terminate it”.39 In fact, the major reason for his reluctance to 
get involved in the matter was his fear that the United States would get itself entangled 
in a no-win situation. This was what the minister was trying the Department to 
understand from the very beginning. He expressed his views most clearly, however, in 
an informal letter to Edwin Wilson, dated May 18: Hanna argued that “Guatemala must 
be left to settle this problem in her own way (…) Should we interfere and fail, the 
situation will be much worse. Should we succeed, we certainly will be held responsible 
for the ultimate consequences of altering the present course of events, and the 
consequences might be grave and far reaching, if not even catastrophal”.40 
Hanna’s correspondence showed no inclination on his part to talk to Ubico about 
his career plans. While the minister recognized that Ubico would not be budged by either 
“national or international” pressure, he also observed that the caudillo was very anxious 
over Washington’s reaction to his eventual “reelection”. According to Hanna, this anxiety 
was the only reason why the General wanted to give his continuance in office a 
“semblance of legality” and this, the minister believed, should give him some leverage to 
steer Ubico in a direction that should be acceptable to the United States. Hanna would 
go no further, however, than to inform “private persons close to the president” that a way 
should be found to give a “semblance of legality” to his unavoidable continuance in 
office.41  
 
Strangely, the minister had a better grasp of what nonintervention meant in the 
Guatemalan context than his superiors did. In far-off Washington, the State Department 
was still under the illusion that the 1923 Treaty had a bearing on the matter and it was 
unwilling to come to terms with Ubico’s plans. The Division of Latin American Affairs 
immediately began a study of the Guatemalan constitution. It concluded that there was 
no way that amendments to Article 66 could legalize Ubico’s reelection, since the 
constitution prescribed a delay of six years before any proposed change to Article 66 
could even be considered by a Constitutional Assembly. Since the 1923 Treaty 
prohibited alterations to the “constitutional organization” of Guatemala and required its 
signatories to abide by the “principle of non-re-election”, the report concluded that “we 
may have to come to a decision regarding our attitude to Ubico in the light of our relation 
to the 1923 Treaty”. The only way out was a scenario in which Guatemala would 
denounce the Treaty (which could be done with one year’s notice: exactly in time for the 
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start of Ubico’s second term). Since El Salvador and Costa Rica had also withdrawn 
their support for the treaty, Guatemalan denunciation would nullify the Treaty for the 
remaining signatories, Honduras and Nicaragua, too: one of the Treaty’s stipulations was 
that at least three countries had to support it to remain in force.42 
This situation directly affected U.S. policy in Central America and was discussed at 
the highest levels of the State Department. On May 7, Hull and Welles sent a telegram to 
the American legation in Guatemala: “This government is concerned over a tendency 
apparent in certain countries in Central America to endeavor to alter the constitutional 
manner of succession to the presidency by illegal methods in order that present 
incumbents may continue in office beyond the periods for which they are elected”. The 
case of Ubico was a special one, according to the Department, because of his “great 
prestige” in the region. His actions would undoubtedly affect the attitude and future 
policies of other Central American leaders. The Department feared that the entire region 
might revert to a “system of personal rule” and the associated disturbances and 
international conflicts which “characterized the period prior to 1907 and 1923 when 
constitutional government was practically unknown in Central America”. In this light, the 
Department told Hanna that “it will not have escaped your attention” that Ubico had the 
“unique opportunity” to greatly increase his prestige in the entire hemisphere by 
“resolutely declining to take part in any movement to continue him in office illegally”.43 
What followed was a very confused correspondence between Washington and the 
Legation. The State Department may have interpreted Hanna’s stoic acceptance of 
Ubico’s maneuvering as a sign of sympathy toward the General (or at least, it feared that 
other observers would regard it as such). Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles therefore 
instructed the minister to make sure that “the impression, if it exists, that this 
Government sympathizes with any plan to amend the Guatemalan Constitution illegally, 
or to continue President Ubico in power contrary to its provisions, be not (repeat not) 
allowed to remain uncorrected”. To really complicate things for Hanna, the instructions 
also said that the “Department does not, of course, wish to convey the impression that it 
is endeavoring to advise President Ubico concerning the course he should follow”.44 
Hanna was naturally confused as to what was expected of him. As he was already 
following his own policy of non-interference, he interpreted his instruction to mean that 
he should take a tougher stand and inform Ubico that the United States were definitely 
unsympathetic to his plans for continuismo. In several telegrams and airmail reports 
dated May 2 to May 5, Hanna argued that Ubico did not have the slightest reason to 
believe that the U.S. sympathized with his actions and that any affirmative action to 
change the caudillo’s mind would be futile. The minister feared that any statement he 
would care to make would offer Ubico an opportunity to draw him into a discussion on 
the legal aspects of the case. In that way, the General might provoke statements which 
would be prone to misinterpretation and the eventual result may prove to be 
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“embarrassing”. Instead, Hanna counseled a policy of “complete aloofness [so that] we 
will in nowise compromise ourselves and will retain absolute freedom for future action, 
especially when the question of recognition arises”.45 
Despite his personal reservations, Hanna tried to arrange an audience with Ubico 
on May 7. This proved to be difficult as the Chief of Protocol and the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs kept stalling his request and tried to learn why Hanna wanted to see the 
President. Some days later, Hanna finally got his interview with Ubico and read him a 
Spanish translation he had prepared on the basis of his instructions: 
The Department of State does not of course wish to convey the impression 
that it is endeavoring to advise President Ubico concerning the course he 
should follow, which, naturally, is a matter for his own decision, but the 
Department nevertheless believes that it should make very clear to President 
Ubico that the Government of the United States is not in sympathy with any 
effort to alter the Guatemalan Constitution illegally or to continue President 
Ubico in office contrary to the provisions of that Constitution. 
Immediately after Hanna finished his reading, Ubico remarked that “the clear meaning of 
the statement was that the Department of State did not want him to continue in the 
Presidency”. The General added that it was not his wish either, but the Guatemalan 
people and the Constituent Assembly would insist that he did.46  
Hanna studiously refrained from giving any comment, but in the days following the 
interview, the Foreign Minister kept calling upon him to get back on the statement. The 
initial efforts of the Foreign Minister, Dr. Skinner Klee, were bent on finding loopholes or 
ulterior interpretations for Hanna’s statement. When this had no effect on a stoic Hanna, 
Skinner Klee described in dramatic terms Ubico’s pain and surprise that the State 
Department did not trust or appreciate its staunch ally. When, in the course of several 
days, the Foreign Minister grew increasingly anxious over Hanna’s non-committal 
responses, he started to paint ever more gloomy pictures of a future without Ubico, 
which would certainly be marked by “political confusion, conflict and possible disorder”.47 
Interestingly, historian Kenneth Grieb hypothesizes that Ubico deliberately 
dramatized U.S. resistance to his continuance to force it to play down its statement or to 
stand accused of direct intervention.48 If so, this may explain why the Department lost its 
nerve and finally—after almost two weeks of silence—decided that there had been a 
terrible misunderstanding. The blame was put squarely on Hanna. On May 24 Sumner 
Welles wrote Hanna a very strict letter, stating that “[t]he Department does not consider 
that the statement you prepared [for the interview with Ubico on May 10] accurately 
transcribes the” position of the United States. Referring only to instructions of April 30, 
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Welles claims that the State Department only wished to correct any previously existing 
impression that the U.S. government sympathized with Ubico’s continuance in office. 
Remembering Hanna’s statement that he had informed private citizens close to the 
President that a “semblance of legality” could be given to Ubico’s continuance, Welles 
now claimed that the State Department feared that these statements could be 
interpreted as active interest and sympathy for Ubico’s plans. It was only this gaffe by 
the minister that the State Department had wished to correct when it wrote that Hanna 
should correct “the impression, if it exist, that this Government sympathizes with any 
plan to amend the Guatemalan constitution illegally”. In fact, Welles goes on, the State 
Department did not have any views, “either of sympathy or lack of sympathy”, toward the 
internal affairs of Guatemala and it would not have broached the issue if Hanna had not 
been so talkative. In conclusion, Welles argued that: 
Since both President Ubico and the Minister of Foreign Affairs appear to 
have gained the impression that this government is opposed to President 
Ubico’s continuance in the Presidency, you are instructed to (…) make it 
clear to those two officials that this Government has no attitude, either of 
sympathy or lack of sympathy, toward any movement of the character being 
discussed and neither approves nor disapproves of whatever action may be 
contemplated, which it considers an internal matter, in which it cannot 
intervene”.49 
After Hanna had executed these orders—much to his personal embarrassment, one 
would imagine—he wrote a somewhat indignant report to the Department, asserting that: 
“My conception of the proper way to correct an impression that the Government of the 
United States did sympathize with any plan was to say that it did not sympathize with 
it”. 50  While the minister was probably right, he was suddenly transferred out of 
Guatemala days later. After having spent almost two weeks “in transit”, he was granted 
two months of “vacation leave”.51 The first secretary of Legation, a very experienced 
officer called Sidney O’Donoghue, took charge of the Legation. Hanna never returned. 
O’Donoghue was naturally much more careful not to get caught making any 
remark about the elections and Ubico was finally “reelected” with a wide margin. The 
State Department also kept a very low profile and instructed its Legations not to make 
any public statements which would tie the United States to the Treaty of 1923—on the 
basis of which Ubico’s continuance should have been objected to.52 Although the United 
States did not officially recognize the fact that elections had taken place, it did 
acknowledge a note from Guatemala’s Foreign Ministry which informed the State 
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Department of the outcome of the elections. For all intents and purposes, this was a 
silent acknowledgement of Ubico’s reelection.53 
 
2.2 Continuismo in Honduras 
In general the situation is calm. Each party, however, is building political 
fences for the 1936 elections. Also, political deportations have occurred and 
one newspaper has been suspended. The Nationalists are still considering 
an extension of President Carías’ term of office and the Liberals appear 
disorganized and discouraged.54 
Such was the political situation in Honduras as Leo Keena encountered it when he 
arrived at his post in July, 1935. This short summary immediately captures the main 
themes for the next two years: increased repression and censure, an opposition party in 
disarray, and, eventually, Carías’ reelection. 
Despite the importance of events during Keena’s service in Tegucigalpa, the 
Legation records do not show special concern for Carías’ continuismo. This was partly a 
result of earlier events: Carías was by now entrenched in the presidency and the rival 
Liberal party was still in disarray, so there were no major disturbances or realistic 
alternatives to Carías’ reign during this time. Also, the American Legation under Julius 
Lay had established an effective working relation with the Carías administration and was, 
on the whole, positive about its achievements. Naturally, Lay had assumed that Carías 
was a constitutionalist and in this sense the job of redefining Carías’ rule fell to Keena. 
The fact that this redefinition was not accompanied with searching questions about 
America’s role in Central America is, again, partly due to past happenings: the non-
intervention principle was now more firmly at the center of U.S. policy toward Latin 
America and the question of recognizing continuistas was settled in Guatemala. 
However, there is also a personal dimension to this question: as compared to Lay, 
the American ministers in other Central American republics, or even his secretaries, Leo 
Keena did not betray much intellectual curiosity about Honduran domestic politics or 
about the question of its relation to the United States. Nor did he show a great deal of 
initiative or assertiveness. His reports are fairly bland and devoid of original or personal 
observations on Honduran politics. Furthermore, Keena was always careful to confer 
with colleagues or with the Department on courses of action to follow, even if it 
concerned matters of ceremony. This was not necessarily a bad thing: Lay’s personal 
observations about Honduras often betrayed a bigoted view and his assertiveness often 
bordered on intervention in local politics. These were the kind of things that the 
architects of the Good Neighbor Policy wished to eliminate. Whether Keena was an apt 
student of the Good Neighbor Policy or personally very conservative cannot be 
ascertained. The truth is probably somewhere in the middle: his personal style 
seamlessly fused with Washington’s policy. 
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One of the first things the new minister did after his arrival in Honduras was to turn 
to his colleagues in Guatemala to inform himself on U.S. policy toward unconstitutional 
extensions of presidential terms in Central America: Assuming that the Secretary of 
State had provided instructions on how to deal with Ubico’s continuismo, and since 
“action similar in effect may be taken or attempted in Honduras”, Keena asked secretary 
O’Donoghue for a copy of the secretary’s instructions. Unfortunately, O’Donoghue could 
not offer much in the way of policy guidelines: he only sent Keena a copy of a 
Department telegram acknowledging Ubico’s “reelection”. Naturally, government 
controlled papers in Tegucigalpa also learned about this telegram and about a letter 
from FDR to Ubico from a later date and presented them as examples of active 
American support for continuismo, despite the fact that the wording of both messages 
was the standard diplomatic dribble.55 
Keena initially thought that the continuismo campaign would cause renewed 
instability.56 In August 1935, shortly after Keena arrived and before Carías had decided 
on a definite strategy for his continuance in office, the minister reported that the 
President was considering two courses of action: either he would proclaim his 
continuance in office unilaterally, or he would renounce a second term and appoint his 
own candidate for the presidential elections of November 1936. Keena believed that the 
first course of action would “undoubtedly lead to violence” while the second course 
“might result in a Nationalist victory in the elections” if the selected candidate could unite 
the Nationalist Party and attract a fair number of undecided voters. The minister also 
believed that continuismo “would be viewed with distinct disfavor by the Government of 
the United States”.57  At this early date, Keena still believed that Washington would 
actively seek a legal transfer of power in Honduras.  
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Honduran oppositionists entertained the same notions. Venancio Callejas, a one-
time vice-presidential candidate of Carías, but now an independent Nationalist who fled 
to Costa Rica when the repression accompanying the continuance program was well 
underway, wrote a personal letter to Franklin Roosevelt in which he slammed Carías for 
his cynical disregard of the Honduran Constitution, the 1923 Treaty, and democratic 
procedures in general. He expressed the conviction that “the Government of the United 
States will flatly refuse to extend its recognition (…) to the Dictatorship which General 
Carías pretends to establish by force upon Honduras”.58 Likewise, Angel Zuñíga Huete 
who, despite a history of violence, had gracefully accepted his defeat in the 1932 
Presidential elections and had since focused his attentions on ending Carías’ rule 
through the use of the ballot box59, sent a manifesto to the State Department and all the 
U.S. ministers in Central America in which he gave a brief overview of the Honduran 
constitution and argued that the Carías regime was a “Government of delinquents” and a 
“dictatorship” which should not be recognized by the international community.60 
Honduran politicians continued to try to illicit a sympathetic response from the U.S. 
State Department with their high-minded manifesto’s, expounding the virtues of 
international treaties and constitutionalism, well into the second half of the century. 
Before being forced into exile in the 1930s, they had first hand experience with 
America’s policy of intervention and non-recognition of unconstitutional governments. In 
their writings they referred to treaties and constitutions which had become dead letters 
long ago. Apparently they believed that such talk would strike a cord with the Americans, 
a view that was most likely confirmed by high profile speeches on the sanctity of 
international obligations by American politicians (Zuniga regularly refers to such 
speeches in his writings). Sadly, they did not recognize that such speeches were 
intended for audiences in Europe: the only principle that the government in Washington 
would uphold in the Western Hemisphere throughout the 1930s and early 40s was that 
of non-intervention. 
American diplomats in Central America referred to the manifestos that reached 
their desks as “the usual diatribes” to which they paid little attention. Unwilling or unable 
to consider that Central American politicians could truly entertain such idealistic notions, 
they regarded these writings as the opportunistic propaganda of the political “outs”.61 
Keena was a little more conscientious than that: he had the Spanish manifestos duly 
translated and sent to the Department, sometimes accompanied by a dry analysis of his 
own. However, he too placed little value on them. He feared that Honduras, which now 
had to forego United States guidance, would revert to revolution and caudillo politics.  
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Keena himself ascribed some legitimacy to the idea, locally held, that the 
Honduran peasant had a primitive notion of democracy: “The idea persists (…) in some 
quarters and possibly based on hope, that the Honduran penco [peon] bases his idea of 
liberty on the right to elect a president every four years and if this is denied him he will 
revolt and overthrow the government denying him that right”. The minister believed that 
this “premise may be well founded”, since “it is historically true that an urge toward 
revolution is latent in the Honduran penco”.62 However, the lethargic masses of peons 
would only move if led by strongmen. In this regard, the exiled opponents of Carías “will 
have to show more personal daring in fomenting and leading a revolutionary movement 
than has been exemplified in the pamphleteering campaign carried on during the past 
year from the other side of a neutral border”.63 For much of 1936 Keena anxiously 
scanned the horizon for a man-on-horseback who would continue to cycle of revolutions 
and dictatorships that the United States had tried to stop only a couple of years before. 
Remembering that the old policy was to prevent trouble in Central America by 
supporting local elections, Keena reported in January 1936 that the upcoming elections 
for a constitutional assembly that would take a decision on Carías’ second term “cannot 
be considered with justice as fairly representing the will of the electorate as practically all 
prominent leaders of the opposition have been placed in detention by the Government or 
forced to leave the country to escape imprisonment”. Confirming his cautious 
temperament, Keena respectfully inquired if “the Department wish[es] me to make any 
statements to the President of Honduras in regard to these elections?”.64 Shortly, Hull 
replied that the non-intervention principle of the Good Neighbor policy took precedence 
over concerns for local elections: 
The Department does not wish you to make any statement to the President 
of Honduras regarding the conduct of the Honduran elections. However 
regrettable the conditions you describe may be from the point of view of a 
friendly observer the matter at issue is one solely of internal policy for the 
Honduran people themselves to determine.65 
When the Honduran Congress convened on January 1, 1936, it immediately 
started work on its most important task for that year: to legalize President Carías’ 
continuance in office. First, responding to the “petitions” in favor of continuismo which 
had been filed by the municipalities, Congress called for a Constituent Assembly to 
reform the 1924 constitution which prohibited the reelection of a President. Elections for 
the Constituent Assembly were held on January 26 and, not surprisingly, only 
candidates who supported continuismo were elected. The government had been laying 
the groundwork for these elections throughout 1935: getting the municipalities in line, 
suppressing newspapers, and jailing or exiling opponents. Now the continuismo 
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campaign moved along smoothly, although arrests of opponents continued throughout 
1936. In March, the Constituent Assembly cranked out a constitution in just 20 days. The 
new constitution, which went into effect on April 15, appointed President Carías and Vice 
President Williams for a second term which was to last until January 1, 1943. The 
members of the Assembly also appointed themselves as the new National Congress, its 
period of office running to December 5, 1942.66 As of January 1, 1937, the inauguration 
date of the President’s new term, Carías would be in office for 6 more years with a 
rubber-stamp Congress to support him.  
Keena remained in an anxious state throughout this whole process. Only after the 
inauguration of Carías did he become more optimistic about the prospects for continued 
peace in Honduras. Beginning in January, Keena took concrete steps to deal with a 
possible revolution during the elections: he ordered the consulates to compile lists of 
American citizens in their district, probably to prepare for a possible evacuation.67 The 
elections, however, proceeded smoothly, somewhat to the surprise of the Legation and 
the consulates.68 Carías’ opponents used the occasion to flee Honduras unnoticed and 
prepared to overthrow the government from neighboring countries before the opening of 
the Constituent Assembly in March.69 Just after the Assembly convened, Keena warned 
the Department that “the penitentiary and the barracks in Tegucigalpa are reported to be 
filled with political prisoners. This policy is causing a great deal of ill will against the 
government (…) It is regarded in all circles that in time an armed movement will be made 
against the Government”. Keena believed that the strength of such a movement would 
depend on the support that the laboring classes were willing to give to an armed 
incursion of the opposition. Which way the sympathy of the lower classes would go, no 
one seemed to know.70 Despite continuing rumors of revolution, the new constitution 
went into effect in April without any untoward incident. Yet Keena kept up a fairly 
constant flow of reports on the imminence of the great revolution that everyone in the 
capital was expecting.71 Not until the start of the rainy season, which seemed to make 
any military campaign impossible, did Tegucigalpa in general and Keena in particular 
utter a sigh of relief. 
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The American legations drew some important lessons from the 1936 continuismo 
campaign. The first lesson, clearly established by Department instructions during the first 
half of 1936, was that the legation could not play any positive role in local events. The 
Department made it clear that the old policies of supporting elections and the 1923 
Treaty were now obsolete. A second lesson was that both the Liberal opposition to 
Carías and the general population’s taste for revolutions were not as strong as expected. 
Even if it had been, the Nationalist government proved much more powerful than 
expected. Stability now seemed assured by the indecisiveness of Liberal leaders, the 
lethargy of the people, and the modern repression techniques of the government: 
systematic arrests, wholesale press censorship, a working agreement with neighboring 
caudillos, and the airplane.72  American guidance to promote stability was no longer 
necessary: the future of Central America would be determined by force, not by treaties 
and elections. 
 
2.3 Constitutionalism in El Salvador 
Obviously, Martínez and the United Status got off to a bad start. If the Department of 
State was serious about adopting El Salvador into the hemispheric system of friendly 
states that was being built with the help of the Good Neighbor, it needed to mend some 
fences. What better way to do that than to send a diplomat who could give a personal 
touch to the new relationship. The choice for a new Minister fell to Francis Corrigan: a 
political appointee who could give the impression of being intimately connected with the 
Roosevelt administration, rather than just to the Department, and also an Irishman who 
would doubtlessly be considered más simpático by the Latinos than an Anglo Saxon.73  
Corrigan’s tenure in San Salvador initiated a brief honeymoon between the 
Legation and the Martínez regime. The new minister was initially friendly to the 
government, welcomed local journalists to his office to propagate FDR’s Good Neighbor, 
and negotiated a new reciprocal trade agreement between the United States and El 
Salvador. Corrigan was clearly willing to let bygones be bygones and painted a 
sympathetic picture of the local government: arguing that it enjoyed a great degree of 
public support because it had rectified the economic and financial dislocation that had 
characterized the Araujo administration (significantly, the 1931 coup and 1932 uprising 
were not mentioned for a while). In January 1935, Corrigan approvingly stated that "the 
political philosophy of this administration seems to have a definite trend toward a strong, 
scientifically operated financial system centrally controlled and a gradual decentralization 
of ownership of land".74 
Corrigan did have to swallow some bitter pills to be able to continue his labors 
toward reconciliation: in 1934, the Martínez regime negotiated a trade pact with 
Germany before U.S.-Salvadoran negotiations on a new trade agreement even started. 
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In that same year, the administration also extended diplomatic recognition to the 
Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo in formerly Chinese Manchuria. The U.S. minister 
carefully explained that these dealings were not an indication of Salvador’s sympathy 
with these dangerous regimes, but merely a result of diplomatic pressure from Germany 
and the relative inexperience of Salvador’s Foreign Minister.75 
Another potential irritant in U.S.-Salvadoran relations was Martínez’ “election” to 
the presidency in 1934. It should be remembered that, formally, Martínez had only been 
Araujo’s replacement in the past years. When Araujo’s tenure officially ended in 1935, 
Martínez could, according to the letter of the constitution, present himself as a candidate 
for the presidential elections: since he was never elected to the presidency, the 
constitutional ban on reelection did not apply to him. The only obstacle to Martínez’ 
election was a constitutional ban on the election of any presidential candidate who had 
served in the previous government in the six months preceding the election. This ban 
was intended, of course, to prevent a government that came to power by extra-
constitutional means (say, a coup) from legalizing its reign by getting itself elected to 
office. In short, it was directed against Martínez. The general, however, skillfully dodged 
the issue by abdicating six months before the end of Araujo’s term and handing the reins 
of government to his trusted aide and vice-president, General Menendez. Shortly after 
Martínez’ inevitable election to the presidency, Menendez was just as easily reinstated in 
his old position of vice-president.76 
Minister Corrigan double-checked the legality of these maneuvers and eventually 
concluded that the whole affair complied with “the letter” of the constitution. His superiors 
in the Department let it go at that.77 The Legation’s and Department’s quiet acceptance 
of what was obviously an attempt to get around the spirit of the Salvadoran constitution 
(an interpretation that was carefully avoided) probably stemmed from a genuine desire to 
normalize the relationship with El Salvador by not getting into another debate on the 
legality of its government. The last disagreements on that point had been put to rest—at 
great costs to U.S. prestige in the region—only months before. 
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After the elections, the Government did lift the state of siege which had been in 
force, in Corrigan’s words, since the “so-called [sic.] ‘communistic’ uprising” of 1932.78 It 
also relaxed its censorship over the press and invited exiles to return home. These 
actions, combined with seemingly spontaneous popular celebrations on the occasion of 
Martinez’ election79, led Corrigan to conclude that “a trend toward greater liberality” was 
perceptible in El Salvador. 80  Whether Martínez liberalized his regime specifically to 
sugarcoat his election for the Americans is uncertain. This move is probably merely an 
indication of the growing confidence the president had in the security of his position. 
Martínez was, however, anxious to improve his image with the yanquis. His 
colleagues in neighboring countries provided an excellent opportunity for just that. The 
continuismo campaigns in Guatemala and Honduras—and Somoza’s naked ambition for 
the Nicaraguan presidency—allowed Martínez to present himself as the standard bearer 
of constitutionality in Central America. While policymakers in Washington were moving 
away from an interventionist policy based on treaties and constitutions, U.S. policy in 
Central America continued, for a while, to be discussed in those terms both by Central 
Americans and by Legation officers. In fact, Corrigan himself introduced the Good 
Neighbor policy to the Salvadoran press by explaining that its objective was to prevent 
the rise both of dictatorship and of communism and to further the spread of democracy in 
the hemisphere.81  
Corrigan’s words and past experiences must have inspired the Salvadoran 
president to set up an anti-continuismo campaign (although opposition against the 
phenomenon among his compatriots and even close collaborators must also have 
played a role in this tactic). Martínez’ campaign started in May 1935—the exact month in 
which rumors about U.S. objections to Ubico’s continuismo campaign started to 
surface—when the Salvadoran President expressed his approval for calls to change the 
country’s constitution which were emanating from the National Assembly. Martínez 
immediately declared that a revised constitution should prohibit the reelection of a 
president or the extension of his term.82 In a personal interview with Corrigan in August, 
Martínez further expressed his opposition to changes in the Guatemalan constitution and 
his fear that Carías’ continuismo campaign in Honduras and Somoza’s ambition for the 
presidency of Nicaragua would renew the disturbances that haunted Central America 
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before the signing of the 1923 Treaty. 83  Backing up his words with action (in the 
diplomatic field at least) Martínez claimed that he had sent two personal envoys to 
Somoza to dissuade the latter from seizing power by force.84 Underlining the irony of the 
new situation, the Salvadoran Sub-Secretary of Foreign Affairs told Corrigan that, not so 
long ago, the Central American states had refused to recognize the unconstitutional 
government of Martínez, but now the same states that still adhered to the 1923 Treaty 
on paper were destroying their own constitutions while Martínez had come out in favor of 
constitutionalism.85 
The Salvadoran President’s lobby for constitutionalism struck a cord with Corrigan, 
who concluded that “Martínez stands for public order and constitutionality”.86 The public 
stance of the Salvadoran Government also attracted refugees from all over Central 
America who opposed the continuismo campaigns in their own countries. The presence 
of these men—some of them not as politically pure as they would like to claim—
reinforced Martínez’ portrayal of the situation in Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. 
For example, General Solórzano from Guatemala told the American legation that his 
native country was the scene of wholesale executions and that a revolution against 
Ubico was eminent.87 The Honduran General Callejas claimed that civil war in Honduras 
could only be prevented if the United States told Carías to step down.88 Former president 
Sacasa of Nicaragua, who was finally kicked out of the presidential palace and had 
made his way to San Salvador, told Corrigan that Somoza had destroyed three decades 
of patient labor toward constitutionality in Nicaragua. The result, said the president-
turned-refugee, could only be complete chaos.89 
Proceeding from the information available to him locally, Corrigan concluded that 
Ubico and Martínez stood on opposite sides on the matter of their Central American 
policy. While Ubico had a “Napoleon complex” and tried to dominate the region with his 
“Machiavellian” tactics, the more moderate and “Erasmian” Martínez was solely 
concerned with the wellbeing of his own country. Corrigan recognized that vigorous 
leaders like Ubico and Martínez represented the future of Central America in contrast to 
Costa Rican President Jíminez, “the aging older statesman (…) with his wise and liberal 
viewpoint”. The two however, were “of totally different type and temperament”. Carías 
and Somoza both admired Ubico as their “prototype” and the former at least wanted to 
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emulate Ubico’s tactic of continuismo. Corrigan only foresaw trouble and uprisings 
resulting from these actions and hoped that older, democratically inclined statesmen like 
the Honduran ex-President Paz Barahona would have a moderating influence in these 
“American Balkans”.90 
 
Corrigan was a medical doctor with the temperament of an academician, not that of a 
weathered diplomat. He liked to tackle abstract and philosophical problems and even 
though he was a good representative, he did not have that sixth sense for intrigue and 
infighting that some of the better political reporters in the Foreign Service had. While his 
political preferences or ideologies do not seem to have differed markedly from his 
colleagues in neighboring countries, he did express them more eloquently and 
vigorously. In his reports, he liked to touch on the Big Issues of diplomacy, those that, to 
paraphrase the minister’s own word, would be studied by historians and judged by 
history.91 
This streak in Corrigan’s character was reinforced by his friendship with Arthur 
Lane, the U.S. minister to Nicaragua. Much like Corrigan’s, Lane’s convictions do not 
seem to differ that much from contemporaries, but he did share the doctor’s way with 
words and he was an unusually conscientious man on top of that. In 1935, the 
Department sent Lane to Salvador on a visit for consultation and an exchange of views. 
Lane gave Corrigan a few of his more important reports, based on his experience in 
Nicaragua, to serve the new minister as reference materials.92 The 1935 files of the 
Salvadoran Legation still hold one of the most interesting of these, in which Lane 
recounts his struggle to reconcile the “Good Neighbor” with “non-interference”, 
eventually concluding that:  
We should not interfere in Nicaraguan internal affairs; should we feel, 
however, that a word from us might serve to maintain the peace of the 
country and consequently avoid bloodshed or disorder we should not refrain 
from assuming the responsibility of the “good neighbor” by expressing our 
views, preferably as the personal views of our diplomatic representative.93 
While stated in neutral terms, in the Nicaraguan context, this memo clearly implied that 
Lane intended to use his personal influence to prevent Somoza from committing a 
violent coup against the Sacasa Government. Indicative of the latitude that the State 
Department permitted its envoys at the time, Sumner Welles had approved above 
interpretation of the Good Neighbor policy.94 
Lane was transferred to the Baltic states in 1936, but with Corrigan the Central 
American diplomatic corps retained an articulate advocate for interference, or, as he 
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might have put it himself, a “responsible” Good Neighbor.95 As Lane was packing up in 
Nicaragua, Corrigan reported to the Department his expectation that the continuismo 
campaigns in Guatemala and Honduras would be confronted with revolutionists bearing 
the banner of constitutionalism. Local people were looking to the powerful American 
legations for some guidance and in this light, said the minister, it was imperative that the 
United States develop some positive side to the Good Neighbor, which was currently 
focused too much on a negative stance of non-intervention. Corrigan himself opined that 
the U.S. missions should apply their influence to prevent bloodshed or dictatorship and 
to stimulate liberal and democratic policies: “It takes more than one good neighbor to 
make a good neighborhood”.96 Some weeks later, as Somoza was poised to take over 
the presidential palace, Corrigan expressed himself more frankly: 
Cynical disregard of constitutional guarantees, first by General Ubico in 
Guatemala, second by General Carías in Honduras, and now imminently by 
General Somoza in Nicaragua, for their own personal interests, will have 
destroyed the result of a generation of patient diplomatic effort to advance 
these countries (some of them still embryonic) on the road to become 
constitutional democratic republics. 
The Department’s retreat from Central America had gone far enough, the minister 
opined, and it should be prepared to offer friendly and tactful advice to the sister 
republics.97 
By this time however, Washington’s thinking was entirely out of step with that in 
the Central American Legations. The Department had indulged Lane’s musings about 
the “responsible” Good Neighbor, had derailed Hanna’s essentially correct handling of 
Ubico’s continuismo, and had deflected Keena’s questions about the elections in 
Honduras, but in 1936—finally—it was ready to lay down the law:  
[T]he Department expects its diplomatic representatives in Central America 
to conduct themselves in their relations with the Governments to which they 
are accredited, and with the people of the countries, in exactly the same 
manner they would if they were accredited to one of the large republics of 
South America or with any non-American power; that is to say, they should 
abstain from offering advice on any domestic question, and if requested to 
give such advice they should decline to do so.98  
While these instructions fitted the general trend of U.S. policy—the adoption of non-
interference as official policy was made public in the same year—the State Department 
told its envoys that the Central Americans themselves were to blame for the U.S. retreat 
from a pro-constitutionalist policy. It was, after all, the signatories themselves who 
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abrogated the 1923 Treaty: first Ubico by continuing himself in office and then Carías 
and Sacasa by recognizing this step.99 
It should be noted with special emphasis, however, that Washington’s withdrawal 
from the 1923 Treaty—and, more broadly, from a pro-democratic stance or any other 
kind of interference—was not an ex post facto nod of approval to Ubico and Carías: As 
the Department noted, both presidents would have been happy to keep the Treaty in the 
books, as it would protect them from coups and revolutions. According to the 
Department, by publicly withdrawing its support from the Treaty, the U.S. was saying that 
it would not object if either Ubico or Carías was overthrown. This was not an academic 
point: In Honduras at least, a revolution was thought to be brewing. Washington’s only 
regret at this time was that its new policy would leave the fate of the Sacasa Government 
in the hands of General Somoza.100  
Corrigan cared very little for the argument that Hondurans themselves would take 
care of Carías, and even less for the fact that Somoza would take care of Sacasa. The 
old circle of dictatorship followed by revolution followed by…etc. was exactly the one that 
had to be broken up by the moderating influence of the U.S. legations: “Dictatorships 
with their tyrannies, imprisonments, political exiles and political executions are abhorrent 
to the spirit of America. A swing to the other extreme always follows”. The Isthmian and 
Caribbean countries, argued Corrigan, needed the United States. Betraying his medical 
background the minister stated that “they are politically embryonic and still need 
obstetrical care lest they be born badly and grow up idiots”. Therefore, Corrigan objected 
to the 1936 instructions: The U.S. should not have to bend over backwards to keep its 
hands off.101 It was an objection for the record. The Roosevelt administration was not 
going to change the course of its Latin American policy to humor the constitutionalist 
factions of Central America. Minister Corrigan realized as much and, in the end, decided 
that “like a good soldier [I will] go along and follow orders”.102  
“Good soldier” was perhaps a bit modest. Corrigan was hopelessly ambitious. He 
was not a man to stay put and fight a loosing battle for his ideals. Nor was he so 
principled that he left the Foreign Service in disgust (which is what Arthur Lane did, 
eventually103). In fact, he was pulling strings to get appointed to a more prestigious post. 
And what strings! Letters went out throughout 1937 to other ambassadors, senators, 
Undersecretary Welles, Secretary Hull, and (why not?) President Roosevelt. Spain, Chile, 
Cuba, even Peru would be “acceptable”, but privately, Corrigan entertained the hope of 
being appointed Assistant Secretary. Alas, while Roosevelt apparently thought that 
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Corrigan was the best of the political appointees, it was determined that he was most 
needed in Panama. The doctor left Salvador in September 1937.104  
 
Corrigan never objected to Martínez’ rule; his gall was reserved for Ubico, Carías, and 
Somoza. Up to Corrigan’s leave, the Salvadoran General himself kept a low profile and a 
relatively clean house. Some incriminating rumors reached the American legation at 
times: the government was said to be relaxing its standards of honesty; journalists 
complained of intimidation; a young sergeant was executed in the city’s graveyard, the 
blood stains remaining visible for days.105 But Corrigan obsessed over the Big Issues. 
Not until right up to his transfer did he get a sense that Martínez was moving in the same 
direction as Ubico and the other apostles of continuismo. On March 13, 1937, Corrigan 
allowed that the Salvadoran regime might be called a “military semi-dictatorship”. But as 
it was made up of lower army officers and “liberals”, it should still be recognized as a 
“middle class movement and may be considered as a step toward democracy”.106 Two 
months later, Corrigan reported on the growing cult of personality surrounding Martínez. 
The Assembly’s recent decision to bestow the title of “benefactor of the nation” on the 
executive was a case in point. As the U.S. minister ominously noted, such flattery might 
“affect [Martinez’] future plans”.107  
The inversion of cause and effect in Corrigan’s analysis of Martínez’ future plans is 
emblematic of his interpretation of local politics. It seems much more probable that the 
Salvadoran chief of state had left the door to continuismo ajar even as he criticized his 
neighbors. Such cynical maneuvering was not unheard of. In 1927, for example, 
President Machado of Cuba had declared—with tears in his eyes, one imagines—that “a 
man whose lips had never been defiled by a lie, would lower his dignity, and dishonor 
himself, if after a political labor of twenty-five years during which he opposed the 
principle of reelection with the word and the sword in two revolutions, he should now 
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accept the principle for himself”. 108  A little over a year later, Machado had himself 
reelected in a single-candidate election. Likewise, Ubico and Carías had started out with 
a strong constitutionalist program. Now Martínez was ready for his 180 degree turn. 
In May 1935 Martínez had approved a plan to rewrite the Salvadoran constitution 
and, at the time, had voiced his demand for the adoption of stricter laws against 
reelection. Since that time however, the president had not seen fit to convene a 
constitutional convention, even though a complete draft for a new constitution was ready 
to be discussed. Throughout 1937, Martínez carefully kept alive the hope that a 
constitutional convention would be organized shortly. When asked whether he 
entertained plans for continuismo, the President remained noncommittal. The 
Government controlled press however, floated several trial balloons in the form of 
editorials calling on the chief to continue his labors. Whether Martínez was so 
circumspect because he feared Washington’s reaction is unknown. It seems more 
probable that he had to take into account local opposition to his continuismo. El Salvador 
had a much stronger constitutional tradition than its neighbors, and any untoward 
designs on the nation’s first law were considered unacceptable. In fact, opposition 
against continuismo was so strong inside Martinez’ own government, that several sub-
secretaries and lower officials resigned in 1937 to protest the unofficial plans for 
reelection.109 
The American Legation, now under the leadership of Minister Robert Frazer, a 
career officer who was temperamentally more akin to Keena than to Corrigan, closely 
watched and meticulously reported the process. Frazer sympathized with government 
professionals, journalists, and liberal aristocrats who objected to Martínez’ evident plans 
for continuismo. The illiterate masses, opined the minister, were incapable “of forming 
intelligent political opinions and virtually do not count in a juncture of this kind”.110 Even if 
there were some socialists and communists among them who opposed continuismo, the 
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suppression of the 1932 uprising had been so ruthless and complete that this group was 
no longer a faction in local politics.111 Aside from a small group of discontents who 
opposed Martínez for selfish reasons, Frazer argued that the most important opposition 
emanated from the wealthy and educated “honorable citizens” who appreciated 
Martínez’ excellent administration but valued the “ancient principles” of the 
constitution.112 
The Legation was pessimistic, however, about the opposition’s chances to 
successfully resist continuismo, as it suffered under the restrictions of press censorship 
and the suppression of free speech and remained inarticulate and unfocused.113 While 
the “brightest minds” left the government in protest, they were not expected to take their 
opposition any further.114  Moreover, the State Department had become much more 
careful in keeping its Legations out of local politics: a timely telegram instructed 
Salvadoran mission that it was to express no opinion whatsoever on the “controversial” 
reelection of Martínez.115 
Martínez’ constitutional coup began in earnest in July 1938. Discontented army 
officers and government officials were replaced and the independent newspaper Diario 
de Hoy was closed down. One liberally-minded editor was given a canoe and told to row 
upriver and not get out until he reached Honduras.116 In October, government organized 
elections brought together government sponsored deputies for a Constituent Assembly. 
The new deputies, opined Frazer, were of so little ability that original ideas were not to 
be expected from the Assembly. It would doubtlessly serve as a rubber stamp congress 
only. Indeed, on January 24, 1939, a new constitution was promulgated which prohibited 
reelection, but at the same time made an “exception” for President Martínez, who was to 
remain in office until March, 1945.117 
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The end…almost. In January 1939, four generals of the Salvadoran army approached 
the secretary of the American Legation. How would the United States feel about a coup 
against Martínez, they wanted to know. The United States has no feelings either of 
sympathy or lack of sympathy toward such a development, was the (now standard) reply. 
This pleased the generals.118 It told them that the United States felt no obligation to 
protect the status quo, as had been the norm under the defunct 1923 rule. For what it 
was worth, there were a handful of individuals in Central America who understood that 
the State Department’s quiet shelving of the 1923 Treaty was not a mark of approval or 
an implicit invitation for continuismo. 
It was worth very little, though. A grand total of four generals might seem like a 
formidable force in a small country like El Salvador, but in fact, the Salvadoran army 
boasted some 30 generals of the brigade rank only (while the army itself was no larger 
than a single American brigade). In any case, the four rogue officers were no match for 
the security apparatus that Martínez had developed in the preceding years. The 
generals were arrested before they even had a chance to execute their plans.119 Times 
had changed: the caudillos were building modern, centralized states with all the newest 
techniques for the suppression of dissent at their disposal. Political stability no longer 
required the tutelage of the U.S. legations. Whether the attendant gain in state 
sovereignty equaled the loss of political liberties is a question no historian could answer. 
 
3. DICTATORS RULE THE ISTHMUS 
In 1934, Arthur Lane drew the Department’s attention to the large outlay of funds that the 
Nicaraguan Government made available for its army: “When a country which has nothing 
to fear from its neighbors spends 60 per cent of its budgeted income on the maintenance 
of its army, there cannot be much optimism for its economic and educational 
development”.120 Some weeks later, Lay echoed that: 
The Government here [in Honduras] has contracted for 3,000 modern rifles, 
1,250,000 cartridges, clips for same, about 100 machine guns, 500 airplane 
bombs, and the budget provides for three more bombing airplanes. There 
seems to be no good explanation for the purchase of this enormous quantity 
of munitions at this time. There is no internal revolt in sight, anyway, for two 
years. Nicaragua is no longer a real menace, although they sometimes try to 
make me think it is. By a process of elimination I have come to the 
conclusion that the purchase of these munitions and arms is for graft.121 
At the time, both Lane and Lay missed the point, which was that the governments of 
Central America were thinking in terms of power. Both the Legations and the Department 
were still thinking in terms of treaties and moral suasion: Undersecretary Welles’ only 
suggestion regarding the increase of weaponry was to express his devout hope that the 
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ongoing discussions on arms reductions that the Central American governments had 
themselves engaged in would offer a solution.122 
The American conception of “progress” in Central America had imagined 
constitutional stability under the watchful eyes of American observers. The Central 
American governments, meanwhile, entertained a vision of strong and dynamic states 
that would rule for the people, rather than being ruled by the people. The idea of a 
‘Somoza solution’, whereby the United States ruled Central America by dictatorial proxy, 
denies the fact that during the early 1930s, Central Americans were shaping the Central 
American future. That the future they imagined was unattractive in terms of American 
ideas of good government was entirely beside the point. Martínez’, Ubico’s, and Carías’ 
ability to stay in power in spite of American reservation or even resistance, demonstrates 
that they were the actors, not those acted upon. The masters, not the students. 
Caught between an increasingly passive State Department and increasingly 
dynamic and dictatorial states, the diplomatic corps experienced considerable difficulty in 
coming around to the new balance of power in Central America. Doubtlessly, the 
realization that its guidance was no longer appreciated by the local government was a 
bitter pill to swallow. The traditional perception of Central America as a region that would 
be subjected to chronic cycles of dictatorship and revolution if it was not for American 
tutelage, accounts for the fear expressed by the Legations of Guatemala and 
Tegucigalpa that continuismo would lead to revolution. Lane and Corrigan may have 
been the most vocal proponents of intervention in favor of constitutionalism, but even 
timid minister Keena expressed a need to “talk to” Carías about the reelection campaign. 
It seems highly doubtful that “friendly advice” would have made a difference at this point 
anyway. There is no reason to assume that Ubico and Carías would fail to withstand 
American pressure while Martínez had held out and eventually triumphed over it. 
The continuismo campaigns required a new conception of the relations between 
the local regimes and the legations. As we shall see in the next chapter, one interesting 
effect of the reelection campaigns—combined with international developments—was that 
the American legations began to report on the many “Fascist” tendencies of Ubico, 
Carías and Martínez. It must have been clear to the latter also that if they meant to win 
back the American sympathy they had enjoyed after their initial election, they had to 
come up with new ways to make themselves useful to the yanquis.   
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WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS 
The Good Neighbor and Fascism, 1936-1939 
~ Winning hearts and minds ~ 
  
 
Meanwhile, the trend towards Fascism is 
increasingly pronounced throughout most of 
Latin America. Fascist trappings naturally 
appeal to the “strong men” dictators (…) 
[T]he four reigning Central American 
dictators (…) started flirtations with the Euro-
Asiatic dictatorial countries; El Salvador was 
the first nation in the world outside Japan to 
recognize Manchukuo and Jorge Ubico of 
Guatemala—who has frequently described 
President Roosevelt as “a dangerous 
communist”—once planned an alliance with 
Italy, but was restrained by his aides. 
 
~ Wilbur Burton, The Spectator, 1938 1 
 
 
When Corrigan wrote that “dictatorships with their tyrannies, imprisonments, political 
exiles and political executions are abhorrent to the spirit of America”2, he was not voicing 
an old cliché. Rather, he expressed a concern that would not—and perhaps could not—
have presented itself with the same urgency only a couple of years earlier. Although 
American foreign policy and politics would take many twists and turns before the United 
States got involved in the War, events around the world during the late 1930s presented 
the clear and immediate possibility of a future conflict with the European dictatorships. 
As historian Benjamin Alpers argues, the contemporary, 21st century American 
notion of dictatorship as the opposite of democracy is comparatively new:  
There is nothing necessary about the peculiar and central role that 
dictatorship has played in the political life of this country (…) [F]or most of the 
history of Western political thought, dictatorship and democracy were 
regarded as only two of many possible forms of political organization—
among them, tyranny, aristocracy, and monarchy. Although dictatorship and 
democracy were certainly distinct from one another, they were not complete 
opposites.3 
The identification of a democracy/dictatorship dichotomy and its association with a more 
fundamental good/evil divide is the result of a historical development, not a timeless truth. 
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Indeed, during the 1920s, American intellectuals held a fairly benign view of strong 
men and dictators in “backward” countries. After the stock market crash of 1929, as 
capitalist democracies around the world struggled to survive economically and even 
politically, the idea that dynamic dictatorships, such as that in Mussolini’s Italy, were the 
way of the future gained even more ground. From its high watermark of around 1930, 
however, the regard for dictatorship in the United States took an ever accelerating 
plunge. The catalysis of this development was the increasingly blatant aggression shown 
by the European dictatorships, primarily Italy and Germany and, to an extent, Soviet 
Russia. Another development in the history of the idea of dictatorship was that a new 
category of dictatorship was proposed in Italy: This was the notion of the “Totalitarian 
State” which, briefly summarized, was a particularly dynamic, aggressive, “modern” form 
of dictatorship which sought “total” domination over its subjects. Americans eventually 
applied the term not just to Italian Fascism, but also to German Nazism and even to 
Soviet Communism. From roughly 1935 to 1939, the American image of Totalitarianism 
was shaped by the persecutions, show trials, and international aggression of the 
European dictatorships.4 
It so happened that the Central American continuismo campaigns of the second 
half of the 1930s coincided with these ominous international events. While Ubico, Carías, 
and Martínez were securing their continued rule, Italy occupied Ethiopia, Germany 
remilitarized the Rhineland, and Japan invaded China. The concurrence of these events, 
combined with the apparent sympathy of the isthmian regimes for Italian and Spanish 
Fascism, raised the question of whether the Central American governments were 
somehow part of a global trend in favor of totalitarian dictatorships. 
This question was decided in favor of the caudillos, who were eventually adopted 
into the United Nations alliance. American historians have generally praised the Good 
Neighbor policy for enabling a close working relationship between the United States and 
Latin America during the Second World War. The situation during the First World War 
had been quite the opposite. Moreover, U.S.-Latin American relations had grown colder 
after that war as intervention became a contentious issue. The initiatives of the 
Roosevelt administration are said to have turned that state of affairs around. 
 
1 THE GOOD NEIGHBOR AND FASCISM 
In December 1941, nine Central American and Caribbean nations followed the example 
of the United States by declaring war on the Axis. They were only the forerunners, 
because, eventually, all Latin American countries joined the war on the side of their 
northern neighbor. This was a remarkable development considering the fact that all the 
major nations in Latin America (except Brazil) remained neutral during World War I. 
Moreover, Latin Americans long considered the United States—the so-called “Colossus 
of the North”—a threat to their own independence. Naturally, the Roosevelt 
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administration considered the wartime alliance with Latin America to be the crowning 
achievement of its Good Neighbor policy, which allayed Latin fears about American 
intentions and cleared the way for cooperation. As Assistant Secretary of State Adolf 
Berle noted after the outbreak of the war: “The heartening thing (…) is the swift and 
virtually anonymous support from all of the republics of this hemisphere. If ever a policy 
paid dividends, the Good Neighbor Policy has. So far, they are sticking with us with 
scarcely a break”.5 
Many historians agree with Berle’s assessment that the Good Neighbor laid the 
groundwork for the wartime cooperation.6 In his classic study on the Good Neighbor 
policy, Bryce Wood argued: “Just before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, then, it 
may be said that the United States had established, with the assistance of certain Latin 
American states, an unprecedented set of relationships productive of a nearly solidary 
American attitude toward threats from without”.7 The Roosevelt administration’s strict 
adherence to nonintervention; rhetorical commitment to the ideal of pan-American 
solidarity and equality; and encouragement of reciprocal trade agreements significantly 
improved South American perceptions of the United States. By the end of the decade 
“the northern colossus no longer looked quite so much like Latin America’s natural 
enemy”.8 
During the first term of the Roosevelt administration—while the Depression was 
still the number one concern and free-trade enthusiast Cordell Hull was in charge of 
foreign policy—Washington put its improved relation with Latin America to good use by 
stimulating a hemisphere-wide reciprocal trade program. During the second term 
however, the attention of the administration turned to the threat emanating from 
European fascism. Roosevelt himself got more and more involved in the execution of 
foreign policy and, in the Western Hemisphere, this meant that interest in trade 
agreements dwindled and the greatest stress was put on a policy of building inter-
American solidarity against foreign threats. 9 
Too often ignored, however, is the fact that the Latinos were not passive receivers 
of Good Neighborliness. Martínez in particular was an adept student of the policy and 
appropriated it for his own purposes. While the general prepared for his own continuismo 
campaign toward the end of the decade, his regime further dramatized the neighborly 
relations between Washington and San Salvador for local and international audiences. 
Ubico, Carías, and Martínez successfully won the hearts and minds of American 
diplomats with a determined campaign that associated their governments with American 
goals and objectives, despite the ideological divides.  
                                                 
5 Quoted in Gilderhus, Second Century, 96. 
6 For further discussion on this theme, see Gilderhus, Second Century, 91-108; Gellman, Good 
Neighbor diplomacy, 121-126 and Michael J. Kryzanek, U.S.-Latin American Relations (3rd edition: 
Westport, CT, and London 1996) 59-62. 
7 Wood, The Making, 334. 
8 Gilderhus, Second Century, 94. 
9 Leonard, Latin America, 1-8; Howard Jablon, Crossroads of Decision. The State Department 
and Foreign Policy, 1933-1937 (Lexington, KT, 1983) particularly chapter 1 and 5. 
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The fact that the U.S.-Central American connection was a two-way street has been 
remarked upon in several excellent studies. Frederick Weaver, for example, notes that 
while “it is still true that many acting in the name of the United States have been 
complicit in what have frequently had very unpleasant consequences”, he is also 
“impressed by some Central Americans’ ability to manipulate U.S. fears and 
acquisitiveness for their own ends”.10 The ability of local actors to appropriate the goals 
or terms of U.S. policy is also the topic of some research. Thomas Leonard, a specialist 
in U.S.-Central American affairs, recounts how the leaders of Central America 
represented the signing of Hull’s trade pacts as a sign of U.S. support for their regimes. 
Discussing the Cold War era, Joseph and Spenser note that: “Not infrequently, Latin 
American states used a Cold War rationale, generated outside the region, to wage war 
against their citizens, to gain or perpetuate power, and to create or justify authoritarian 
military regimes”.11 
When studying the legations’ archives, it is not always easy to ascertain who 
manipulated who. Perhaps it is even somewhat misleading to put the matter in such 
terms, because it implies a degree of planning and purposefulness that may not have 
existed in fact. Concerning the subject of the next twenty pages, which involve many 
people accusing many other people of being closet fascists, there was doubtlessly as 
much frantic mudslinging as there was determined deception. However, the years before 
the outbreak of the Second World War represent an excellent case study to investigate 
how comparatively new terms like fascist and Good Neighbor were defined and 
redefined both by Americans and Central Americans.  
 
2. THE SPECTER OF FASCISM 
The rise of Fascism was a point of major debate in Central America throughout the late 
1930s. But what this new term and the dangers that it implied meant in the local context 
remained a contested issue for some years. Initially, local opposition groups 
appropriated the term to label their enemies: the Central American dictators. American 
observers, most notably the United States press, but also the local legations and the 
State Department, initially shared the opposition’s concern for the supposedly Fascist 
tendencies in Central American politics. By the end of the decade, however, the 
caudillos successfully turned the tables on their opponents: By the start of the Second 
World War, the Central American governments were identified in Washington as the first 
line of defense against Fascist intrusions in the hemisphere.  
 
2.1 The opposition 
From the early 1930s onward, actual repression—or fear thereof—in Guatemala, El 
Salvador, and Honduras produced a steady stream of refugees. This was not a 
homogenous group, either politically or socially. It included aristocrats and high army 
                                                 
10 Weaver, Inside the Volcano. 
11 Leonard, Central America, xii-xv and 104-108; Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Spenser eds., In 
from the cold. Latin America’s new encounters with the Cold War (Durham and London 2008) 5.  
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officers who were members of opposition parties; conscientious objectors to the 
continuismo campaigns who had been high- or midlevel employees of government or 
public institutions; and simple campesinos who had fled the violence of the 1932 
Matanza. Members of the first group formed stable exile communities in Panama, San 
José, Mexico, New Orleans, and New York City by the late 1930s. It was said that in 
Mexico, dozens of seats in local cantinas were occupied by as many disgruntled politicos 
and generals from Central America.12 
Those who reached the safety of the more liberal states surrounding Central 
America were the lucky ones: oppositionists who fell into the hands of one of the 
dictators were submitted to their mercy. Whether mercy was granted or not depended on 
circumstances. If Ubico had a score to settle with Martínez, he might help the latter’s 
opponents. If not, he was liable to solicit his neighbor’s good-will by punishing his 
enemies. A group of Salvadoran peasants that reached Honduras in 1932, for example, 
was relocated to distant regions by the Carías regime and never heard from again: “[I]t is 
not known whether they have survived”, reported the legation almost ten years later.13 In 
August 1937, the Honduran rebel leader Umaña was captured in Guatemala and shot 
“while attempting to escape”.14  
In Mexico and Costa Rica, however, political exiles were fairly safe and generally 
free from government censorship. It was primarily from the capitals of these countries 
that a continuous barrage of propaganda against the caudillos was emitted throughout 
the 1930s. Interestingly, such propaganda was not only directed at compatriots, but also 
at the U.S. legations, the State Department, or to Franklin Roosevelt personally. Despite 
Washington’s stress on non-intervention over the past years, the idea of the United 
States as a crusader for democracy was still alive. 
During the early 1930s, opposition letters addressed to the Americans focused on 
constitutions and treaties and, of course, on how these were trampled by the Ubico, 
Martínez, and Carías regimes. Considering that the writers of these letters had years of 
experience with the pro-constitutionalist interventions of the Republican administrations, 
it is not surprising that oppositionists expected this theme to strike a chord with the 
yanquis. For example, Angel Zúñiga Huete, who voluntarily left Honduras after Carías’ 
election victory, had lived through several episodes of U.S. intervention in favor of the 
1923 Treaty. During Carías’ continuismo campaign, he spammed the State Department 
with lengthy and eloquent letters on the constitutional articles that were crushed in his 
homeland. His personal history with the Americans did not prepare him for the new age 
of nonintervention that was taking shape. For years, Zúñiga Huete wrote about treaties 
                                                 
12 For example: Harold A. Collins (U.S. Chargé d’Affairs a.i. to Costa Rica) to the Secretary of 
State, Despatch 1329, February 5, 1937, PR Honduras, Box 23, cl. 800: Costa Rica.  
13 Erwin to the Secretary of State, Despatch 1530, August 19, 1941, PR Honduras, Box 68, cl. 
800.B: Relations between Communists and Nazis. 
14 Cramp to the Secretary of State, Despatch 764, August 9, 1937, PR Honduras, Box 23, cl. 800: 
Honduras.  
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and constitutions that had long been abandoned both in Washington and in 
Tegucigalpa.15 
With the rise of Fascism in Europe however, the theme of democracy started to 
play an ever increasing role in American newspapers and in the speeches of American 
statesmen. In this pro-democratic and anti-Fascist rhetoric, the Central American 
opposition movements found a new parlance to translate their concerns about local 
matters to the Yankees. 
The opposition’s arguments did not undergo fundamental changes throughout the 
1930s. Stated in neutral terms, it objected to the fact that no honest elections had been 
held since Ubico, Martínez, and Carías came to power; that these gentlemen changed 
the constitutions to remain in power; and that violent and non-violent means were 
employed by these regimes to keep opponents quiet. As such, the situation described in 
the writings of Central American oppositionists—while objectionable in itself—was not 
different in any meaningful way from the situation that had existed under earlier dictators 
and caudillos. Yet, by the late 1930s Central American oppositionists found a 
sympathetic audience for their writings by representing the authoritarian governments in 
their home countries as Fascist dictatorships.  
The Honduran Liberal Party was particularly adept at appropriating the language of 
Democracy vs. Fascism to translate its concern about Carías’ growing power to 
Washington. In one representative letter, Angel Zúñiga Huete claimed that “the Dictator 
Carías is in accord with the totalitarian doctrines of the Dictators Hitler and Mussolini, 
and (…) democracy in Honduras has been exterminated”. The Liberal further claimed 
that President Roosevelt was “a true democrat, who is interested, according to his 
declarations and those of Mr. Hull, and Sumner Welles, in that which prevails in the 
Governments of America which sustain democratic doctrines and do not permit exotic 
doctrines such as Nazis, communists, etc.” 16  Whatever declarations Zúñiga Huete 
referred to were likely to have been intended for European audiences. Central American 
opposition groups, however, were quick to point out that the ideals of democracy could 
only have universal application. As Venancio Callejas, a Honduran Nationalist who had 
broken with Carías during the continuismo campaign, argued in a personal letter to 
Roosevelt: 
If the United States actually believes[,] as you have stated Mr. President, in 
Democracy, in Liberty[,] and in the blessings conferred by Peace (…) we feel 
absolutely certain that the Government of the United States will flatly refuse 
to extend recognition (…) to the Dictatorship which General Carías pretends 
to establish by force on Honduras, against the express wish of the People of 
Honduras, and clearly violating our National Institutions[. T]here is absolutely 
                                                 
15 Argueta, Carías, 295-299 
16 El Comité Central del Partico Liberal Hondureño to Erwin, July 4, 1938 enclosed in: Erwin to 
the Secretary of State, Despatch 362, July 12, 1938, PR Honduras, Box 35, cl. 800: Political 
Affairs. 
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no means of reconciling your noble[,] straightforward Declarations, with an 
Act of Recognition of that anti-democratic, illegal regime…17 
The high-sounding words of men like Zúñiga-Huete and Callejas—who did not exactly 
have clean consciences themselves—did not go unnoticed. Historian Kenneth Grieb 
argued that the idea of a Fascist threat to Central America was “a masterstroke of 
propaganda”, for it was quickly picked up by the American press.18 
 
2.2 The American press 
Grieb identified a “myth” of a “Central American dictator’s league” in the American press 
during the 1930s. Newspapers and magazines of an impeccable reputation reported 
throughout 1937 and 1938 that the dictatorial regimes of Ubico, Martínez, Carías, and 
Somoza were in a secret alliance to keep each other in power and to suppress 
democratically-inclined opposition. There was no direct proof for the existence of such 
an alliance and the notion that it did exist was based entirely on circumstantial evidence: 
rumors spread by political exiles; isolated instances of actual cooperation between the 
isthmian republics; and the caudillos’ seemingly ominous international acts, such as 
Guatemala’s and Salvador’s early recognition of Franco’s regime and their subsequent 
retirement from the League of Nations.19 
In fact, Grieb wrote, a Central American dictator’s league never existed. It might 
have appeared that the regimes in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua 
were ideologically related, but in reality they did not abandon old rivalries and jealousies. 
Ubico, for example, was determined to dominate his neighbors, but was actively 
opposed by Martínez, while Somoza also made occasional claims to the leadership of 
the old Central American Unionist movement. Honduras was caught in the middle of the 
expansionist ambitions of its neighbors and made frantic attempts to remain on good 
terms with both of its strong northern neighbors. At the same time however, it was also 
engaged in a border conflict with Nicaragua, which, despite U.S. attempts at mediation, 
dragged on for decades. Under such circumstances, cooperation between the dictators 
was never realized.20 
Simultaneously, it was reported in The New York Times, that the four Central 
American dictators had “joined in a protective alliance against political enemies”. The 
recent continuismo campaigns figured prominently in the New York Times’ description of 
the local dictatorships, asserting that:  
matters are moving for the first time in history toward continuing dictatorships 
of the Fascist type in this section of Central America, where two Presidents 
[i.e. Ubico and Carías] already are serving their second terms in office, 
contrary to their Constitutions, and a third [i.e. Martínez] is considering the 
                                                 
17 Venancio Callejas to Franklin D. Roosevelt, November 30, 1936 enclosed in Callejas to Keena, 
December 11, 1936, PR Honduras, Box 8, Vol. IX, cl. 800: Political Affairs. 
18  Kenneth J. Grieb, “The Myth of a Central American Dictator’s League”, Journal of Latin 
American Studies 10:2 (November 1978) 329-345. 
19 idem, 329 & 330. 
20 Idem. 
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same action. This is unprecedented in this part of the world, where United 
States influence has been great.  
The last sentence is especially significant. It gives witness to the assumption that the 
United States would not allow the existence of dictatorships in its “backyard” if that could 
be prevented. And since it was unthinkable that locals could successfully stand up to the 
United States, it was assumed that a more powerful, sinister force was behind this 
development. Therefore, a link with Fascism was imagined, even though the evidence 
for such a link was tenuous. When Martínez managed to succeed himself in 1939, The 
New York Times reported that the general had used “methods typical of Hitler and 
Mussolini” and that “[e]xpert assistance was given to his supporters by Fascists and 
Nazis”. When Germany, Italy, and Japan signed the “anti-Communist” Rome Pact, the 
Times reported that the news was received “with glee” in Central America. Even if the 
dictators there did not join the Pact, it was obvious that their own League closely 
mirrored that of the Axis nations and there was “little need” to “take chances with [the] 
big good neighbor to the north” by formalizing those ties.21 
That the American press saw a Fascist dictator’s league where there was none, is 
partly explained, Grieb wrote, by the fact that: 
[t]he prevalence of the charges [against Central American dictators] was 
coincidental with alarm in the North American press about the spread of 
Fascism. The resulting sensitivity caused Yankees to perceive ‘Fascist 
influence’ throughout the world, much as in a subsequent era they would do 
the same with Communism. This mentality rendered the North American 
press susceptible to tales of a Central American Dictator’s League, which 
was presumed to be the extension of some vast plot hatched in Germany or 
Italy, since dictatorship was equated with Fascism in the Yankee mind. 
Claiming that “dictatorship was equated with Fascism in the Yankee mind” was 
stretching the point. Mussolini, for example, was a respected foreign head-of-state in the 
United States during the 1920s. However, throughout the years 1936 to 1937 at least, 
the relationship between Central America dictatorship and Fascism was hotly debated at 
the American legations. 
 
2.3 The Legations 
Ubico was initially regarded as the legitimate and rightful president of Guatemala and all 
his minor sins were disregarded in the light of his honest and progressive administration. 
But from 1936 onward, American diplomats at the legation began to report the anti-
liberal aspects of Ubico’s reign. Increasingly, words like “regimented”, “dictatorial”, and 
even “totalitarian” were used to typify his administration. These were not value-neutral 
terms. While a “strong”, “firm”, or even “heavy-handed” government was deemed a 
                                                 
21 “A Dictatorship Belt”, NYT (September 5, 1937) 98; “Dictators agree in Latin America”, NYT 
(July 20, 1937) 18; “Salvador extends President’s term 6 years”, NYT (January 5, 1939) 1; “Pact 
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stabilizing factor in a country that was considered to be plagued by “graft-hungry men” 
and “political passions”, a totalitarian dictatorship was something else altogether.22  
Earlier in the decade, Ubico was on very good personal terms with minister 
Whitehouse, but after 1934, the caudillo became increasingly secretive and withdrawn. 
The American legation noted on several occasions that Ubico was not the congenial 
man he was during the first years of his reign and that it had become very difficult to 
establish any kind of contact with him. A 1937 memorandum established that: 
[u]pon his entry into office, he [Ubico] was more friendly and congenial than 
he is at the present time. This attitude is believed to be due to a loss of 
confidence in many of the persons who surround him. He is extremely high 
tempered and very reluctant to take or allow advice. This is considered his 
one weak point.23 
Such behavior, one can speculate, probably developed during the years 1934-1937, as 
the general schemed to continue himself in power.  
It is likely that Ubico’s aloofness contributed to the legation’s suspicions about his 
alleged ties with European Fascism. At the very least, the distance that Ubico put 
between himself and the legation prevented the Americans from hearing his version of 
many developments. Concurrently, the new minister to Guatemala, Fay Allen Des Portes, 
had to rely on the outward appearances of Ubico’s government. Throughout the year 
1937 he became very concerned about Ubico’s dictatorial measures. In January of that 
year, the minister noted that Ubico “is apparently reactionary to the point where he 
favors strongly the dictatorial methods of Fascism”. He continued that Ubico “has little 
use for pure democracy in Guatemala and he is probably inclined to view with a certain 
measure of suspicion the acts or policies of any Governments of liberal tendencies”.24 
While Ubico seemed to distance himself from the American legation, he 
exchanged tokens of affectation with Franco, Mussolini, and Hitler: Guatemala was one 
of the first governments to recognize the rebel “government” of General Franco and 
when Germany left the League of Nations in October 1936, Guatemala followed suit 
some weeks later.25  In June 1937, Des Portes reported that Ubico had received a 
decoration from the King of Italy. “The matter is of significance”, the minister wrote, “as 
an indication of the orientation which has recently been noted in the policies and 
prejudices of President Ubico.” The president, the report continued, was: 
[s]trongly attracted by and a great admirer of certain of the dictatorial 
Governments in Europe, and his own administration reflects the policies and 
                                                 
22 Des Portes to the Secretary of State, Despatch 267, June 9, 1937, (M1280, Roll 4) Jorge Ubico: 
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characteristics of such Governments. His prompt recognition of the Franco 
Government in Spain, his growing friendliness with Germany and Italy, and 
his correspondingly intense antagonism to liberalism in any form are straws 
which indicate the direction of the wind.26 
 
As Franco set up his Fascist government in Spain, Carías destroyed the constitution of 
Honduras. It proved tempting for minister Keena to connect the two events and to 
compare the factional squabbles of Honduras with the dramatic divide between Right 
and Left in Europe: “The conflict between the Fascists and Communist ideas of 
government has its repercussions in Central America”, Keena reported, “and translated 
to this area finds a lineup with Mexico definitely to the left and Costa Rica partially; 
Guatemala and El Salvador distinctly to the right and Honduras and Nicaragua now to 
the right but both facing possible conflicts”. According to the minister, this division was 
also visible within Honduras itself. Since the Liberals were not able to connect their 
opposition to Carías with a greater cause that could attract a broader following, they may 
now be experimenting with Leftist ideologies: 
The Government of President Carías is strongly anti-Communist. In reflection 
of the alignment of forces in Spain this naturally throws the Liberal Party, 
which is seeking a cause to espouse in addition to its claim for the 
continuance of the Constitution of 1924, which, so far, has not awakened any 
fighting sentiment in the country, into the Communist fold since they must be 
diametrically opposed to the Government and also as partisanship of that 
idea appears to present the only opportunity they might have for obtaining 
the money and assistance [from foreign sources] which would be needed to 
overthrow the Government. 
“[T]he next conflict for power in Honduras”, Keena concluded, “may be on the lines now 
being so clearly marked out in Europe”.27 
Keena’s predictions were not immediately adopted by his successor, John D. 
Erwin. In fact, the first couple of months of Erwin’s service in Honduras were uneventful, 
if, at times, frustrating. The legation dutifully followed central policy as it tried to establish 
a working relation with the Carías government on inter-American neutrality and as it 
attempted to bring Honduras and Nicaragua closer together on a long-pending boundary 
dispute which endangered inter-American solidarity. Both were arduous tasks as the tiny 
Honduran Foreign Ministry was slow to answer legation queries and the government as 
a whole did not budge from its intransigent stance on the boundary dispute. Frustration 
at the American legation slowly built up. The inability or unwillingness of the Carías 
administration to work with the legation on important inter-American projects were 
interpreted as indicators of its provincialism, backwardness, and lack of concern for 
anything but the survival of the regime. When combined with the latent concern over 
Carías’ dictatorial methods during the continuismo campaign, these apprehensions 
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caused the legation to define the Honduran government as an archaic 19th century 
caudillo regime. 
In August 1938, first secretary William Cramp wrote a damning report on the 
Carías administration for its uncompromising position in the Honduran-Nicaraguan 
boundary. The administration, according to Cramp, had “fallen into such provincialism 
and corruption as might have been expected at the beginning or the century, but even 
for Central America is now somewhat unusual”. 28  The government’s backtracking 
caused the secretary many headaches: 
The Legation has had the greatest difficulty in obtaining action on even 
informal routine matters. Replies to oral or written requests are not received 
for from one to three months, and sometimes never, in spite of repeated 
reminders. Favorable action, as promised in satisfactory replies, is seldom 
actually carried out.29 
The legation was obviously considerably embarrassed by this situation, since it 
interfered with its own efficiency. This situation significantly influenced its evaluation of 
the regime: “[This] is not a Government of the people, but a small group of incapable, 
dishonest and extremely provincial politicians controlling the primitive capital of a small, 
backward Central American Republic”.30 Although Cramp aimed most of his antagonism 
at Carías’ ministers, who “have no interest in the fate of Honduras and are swayed 
purely by hope of personal gain and glory”, the president himself was not free of blame:  
[He] has the typical Indian characteristics of equivocation whenever possible. 
He dislikes decisions, but, when his hand is forced, his judgment is based 
entirely upon political expediency. He appears to me to feel that his 
incumbency of the presidency is far from secure and that he can only stay in 
office by holding the reins of Government with an iron hand and keeping the 
entire Executive Power therein. He apparently trusts no one, not even his 
own Cabinet, and the ever-growing discontent throughout the country with 
his regime has brought to him the realization that he can continue in office 
only by strong dictatorial methods and never through popular demand.31 
Up to about November 1939, Erwin reported with some regularity on the 
government’s laxness, corruption, provincialism, and dictatorial practices.32  So when 
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Carías’ supporters, toward the end of 1938, announced that the president’s tenure would 
be extended for a second time, they could not count on Erwin’s sympathy. The 
government itself, confident of its powerful position, handled the issue with a matter-of-
fact attitude and pushed a bill through congress within less than a month which allowed 
Carías to rule until 1944. This still was not fast enough, however, to avoid the moral 
indignation of the American minister. Drawing implicit comparisons with the European 
dictatorships, Erwin reported to the Department that public support for Carías’ 
continuismo could only be explained by the secret police’s silencing of the opposition 
and by prevalence of official propaganda which whipped up the sentiments of the 
uninformed masses: “Backward and unprogressive as it may be, Honduras certainly has 
not failed to take advantage of modern inventions and propaganda tricks in whipping up 
sentiment among the masses for CONTINUISMO”.33  
 
For many observers outside of El Salvador, there seemed little doubt that Martínez 
favored Fascism. The Salvadoran chief was often mentioned in one breath with his 
presumably Fascist-minded neighbors. In 1937, for example, Des Portes noted that 
"There appears a growing sentiment that president Ubico of Guatemala, Carías of 
Honduras, and Martínez of El Salvador, are leaning more and more toward the Mussolini 
and Hitler form of dictatorship, a sentiment which would seem to be founded on 
undeniable proof". 34  Similarly, Laurence Duggan of the Department noted that “the 
Governments of Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras are Fascist in 
character and sympathy, if not in name”.35 Such assertions were based on, or at least 
confirmed by, the American press, Salvadoran opposition groups, and actions by the 
Salvadoran government—particularly its early recognition of Franco’s rebel 
government.36 
In 1938, the year that Martínez followed in his neighbor’s footsteps by starting a 
campaign for his continuance in office, rumors about the general’s Fascist sympathies 
were particularly widespread. The British chargé in Guatemala wrote Des Portes that the 
Salvadoran continuismo campaign provided “further evidence that Martínez has turned 
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Fascist in the letter and the spirit”, a view that the American minister seemed to have 
subscribed to.37  Meanwhile, the U.S. military attachés to Central America had been 
worried for some time about Salvador’s use of Italian military airplanes and in 1939 
captain Lamson-Scribner noted that, besides being morally questionable, Martínez’ 
continuismo probably enjoyed active support from local Nazis.38 
The American legation in Salvador was surprisingly philosophical about Martínez’ 
supposedly Fascist inclinations, although there were a few acute “black scares” at the 
legation throughout the years. In August 1938, for example, the Americans were anxious 
about the inclusion of an Italian national in Martínez’ retinue during a campaign trip. It 
was soon determined, however, that the Italian in question had imposed himself on 
some officials in Martínez’ following and had no personal connections to the president.39 
The matter was soon forgotten and, overall, Martínez continued to enjoy the legation’s 
sympathy. After the general was reelected to office in 1939, minister Frazer’s only 
comment was that the president’s political philosophy was akin to that of “certain” 
European leaders. Until about 1941, this was as close as Frazer got to accusing 
Martínez of Fascist sympathies.40 Why this was so will be discussed in the following 
section. 
 
While the Department itself was not particularly interested in Central American affairs 
during the late 1930s, reports about Fascist influences in the highest echelons of foreign 
governments did cause some anxiety. The example of the Spanish Civil War in particular, 
raised concerns that a similar ideological conflict might erupt between the Central 
American dictators and their leftist neighbor to the north: Mexico. In March, 1937, 
Laurence Duggan, a close collaborator of Assistant Secretary Welles, complained that 
Ubico had a “Communist fear psychosis” which made the latter unreasonably fearful of 
supposedly “Communist” influences from Mexico. The matter was serious because inter-
American solidarity under U.S. leadership was high on the list of foreign policy objectives. 
American attempts to temper Central American fears about Mexico, however, had come 
to naught. The Mexicans, Duggan wrote, were probably blissfully unaware of the fact 
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that its publications were considered revolutionary propaganda in Central America and 
“[i]n connection with such consideration as may be given this question, it should not be 
forgotten that the Governments of Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras 
are Fascist in character and sympathy, if not in name, and that the Governments of the 
first three named States have already recognized the ‘Government’ of general Franco”.41 
 
2.4 The Dictators 
Were the Central American dictators closet Fascists? Taken as a whole, the literature on 
Central American history provides no conclusive evidence, pro or contra, for the alleged 
Fascist sympathies of Ubico, Martínez, or Carías. Although there are studies that 
describe the influence of Nazis and Fascists in Latin America during the War42, there are 
no in-depth studies that show how the European ideologies were perceived or received 
by Central American leaders themselves. 
There were certainly outward parallels between the European Fascist regimes and 
the Central American dictatorships. Most obviously, both were authoritarian, state-
centered, and single party political systems that employed the secret service and the 
army to enforce their rule. On the economic level, the Fascist and the caudillo 
governments both had a conception of modernization that focused on state-directed 
development through corporations. The object of modernization under both systems was 
understood to be a strengthening of the state, not a reform of the social structure. Both 
the Fascist and the Central American idea of social stratification were based on a 
hierarchy of race. And even though the Central American idea of race was more 
traditional and less Spenserian than that of the Fascists, anti-Semitism was rather 
pronounced in Central America. 
Also, the foreign policies of the caudillos at times appeared to favor the Fascist 
nations. Germany was an important market for Central American coffee and many 
Central American nations accepted the Aski mark system of bartering, giving the 
Germans an even bigger stake in the Central American economies—sometimes at the 
expense of the United States. Italian efforts to revive its armament industry by vigorously 
pushing its weapons on the international arms markets were modestly successful in 
Central America, where the Salvadoran government bought several airplanes and 
pieces of artillery at discount prices. Meanwhile, Franco’s ideology of ‘hispanidad’ and 
his ‘Falange’ party naturally appealed to the culturally Hispanic elites of Central America. 
Besides a traditional interest for the politics of the “mother country”, Central American 
elites sympathized with Franco’s fight against the Communist specter. Concurrently, 
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Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras were among the first nations to extend 
diplomatic recognition to Franco’s rebel government. 
 It should not be surprising, then, that some historians have described the isthmian 
dictators as active supporters of Fascism. Perhaps most recently, John Bratzel noted 
that Ubico and Martínez regarded Fascism as a positive alternative political system43, a 
claim supported in several earlier historical studies.44 Elam, in a study on the Central 
American military, claimed that “in the period 1920-1965, military officers attracted to 
corporate, fascist, or military populist political models temporarily dominated 
governmental institutions” in several countries, including Guatemala and El Salvador.45 
In a historical study on El Salvador, James Dunkerley took the claim that Central 
American dictators sympathized with Fascism furthest by stating that Martínez was an 
“unashamed admirer of Hitler and Mussolini”.46 
While there are enough parallels between the Fascist and caudillo political system 
and enough outward signs of sympathy and limited cooperation between Central 
American and European Fascist governments, two important questions require further 
exploration: Firstly, if Central American leaders sympathized with or admired European 
leaders, did that mean that they were firm adherents of the Fascist ideology? Secondly, 
could the caudillos in any way be described as proxies of the European Fascist regimes 
or did their sympathy for certain European leaders translate to a viable security threat for 
the United States? The American press and the Central American opposition would have 
answered both of these questions with a solid “yes”. Even the American diplomatic corps 
entertained some suspicions in this same direction. But do these suspicions reflect 
reality? 
With regard to the first question, several historians have offered some important 
evaluations of the caudillos’ apparent regard for Fascism. Thomas Leonard, one of the 
foremost experts on U.S.-Central American relations, argued that many of the 
supposedly Fascist tendencies of Ubico’s regime “were peculiar to the nature of 
Guatemalan politics”. With regard to El Salvador, Leonard stated that Americans 
overestimated the prestige of Fascism in that nation because they “did not consider 
[Martínez’] Fascist sympathies within the context of Salvadoran nationalism or as a 
response to previous U.S. interference in El Salvador’s domestic affairs”.47  In other 
words, Central American statesmen admired those aspects of European Fascist 
governments that were already “peculiar” to their own style of government, such as a 
strong demand for order and material progress. This did not translate to a complete 
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understanding of, or adherence to the Fascist program of virulent racism, glorification of 
violence, brutal international competition, etc.  
Kenneth J. Grieb and Thomas J. Dodd, the foremost American bibliographers of 
Jorge Ubico and Tiburcio Carías, respectively, offered an even more nuanced picture of 
the political ideas of these statesmen. Dodd argued that even though the political 
philosophers in Carías’ party considered Mussolini’s Italy as a model for establishing 
order, other “Fascist-like” aspects of the Honduran regime were actually based on 
regional sources which were more evidently relevant to the Honduran experience. 
Carías’ ideas on order and progress, and the important function of the state in achieving 
these goals, were more akin to the ideas of Auguste Comte—whose philosophy played a 
significant role in the Central American Liberal tradition—than to the practice of Mussolini. 
Hostility toward democratic practice reflected Honduras’ historical experience with the 
failure of limited democratic experiments during the Great Depression. Personalista rule 
was based on the regional examples of Plutarco Eías Calles in México, Jorge Ubico in 
Guatemala, and Maximiliano Hernández Martínez in El Salvador, not on Hitler or 
Mussolini. Even Franklin Roosevelt and Ramsey McDonald were considered more 
appropriate models of strong executive power during a time of economic crisis than the 
European dictators. Lastly, the idea of a corporate state, which appeared so attractive to 
some of Carías’ ideologues, was based on the Mexican revolutionary experience, not on 
the Fascist model.48 
Grieb added to these observations an analysis of Guatemala’s international 
perspective and its differences with that of the United States. While the North Americans 
focused on Hitler, arguably the harshest and most dangerous Fascist dictator from an 
American perspective, Guatemalans focused on Franco and Mussolini. Latin American 
culture was more intricately tied to that of Southern Europe, especially Spain, the 
“mother country”. So it was primarily Franco, not Hitler, who was regarded as the model 
of Fascism in Guatemala. Ubico respected Franco’s military background and leadership 
style and sympathized with his fight against Communism. This is what Fascism meant to 
the Guatemalan statesman. As a former cabinet minister of Ubico later told Grieb: 
“General Ubico did not recognize the Franco government because of any ideological 
sympathy, but simply because it was a military regime. General Ubico had a great 
appreciation for a military career”. By contrast, Ubico considered Hitler a “peasant” who 
was far inferior to his colleagues in southern Europe.49 
The files of the American legation in Guatemala also offer an interesting sidelight 
on Guatemalans’ distaste for the German variant of Fascism. There were two groups of 
Germans in Guatemala: The older families of long residence who had become part of 
the coffee aristocracy and the lower class newcomers who had not achieved any kind of 
economic or social stature yet. The older Germans, many of whom had left the Heimat 
when it was still an empire, found the ideas of the Nazi Party distasteful and considered 
its very existence a symptom of the disease of the factionalized Weimar Republic. 
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Members of the second group, however, were attracted to the Nazi Party, because it 
offered them a chance to increase their prestige and stature by climbing the Party’s 
ranks. Correspondingly, it was the young German “upstarts” who managed the Nazi 
Party in Guatemala. The newfound confidence and self-importance of the young Nazis 
affronted the sensibilities of the Guatemalan aristocracy, both German and native. 
Guatemalan society ostracized a local Nazi leader, for example, because he had 
presumed to demonstrate his seniority over the German minister by having the 
distinguished old gentleman sit and wait in the anteroom of his office for two hours 
before seeing him. 
Added to the arrogance of local Nazi “upstarts” was the racial component of Nazi 
teachings. It was well-known in Guatemala that Hitler’s Mein Kampf had allotted an 
inferior place to the “Latin races”. While this was enough reason for many Guatemalans 
to look down on the German variant of Fascism, the racism expressed by young Nazis in 
Guatemala was even harder to swallow. One local incident, which carried much more 
weight in Guatemala than any news that could have come from Europe, involved a 
German Party member who refused to offer his seat to a colored Guatemalan lady at a 
society dansant. The incident caused a scandal in local society and it was said that 
Ubico himself was considerably dismayed. According to the American legation, the 
president was “proud of his racial heritage” and profoundly shocked by the behavior of 
local Nazis.50 
It appears then that such sympathies as Central American statesmen may have 
entertained for Fascism were rather superficial; they were based more on outward 
similarities between Southern European Fascism and caudillismo—authoritarianism and 
a strong demand for order and national progress—than on a shared body of concepts 
and ideas. Kenneth Grieb proposed that, for a time, Central American leaders attempted 
to stay on good terms with both the United States and with the new powers of Europe. 
On the one hand, the Central American states had considerable economic and cultural 
ties with Germany, Italy, and Spain. On the other, the United States’ attitude toward the 
European dictators was for a time, in Grieb’s words, “torn by indecision and immobilized 
by internal dissension regarding neutrality”. As long as the power of Fascist states 
appeared to be on the rise and the United States remained tied to its isolationist policy, it 
was only natural for the isthmian republics to seek the friendship of the European states, 
leading to the many small signs of friendship described above.51 
However, at the Pan-American conferences at Buenos Aires in 1936 and Lima in 
1938, the United States took on an increasingly hostile posture toward the Fascists. 
Combined with increasingly belligerent speeches made by Roosevelt, it must have 
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become increasingly obvious to the Central American chiefs that they would not be able 
to continue friendly relations with both the United States and the Fascist powers.52 And 
considering the overwhelming superiority of American power in the region, it was not 
long before the caudillos chose to play along with the yanquis.  
 
3. BECOMING GOOD NEIGHBORS 
From roughly 1938 onwards, the legations were exposed to pressure and incentives 
both from “above” and from “below” to redefine their relationship to the Central American 
dictatorships. The developing crisis in Europe moved the State Department to renew its 
interest in Central America. Significantly, its focus was not on Central American politics 
per se, but on the alleged activities of mainly German and Italian nationals there. The 
Central American presidents, meanwhile, battered the legations with signs of goodwill in 
an attempt to convince the yanquis that they were not Fascist stooges.  
 
3.1 Winning hearts and minds in Guatemala 
Three factors contributed to Des Portes’ redefinition of Ubico as an opponent of Fascism 
and a staunch friend of the United States. The first was personal diplomacy; second 
came their joint fear, encouraged by the State Department, of “exotic” ideologies; and 
third were the intrigues of Ubico’s underlings. 
It appears likely that Ubico took the first steps, toward the end of 1937, to regain 
the affection of the American legation. With the start of a new round of personal 
diplomacy the general probably wanted to break his increasingly isolated position. In 
September 1937, Ubico’s Chief of Protocol visited Des Portes to inform the minister of 
Ubico’s great admiration for the United States and his personal support for the latest U.S. 
initiative to loan destroyers to Brazil, which, in the words of the Chief of Protocol, formed 
a “bulwark of defense (…) against foreign aggression”. In the following weeks, the 
government-controlled press, probably with the “tacit approval” of Ubico, started to 
denounce the aggressive maneuverings of the dictatorships in Europe.53 In November, 
the Nicaraguan envoy to Guatemala, who was said to be on good terms with Ubico, had 
a chat with Des Portes at the presidential palace and also informed the minister that 
Ubico had definitely changed his mind about Italy and Germany and that he had decided 
to support the United States instead.54 Such signals gave Des Portes the impression that 
Ubico now planned to follow United States policy, if hostilities were to break out in 
Europe or Asia. “The legation has felt at various times in the past”, Des Portes reported: 
“that President Ubico, because of his somewhat dictatorial administration, 
had strong leanings for and sympathy with the dictatorial Governments of 
Europe, even to the extent possibly of permitting his policies and 
administration to be colored by their ideology. Whether or not such 
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observations were correct at the time, they would now appear to be refuted 
by the tenor of the comment published from day to day in the local papers”.55 
Des Portes’ observations about Ubico’s change of heart were guarded at first, but 
the general prepared a diplomatic coup to win the minister over. On January 25, 1938, 
the legation reported that Ubico had just completed his customary annual inspection trip 
to the provinces. Somewhat at variance with the usual procedures, a second inspection 
trip was announced for February.56 The official purpose of this trip was to hold public 
audiences and to open a new road in a very remote, isolated region mainly inhabited by 
Indian communities. It appears probable however that Ubico’s real or secondary motive 
was to showcase his popularity and mode of government to the Americans: In February, 
Des Portes was officially invited to join the general on his trip. If it was indeed Ubico’s 
plan to ingratiate himself to the Americans during an adventurous ride over the 
countryside, that plan worked splendidly.  
Des Portes’ official report on the inspection tour57 suggests that it was set up more 
like a short vacation than a business trip. All the officers of the American legation, 
including their wives and children, were invited for the excursion. They were treated to a 
visit of the Lago de Atlitlán, a volcanic lake said to be one of the most beautiful in the 
world, and got to see the nearby Indian settlements where the inhabitants still adorned 
the colorful dress of their Maya ancestors—all sights that a modern tourist would want to 
take in. As was the usual practice, Ubico set up court in the villages he visited to receive 
local inhabitants and to listen to their troubles and concerns. In the case of complaints 
against local officials or disagreements among locals, the president would provide quick 
justice on the spot. If the issue at hand involved the local authorities, Ubico often 
decided on the matter in favor of the Indian petitioner. Needless to say, this practice 
made the president very popular among the rural populations, especially because 
previous governments had all but ignored them.58 
The spectacle of the village audiences, combined with the ceremonies surrounding 
the opening of the local road, demonstrated Ubico’s fatherly concern for the Indians and 
opened Des Portes’ eyes to the reverential regard which many peasants showed for the 
president. He recounts how eager “the natives” were to “touch his [Ubico’s] clothing, kiss 
his hands or to receive from him a paternal touch on the head”. When the minister talked 
to the president about this, Ubico piously remarked that:  
…he felt himself fortunate to have been able during the course of his 
administration to do much to liberate them [the Indians] from the economic 
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exploitation and political oppression under which they had labored for many, 
many years.59 
While the president’s inspection trips and “social justice demagoguery” account for his 
genuine popularity among many peasants, there was a wholly different side to his 
treatment of the Indians. While Ubico had abolished a system of debt peonage early in 
his administration, he also instituted vagrancy laws which basically allowed authorities to 
pick up any peasant who could not provide proof of employment and to deliver the latter 
to the landlords for penal labor. In this manner, the government could control the rural 
populations while the large landowners depended on the authorities for an adequate 
supply of workers.60 This is not the side of the regime that Des Portes got to see during 
the trip, of course. As far as the minister knew, the Indians’ “gratitude and loyalty [to 
Ubico] were patently evident”. The American minister readily identified with Ubico’s 
patronizing attitude toward local Indians, because he held similar feelings for the 400 
“Negro families” that worked his farm in North Carolina. In this regard the president 
turned out to have a lot in common with the plantation owners who Des Portes knew 
from his home state.61 Clearly then, this could not be a Fascist dictator. 
After the trip, Des Portes enthusiastically reported that Ubico was a “most 
delightful and entertaining host”. He found that the personal contact with Ubico was “the 
most gratifying and personally satisfactory result” of the undertaking. Through such 
personal contact, Des Portes was able to establish that Ubico was not physically or 
mentally sick (as rumors had it) and that the president was in fact “a man of 
extraordinary intelligence, ability and keen perception”. Touching on the more general 
effects of the trip, Des Portes claimed that Guatemalan army officers were delighted with 
the president’s decision to take the Americans along with him: “they have been fearful of 
Fascist tendencies in the Chief Executive, and our association with him is believed by 
them to denote his rejection of such influences and his decision to cooperate with the 
United States in every action of his administration”.62  
The State Department was greatly relieved that Ubico was finally warming up to 
the American minister again. After some years in which Ubico had been very withdrawn, 
the latest road trip “indicates that Mr. DesPortes has been successful in making himself 
persona grata to president Ubico, which is of the greatest importance in the conduct of 
our relations with Guatemala”.63  
During the months following the inspection trip, Des Portes and Ubico grew closer. 
Personal interviews between the minister and the president became more common than 
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they had ever been.64 The caudillo continued to make dramatic signs of good-will, which 
were greatly appreciated by Des Portes. Slowly but surely, the legation revisited its 
interpretation of Ubico as a Fascist sympathizer. By the beginning of 1938, its opinion of 
him was merely that he was “undoubtedly an opportunist in his international relations 
and astute enough to play Democratic and Fascist influences against each other”. In the 
domestic field, Des Portes reported, Ubico seemed “satisfied to consider his 
Government, however dictatorial it may be, as being based on democratic principles”.65 
Another point on which Des Portes and Ubico grew particularly close eventually 
was their common concern for the threat of “exotic ideologies” and foreign aggression. 
While the Department had shown appreciation for Des Portes’ improved relations with 
Ubico, this minor personal triumph on the minister’s side was buried under Washington’s 
concerns for the rise of Fascism in Europe. Starting in 1937, the Department produced a 
steady stream of instructions which related to its inter-American policy in opposition to 
“totalitarian” influences from Germany, Italy, Spain, and Japan. These instructions 
prioritized reporting on German, Italian, Spanish, and Japanese activities in Latin 
America. Furthermore, the Department was very anxious to get pan-American approval 
for all its public statements on events in Europe, requiring legation personnel to pry 
diplomatic statements in support of these policies on a very regular basis.66 Compared to 
the sheer volume of instructions and reports on these matters, as well as the importance 
that the Department obviously assigned to them, interest in local affairs definitely took a 
back seat.  
While American politics and public opinion remained divided on the nature of the 
threat posed by European Fascism, minister Des Portes in particular and the American 
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diplomatic corps more generally were early converts to the idea that the Americas were 
threatened by Japanese imperialism and German Nazism. 67  Already in 1937, Des 
Portes reported on alleged Japanese designs on Lower California (Mexico). Throughout 
the following years, Des Portes’ reports showed a rising concern for German threats to 
the Americas. In Guatemala, the biggest threat came from Nazi attempts to assimilate 
the large German colony; to spread discontent among the Indian peons on German 
fincas; and to bribe or otherwise influence important government officials. After the start 
of the war in Europe, Des Portes became convinced that the United States should take a 
much tougher stand against the Nazis. In May 1940 Des Portes drafted a report at his 
own initiative—which he admitted was somewhat presumptive—about the dangers of 
U.S. passivity in the face of German aggression. The minister argued that “the American 
nations must not stand, like the European democracies, gaping at the approaching storm 
and hoping that it will pass them by even if others get wet (…) it seems desirable to take 
immediate diplomatic steps to frustrate in so far as possible any German effort to 
establish bases in this Hemisphere, either in the European colonies or the American 
Republics. We must not repeat the mistake of European democracies in passively 
awaiting a German attack when our national safety is at stake”.68  
While the Department and the Guatemalan legation agreed early on that Fascism 
was a major threat, Ubico had his own monsters to fight. In the general’s worldview, it 
was not Fascism that threatened his reign, but Communism: his catch-all phrase for 
everything reeking of Mexican influences, labor activity, or political opposition. While Des 
Portes tried to open Ubico’s eyes to the dangers of the Right, Ubico tried to convince the 
minister of those from Left. In July, 1938, Señora de Ubico told an American citizen that 
the United States was not active enough in combating Communism. At the presidential 
palace it was believed that Communist tendencies—possibly Ubico’s interpretation of 
New Deal measures—made the United States an unreliable partner.69 Some months 
later, the president himself lectured Des Portes on the dangers of Communistic labor 
demands on American industry. If he were president of the United States, the general 
asserted, he would end labor disputes in five minutes.70 In another personal talk between 
the president and the minister, Ubico warned that his friendship for the United States 
had its limitations: “Guatemala will follow the policy of the United States as long as it is 
not Communistic”.71 
To the legation staff, Ubico’s “distrust of genuinely democratic Government”, and 
his tendency to “profoundly confuse democracy and Communism” were supremely 
                                                 
67 Gilderhus, Second Century, 91-96. 
68 Des Portes to the Secretary of State, Despatch 1256, May 15, 1940, PR Guatemala (SCF), 
Box 3, cl. 711: War. Peace. Friendship. Alliance. 
69 Des Portes to the Secretary of State, Despatch 697, September 24, 1938, PR Guatemala 
(SCF), Box 2, cl. 800: Guatemala. 
70 Walter McKinney (U.S. Secretary of Legation to Guatemala), Memorandum of Conversation 
with President Ubico, December 6, 1938, PR Guatemala (SCF), Box 2, cl. 820.02: Nazi Activities. 
71 Des Portes, Memorandum of Conversation with President Ubico, September 23, 1938, PR 
Guatemala (SCF), Box 2, cl. 820.02: Nazi Activities. 
WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS 
 
181 
frustrating.72 According to the legation, the threat of Communism in Guatemala was 
actually negligible, as it considered the native Indian workers too docile and passive to 
take an interest in that doctrine. The only possible converts were disgruntled middle-
class Ladinos and former soldiers, but only in so far as the government was actually 
driving them in the arms of the Communists by its suppressive actions.73 The appeal that 
Fascism had to members of the military officer corps posed a much more serious risk to 
the government’s safety, according to the legation, but Ubico continued to overestimate 
the dangers of Communism at the expense of his alertness to the Fascist danger.74 
Whether it was his developing working relationship with minister Des Portes; 
signals from the American government; a concern for his image in the American press; 
or genuine irritation over the behavior of some Nazi Party members in Guatemala can 
not be ascertained. Roughly toward the end of 1938, Ubico did exchange his anti-
Communist rhetoric for the anti-Fascist kind. The issues which preoccupied the 
general—fear of Mexico, the Belize dispute, and development of the Guatemalan 
military—remained the same, but were now dressed up differently: Ubico told the 
legation at various times that German agents had infiltrated the Mexican government; 
that the war in Europe might necessitate a Guatemalan seizure of Belize if Great Britain 
were ever subdued by Nazi aggression; and that his country needed a standing army of 
at least 70.000 men armed with American weapons if it was to play a useful role in any 
potential conflict. The legation was not unaware of Ubico’s manipulation of local issues, 
but was satisfied that the general no longer underestimated the dangers of Fascism.75 
That Des Portes and Ubico were back on speaking terms did not mean that all 
fears of Fascist influences in the Guatemalan government had disappeared. In the eyes 
of the Americans, the president himself was now free from suspicion. But the fact 
remained that the Guatemalan government had dealt with Fascist governments in the 
past. If this had not been Ubico’s doing, then there must be Nazis in his cabinet. Already 
in June 1938, the secretary of legation reported rumors that ministers Carlos Salazar, 
Roderico Anzueto, and José Gonzáles Campo were Fascist sympathizers. 76 
Furthermore, Des Portes reported, there were many disgruntled army officers who would 
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like to see a regime change for “selfish or ulterior motives”, and were liable to seek an 
alliance of convenience with Nazi agents in the German colony.77 
The interesting effect of this shift of the legation’s suspicions from Ubico to his 
underlings is that it inflated the importance that the Americans ascribed to the 
Guatemalan president as a guard against Fascist scheming. In an informal letter to 
Laurence Duggan, Des Portes wrote that he had worried about Ubico’s Fascist 
tendencies in the past, but that the president was now “grand” towards him. As long as 
the caudillo remained in power, U.S.-Guatemalan relations would be satisfactory. The 
very fact that Ubico was now openly friendly to the United States made Des Portes fear 
that the president would become a target for Fascist plots: “he shows it [friendliness to 
the U.S.] so plainly in every way that I am fearful the Germans or Italians may try some 
plot against him”. “As soon as the German and Italian Ministers found”, Des Portes 
continued: 
…that they had no more influence with President Ubico they started a secret 
friendship with General Anzueto. Of course, as you know, General Anzueto 
has great presidential ambitions, but he is now being very closely watched by 
the President. I have been very much tempted to inform President Ubico in 
some of our informal talks, just what General Anzueto is doing and of his 
activities, but I have thought it best not to do it so far. But on the other hand, 
it would have a very serious effect on our relations if anything should happen 
to President Ubico and General Anzueto should gain control here.  
The quote illustrates just how effective Ubico’s personal diplomacy was. And as long as 
other military leaders were under suspicion for Fascist inclinations, it was vitally 
important, in Des Portes’ view, that the president was secure. A hint of doubt about the 
importance of a noninterference policy, when compared to the Fascist danger, is evident 
from Des Portes’ inclination to warn Ubico about Anzueto’s skullduggery. From late 1938 
to the end of his tenure, Des Portes remained convinced that “[a]s long as President 
Ubico is in power, I do not think that we need be fearful of any German, Italian, or 
Japanese influence here”.78 
 
3.2 Winning hearts and minds in Honduras and El Salvador 
While the Department concentrated on events in Europe, the Carías administration 
geared its policy toward that of the United States. Shortly after the 1937 confirmation of 
Carías’ continuance in office, the administration (possibly in an effort to neutralize local 
rumors that the United States opposed continuismo) began to model much of its “policy” 
toward Europe and Asia on that of the United States. So in March 1938, the Carías 
government declared on its own initiative that it would follow United States policy 
regarding the Austrian Anschluss. Over the next months, it also declared its support, 
without question or delay, for U.S. neutrality policy and issued neutrality proclamations 
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which were practically copies of American texts.79 When the United States edged toward 
a more pro-Allied policy, Honduras dutifully followed suit: In April 1939, Carías issued a 
decree which prohibited foreigners to engage in political actions connected to their home 
country (although neutrally worded, the decree was clearly aimed at Fascist and Nazi 
organizations) and in May 1940 it protested Germany’s invasion of Holland and 
Belgium.80 Before long, the legation admitted that Carías was very anti-German and, 
given its track record, would probably follow the United States into war if it came to 
that.81 
Of course, such cooperation was cheap for the Carías government: it never had an 
international policy beyond Central America; it had few connections with either Germany 
or Italy; German and Italian colonies were correspondingly small; and it probably could 
not care less if Austria was merged with Germany. In other words, it had nothing to loose 
in following American policy in Europe. Actually, its association with the United States in 
these matters, which was given wide publicity in Honduras, probably conveyed the 
impression that Carías was an important ally of FDR. To the legation, the 
uncharacteristically swift response of the Carías government to any query about its 
position on European affairs was a true asset: it enabled Erwin and his colleagues to 
respond quickly and satisfactorily to any State Department instruction on the subject. 
Over time, Carías’ quick and cheap cooperation on European matters overshadowed his 
intransigence on local matters that truly mattered to him like the boundary dispute with 
Nicaragua—an issue that was eventually dropped from Washington’s list of priorities 
anyway.82 
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Confronted on one side with a very demanding State Department, as in the case of 
Guatemala, and on the other by a regime that was extremely helpful, Erwin had every 
incentive to seek a working relationship with the Carías administration and to treat its 
moral shortcomings as a matter of academics. Several weeks after the completion of the 
continuismo campaign, Erwin joined a diplomatic delegation which was put together at 
the initiative of the Papal Nuncio in Honduras to offer his congratulations to Carías on his 
successful continuance in power. Somewhat apologetically, Erwin reported that he could 
not have “tactfully refuse[d] to participate” in the Nuncio’s plan. Anyway, “[t]he population 
as a whole appears to accept it [continuismo] as a fait accompli, and there is now less 
discussion of the political policy involved in this arbitrary extension of the Presidential 
term then was the case before it was consummated”.83 The State Department showed 
no interest in the event. 
Legation’s reports on the successful continuismo campaign were among the last 
in-depth reports on the local political scene per se before the War. The State 
Department’s demands for reports of the activities on local “totalitarian” agents taxed the 
limited capacities of the small legation. By 1941, at the latest, the legation’s activities 
consisted almost completely of research and activities related to the European war. 
Carías meanwhile, was hard at work to outdo the Yankees in anti-totalitarian measures. 
In 1939 Carías cleverly issued a decree against “anti-democratic” activities—a decree 
that only formalized his suppression of any form of opposition. Some months later, the 
president cut all government subsidies to the local newspaper El Cronista, which was 
considered pro-Axis by the legation. In June, 1940, Honduras eagerly consented to a 
U.S. proposition for “combined staff conversations” on a coordinated military response to 
foreign threats. U.S. officers who visited Honduras for the talks were very pleasantly 
surprised by the government’s more than cooperative attitude. The next month, the 
semi-official newspaper La Epoca began to actively propagate the government’s anti-
totalitarian standpoints and the regime itself stepped up activities against supposedly 
Nazi propaganda emanating, it said, from the German legation in Guatemala.84 
Recent historical research showed that actual activities by German or Italian 
agents small and ineffectual compared to the draconian measures taken against them in 
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Central America.85 Some of the legislation and action against the totalitarian threat may 
have been provoked by a genuine “fifth columnist scare”, as the legation reported at one 
point. It is clear however that Carías also had an ulterior motive for playing up his 
measures against the Axis. In May, 1940, an agent of Carías visited the legation to warn 
Erwin that due to Carías’ effective measures against them, the local Nazis were now 
seeking a rapprochement with the Liberals and other enemies of the regime. Five 
months later a belated revolt of the Liberal Party against the recent continuismo 
campaign actually broke out, but was very quickly suppressed by the authorities. Carías 
was quick to point out to Erwin that the defunct Liberal Party could not have pulled off 
any type of military action without the active collaboration of the Nazis.86 
As American fear of the so-called “Fifth Column” developed, Carías’ assertions 
about a supposed alliance between the totalitarians and the Honduran Liberal Party 
were fully adopted by Erwin and his legation. In 1941, when the Honduran authorities 
alerted the American Legation about another plot by Honduran exiles in collaboration 
with Nazi agents, the Legation reported that “[i]t has long been suspected and thought 
probable that the Nazi organization would welcome an opportunity to assist any 
conspiracy to overthrow the present Honduran Government which is definitely anti-
Nazi”.87 Carías’ efforts to align himself with U.S. policies could not have been more 
fruitful: By presenting himself as a staunch protector of “democracy”, he had convinced 
the American legation that his opponents could only be the very opposite. The situation 
that existed only 4 years earlier—when the Honduran Liberal Party’s claim that Carías 
was a Fascist sympathizer received considerate attention from the Americans—was now 
reversed. 
 
Throughout the late 1930s the American legation in San Salvador was considerably less 
alarmed about Martínez’ supposed Fascist sympathies than the outside world was. A 
likely explanation for the legation’s peace of mind is found in a combination of factors. 
First of all, Martínez kept a low profile while Ubico and Carías were busy changing 
constitutions to fit their needs and Somoza armed for battle with the Nicaraguan 
president. The Salvadoran general’s declarations in favor of constitutionalism and his 
(unsuccessful) attempts at mediation in Nicaragua appear to have impressed Corrigan. 
The U.S. minister reserved his diatribes against dictatorship for Salvador’s neighbors 
while Martínez’ reputation remained largely untarnished by continuismo until about 1938.  
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Related to the previous point, Martínez’ self-identification as a proponent of 
constitutionalism was not appreciated by his neighbors, who appeared to be usurpers by 
comparison. This matter was complicated by the fact that many politicians who were put 
on the sidelines in Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua initially sought the protection of 
the Salvadoran government. This made San Salvador, for a while at least, a seedbed of 
revolutionary plotting. Add to that mix the traditional rivalry between Guatemala and 
Salvador and it becomes clear why Martínez felt, around the middle of the decade, that 
he was surrounded by hostile states.88 
Under these circumstances, it was not surprising that the Martínez government 
tried to curry the favor of the powerful Americans. The language of the Good Neighbor 
policy was translated by the Salvadoran government and official press to fit the 
circumstances of its regional position. The “international peace” and “inter-American 
solidarity” aspects of Roosevelt’s foreign policy were appropriated by Salvadoran 
authorities and vigorously pushed in the national press. The message, for anyone who 
cared to listen, was clear: if peace-loving El Salvador ever got embroiled with its 
neighbors, the fault was not on her side. 
Frazer was naturally eager to jump on the Good Neighbor bandwagon in El 
Salvador. It was, after all, his job to promote the Roosevelt administration’s policy there. 
On several occasions the minister cheerfully told local newspapers that, yes, the 
Roosevelt administration was interested in peace and inter-American solidarity, and, yes, 
Presidents Martínez and Roosevelt did seem to agree on those issues. At one point, 
Martínez was so flattered by a press interview Frazer had given that he wrote him a 
personal thank-you note. In response, the minister wrote that the interviews represented 
no less than his “heartfelt” admiration for the governments’ pro-American standpoints.89 
Yet Martínez was preparing for his continuance in office at the same time. While 
Frazer never commented publically on continuismo, interested local observers could 
easily have gained the impression that the American legation approved of it. Off the 
record, the minister regarded Martínez’ “reelection” and the supposed Nazi influence—
that The New York Times, for example, thought to be behind it—as philosophical matter: 
To the Latin mind, Frazer wrote to the Department, “a strongly centralized Government, 
tantamount to a dictatorship suppressing all but the outer form of representative 
government, does not constitute a denial of the aims of American democracy as long as 
it is free from the label of Fascism or Naziism, however similar it may be in actual 
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form”.90 As it was, the minister and his superiors in Washington were satisfied to leave 
these philosophical questions for what they were and to focus on the Good Neighbor. 
And by that measure, Frazer reported, El Salvador was the country where the Good 
Neighbor policy “has borne the finest fruit”.91 
 
4. TRADITIONAL DICTATORSHIP VS. FASCISM 
Initial concerns in Washington about the Fascist inclinations of the Southern neighbors 
abated by the time the war broke out in Europe. The caudillos’ goodwill campaigns 
convinced policymakers that theirs was a familiar, non-threatening, traditional sort of 
dictatorship. A Department study that leaned heavily on reports from the field, argued 
that “dictatorship as distinct from Fascism so-called [is] no new phenomenon in the 
American Republics and (…) were one of the American Republics at this time to adopt 
Fascist forms of government, its Fascism would be merely a new cloak for traditional 
Latin-American personalist dictatorship”. 
The caveat “at this time” was significant, however. Developments such as the 
centralization of power, nationalistic policies toward foreign (American) companies and 
“radical” social policies aimed at the Indian masses, did indicate that the particular mix of 
authoritarianism, nationalism, and socialism that characterized Fascism was present in 
many Latin Republics. Hence, the Department noted, the development of an “embryo 
Social Nationalism” was a matter of continued, if not particularly acute, concern. 
In Central America, the Department argued, there was reason to remain alert 
because “Naziism and Fascism are said to have made some converts in high 
Government circles”. That the caudillos themselves had been successful in dissociating 
themselves from Fascism in the Yankee mind, however, is evident from the 
Department’s assertion that: 
Even such a self-admitted dictator as President Ubico of Guatemala has 
solemnly assured American representatives that he will oppose in every way 
the spread of European rightist totalitarian principles in this country and will 
follow the lead of the United States as long as this country [sic] does not 
swing to Communism.92 
The legations in Central America were no less enthusiastic. As the United States 
moved ever closer to involvement in the European war, American ministers developed a 
symbiotic relationship with the local regimes. The groundwork for that relationship had 
been laid during the late 1930s. It should be stressed that the caudillos themselves 
played a major role in the development of a cordial working relationship by adopting the 
American concerns for a Fascist threat and representing their own governments as an 
important barrier against it. But the fact that the caudillos were ultimately more 
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successful than their opponents in appropriating anti-Fascist language was also due to 
pressure from Washington on the legations. Toward the end of the decade, the 
Department showed little or no interest in field reports on local political matters. The 
legations accordingly learned to put aside their concerns about local dictatorial 
measures and to focus on subjects of inter-American solidarity and foreign threats 
thereto. 
Up to about 1939, the collaboration given by the local caudillos, primarily in the 
form of support for U.S. international declarations and initiatives pertaining to the 
European situation, allowed Washington to present itself as an important international 
leader in favor of peace. From the standpoint of Central America, such international 
cooperation was cheap in the sense that it never had much of foreign policy toward 
Europe anyway. Washington, however, considered Central American support an 
important asset to its international position. It should not, therefore, be surprising that in 
the end the legations’ function during the war was to serve as a catalyst for allied 
cooperation. Their old functions of local power brokers or independent political observers, 
functions which the legations had performed more or less successfully in the past, 
moved to the background.  
Chapter 6 
 
WITH FRIENDS LIKE THESE… 
The alliance against fascism, 1939-1943 
~ With friends like these… ~ 
  
 
The world’s biggest dictator is America’s Best 
Neighbor between here and the Rio Grande. 
The million people and the resources of the 
46,332 square miles of Honduras are behind 
the United States in peace or war, and the 
efforts of the totalitarian states to undermine 
the influence of America run up here against 
the most formidable physical obstacle to be 
found anywhere on earth. (…) General 
Tiburcio Carias Andino, President of 
Honduras (…) is a third again larger than 
Stalin, twice the size of Hitler, and would 
make three of Mussolini. 
 
~ Hubert R. Knickerbocker, 1939 1 
 
 
 
After the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, the Central American caudillos were adopted 
in a hemisphere-wide, and later worldwide, alliance led by the United States. Initially, the 
hemispheric alliance was aimed at keeping the Americas out of the war. After Pearl 
Harbor, the new worldwide alliance that came to be known as the United Nations was 
aimed at defeating fascism. Whatever its aim or reach, though, the alliance that formed 
under U.S. leadership was conceived of as a league of freedom-loving countries, 
democracies even, who jointly faced the evil of totalitarianism. 
The alliance was considerably more diverse than the symbolism of “the 
democracies vs. the dictatorships” would permit, however. And its commitment to the 
ideal of democracy was, at best, pragmatic. Of the Big Three—the United States, Great 
Britain, and the Soviet Union—one was an outright dictatorship, while the other two were, 
during the War at least, colonial empires. Hence, some subtle—and not so subtle—
artifices were needed to force the alliance partners into the mold of democracy. In the 
United States, for example, Joseph Stalin, the notorious mastermind of the show trials 
and a former ally of Hitler, was re-imagined as “Uncle Joe”, a benign patriarch for the 
Russian people.2 
Similarly, the caudillos of the American hemisphere were re-imagined in the United 
States as staunch, if somewhat eclectic, defenders of democracy. As Knickerbocker’s 
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prosaic description of Carías indicates, the caudillos were never conceived of as 
anything other than dictators—that would have required outright denial of the facts. But 
together with his formidable bulk (weighing in at 250 pounds), the journalist considered 
Carías’ firm hold on power to be an obstacle against the spread of fascist influence in 
the Western Hemisphere. The sins of the Central American dictators were absolved after 
the start of the War, because they became allies in the fight against the even more 
vicious tyranny of fascism.  
 
1. WARTIME COOPERATION REVISITED 
United States policy toward Central America during the Second World War has received 
scant attention in the historiography. As far as the history of the War is concerned, 
Central America was not, of course, a very interesting theatre. This might have been 
different if a real threat against the Panama Canal had developed; if German 
submarines had attacked the isthmian shores; or if the large German colonies in the 
region had developed into a fifth column movement. Even though fear for such events 
was very real during the earlier phases of the War, nothing came of it and Central 
America remained free from external threats.  
Washington had no policy aimed specifically at Central American during the War. 
Its plans for the region were part of a larger hemispheric policy, which was itself part of a 
larger strategy to fight the War and, roughly from 1943 onward, to shape the postwar 
world. United States hemispheric policy as it concerned Central America was a strange 
mixture of feverish activity and negligence. The activity sprang entirely from the 
multifaceted efforts to win the War. Meanwhile, Washington also neglected the region in 
the sense that matters not related to the War, matters that had no significance beyond 
the strictly Central American context, received no attention. There was only wartime 
policy and Central America played an (infinitely) small role in that policy, but there was 
no Central American policy as such.3 
In the absence of a Central American policy, or Latin American policy for that 
matter, historians have found little to write about where the World War period is 
concerned. Bryce Wood’s classic, two volume account of the rise and decline of the 
Good Neighbor policy, for example, almost entirely ignores the War. The first book ends 
in 1939 with the observation that “[j]ust before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor  (…) 
it may be said that the United States had established, with the assistance of certain Latin 
American states, an unprecedented set of relationships productive of a nearly solidary 
American attitude toward threats from without”. Especially as compared to inter-
American cooperation during World War I and the later Korean War, the support that the 
United States received from its Latin American allies was, according to Wood, the 
                                                 
3  A brief overview of State Department wartime programs can be found in: Findling, Close 
Neighbors, chapter 5. For military programs, see: Child, Unequal Alliance, 27-62. For cultural 
programs, see: Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas, 35-61. For local economic developments and 
the role of U.S. war-related economic measures therein, see: Bulmer-Thomas, Political Economy, 
87-100.  
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greatest triumph for the Good Neighbor. Wood’s second monograph, this time on the 
decline of the Good Neighbor, picks up the story in 1944, with Braden’s attempts to block 
the rise of Perón in Argentina in 1944. 4  One would get the impression that nothing had 
happened in the meantime. 
Many later books on U.S. inter-American policy offer a similar perspective on the 
war years—i.e. that they represent nothing more than an afterthought to the Good 
Neighbor policy and a prelude to the Cold War.5 Those who present a more critical view 
of the Good Neighbor, such as the proponents of a “Somoza solution” interpretation, 
adopt a similar timeline, but are, of course, less enthusiastic than Wood is about the 
nature of wartime cooperation. According to Lars Schoultz, for example, the Good 
Neighbor was merely a cosmetic cover for the promotion of self-seeking economic and 
strategic interests. The War was another extension of this tendency, with the external 
threat serving as a justification for the attainment of more bases and raw materials in 
exchange for lend-lease weapons. The War only made it easier for Washington to 
strengthen its ties to the military regimes that had kept order in its backyard since the 
early thirties. The U.S. unconditionally supported the dictatorships in the interest of local 
stability and the dictatorships unconditionally supported the U.S. in order to be illegible 
for lend-lease aid, flexible trade and financial agreements, and prestigious United 
Nations status. After the War, the strong bonds with local military regimes “would 
facilitate the transmission of anticommunist values to Latin America”, according to 
Schoultz.6 Thus, the War was a bridge between the 1930s and the Cold War, but not a 
period of inherent interest.  
The theme that Schoultz describes—the continuity between U.S. imperialist policy 
in Latin America during the first half of the century and its ruthless Cold War policy 
during the second half of the twentieth century—has been popular in the historiography 
for a while, but, remarkably, did not lead to an upsurge of interest in the connecting 
years of the War. Rather, the events of the Cold War proper provoked an interest in what 
has been called the “first Cold War” in Latin America: The convergence of North and 
South American elitist, anticommunist ideologies in the wake of the Mexican and 
Bolshevik revolutions and the concurrent attempt to “contain” social changes in the Latin 
republics.7 The Somoza solution interpretation fits this narrative particularly well, as it 
appears to foreshadow U.S. support for Latin American dictators during the Cold War 
itself. The intervening World War period, with its emphasis on external threats, seems 
nothing but a brief departure from this general trend of containment of internal social 
forces. In this context, Andrew Crawley recently observed a tendency in the early 
historiography of U.S.-Central American relations to combine “what was known of the 
pre-1930 era” with “what was known of the post-1945 period” and to make some 
                                                 
4 Wood, The Making, 334-361; Idem, The Dismantling, ix-xiv.  
5 Gilderhus discusses to this trend: Gilderhus, The Second Century, 91-96. 
6 Schoultz, Beneath the United States, 309-315. Similar arguments can be found in: Schmitz, 
Talons of the Eagle, chapter 3; Coatsworth, The Clients and the Colossus, 45-48. 
7 Gould, in: Grandin and Joseph, A Century of Revolution.  
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“intuitive leaps” for the period in between.8 The current chapter seeks to fill in those gaps 
in the historiography, at least as far as the day-to-day diplomatic relations between the 
United States and the Central American states are concerned. 
 
2. WITH FRIENDS LIKE THESE… 
An old truism about Americans is that they tend to have a simplistic, dualistic view of the 
world, dividing it into friends and foes; black and white; good and evil. 9  The 
freedom/tyranny divide is a familiar example that instructed popular conceptions of both 
World Wars and the Cold War.10 It is certainly true that during the Second World War, all 
those fighting fascism on the American side were considered part of the “free world”, 
including the dictatorships of Central America. One can be cynical about America’s 
“easy” acceptance of dictatorial allies during the War. Yet, there was nothing particularly 
easy about it. At least in the eyes of contemporaries, the war against fascism was the 
biggest challenge that civilization had ever faced. Any discussion of America’s wartime 
cooperation with the Central American dictators, therefore, should stress that it was 
accompanied with doubts and ambiguities on the American side—even if these were 
eventually put aside in the interest of the larger goal of defeating fascism. 
The U.S. foreign policy establishment during the Second World War was an 
enormous organization and to claim that everyone working within that establishment had 
a simple, dualistic view of the world would not do justice to the rich variety of competing 
voices and viewpoints that, in reality, informed U.S. foreign policy. In fact, an 
undercurrent of ambivalence about America’s dictatorial allies was noticeable in the 
State Department and the Foreign Service throughout the war years. Among the 
American legations in Central America, that undercurrent was most clearly in evidence, 
somewhat ironically, at Frazer’s post.  
Before the War, Frazer remained untouched by concerns voiced in the American 
press and among his colleagues in the Foreign Service that the dictators of Central 
sympathized with fascism. When, in December 1940, a Spanish informer in Nicaragua 
told the American minister there that Martínez was “with” the Nazis and that the latter 
had gleefully predicted that when Germany won the War he would have the pleasure of 
hanging 50 Americans and of “eating their fried testicles”, Frazer countered that: “I know 
President Martínez very well and admire him greatly, not only as the ablest administrator 
and president this country ever had, but [also] because of his scrupulous honesty and 
                                                 
8 Crawley, Somoza and Roosevelt, 3 
9 Bratzel argues, for example, that the United States had a dualistic view of the war as between 
good and evil. This tendency writes Bratzel, also extended to Latin American policy during the 
war: Cooperating countries became close allies while uncooperative countries were seen almost 
as traitors. See: Bratzel, “Introduction”, in: Leonard and Bratzel eds., Latin America during the 
Second World War (2007) 1-16, there 1-2 and 8; Friedman, Nazis and Good Neighbors, 82-84.  
10 Alpers, Dictators, 188-302; Purcell, Crisis, 233-272. 
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fair dealing”.11 During the year following, however, Frazer experienced a profound crisis 
of confidence in the Martínez regime.  
In September 1941, the minister admitted that although “the Legation is loath to 
alter the favorable opinion it has long held as to the sincerity of President Martínez’ 
continually expressed pro-democratic sympathies” there were certain aspects of the 
regime that raised legitimate doubts on this count and “it should be reported that an 
already considerable, and it would appear growing number of responsible people here 
certainly do harbor this doubt [about Martínez’ pro-democratic sympathies]”.12 In October, 
Frazer reported the prevalence of government actions “of a more or less totalitarian 
character”.13 In December, days after Salvador’s declaration of war, Frazer announced 
that the Martínez government was developing from a “liberal dictatorship” to an out-and-
out “totalitarian government”. At that point, the minister admitted, the President’s good 
qualities—his honesty, progressivism, and social programs—only just outweighed his 
bad qualities.14 
What might explain Frazer’s doubts about Martínez, which, it will be noted, 
developed at a time when his colleagues in Guatemala and Honduras had just left 
similar qualms behind them? The minister in El Salvador was not unusually sensitive to 
signs of political abuse, otherwise he would have raised his doubts at the time of 
Martínez’ 1939 “reelection” campaign. Nor could the minister count on the sympathy and 
understanding of his colleagues and superiors, who, by this time, were only interested to 
hear about the unbreakable ties of inter-American solidarity in the face of totalitarian 
aggression. Actually, it was a belated local reaction to the continuismo campaign, played 
out in the context of El Salvador’s unique political culture, that opened Frazer’s eyes to 
the reality of Martínez’ repressive tactics. 
Traditionally, Salvadorans considered themselves more civic-minded than the 
people of neighboring Central American republics and they valued the strength and 
endurance of constitutional rule in their country. Compared to its supposedly volatile and 
dictator-ridden neighbors, El Salvador seemed stable and progressive. Looking down 
upon Guatemalans and Hondurans, the people of El Salvador felt a stronger bond with 
liberal Costa Rica—which partially explains why Costa Rica was the first to recognize the 
Martínez government. So when Martínez, after repeated promises to the contrary, 
                                                 
11 Meredith Nicholson (U.S. Minister to Nicaragua) to the Secretary of State, Despatch 1355, 
December 23, 1940, PR El Salvador (SCF), Box 2, cl. 820.02: Military Activities; Frazer to Col. 
J.B. Pate (U.S. Military Attaché to Costa Rica), January 14, 1941, PR El Salvador (SCF), Box 3, 
cl. 121: Diplomatic Branch. General; Frazer to Capt. Frank M. June (U.S. Naval Attaché to 
Guatemala), January 14, 1941, PR El Salvador (SCF), Box 3, cl. 121: Diplomatic Branch. General 
Frazer to Nicholson, January 14, 1941, PR El Salvador (SCF), Box 3, cl. 121: Diplomatic Branch. 
General. 
12 Frazer to the Secretary of State, Despatch 1673, September 4, 1941, PR El Salvador (SCF), 
Box 4, cl. 800: Non-American Activities. 
13 Secretary of State to Frazer, Despatch 464, October 8, 1941, PR El Salvador (SCF), Box 4, cl. 
801: Government; Frazer to the Secretary of State, Despatch 1777, October 1941, PR El 
Salvador (SCF), Box 4, cl. 801: Government. 
14 Frazer to the Secretary of State, Despatch 1786, December 20, 1941, PR El Salvador (SCF), 
Box 4, cl. 800: Political Affairs. 
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changed the constitution to continue himself in office, in imitation of Ubico and Carías, 
many Salvadorans were deeply indignant. A considerable number of government 
employees, from the lowest rungs to the cabinet level and including many conservative 
aristocrats, quit their jobs in protest against continuismo. Several of them told the 
American minister that they still admired Martínez personally and supported many of his 
policies, but refused to work for an unconstitutional government.15 
There were no alternative political parties that those who deserted Martínez after 
1939 could turn to. Despite its purported progressivism, a stable system of political 
parties had never developed in El Salvador. Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua had 
their traditional two-party system of Liberals and Conservatives—even if that system fell 
apart as a result of the rise of the caudillos—but in El Salvador, political parties had 
always been ad hoc: Organizing around a leader when presidential elections were due 
and mostly dissolving shortly after elections. Martínez broke with this tradition, in a way, 
by founding and sustaining his own political party, the Partido Pro Patria, after his rise to 
power. In fact, however, the party was more of a traditional patron-client system than a 
political organization and served as a solid power base for the President. Concurrently, 
Pro Patria was the only legal party in El Salvador: There was no opposition party, “loyal”, 
exiled, or otherwise.16 
But much like in the Honduran case, where the exiled Liberal Party tried to capture 
the banner of “democracy” in the late 1930s, the ideological battle with fascism offered 
opportunities for disgruntled Salvadorans to express their concerns. In September, 1941, 
two new organizations were founded: The Acción Democrática Salvadoreña (ADS) and 
the Juventud Democrática Salvadoreña (JDS)17 —the first made up of former government 
employees and professionals, the second of young, idealistic writers. Formally, these 
were not political parties, but civic organizations that wished to express their sympathy 
with the Allies by promoting democratic ideals and counteracting the spread of 
totalitarian ideas.18 The regime was not duped, however: Shortly after the founding of 
said organizations, Foreign Minister Araujo visited minister Frazer to warn him that ADS 
and JDS were in fact anti-government parties and therefore, naturally, communistic and 
pro-Nazi. The Martínez government was somewhat embarrassed by the situation 
because it was on record as promoting democracy and opposing totalitarianism itself, 
but, argued the President and the Foreign Minister, the present world crisis required 
unity and patriotism in the face of threats: If the members of ADS and JDS were genuinely 
interested in the defense of democracy, they could join Pro Patria. The fact that they did 
                                                 
15 Parkman, Nonviolent insurrection, 4-8 and Frazer to the Secretary of State, Despatch 444, 
January 19, 1939, PR El Salvador, Box 21, Vol. VII, cl. 800: Political Affairs II. 
16 Ching, “Patronage and politics”, 50-70, 
17 Respectively: Salvadoran Democratic Action and Salvadoran Democratic Youth. 
18 Francisci Lime to Frazer, September 19, 1941, PR El Salvador (SCF), Box 4, cl. 800: Accion 
Democratica; Frazer to the Secretary of State, Despatch 1715, September 22, 1941, PR El 
Salvador (SCF), Box 4, cl. 800: Accion Democratica. 
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not proved that they were only interested in creating division.19 Some weeks later, ADS 
and JDS were outlawed.20 
The American legation had witnessed opposition to the Martínez regime before, 
most notably in 1932 when thousands of peasants revolted, but these episodes had 
generally been disregarded as being purely local affairs. This time it was different: The 
members of ADS and JDS were not peasants, professional politicians, or disgruntled army 
officers, but former government officials, physicians, lawyers, and professors—in a word, 
close friends and acquaintances of the legation. 21  Moreover, in the parlance of 
democracy, the new organizations found a theme that related both to traditional 
Salvadoran civic culture and the interests of its middle class supporters and to American 
war-time idealism. 22  Toward the end of September, 1941, Frazer reported to the 
Department that it was ridiculous to characterize ADS as communist or pro-Nazi, as the 
local government did, because its members were “all prominent, conservative and 
patriotic. Most of them are known to have resigned office because, although formerly in 
full accord with the President [Martínez], they disagree with the extension of his 
presidential term and his continuation of a de facto dictatorship”.23 When, in October, the 
government formally restricted the right of assembly and presented this as a measure to 
deal with enemy activities, Frazer reported that the decree was obviously directed at 
“legitimate” opposition such as that of ADS and that it was enacted “in spite of President 
Martínez’ reiterated statements of his believe in and support for democracy”.24 
Notwithstanding Frazer’s special reports on the suppression of ADS and his 
concurrent suspicion that the Martínez regime was showing a tendency toward 
totalitarian practices, only the middle level of the Department demonstrated a passing 
                                                 
19 Frazer, Memorandum on Visits by Drs Araujo and Avila re New Democratic Parties, September 
23, 1941, PR El Salvador (SCF), Box 4, cl. 800: Accion Democratica; Frazer to the Secretary of 
State, Despatch 1720, September 24, 1941, PR El Salvador (SCF), Box 4, cl. 800: Accion 
Democratica; Frazer to the Secretary of State, Despatch 1727, September 24, 1941, PR El 
Salvador (SCF), Box 4, cl. 800: Accion Democratica. 
20 Interestingly, James Dunkerley claims that Martínez made it a crime to express support for the 
Allied cause. According to him, this proves that Martínez sympathized with the Axis and, by 
implication, makes American war-time support of his regime all the more cynical. It is probable 
that Dunkerley refers to events such as the suppression of ADS and JDS, but, as should be clear 
from the foregoing, these organizations were concerned with local affairs and their suppression 
was also a matter of local politics. The American legation was fully aware of this fact. See: 
Dunkerley, The Long War, 33. 
21 One year earlier a comparable “Central American Democratic Party” was founded, but the 
legation concluded on that occasion that it was made up of unimportant people without influence. 
Its leader was described as a “dark” and “cheaply dressed” man who appeared to be “rather a 
crackpot”. The legation basically ignored the existence of the party. Gerhard Gade (U.S. Chargé 
d’Affaires a.i. to El Salvador) to the Secretary of State, Despatch 1158, October 18, 1940, PR El 
Salvador, Box 32, cl. 800: Political Affairs; Frazer, Memorandum of Conversation with Frorencio 
Calderón, November 25, 1940, PR El Salvador, Box 32, cl. 800: Political Affairs. 
22 Weaver, Inside the volcano. 
23 Frazer to the Secretary of State, Despatch 1720, September 24, 1941, PR El Salvador (SCF), 
Box 4, cl. 800: Accion Democratica. 
24 Frazer to the Secretary of State, Despatch 1740, October 3, 1941, PR El Salvador (SCF), Box 
4, cl. 800: Accion Democratica. 
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interest in the matter.25 The suppression of ADS almost coincided with America’s formal 
engagement in the War. When former members of the, now illegal, ADS visited Frazer at 
the legation on December 18, only 11 days after Pearl Harbor, the minister could not 
help but sympathize with those “sincere men of high ideals, actuated by unselfish, 
patriotic motives”. They left a manifesto with the minister that expounded their ideals, 
perhaps in a last effort to involve the Americans in their conflict with the regime. Writing 
his report on the meeting that evening, Frazer regretfully noted that there was nothing 
more he could do to help, since the Department had already been notified about the 
situation but, under the circumstances, could not act “without indulging in improper 
criticism of President Martínez’ administration”. “This memorandum, therefore, is being 
filed merely to complete the records”.26 
 
To argue that American foreign policy establishment simply held a dualistic view of the 
world is to oversimplify matters. It might be said that the State Department as a whole 
was temporarily too involved in the execution of wartime measures to be bothered by the 
idea that it was cooperating with Latin American dictators to fight European dictators, but 
there was definitely an undercurrent of moral ambiguity about this situation. This 
undercurrent came to the surface toward the end of the War, as the acute threat to the 
American continent passed and the State Department briefly turned against its former 
dictatorial allies. But this was still in the future. Around 1941, people like Frazer had no 
choice but to put their doubts aside—or, at most, on file—and work with the caudillos. It 
was the stresses of total war that forced a close alliance upon the Americans and the 
Central Americans, regardless of any mutual dislike for each other’s political culture 
(Ubico, it should be remembered, was suspicious of the New Deal’s “communistic” 
tendencies).  
Wartime cooperation was to leave its own marks on the thinking of the Foreign 
Service, however. It turned out that the caudillos were able to provide quick and 
supposedly effective cooperation in the fight against the Nazi danger. There were no 
courts or legislatures to deal with: One man could commit his country to a new treaty or 
introduce measures to suppress subversive elements. And so, the historical experience 
of wartime cooperation would produce two competing modes of thought about the 
cooperation with local regimes: One was a deep sense of ambiguity about U.S. 
association with dictatorships; the other was that the caudillos proved effective allies 
against an external, totalitarian threat. In Central America, the latter mode of thinking 
would be represented by Erwin, who, despite his pre-war criticism of Carías, became the 
regime’s staunchest supporter after the War. Both ideas would profoundly influence 
post-war developments.  
                                                 
25 Secretary of State to Frazer, Instruction 464, October 8, 1941, PR El Salvador, Box 4, cl. 800: 
Government; Frazer to the Secretary of State, Despatch 1777, October 16, 1941, PR El Salvador, 
Box 4, cl. 801: Government.  
26 Frazer, Memorandum on Call at Legation of Dr. Francisco A. Lima and six other members of 
the Central American Committee of the Acción Democrática Salvadoreña, December 18, 1941, 
PR El Salvador (SCF), Box 4, cl. 800: Accion Democratica. 
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2.1 Friends on paper. The diplomat’s war. 
The State Department was mainly concerned with the political side of the War—the “war 
on paper” if you will. Inter-American cooperation and coordination had always been 
important objectives of the Good Neighbor policy and was put to good use throughout 
the international crises that the Roosevelt administration faced. Reciprocal trade treaties 
were pushed as a remedy against the Depression; neutrality policy was coordinated at 
inter-American conferences; and the American Republics were all recruited into the 
allied camp during the War. Interestingly, material benefits were not always expected 
from inter-American cooperation. Individual reciprocal trade agreements did not always 
yield beneficial economic results and most American Republics were not thought 
capable to protect their neutrality or to contribute to the war effort in the military sense. 
For an important part—and this is particularly true where U.S.-Central American relations 
are concerned—the benefits of inter-American cooperation were political in nature. The 
ability of the United States to mould a regional block in favor of its policies of either “free 
trade”, “peace”, or “democracy” (as was the case with reciprocal trade, neutrality, and 
war respectively) reflected on its ability and stature as a  world leader.27 
Where Central America was concerned, the State Department never expected 
substantial material benefits in the cases of reciprocal trade, neutrality, or war. The 
economies of the United States and Central America were non-competitive, so there 
were generally no tariffs or trade barriers against coffee and bananas in the United 
States, neither were there trade barriers against manufactured products in Central 
America—yet, reciprocal trade agreements were duly negotiated. The Central American 
states had no important political ties with either Europe or Asia—yet they duly followed 
U.S. neutrality policy. Lastly, no one in the Roosevelt administration expected the 
isthmian republics to contribute to the war in a traditional military sense. For example, 
Secretary of the Army Stimson noted after a dinner with representatives of Latin 
American armies that “when I saw the swarthy faces of some of the representatives of 
countries like Honduras who sat in front of me at this table, I ‘had me doubts’, so to 
speak, as to how much they would take of this burden [of military cooperation]”.28 
Regardless of the overtly racist argument of Stimson, Washington’s skepticism about the 
war-making potential of a country like Honduras was solidly realistic. Yet the political—or 
“moral” as it was sometimes called—support of Central American states for the war effort 
was aggressively sought and greatly appreciated when forthcoming. 
The caudillos actively supported U.S. international initiatives before the start of the 
European war, this trend continued at an accelerated pace after 1939. Events in Europe 
set in motion the machinery of inter-American cooperation that was created at pre-war 
conferences and the Department aggressively pushed the sister republics to toe the line. 
During the first half of 1941, the Department considered measures to “motivate” the Latin 
American republics to take a more aggressive stance against totalitarian actions. At that 
point, a position of strict neutrality, which was still the position taken by the major Latin 
                                                 
27 Also see chapters 4 and 5 for these policies. 
28 Quoted in Schoultz, Beneath the United States, 314. 
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nations, was no longer considered adequate by the Department. The benefits of Lend-
Lease and “sympathetic” consideration of export licenses were dangled before the 
southern governments to make them go along with the U.S.29 No such actions were 
needed in Central America—its leaders apparently being well-aware of the U.S. ability to 
wield stick and offer carrot. In many cases, Central American governments offered their 
help even before it was solicited. Ubico, Martínez, and Carías explicitly told the American 
ambassadors in their capitals that they would follow the U.S. into war (if necessary) at 
some point before Pearl Harbor.30 Those promises were kept alive in the official press 
and resulted in the spontaneous declarations of war in December—those of Honduras 
and El Salvador actually preceding the official American declaration of war against 
Japan by a couple of hours.31 
A brief overview of diplomatic actions around the start of the Second World War 
serves to illustrate the nature of cooperation sought by the United States and provided 
by Central America. In the second half of 1939, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras 
proclaimed their neutrality, following U.S. wishes. One month later, the Department 
requested that American nations jointly condemn the Graf Spee incident off the 
Uruguayan coast—Central American states concurred. On December 22 of that year, 
the Department requested blanket permission for the use of Central American waters, 
airspace, and airfields for the purpose of a “neutrality patrol”. The request was quickly 
granted. In May 1940, the Central American states joined the U.S. in condemnation of 
the Nazi invasion of the Low Countries and provided maximum press attention to the 
event at the request of the Department. During the summer of that year, the U.S. and 
Central America agreed, at Washington’s initiative, to coordinate their actions against 
Axis propaganda and started to exchange information on that subject. Around the same 
time, the State Department brought together representatives from the War Department 
and the Central American armies to hold preliminary talks on defensive cooperation. 
Carías’ assertion that he expected nothing in return for his complete cooperation 
particularly impressed the War Department.  
Naturally, 1941 saw another scurry of diplomatic activity. The Department actively 
sought Latin American approval for a set of plans and strategies called the “Defense of 
Democracies”, that was introduced to Congress and to the sister republics at the 
Montevideo Conference. Central American states applauded the initiative. The isthmian 
                                                 
29 Bonsal to Welles, March 14, 1941, Lot Files, Entry 211, Box 4, Folder marked March to April, 
1941. 
30 Frazer, Memorandum on Call upon President Martinez, November 26, 1941, PR El Salvador 
(SCF), Box 4, Vol, 3, cl. 800: Political Affairs; Salter to the Secretary of State, Despatch 822, 
October 3, 1939, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 2, Vol. 2, cl. 800: Honduras; Erwin to the Secretary of 
State, Despatch 1447, July 8, 1941, PR Honduras, Box 71, Vol. XII, cl. 845: Etiquette; Des Portes 
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PR Guatemala (SCF), Box 4, cl. 800.1: Chief Executive. 
31 Cabot, Memorandum on Central America, General, January 9, 1942, Lot Files, Entry 211, Box 
6, Folder marked January to February, 1942. 
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states also extended their “moral” support for the occupation of Iceland and the 
European possessions in Latin America. Closer cooperation toward the suppression of 
“totalitarian activities” was achieved when the Central Americans agreed to keep a check 
on Axis diplomatic activity, communications, and travel. The alliance between Central 
America and the United States—which might be said to have existed de facto for some 
time—became official with the isthmian declarations of war against the Axis. Toward the 
end of 1941, beginning of 1942, Guatemala, Salvador, and Honduras signed the Atlantic 
Charter.32 
 
Wartime cooperation made great demands on the U.S. Foreign Service, even on those 
officers in the tiny Central American republics. During the 1940-1945 years, the U.S. 
legations in Central America were expanded to be able to deal with the vast amounts of 
work relating to the War.33 But this process was accompanied by considerable confusion, 
especially in the 1941 to 1943 period when the workload for legations rose very quickly 
                                                 
32 For brevities sake, only the files of the legation in Honduras will be quoted here: Erwin to the 
Department of State, Despatch 863, November 16, 1939, PR Honduras, Box 47, cl. 711.1: 
Neutrality. Duty of Neutrals; Department of State to the Embassies and Legations in Latin 
America, December 15, 1939, PR Honduras, Box 47, cl. 711.1: Neutrality. Duty of Neutrals; Erwin 
to the Secretary of State, Telegram 56, December 16, 1939, PR Honduras, Box 47, cl. 711.1: 
Neutrality. Duty of Neutrals; Department of State to the Embassies and Legations in Latin 
America, December 15, 1939, PR Honduras, Box 47, cl. 711.1: Neutrality. Duty of Neutrals; Erwin 
to the Secretary of State, Telegram 57, December 16, 1939, PR Honduras, Box 47, cl. 711.1: 
Neutrality. Duty of Neutrals Erwin to the Secretary of State, Despatch 910, December 16, 1939, 
PR Honduras, Box 47, cl. 711.1: Neutrality. Duty of Neutrals; Welles to Erwin, Instruction 221, 
December 22, 1939, PR Honduras, Box 47, cl. 711.1: Neutrality. Duty of Neutrals; Department of 
State to Erwin, Telegram 6, April 14, 1939, PR Honduras, Box 47, cl. 800: Germany; Erwin to the 
Secretary of State, Despatch 654, April 18, 1939, PR Honduras, Box 47, cl. 800: Germany; 
Department of State to the Embassies and Legations in Latin America, June 27, 1939, PR 
Honduras, Box 49, cl. 824: Equipment and Supplies; Erwin to the Secretary of State, Telegram 21, 
November 7, 1939, PR Honduras, Box 49, cl. 824: Equipment and Supplies; Department of State 
to the Embassies and Legations in Latin America, July 29, 1939, PR Honduras, Box 49, cl. 824: 
Equipment and Supplies; Department of State to the Embassies and Legations in Latin America, 
May, 1940, PR Honduras, Box 57, cl. 711.1: Joint Declaration; Department of State to the 
Embassies and Legations in Latin America, June 3, 1940, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 1, cl. 711: 
Staff Conference; Erwin to the Secretary of State, Telegram 30, June 4, 1940; PR Honduras 
(SCF), Box 1, cl. 711: Staff Conference; Department of State to the Embassies and Legations in 
Latin America, January 16, 1941, PR Honduras, Box 67, cl. 711: Declaration of War; Erwin to the 
Secretary of State, Telegram 5, February 3, 1941, PR Honduras, Box 67, cl. 711: Declaration of 
War; Erwin to the Secretary of State, Despatch 1437, July 1, 1941, PR Honduras, Box 67, cl. 711: 
Declaration of War; Erwin to the Secretary of State, Despatch 1455, July 14, 1941, PR Honduras, 
Box 67, cl. 711: Declaration of War; Erwin to the Secretary of State, Telegram 110, December 8, 
1941, PR Honduras, Box 67, cl. 711: Declaration of War; Erwin to the Secretary of State, 
Despatch 1703, December 12, 1941, PR Honduras, Box 67, cl. 711: Declaration of War; Hull to 
Erwin, Paraphrase of Department Telegram 105, December 31, 1941, PR Honduras, Box 67, cl. 
711: Declaration of War; Erwin to the Secretary of State, Telegram 140, December 31, 1941, PR 
Honduras, Box 67, cl. 711: Declaration of War Paraphrase of Telegram 90 from the Department 
dated December 13, 1941, PR Honduras (SCF), Vol. 2, cl. 820: Military Affairs; Erwin to the 
Secretary of State, Telegram 129, December 18, 1941, PR Honduras (SCF), Vol. 2, cl. 820: 
Military Affairs. 
33 Also consult the figures in chapter 1. 
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while new personnel was not readily available. Already in September 1939, John Cabot, 
first secretary at the legation in Guatemala, wrote his friend Gerald Drew at the State 
Department that the legation was cutting back on routine reports and reports on political 
matters because the Department was probably being “swamped” by other matters 
anyway, but also because the legation was short on clerks.34 What had been a friendly 
reminder of a shortness of personnel in September became a desperate plea for help in 
July, 1940: In an official report to the Department, Cabot noted that “the work of this 
Legation has substantially doubled in the past year” while the “personnel of the Legation 
has not been expanded to handle this increase in business”. The situation became so 
serious that: 
“…matters have now reached the point where it is impossible to conduct the 
Legation’s business as it should be conducted. Important matters requiring 
detailed study can not be given the time which should be devoted to them. 
Less important matters must be slighted in order that more important matters 
may receive attention. The most serious difficulty which the Legation faces, 
however, is the fact that so many matters which it handles must be done by 
or at a certain time. When, as frequently happens, a number of these urgent 
matters must be handled simultaneously the small Legation staff is utterly 
swamped, and it is very difficult for both the officers and clerks to avoid 
slipshod work. I do not need to point out that under such circumstances 
serious errors might readily be made. Moreover, no margin exists for the 
handling of a possible real emergency on top of the Legation’s regular 
business.”  
To compound these difficulties, several people at the legation were showing physical 
signs of exhaustion due to the workload and lack of leave: Two officers (probably Des 
Portes and Cabot) were suffering from chronic stomach problems that, in Cabot’s view, 
were in part caused by “the constant strain of work”. If this situation continued, the 
secretary opined, there was the very real risk that “the Legation’s business would be 
forced virtually to stop” or that one or more members of the staff would “suffer a 
complete breakdown”.35 
The situation at other legations in Central America was substantially the same. 
Beginning in 1941, Frazer reported that all his clerks were overworked and urgently 
asked for more personnel, both at the clerical and officer level. In the following two years, 
every new addition to the personnel of the legation in El Salvador was only followed by 
more urgent appeals for more people because the workload kept increasing.36 Similarly, 
                                                 
34 Cabot to Drew, September 29, 1938, PR Guatemala, Box 20, cl. 123: Cabot. 
35 Cabot to the Secretary of State, Despatch 1372, July 19, 1940, PR Guatemala, Box 26, cl. 121: 
Diplomatic Branch. 
36 Frazer to the Secretary of State, Despatch 1333, February 27, 1941, PR El Salvador, Box 38, 
cl. 123: General; Frazer to G. Howland Shaw (Assistant Secretary of State), May 19, 1941, PR El 
Salvador, Box 38, cl. 123: General; Frazer to the Secretary of State, Despatch 1640, August 16, 
1941, PR El Salvador, Box 38, cl. 123: General; Shaw to Frazer, Instruction 438, September 2, 
1941, PR El Salvador, Box 38, cl. 123: General; Gade to the Secretary of State, Telegram 100, 
December 4, 1941, PR El Salvador, Box 38, cl. 123: General; Hull to Gade, Telegram 155, 
December 9, 1941, PR El Salvador, Box 38, cl. 123: General; Frazer to the Secretary of State, 
Telegram 113, December 11, 1941, PR El Salvador, Box 38, cl. 123: General; Hull to Frazer, 
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Erwin started pleading for more personnel in 1941. Halfway through 1942, the minister 
reported that his legation was operating with a minimum of employees. The clerks were 
overworked and, most damningly, the “minister [was] doing at least half his own 
typing”.37 
Even if the Department sympathized with dire situation at its Central American 
posts, which was not always the case38, it was low on personnel itself39 and devoted 
most of its attention to other parts of the world. It was slow to react to the shortness of 
personnel in its relatively unimportant Central American posts. From 1941 onward, the 
legations did welcome several new colleagues: Officers, clerks, and specialist who were 
send to work on war-related projects. However, it appears that the increase in personnel 
did not keep up with the increasing workload. Requests for extra personnel from the field 
continued until at least 1943.40 
                                                                                                                                                 
December 17, 1941, PR El Salvador, Box 38, cl. 123: General; Frazer to the Secretary of State, 
Telegram 132, December 23, 1941, PR El Salvador, Box 38, cl. 123: General; Hull to Frazer, 
Telegram 179, December 23, 1941, PR El Salvador, Box 38, cl. 123: General; Frazer to 
Secretary of State, Telegram 137, December 27, 1941, PR El Salvador, Box 38, cl. 123: General; 
Frazer to the Secretary of State, Despatch 1252, January 7, 1941, PR El Salvador, Box 40, cl. 
124.66: Conduct of Office; Frazer to the Secretary of State, Despatch 1590, July 21, 1941, Box 
40, cl. 124.66: Conduct of Office; Frazer to the Secretary of State, Despatch 2642, June 30, 1942, 
PR El Salvador, Box 56, Cl. 123: General; Frazer to the Secretary of State, Airgram A-29, July 28, 
1942, PR El Salvador, Box 56, Cl. 123: General; Frazer to the Secretary of State, Telegram 210, 
July 28, 1942, PR El Salvador, Box 56, Cl. 123: General; Gade to the Secretary of State, Airgram 
A-153, December 10, 1942, PR El Salvador, Box 56, Cl. 123: General. 
37 Albert H. Cousins (U.S. Secretary of Legation to Honduras) to the Secretary of State, January 3, 
1941, PR Honduras, Box 64, cl. 124.66 Records and Correspondence; Cousins to the Secretary 
of State, July 8, 1941, PR Honduras, Box 64, cl. 124.66 Records and Correspondence; Erwin to 
the Secretary of State, Despatch 1762, January 7, 1942, PR Honduras, Box 75, cl. 123: Cousins; 
Erwin to the Secretary of State, telegram 50, February 25, 1942, PR Honduras, Box 75, cl. 123: 
Mendez; Erwin to the Division of Foreign Service Personnel, July 31, 1942, PR Honduras, Box 75, 
cl. 124: Embassies and Legations; Erwin to the Secretary of State, Despatch 2072, May 23, 1942, 
PR Honduras, Box 75, cl. 124.3: Employees; Hul to the U.S. Embassies and Legations in Latin 
America, September 12, 1942, PR Honduras, Box 75, cl. 124.3: Employees; Erwin to the 
Secretary of State, Despatch 2332, September 18, 1942, PR Honduras, Box 75, cl. 124.3: 
Employees; Erwin to the Secretary of State, Airgram A-9; January 7, 1943, PR Honduras, Box 93, 
cl. 124.61: Office Hours. 
38 In November 1942, after another plea for more personnel Philip Bonsal of the Department 
wrote Gerald Drew (chargé in Guatemala at that point) that he appreciated the heavy burden on 
the staff in Guatemala, but added somewhat acidly that “under present conditions we all of us 
have our hands more than full”. Bonsal to Drew, November 27, 1942, PR Guatemala (SCF_. Box 
5, cl. 711.5: Deportation. 
39 For some comments on ARA’s workload, see: Daniels, Memorandum, January 6, 1941, Lot 
Files, ARA, Entry 212: Memorandums relating to Administrative Matters, January 6, 1938 to June 
29, 1943 (henceforth Entry 212), Box 1, Folder marked 1941; Ray to Daniels, May 19, 1941, Lot 
Files, Entry 212, Box 1, Folder marked 1941.; Daniels, Memorandum, May 24, 1941, Lot Files, 
Entry 212, Box 1, Folder marked 1941; Chapin, Memorandum, May 9, 1942, Lot Files, Entry 212, 
Box 1, Folder marked 1942. 
40 Unknown author to Shaw, may 28, 1941, PR Guatemala, Box 34, cl. 123; Archer Woodward 
(U.S. Consul to Guatemala) to Des Portes, January 13, 1943, PR Guatemala, Box 59, cl. 123: 
Personal Records of Officers; Drew to John Erhardt (Chief of the Division of Foreign Service 
Personnel), February 19, 1943, PR Guatemala, Box 59, cl. 123: Personal Records of Officers; 
Drew to Cabot, April 2, 1943, PR Guatemala, Box 59, cl. 123: Personal Records of Officers; Drew 
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Not surprisingly, the work of the legations suffered from the constant strain and 
shortages of personnel. This situation had some very significant consequences for the 
efficiency of the Central American posts. First of all, the attention of the legations shifted 
from their usual focus on internal political matters to the many new tasks surrounding the 
war-effort. As Cabot indicated, routine reporting and in depth analysis of local politics did 
not receive as much attention as under normal circumstances. This claim is backed up 
by the volume and topic distribution of the legation’s files. The volume of files devoted 
solely to reports on local political conditions dropped while the number of subject 
headings and volume of paperwork related to the war-effort greatly expanded. 
Comments of outside observers, mainly State Department inspectors and officers, 
confirm the direction of the trend away from political reporting: A 1941 inspection report 
of the Honduran post, for example, shows that the legation devoted most of its 
manpower to reports on supposed Axis activities in the region, at the expense of reports 
on local conditions. A broader State Department study of that same year noted that 
political reports from the field focused mainly on totalitarian activities, rather than local 
events. 41  This was not just to blame on the men on the ground, of course. The 
Department itself showed little or no interest in local political affairs.42 
Secondly, and perhaps more seriously, even war-related work was often handled 
in a somewhat superficial manner. In and of itself, the need for coordination between the 
many wartime agencies operating in Central America; the complex and ever-changing 
requirements of economic warfare; the surveillance of thousands of locally resident Axis 
nationals; the negotiation of new agreements and treaties, etc, etc was so demanding a 
job, especially considering the lack of personnel, that the legations mainly confined 
themselves to the handling of these matters on paper. There was no manpower 
available to handle the practical side of these matters or even to check up on their 
correct execution. For example, when the Department inquired after the efficiency and 
significance of the work that several wartime agencies were doing in Honduras under the 
general coordination of the legation, the best answer that the legation could provide was 
that “aside from wasting money and time, the agencies appear to do no particular 
harm”.43 
The State Department rarely pressured its legations to follow up on the 
cooperative agreements negotiated with the caudillos, except, perhaps, where the 
suppression of fifth column activities and the flow of strategic materials was concerned. 
The Department never expected much in the way of material benefits from its Central 
                                                                                                                                                 
to John William Baily, Jr. (Assistant Chief of the Division of Foreign Service Personnel), July 6, 
1943, PR Guatemala, Box 59, cl. 123: Personal Records of Officers. 
41 Charles B. Hosmer (U.S. Foreign Service inspector) to the Department of State, December 1, 
1941, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 3, Vol. 1, cl. 124.6 : Inspection Report; Background 
Memorandum Explanatory of Principal Services Requested of our Diplomatic Missions and 
certain Consulates, May 9, 1941, Lot Files, Entry 211, Box 5, Folder marked May, 1941. 
42 Dawson to Hanke, February 12, 1943, Lot Files, Entry 211, Box 14, Folder marked Analysis 
and Liaison: November 1942 to July 1943. 
43 Faust to the Secretary of State, Airgram A-102, October 28, 1942, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 5, 
cl. 124.66: Records and Correspondence. 
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American alliances. It wanted the isthmian states to back the inter-American war 
measures; it wanted photographs of the caudillos signing their declarations of war44; it 
wanted quotations from the local president’s speeches that gave voice to local support 
for the war-effort45, all of it in the interest of presenting a united bloc of states under 
American leadership for the benefit of both domestic and foreign audiences.46 In a word, 
the Department was well aware of, and imminently satisfied with the fact that 
cooperation with the Central American republics existed mainly on paper. 
The result of these developments for the relationship between the legations and 
the local regimes was twofold: First, the legations relied more and more on their personal 
associations with the local presidents and their trusted allies. Second, the legations lost 
sight of the local political situation. The context of local politics faded from the legations’ 
reports, to be largely replaced by the context of fighting an international war. 
Outwardly, the Central American administrations showed themselves very willing 
to cooperate with the legations. For the hand-full of overworked officials at the American 
legations, this cooperative pose must have been very gratifying: Without it, it would be 
well nigh impossible to meet the demands of the State Department. The stability and 
continued rule of the Central American regimes thus became an important asset to the 
American legations—leading to a grossly inflated estimate of the importance of the 
regimes to U.S. wartime interests and of the consequences of their possible demise. 
Thus, Frazer would not raise the issue of the suppression of ADS, for fear of “indulging in 
improper criticism” of Martínez, as we have seen. Erwin and Des Portes went much 
further. Erwin did not let an occasion go by to emphasize Carías’ personal cooperative 
stance. The minister also came to believe that if anything happened to Carías the 
country would be thrown into chaos, because there was no one in Honduras who was of 
sufficient prestige to take his place.47 Des Portes argued, in a personal letter to Laurence 
Duggan of the State Department, that “any political disturbances” would be very 
unfortunate “in view of the international situation”. The minister goes on that—despite 
the views of some observers who feel that the government is dominated by Nazi 
sympathizers—he personally felt that “we are getting one-hundred percent cooperation 
from President Ubico (…) and any change that might occur could only operate to the 
detriment of our war effort”.48 
                                                 
44 For example: Hull to Erwin, Telegram 87, December 12, 1941, PR Honduras, Box 68, cl. 800.1: 
Chief Executive 
45 For example: Josephus Daniels (U.S. Ambassador to Mexico) to the U.S. Embassies and 
Legations in Latin America, August 18, 1941, PR El Salvador, Box 45, cl. 711: War Peace. 
Friendship. Alliance; Frazer to Daniels, August 21, 1941, PR El Salvador, Box 45, cl. 711: War 
Peace. Friendship. Alliance.  
46 For example: Hull to the Embassies and Legations in Latin America, November 10, 1942, PR 
Honduras, cl. 711: War. Peace. Friendship. Alliance. 
47 Erwin to the Secretary of State, Despatch 2551, January 8, 1943, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 11, 
cl. 800: Honduras; Pate, Memorandum for the American Minister, January 23, 1943, PR 
Honduras (SCF), Box 12, cl. 800.1: Chief Executive; Erwin to the Secretary of State, Telegram 
304, December 23, 1943, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 11, cl. 800: Revolutions. Honduran Political 
Exiles. 
48 Des Portes to Duggan, November 27, 1942, PR Guatemala (SCF), Box 5, cl. 800. 
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This sentiment was largely shared by de State Department, where the Central 
American desk was occupied by John Cabot, who was previously Des Portes’ secretary 
in Guatemala. Synthesizing the reports coming in from the field, Cabot noted that “in the 
larger aspect (…) we are unfortunate in having to back in effect at least three long-
standing dictatorships in Central America which no longer command the confidence and 
respect at home and abroad that they once did. There is danger that we will find 
ourselves caught in the dilemma of either supporting an unpopular tyranny or of 
fomenting disorder which could scarcely fail to redound to the benefit of the 
totalitarians”. 49  This seems to be the highest level at which this problem was 
contemplated and for the duration of the War, the State Department was satisfied to let 
matters in Central America run their course as long as cooperation was forthcoming. 
 
2.2 Friends in practice? The soldier’s war. 
How the developments and prejudices described above influenced the thinking of the 
U.S. ministers in Central America can be more readily appreciated, if we contrast their 
views with those of the American military representatives in the region. Around the 
beginning of the War, American military representatives greatly expanded their political 
reporting. Apparently, they were acting on the orders of the War Department, which was 
desirous to know how the political situation on the ground could affect military planning. 
The reports of the American Naval Attaché in Central America, Frank June, are greatly 
at odds with the reports of the American legations. This is significant because it 
demonstrates that the opinions of the American legations should not be taken at face 
value.  
Taking Guatemala as an example, Captain June was carefully optimistic about 
Ubico’s willingness to cooperate with the United States at the start of the War. Only a 
few months into the War, however, the Naval Attaché came to the remarkable 
conclusion that: 
At first glance, the Guatemalan Government appears to be cooperating fully 
with the United States. Closer scrutiny however reveals certain flaws in her 
spirit of cooperation which tend to indicate that the Government is pursuing 
perhaps a policy of economic and political expediency. There are likewise 
certain considerations which tend to indicate that Guatemala may be 
prepared to reverse its position at some time in the future, if such reversal is 
warranted by world events. 
The attaché came to this conclusion after a very extensive investigation of Guatemala’s 
practical contributions to the war-effort. June noted that Guatemala refused to use its 
own artillery to protect its ports; that it had deported Nazi prisoners to the U.S. only to be 
rid of the burden of taking care of them; that its decrees against Nazi activities lacked 
“teeth” in practice; that its government was full of Nazi sympathizers; etc, etc. 
                                                 
49 Cabot to Winters and Bonsal, October 6, 1941, Lot Files, ARA, Entry 209: Memorandums 
Relating to Individual Countries, March 3, 1918 to December 31, 1947 (henceforth Entry 209) 
Office of American Republic Affairs: Individual Countries, Box 46, Folder marked El Salvador, 
1940-1947. 
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Concerning this last point, the legation agreed with June, but the captain was not 
convinced (as the legation was) that Ubico himself was pro-American: 
The American Legations feels strongly that the President himself is sincere in 
his desire to cooperate with the United States and it is therefore possible that 
the aforementioned points are the responsibility of his subordinates. 
However, in a country which is so dominated by one man, it is difficult to 
believe that he should be unaware of the topics brought out in this [report].50  
The attaché stuck to this analysis throughout his tenure in Guatemala and even 
grew more disillusioned as time progressed. Over the course of about two years, he 
became convinced that Ubico only cooperated because he wanted U.S. military and 
economic assistance without the sacrifices involved in fighting the War.51 In March of 
1942, Captain June summarized the effects of U.S. policy on Central American 
governments in general: 
They regard us as A-1 suckers. They believe that their own particular country 
is now vitally important to the United States and that they can therefore put 
pressure on the United States to obtain economic or other concessions in 
exchange for permitting the use of their territory for military purposes. They 
construe our foreign policy, in its application to them, as anemic and as a 
sign of our softness and impending disintegration. While they are willing to 
accept our handouts, they neither trust nor respect us. We are speaking to 
them in a language which Latins, long accustomed to tyrannical and 
dictatorial treatment, do not understand (…) The dictator-presidents of some 
Central American Countries are so accustomed to dictate to their own people 
that they are under the impression that they can now dictate to the United 
States also.”52 
June blamed Guatemala’s lax cooperation in the war-effort on United States Foreign 
Policy, which he believed “has been on the wrong track or (…) has been improperly 
administered in the field”.53 Des Portes, on his part, complained on several occasions 
that June and other military representatives were venturing beyond their jurisdiction with 
their political reporting. The State Department agreed, but was unwilling to tell the War 
Department to silence its representatives abroad.54  
While Frazer seemed to have had little trouble with the military people, Erwin’s 
relationship with the military attachés was even tenser than that between Des Portes and 
June. In many cases the point of contention, cooperation with the local regime, was the 
same. Erwin reported that his military attaché, Thomas Austin, was paranoid about the 
                                                 
50 June to Navy Intelligence Division, Serial 51-42, January 30, 1942, PR Guatemala, Box 47, cl. 
121: Naval Attaché. 
51 June to Navy Intelligence Division, Serial 181-42, April 14, 1942, PR Guatemala, Box 47, cl. 
121: Naval Attaché. 
52 June to Navy Intelligence Division, Serial 134-42, March 19, 1942, PR Guatemala, Box 57, cl. 
800: Guatemala. June notes that this analysis applies particularly well to Guatemala and 
Nicaragua. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Drew to James B. Stewart (U.S. Minister to Nicaragua), October 17, 1942, PR Guatemala 
(SCF), Box 5, cl. 800: Central America; Long to Bonsal, December 2, 1943, PR Guatemala, Box 
69, cl. 121: Naval Attaché; Bonsal to Long, December 14, 1943, PR Guatemala, Box 69, cl. 121: 
Naval Attaché. 
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intentions of the Honduran government.55 On a later occasion, Erwin proclaimed—at 
least somewhat diplomatically—his believe that "our Military Attaché obtained [his] 
information where the spider gets the material for his web and that some of his reports 
had little more substance".56 When an American military instructor, “after much soul 
searching”, informed the legation that the military preparedness of Honduras against 
foreign aggression was not up to par, Erwin offhandedly dismissed the information 
because, the minister believed, the instructor was biased and, due to his low military 
rank, not fit to evaluate state policies anyway. When the same instructor offered further 
information on the substance of Carías’ cooperation, Erwin refused to listen to him, 
choosing to believe that the local regime was entirely frank in its support of the war-
effort.57  
Why did the views of some of the military people differ so much from that of the 
legations? A major part of the explanation must be that American diplomats and military 
officers worked with widely different sources of information. The legations came to rely 
on its personal relation with the local presidents, who put up quite a show to convince 
the Americans of their cooperative stance. Furthermore, the legations were 
overwhelmed by the “paper” side of wartime cooperation, while Captain June and others 
were more intimately familiar with the practical sides of that cooperation. Guatemala, for 
example, cooperated fully on paper (as June also attests), but its practical cooperation 
lagged behind. It seems probable that the legation was only acquainted with the different 
war-time treaties and agreements between the United States and Guatemala and did not 
have the manpower or the expertise to evaluate the execution of those treaties.  
As June argued, the Ubico administration regarded anyone who showed undue 
enthusiasm for the war against dictatorship with suspicion (for obvious reasons) and it 
did everything it could to prevent people from visiting the American legation to voice their 
concerns about the Guatemalan dictatorship.58 Meanwhile, the captain himself became 
well acquainted with the growing dissatisfaction over Ubico’s long-time reign.59 During 
the early forties, junior officers in the Guatemalan army became restless because the 
Ubico administration hampered their upward mobility and relied mainly on the support of 
Guatemala’s many Generals (in 1944, these junior officers would have a major role to 
play in the revolution). Unlike the diplomatic officers at the legation, Captain June 
witnessed this growing discontent through his close acquaintances in the Guatemalan 
                                                 
55 Erwin to Philip Bonsal (Chief, Division of Latin-American Affairs), December 24, 1942, PR 
Honduras, Box 75, Vol. II, cl. 123: Erwin. 
56 Faust to the Secretary of State, Telegram 127, June 9, 1943, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 15, cl. 
891: Censorship of the Press. 
57 Erwin to the Secretary of State, Despatch 1452, July 11, 1941, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 3, Vol. 
2, cl. 820: Military Affairs. 
58 June to Navy Intelligence Division, Serial 16-43, January 19, 1943, PR Guatemala, Box 69, cl. 
121: Naval Attaché. 
59  June to Long, February 6, 1942, PR Guatemala, Box 60, cl. 820.02: Espionage and 
Propaganda; June to Navy Intelligence Division, Serial 10-43, January 11, 1943, PR Guatemala, 
Box 69, cl. 121: Naval Attaché. 
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army. For the time being, however, the legations were out of touch with the latest internal 
political developments and focused on supposed fifth column threats. 
 
3. THE SIXTH COLUMN 
During the Spanish Civil War, the Nationalist General Emilio Mola boasted that the four 
columns of his army advancing on Madrid were aided by a clandestine “fifth column” of 
sympathizers within the city that would undermine the Republican government. Fear of 
agents provocateur, saboteurs, spies, agitators, etc. was as old as war itself, but the 
image of a fifth column was something new altogether. It suggested whole cadres of 
enemies—not just the lone spook—hard at work to deliver cities or even whole countries 
into the hands of the adversary without a shot being fired. After the Civil War, the image 
was applied in the West to explain German successes during the Second World War. 
Although the strength of the German fighting forces was generally recognized, their 
quick and easy victories in 1939 and 1940 seemed impossible unless they had received 
assistance from the inside. Thus, inordinate significance was ascribed to the role of 
Norwegian “Quislings” or French collaborators, setting off an international fifth column 
scare that hit the United States with full force by 1940. As a result, thousands of “enemy 
aliens”, Germans, Italians, and Japanese, were interned in the United States because of 
their potential to form a fifth column.60 
The domestic fifth column scare, which lasted from roughly 1940 to 1942, had far-
reaching consequences. Francis MacDonnell catalogued some of the results of the 
powerful wave of fear that swept the United States early in the War: 
The FBI’s manpower, funding, and authority rapidly expanded. The British 
and American intelligence communities established close ties of cooperation. 
The United States developed its own capacity for Fifth Column operations in 
the form of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and later the Central 
Intelligence Agency. Congress passed important security legislation and took 
an active part in investigating alleged domestic subversion. Isolationism lost 
credibility as a viable foreign policy option for the United States…These 
changes fostered American internationalism abroad while accelerating the 
creation of a powerful intelligence establishment at home.61 
The irony of it all was that there never was a serious fifth column threat against the 
United States: While small, ineffectual spy networks did exist and did form a basis for the 
scare, the latter was caused, fed, and sustained by a historic mistrust of German 
expansionism, lightning fast German advances from 1939 onward, and alarmist 
accounts by the American yellow press. The American government did not discourage 
the developing scare because, on the one hand, it was concerned about the fifth column 
too, while, on the other hand, the internationalist Roosevelt Administration gratefully 
employed the fifth column image to silence isolationist critics. Meanwhile, the British 
intelligence services chipped in by feeding information about German subversion to their 
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American counterparts. The British hoped that the United States would be more 
sympathetic to the travails of Europe if it felt directly threatened by the Nazi’s. Lastly, as 
the United States developed its own intelligence agencies to hunt down Nazis across the 
hemisphere—FBI, OSS, Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), Military Intelligence Division 
(MID), Secret Service, and special divisions within the Treasury and State Departments—
the competition, overzealousness, and ambitions of these agencies began to play an 
important role in the supply of misinformation about the extend of the fifth column 
threat.62 
The Dutch historian Louis de Jong, probably the first to seriously investigate the 
phenomenon of the fifth column scare from a historical perspective, established that 
Hitler and the Nazi top were not interested in the conquest or invasion of the American 
continent—at least not in the short term—and did not develop spy rings to prepare for it. 
Later German studies confirmed De Jong’s findings. Reiner Pommerin established that 
up to about 1941, Hitler was in fact careful not to antagonize the United States. Some 
halfhearted programs to establish spy rings or to elicit the loyalty of German colonies on 
the American continent were developed by the middle sections of the German Foreign 
Ministry and the Auslandabteilung of the Nazi Party. These programs failed because of 
lack of support from the German leadership; rivalry between the state bureaucracy and 
the Party; resistance from the German colonies; and watchfulness of the American 
nations. Only the German program to improve trade relations with South America was 
modestly successful before 1939, but quickly fell apart after the start of the War. The 
small German “spy rings” that did exist, notably in Uruguay and the United States, were 
amateurish affairs and were quickly eliminated by local intelligence services.63 
The story of the fifth column scare and the (largely) unjustified program of 
internment of Americans of foreign origin inside the United States is fairly well known. 
Somewhat less familiar is the fact that Washington actively pursued the alleged fifth 
column in Latin America too. The American perception of a fifth column threat to Latin 
America led to the establishment of a hasty program for the deportation and internment 
of thousands of Germans and Japanese. It also justified the American expansion of 
intelligence activities in the region and the establishment of firm military ties with 
Southern governments. In this case also, historians later asserted that the danger of 
actual enemy subversion was too small to justify the disruptive and ethically 
questionable measures taken against the “fifth columnists”. Historian Max Friedman 
even quipped that the real threat to Latin America society was not from a fifth column, 
but from a sixth column of people who believed in the existence of the fifth column.64  
The consequences of American actions against the German threat to Latin 
America were no less significant than the results of the domestic fifth column scare. In 
the words of Friedman: 
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…some of the same faulty practices established in the anti-German 
campaign were redirected toward the [Communists during the Cold War] – 
producing even more ineffective foreign policy and a sanguinary record that 
fueled further conflict with the rest of the Americas. The campaign against 
the Germans living in the region not only ruined the temporary gains of the 
Good Neighbor policy and failed to achieve its central goal of improving 
hemispheric security; it also created a precedent for the excesses of the anti-
Communist crusade that obsessed the United States over the next fifty 
years…65 
It might be added—or specified—that the Nazi hunt in Central America had a particularly 
negative effect on the American Foreign Service, which was the backbone of the “sixth 
column” there. First of all, the legations allowed themselves to loose sight of local events 
while they focused their attention on the apparition of the fifth column—a theme that will 
be further examined in the next chapter. Second, the nonintervention principle, which, 
rhetorically at least, had become something of a religious dogma, was all but abandoned 
in the interest of “fighting” the War. Third, and most damningly perhaps, Foreign Service 
officers in Central America and Washington started to appreciate the usefulness of 
having “sons-of-bitches” on their side against the Nazis. During the War, American 
diplomats developed the justifications for tolerating and even supporting local tyrannies 
that would also inform U.S. Cold War policy. 
 
Throughout the 1930s, American Foreign Service officers in Central America were 
mainly preoccupied with internal political developments. That this should change during 
the War is partly due to the demands of the State Department, but a changing 
conception of what diplomacy should be about also played a major role. Geopolitical 
considerations became important during the War, even thought, at first glance, the 
Central American posts seemed far removed from battle. However, Central America’s 
geographical position, in between the United States and the all-important Panama Canal, 
made it an obvious military target for the enemy. The relatively large colonies of German 
immigrants could easily be imagined to contain enemy agents. Also, “many in the United 
States thought Latin American countries could not manage their own affairs without 
paternal guidance from Washington, and assumed that the hidden hand of a European 
power lay behind any significant unrest or discordance with U.S. plans”.66 
In addition De Jong argued that many people who were not directly involved in 
fighting the War felt an urge to participate in some useful way. Calling to mind the 
feelings of uncertainty, undirected aggression, and helplessness that plagued those who 
lived through the War, De Jong wrote that: 
This inner tension, which is triggered by that acute though nameless fear, by 
that aggressiveness bereft of an immediate target, and by that feeling of 
helplessness and insecurity, could be discharged once one finds in their own 
surroundings an individual upon whom the mark of “hostile” could be set: 
then the fear would lose its mysterious, vague character; the undirected 
                                                 
65 Idem, 12. 
66 Friedman, Nazis and Good Neighbors, 3. 
Chapter 6 
 
210 
aggression [would] get a target; the helplessness and insecurity [would] be 
dissolved in an immediate duty: the attack on the “enemy in our midst”. 
Executing that attack, one would “do something”, “help to win the war”.67 
Officers in the United States Foreign Service did find a niche for themselves in the larger 
fight against fascism—even when they were serving in places far removed from actual 
combat. By securing the cooperation of neutrals and allies and by coordinating American 
wartime measures in other countries, thus securing lines of communication, flow of 
strategic materials, and keeping a check on enemy activities, the Foreign Service felt 
that it fulfilled a vital role in winning the War.  
Though this self-perception became commonplace during the Cold War, it was a 
departure from situation in the 1930s. In his unpublished memoirs, Caffery, for example, 
described the job in idealistic terms: “If you are a good Foreign Service officer, you are 
very good, and you have the most marvelous opportunity in the world for doing really big 
things for your country and for the world and for humankind and even for God. But if you 
are not good, you are no good in the world. So decide for yourself”.68 Those officers 
whose professional education coincided with the War, however, entertained much more 
combatative—“realistic” would be their own term—ideas about their work. After the War, 
they no longer conceived of the world as a place where good, constructive things could 
be accomplished, but as a dangerous, threatening place where self-interest and 
vigilance were the prerequisites of sound diplomacy. John Cabot, secretary of legation in 
Guatemala around the start of the War, argued in his memoirs that:  
The United States has no imperial ambitions, but it must reckon with the 
imperial ambitions of others, and we cannot expect that we alone can sustain 
ourselves against any and all adversaries. We are irremediably dependent 
upon loyal allies and friendly neutrals to help us and supply us with our 
needs. And that is what I mean when I say that our diplomatic 
representatives abroad, who must do everything in their power to see that 
our international relationships are favorable in the event of a crisis, are our 
first line of defense.69 
This bleak outlook came to dominate the view of the postwar generation—those “born in 
this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace” in Kennedy’s 
words. Students as well as practitioners of diplomacy, Kennan, Morgenthau, Lippmann, 
Niebuhr, all expounded the “Realist” attitude shown by Cabot and maligned the starry-
eyed idealism of men like Caffery. 
 
Even if this changing attitude in the Foreign Service was very gradual and thus hard to 
pinpoint in the Legations’ records, it will hopefully become clear that it provides a general 
background for the other two developments: The changing conceptions of 
nonintervention and cooperation with dictatorships. In the context of the fight against 
fascism, American diplomats became increasingly tolerant—even appreciative—of harsh 
measures to “save” the “free world”. Many formerly cherished aspects of international 
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law, American political culture, and the Good Neighbor policy were abandoned because 
imminent dangers required it. One cannot define a single government directive or State 
Department decision that revoked the previously “neighborly” attitude of the United 
States toward Latin America. Rather, the prewar taboo on such things as intervention, 
propaganda measures, and military and intelligence cooperation with local tyrants were 
slowly and sometimes unconsciously subverted—be it in the name of protecting 
democracy against fascism—by State Department officials. In the meantime, the ideal of 
Good Neighborliness was still upheld rhetorically. 
Up to about 1940, the State Department and the Foreign Service maintained a 
principled attitude in matters such as intervention, propaganda, intelligence, and arms 
trade. The non-intervention policy is of course well known, but with regard to the 
execution of its diplomacy, the State Department also felt that cultural attachés were 
inappropriate, because “the conception of an official culture is entirely alien to the United 
States”: 
…it may be pointed out that it has been particularly the totalitarian states 
which have been desirous of appointing “cultural attachés”, whose activities 
and whose identification with propaganda not conductive to the maintenance 
of stable conditions in the receiving countries, are sufficiently well known.70 
An illustrative example of the Department’s attitude toward intelligence gathering is 
Secretary of State Henry Stimson’s famous decision in 1929 to cut funding of the “Cipher 
Bureau”—a Department agency devoted to cracking the diplomatic codes of other 
countries. The reason given by the Secretary was that: “Gentlemen do not read each 
other’s mail”. In 1940, the Department did suggest, tentatively, that its legations in Latin 
America should use “to a greater extent than heretofore the information available to 
intelligent and loyal American citizens resident abroad” in connection with “present world 
conditions”. However, the Department refused to acknowledge that it was “organizing an 
intelligence service”. Instead, it considered its first steps into the realm of intelligence 
gathering merely as an informal arrangement with trusted Americans abroad: “The 
Department believes (…) that most reputable Americans will welcome an opportunity to 
be of service at this time even though their activities must necessarily be rendered gratis 
(no funds being available for the purchase of information) and without evidence of public 
recognition”.71  
During the War, however, cultural attachés and FBI agents (“legal attachés”) were 
sent to all American republics to conduct large scale propaganda programs and to 
gather intelligence on “non-American” activities. These men were joined by military 
instructors who were to ease the introduction of American armaments to the sister 
republics and economic advisors to wage economic warfare on Axis nationals. These 
new activities were also accompanied by more benign programs for the improvement of 
roads, hospitals, sewers, agricultural techniques, and educational programs—all 
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intended to bolster the stability of local governments and thus secure a constant flow of 
strategic materials to the United States. What the proliferation of wartime agencies and 
programs meant for “non-intervention” has been observed in the first chapter and will be 
further developed in the next chapter: More and more Central Americans came into 
direct contact with the Americans, encouraging the view that the United States took a 
direct interest in their affairs while the opposite was true.72 
The legations were probably not completely aware of the extend to which U.S. 
agencies were interfering in Central America. While the ministers were supposed to 
coordinate all American activities in the country were they served, it proved difficult to 
manage the expanding duties of the legations themselves and still be aware of the 
details of programs executed by representatives of the War Department, Justice 
Department, Sanitation Division, Coordination Committee, etc. Furthermore, activities 
expanded faster than regulations on lines of command, so there was a lot of uncertainty 
about which agencies fell under the jurisdiction of the minister and which ones did not.73 
That the ministers in Central America were not professionals, except for Frazer, probably 
did not help.  
However, the Legations themselves were very much involved in the internal affairs 
of Central America as well: Far-reaching economic warfare on German companies, for 
example, could only be accomplished by far-reaching cooperation with the local 
governments—to the point were the legation in Guatemala prepared the laws that the 
local government needed to implement to make economic warfare possible.74 Strangely, 
though, the rhetorical commitment to noninterference remained intact. Naturally, it was 
necessary to come up with new definitions and justifications to harmonize wartime 
activities with a supposed attitude of noninterference. In 1941, for example, Frazer 
argued that encouraging Salvadoran newspapers to print “solidarity-of-the-Americans 
propaganda” did not constitute propaganda: “to regard the exercise of such an influence 
[over the Salvadoran press] as circumscribing their independence is, we think, perhaps 
an extreme view. As a matter of fact, the entire press of Salvador is pro-Pan-American 
anyhow, so that no paper would be violating its principles or sacrificing its ideals by 
printing [U.S. propaganda]”.75 Likewise, when the Honduran government arrested four 
Honduran citizens of German stock at Erwin’s request, the Minister maintained that “in 
supplying these names to the Honduran Government, I did so informally and merely 
suggested the possibility that the Government might wish to consider the desirability of 
removing them”.76 
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Interestingly, in 1942 the Department of State became concerned about the 
“impression” prevalent in some Latin American countries that the United States had 
abandoned its popular nonintervention policy during the War.” The Axis nations were 
using this sentiment to their advantage, the Department believed, with propaganda 
about “Yankee Imperialism”: 
The pretext for this propaganda is the increasing activity of this government 
in various enterprises on the soil of the other American republics: the 
construction and operation of military and naval bases, the Proclaimed List, 
deportations, a wide variety of economic operations (ranging from the war-
connected rubber programs to projects with a pronounced “welfare” aspect, 
such as the health and sanitation program).  
The Department patently rejected the notion that such activities were acts of intervention: 
“After all, intervention on behalf of special groups in the United States [a reference to 
business interests] has not been revived”. Furthermore, all U.S. activities were executed 
on the basis of “collaboration” and “what can honestly be described as [the] interests of 
the whole hemisphere”. This turned out to be the magic formula: As long as local 
collaborators could be found and as long as the objectives of the United States could be 
described as serving a common cause, the Department was not, in fact, intervening: “We 
must get off the defensive. The expression ‘nonintervention’ should give way to 
‘collaboration’, as a sign of changed conditions”. Although it was not acknowledged at 
the time, the problem remained that local collaborators might use their connections to 
U.S. programs to increase their own power and prestige. Also, there was no democratic 
method by which the definition of the “common good” could be established: The State 
Department would take it upon itself to determine that.77 
 
In terms of cooperation with the local regimes during the War, American diplomats 
began to appreciate the harsh measures against subversion taken by local dictatorships. 
For example, in the early summer of 1940, Ubico suggested to the American legation 
that he could have the whole German colony expelled if this would further the cause 
against Nazism. John Cabot, the chargé at that time, admits that his first reaction to the 
plan was to “recoil at its drastic and rather inhumane implications”. However, “after 
having the opportunity to think it over several days”, he came to the conclusion that the 
idea merited serious consideration. On July 23, Cabot wrote to his superiors that the 
“natural instinct” to be shocked by such mass exportation should be suppressed, since 
the Nazi’s themselves deported thousands of Germans from Tyrol and the Baltic 
States—not to mention their policies against the Jews. So, even if “two wrongs do not 
make a right”, it was true that Hitler would not be “appeased” and that only a firm stand 
might stop him. To summarize his views, Cabot argues that “[it] is one thing to behave 
like a gentleman in a drawing room, and quite another thing to be a Casper Milquetoast 
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when confronted by a thug in a dark alley”. The dictatorial allies in Central America were 
particularly useful in this regard, since the American reply to Ubico’s plan could be 
“worded in such a way as to place the decision entirely in the President’s [i.e. Ubico’s] 
hands”. That way, the U.S. could conveniently keep its hands clean.78  
In the context of expanding intelligence and propaganda activities and the arming 
of the Southern neighbors, the military dictatorships of Central America turned out to be 
peculiarly useful allies. Not only were they particularly keen to follow U.S. policies, they 
also had standing armies, intelligence networks, permissive laws against subversion, 
and propaganda machines that could—with a little help and direction from the United 
States—be employed to fight the fifth column. The only liberal country in Central America, 
Costa Rica, was at a disadvantage in this regard: “German and Italian activities in Costa 
Rica date from the very beginning of the Nazi and fascist regimes in Germany and Italy. 
This is accounted for by the fact that (…) the Government of Costa Rica is democratic in 
every sense of the word and activities could therefore be carried on without any 
hindrance”.79 Ironically, then, the most democratic Republic of the isthmus was most 
vulnerable to totalitarian subversion. 
The only problem was that the armies and security forces of the dictatorships were 
hopelessly backward institutions. The War Department even warned the State 
Department on several occasions that any American weapons that were send to Central 
America would go to waste, because no one in those countries knew how to operate 
them. Thus military missions and FBI instructors were eventually sent to Central America 
to train the local security forces in the use of modern weapons, intelligence gathering, 
and surveillance—increasing the regimes’ capability to control its own population. Nelson 
Rockefeller’s famous Coordination Commission financed the dictators’ official press and 
supplied upbeat “information” about the War and the United Nations—thus strengthening 
the impression that the dictators were important allies of the United States. Economic 
advisors helped the local authorities to nationalize German interest—giving the regimes 
new sources for graft and illegal enrichment. U.S. engineers built roads, sewers, 
hospitals, and schools with U.S. funds—but the local leaders claimed that the new 
services were the result of their progressive policies. 
Among these many programs and activities, the growth of inter-American military 
relations, with its obvious implications for U.S. relations to military dictatorships and 
military suppression of communism during the Cold War, is one theme that receives 
more than passing attention in the historical treatment of war years is. Even before the 
War, the U.S. War Department had embarked on a project to push out external (mainly 
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European) arms dealers and to make American arms the standard for the entire 
continent. While this obviously benefited American producers, the rationale for this move 
was that it enabled inter-American defense cooperation. The War was a significant 
catalyst for inter-American military cooperation: United States lend-lease arms, military 
instructors, and military missions flooded the hemisphere. For historians, the proliferation 
of American arms and military know-how raises the question of whether the U.S. military 
program helped authoritarian military regimes, such as those of Central America, to 
maintain themselves in power. There is no easy answer to this question.80 On the one 
hand, U.S. military aid to Central America was very limited both in terms of the overall 
lend-lease program and in terms of the inflated requests for arms made by the military 
regimes themselves. On the other hand, the military establishments of Central America 
were poorly armed and used antiquated weaponry before the War. Even a small delivery 
of modern (sub)machine guns or a single detachment of modern tanks represented a 
significant strengthening of local military forces.  
The program of lend-lease was intended to provide to the American governments 
the means by which they could defend themselves against outside aggression and as 
such, could not be described as intervention, according to the Department. But in 
Central America, where opposition to the dictatorships mounted during the War, as will 
become clear in the next chapter, many people considered lend-lease to be a from of 
support for the local regime against its people. The State Department established 
jurisdiction over arms deliveries to Latin America in 1940 and was aware of the fact that 
any arms sent to the region could be used by the military dictatorships to maintain 
themselves in power. Therefore, the Department was extremely reluctant, before 1941, 
to deliver weapons to Central America. Such sage considerations were abandoned over 
the next two years, however. During those years, it should be remembered, there 
appeared to be a very real probability that Germany would win the War or that Japan 
might bomb the Panama Canal. So, without going into details about the why and 
wherefore of specific arms deliveries, it is understandable that the Department 
temporarily abandoned its carefulness in the interest of the common defense. But once 
the floodgates were open it was difficult to keep a check on the amount and sort of 
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weapons that reached the arsenals of Central America. In 1941, for example, a 
representative of the Auto Ordnance Company inquired whether the Department had 
any objection to its promotion of the Thompson submachine gun among the American 
military attachés in Latin America. The so-called “Tommy gun” was particularly useful for 
street fighting and could hardly be said to serve the “common defense”—the weapon 
would most likely be used to suppress indigenous discontent. Yet, the Department 
somewhat cynically informed the company that “In view of the policy which the 
Department has adopted of lavishing weapons and ammunition on the other American 
Republics (…) there was no reason why [the company] should not make [its] product 
known to attachés here”.81 
Apart from the Department’s own reasons to provide the Central American regimes 
with modern weaponry, the sense of crisis that marked the early war years—say, up to 
the Battle of Stalingrad and the invasion of North Africa—gave the caudillos a good 
bargaining position. And they used it. The prime example is that of Jorge Ubico, who 
managed to squeeze the Americans into promising him the second best lend-lease 
terms—only Great Britain received arms on better terms at the time. It was not the first 
time, of course, that the Guatemalan dictator tried to obtain modern American weapons 
for his army. In 1939, the Guatemalan Foreign Minister suggested that the Guatemalan 
Government had 200,000 well-trained soldiers at its disposal if the United States would 
supply them with weapons—in fact, the army was no larger than some 5,000 badly 
trained recruits. In 1940, Ubico again claimed that he needed 200,000 rifles for his 
“trained soldiers” if his country was to be of any use to the United States in case of war. 
At that point, the legation and the military attachés agreed that substantial arms 
deliveries for Guatemala would go to waste, since the Guatemalan army was only 
trained for parade exercises and “not remotely capable” of using modern American arms. 
But since Ubico would be “very hurt” if the request were denied outright, and might even 
turn to the Axis for supplies, the Department decided to just stall the issue by insisting 
that intensive studies should first be made of the training, capabilities, and needs of the 
Guatemalan army first.82 
Ubico, however, considered such studies unnecessary and was hostile to the idea 
that his soldiers might require further training. So in 1941, he upped the ante. First, the 
Guatemalan Ministry of Foreign Relations pointed out on several occasions that fascist 
Spain had offered a very interesting coffee-for-weapons deal. The State Department 
answered that it would “prefer” that the deal did not take place, considering the “political 
orientation” of the government of Spain. Indeed, the deal was never closed, but the 
Guatemalan ministry kept reminding the Americans that a deal with Spain was a 
possibility. Over the course of the next year, many more opportunities to put pressure on 
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Washington were thrown into Ubico’s lap. In September, 1941, the United States started 
blacklisting German companies in Latin America, but Ubico stalled the matter for some 
time while the official newspaper of the capital started a bitter editorial campaign against 
the American plans. By the end of that year, the United States started negotiations for 
the unlimited use of Guatemalan airfields and ports, but Ubico delayed the matter by 
insisting that diplomatic protocol and ceremony be observed during the negotiations. 
Around that same time, Ubico allowed one of his cabinet ministers, Gonzalo Campo, to 
publish several articles critical of Minister Des Portes in the official press (the two had 
been on bad terms for some time). All the while, however, the Guatemalan President 
was sensible enough not to push the Americans too far: After Pearl Harbor, Guatemala 
immediately declared war on the Axis and some time later, Ubico suspended 
Guatemalan claims on British Honduras—long a source of friction with Great Britain—for 
the duration of the War. With this carefully balanced “push-pull” policy, Ubico managed 
to keep the State Department in suspense. Eventually, the Americans decided that a 
token of good will had to be made to ensure Guatemalan cooperation.83 
Around the end of January, 1942, when an agreement for the use of Guatemalan 
airfields was settled, the Guatemalan Government implied that it was still waiting for a 
delivery of rifles for some 10,000 soldiers, but that it did not plan to pay 60% of the bill as 
suggested by the new lend-lease laws. Rather than feeling that Ubico was pushing them 
around, Department officials actually felt that it had not shown proper gratitude for 
Guatemalan cooperation. The Division of American Republic Affairs believed that there 
was something to be said for the idea of supplying weapons at nominal cost to countries 
that had declared war spontaneously. Bonsal permitted that no-one really expected 
Britain to pay back a fraction of 60% of the cost of lend-lease arms. So in June of 1942, 
around the time that the Department was negotiating an agreement for the use of 
airfields in Guatemala, Washington offered Ubico an even better deal than he had been 
lobbying for: his army was to receive arms to the value of 3 million dollars—no strings 
attached!84 
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Interestingly, the War Department dragged its feet all the while, arguing that the 
weapons earmarked for Guatemala could be put to much better use and that the 
country’s ports and airfields were not even that important from a strategic point of view. It 
should be stressed, therefore, that the decision to deliver arms to Guatemala and its 
neighbors was a motivated by political considerations: to strengthen bonds between the 
American Republics “on paper”. Cabot wrote his chief at the Division, for example that 
the rejection of arms requests by the caudillos would “reveal a clear distrust of our allies, 
and thereby [give] them a cause for offense of greater intrinsic importance than any 
benefit they might derive from a driblet of arms…”.85 Only after about 1943, when the 
American arms industry was at peek production and the U.S. military started to make 
plans for a postwar world dominated by American arms and military tactics, did the War 
Department change its position on arms deliveries. Ironically, toward the end of the war 
the State Department began to take a dim view on the lend-lease agreements it had 
negotiated around 1942: with the real crisis of the War over, the diplomats began 
question the effects that the arms deliveries would have locally.86 The deliveries of tanks, 
airplanes, and machineguns that had been negotiated in 1942 only began to arrive in the 
Central American capitals by 1944. In that year, the Central American populations began 
to mobilize against their tyrannical governments. As they marched on the presidential 
palaces, they encountered tanks clearly marked “U.S. army”. In the end, the Department 
could count itself lucky that the caudillos did not have the stomach to use American 
weapons on their own people (at least not on a large scale) and that rebel army units 
managed the capture some of the lend-lease material before it could be deployed. But, 
as will be discussed in the next chapter, the proliferation of American arms was just one 
consequence of the War.87 
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4. BEST FRIENDS FOREVER? 
A very real external threat combined with the pressure of wartime cooperation and the 
overrated threat of the fifth column drove the American legations in Central America into 
the arms of the local caudillos. While this reasoning makes the wartime alliance of 
convenience between the United States and the isthmian dictatorships justifiable—in a 
utilitarian sense anyway—and perhaps even understandable, the conceptual integration 
of these same dictators in a nominally democratic league of nations was not without its 
consequences, some of them imminently unjustifiable and difficult to understand.  
In the short term, the American legations’ close cooperation with the Central 
American regimes, and their redefinition of those regimes as part of a democratic 
alliance, blinded American diplomats to the fact that a new, democratically inspired 
opposition movement was developing against the dictatorships. Taking Guatemala as an 
example, there emerged broad based popular opposition to Ubico’s regime. Partly 
inspired by wartime propaganda against dictatorship and partly inspired by purely local 
events, large groups in Guatemala’s society rejected Ubico’s rule by 1944 and they 
would eventually topple his regime and that of his short-lived military successors. One 
would expect to find some evidence that the American legation was aware of these 
developments, if only because they had the potential of disturbing U.S.-Guatemalan 
cooperation during the War. But in fact, the legation was blissfully unaware of the extent 
of opposition against Ubico. Even if its officials were not completely ignorant of Ubico’s 
declining popularity, they did underestimate the dangers the regime was in. This is not to 
say that the American legation supported Ubico in the face of mounting opposition, but 
merely to argue that it expected Ubico’s administration to outlast the War and that, 
therefore, U.S.-Guatemalan cooperation during the War was secure. Meanwhile, the 
new middle class, democratically inclined forces of Central America became 
disillusioned about American cooperation with the outmoded dictatorships. The 
Americans, for their part, were unable to integrate the existence of a genuinely pro-
democratic movement into their conception of Central American politics. 
On the long term, the language created during the 1940s to conceptualize the fight 
against fascism, reemerged toward the 1950s to give form and substance to the new 
alliances that formed to battle Soviet communism. While the supposed threat of 
“communistic” uprisings and disturbances played its own role in Central American 
politics during the 1930s, the idea that a fifth column could deliver whole countries to a 
foreign enemy without a shot being fired—an idea that became widely accepted during 
the War—influenced the way in which the American diplomatic corps dealt with the 
communist specter. Also, the hollowing-out of nonintervention and the tolerance for 
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harsh suppression of anti-establishment forces—also tendencies developed during the 
War—allowed the American Foreign Service to play a much more significant role in 
support for Central American military administrations toward the end of the 1940s and 
especially the 1950s. 
But while it is now obvious that the Second World War would be followed closely 
by the Cold War, it should be stressed that the future of U.S.-Central American relations 
remained uncertain for contemporary observers as the War came to its end. In fact, two 
very contradictory strands of thoughts would compete for dominance after about 1945. 
Firstly, many American Foreign Service officers had felt uncomfortable with dictatorial 
rule in Central America ever since the continuismo campaigns. While there was very little 
that could be done to change the political reality in Central America under the 1930s 
Good Neighbor policy, the nonintervention principle was all but hollowed out during the 
War. Democratically inclined diplomats had a free hand, after the War, to pursue the 
export of their ideology—especially because democratic opposition was growing within 
Central America itself. Secondly, the Foreign Service establishment had learned to work 
closely with the caudillos. Since internal political developments, including the growth of 
opposition, had largely been ignored by the Legations, some diplomats were convinced 
that cooperation with the military regimes should be continued after the War. Which one 
of these two perceptions of Central American affairs would come out on top would be 
worked out after the 1944 Revolutions.  
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[W]hen people [on the Honduran north 
coast] read and hear American statements 
regarding the termination of the war, they 
think of local as well as of European 
dictators. 
 
~ Vice Consul Julian Nugent, 1943 
 
 
 
In the summer of 1943, Julian Nugent, the American Vice Consul at the small consulate 
of Puerto Cortés, Honduras, toured his district to collect economic information for his 
reports. It was a difficult journey, quite unimaginable from a modern standpoint or even 
from the standpoint of American embassy in Tegucigalpa at the time. Nugent had to 
make part of his trip on a mule; was immediately involved in local intrigues in every 
village he passed; and found himself caught up in talk of machete charges on the 
Presidential Palace in the grungy cantinas along the road. Inevitably, Nugent got in 
touch with people that were beyond his regular circle of acquaintances. Like an 
entomologist finding a rare species of butterfly, Nugent was surprised to encounter, on 
one of his mule treks, a “seemingly genuine representative of the average low-income 
class in Santa Bárbara”. Even more astonishingly, the vice consul reported how this 
particular specimen:  
…described most fulsomely the lost liberties enjoyed during previous 
regimes, as compared with the present element of suppression. Since this 
person has never held public office and has little hope of ever getting one 
under any regime, his opinions—even if they turn out to be illusions—do not 
appear to be those of a thwarted office seeker. The fact that they are not 
wholly correct from a historical viewpoint would seem to make little difference, 
if this person and sufficient other countrymen really believe such opinions.1 
The disconnect between the vice consul and the Honduran worker concerning Honduran 
history is interesting in itself. If Nugent had shared his view of Honduran political history 
with his road companion, he might have said something to the effect that Honduras had 
always been a backward country where a “General” with 20 odd followers could become 
president.2 Americans in Honduras had apparently forgotten that there had been free 
                                                 
1 Julian L. Nugent (U.S. vice consul to Puerto Cortes) to Thurston, Report 52, August 25, 1943, 
PR Honduras (SCF), Box 12, cl. 800: Continued. 
2 A paraphrase from Faust’s description of the Honduran political process. John B. Faust (U.S. 
Chargé d’Affaires a.i. to Honduras) to the Secretary of State, Despatch 108, June 4, 1943, PR 
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elections and comparative political liberty in that country during the 1920s. Hondurans, 
evidently, had not.3 And even if the Honduran worker from Santa Bárbara idealized the 
time before the Caríato somewhat, his historical recollections were not completely off the 
mark. 
Nugent’s encounter is informative in other respects. The idea that Hondurans 
could entertain political ideologies which had anything but a direct connection with their 
immediate interests was quite foreign to the vice consul and his colleagues. Thus, 
Nugent found the fact that his companion had little hope of obtaining public office 
particularly noteworthy. It was an indication that the latter’s ideas were not a mere 
rationalization for his political ambitions. The idée reçue among Americans at the 
legation was that Honduran politics were an eternal struggle between the “ins” and the 
“outs” and that there were no significant ideological differences between the two, only 
conflicting ambitions. Erwin, for example, believed that “the desire to bring about his 
[Carías’] overthrow is not widespread and is confined to political cliques dominated by 
disappointed seekers for presidential office”.4 The fact that, by 1943, discontent had 
spread beyond the traditional political cliques and involved more than thwarted ambitions 
had not yet been digested by the embassy’s officers. 
Lastly, and intractably tied up with the American perception of Honduran history, 
politics, and politicians, there is considerable irony in the fact that Nugent was surprised 
to find that “when people here read and hear American statements regarding the 
termination of the war, they think of local as well as of European dictators”. The State 
Department and other government agencies had vigorously pushed the dissemination in 
Latin America of propaganda about the fight against dictatorship in order to create more 
sympathy for the “democratic cause”. Due to the notion that Hondurans were backward 
and politically opportunistic, many American diplomats had not considered it possible 
that the locals would conceive of the high ideals behind the war as applying to them. 
Some were more careful than others. Des Portes for example, cautioned the Department 
in 1942 that a propaganda leaflet about the “Four Freedoms” would not be “politically 
acceptable in Guatemala”.5 Also, when Charlie Chaplin’s The Great Dictator reached 
Guatemalan cinemas, Des Portes and some of Ubico’s underlings worried that the local, 
smaller dictator might take the movie personally (as it turned out, Ubico loved the film—
he was not a man prone to self-reflection).6 Erwin, on the other hand, never considered 
                                                 
3 On Barahona period, see: Dodd, Carías, 43-44 and Argueta, Carías, 56-66. 
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the possibility that anti-dictatorial propaganda would affront the local government or 
upset the political status quo. Considering allied propaganda as nothing more than a 
conceptualization of the war, and Honduras as nothing less than an enthusiastic wartime 
ally, the minister reported in 1942 that the distribution of a leaflet about the “Four 
Freedoms” would, in fact, be welcomed in Honduras.7 Erwin was not naïve about the 
nature of Carías’ government; he knew full well that it was a dictatorship, it was just that 
he never dreamed that Hondurans could believe that the Four Freedoms applied to them. 
Even though Honduras had its own history of liberal politics, as the worker from 
Santa Bárbara rightly reminded Nugent, American wartime propaganda did contributed 
to local discontent about the dictatorship. It would be misleading to argue that American 
propaganda caused the discontent, but the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms did 
provide a ready-made ideological context for it. And Nugent was right about one thing: if 
enough Hondurans—and Salvadorans and Guatemalans for that matter—believed in the 
“democratic cause”, it mattered little if it was intended to apply to them or not. By about 
1944, enough Central Americans had concluded that the dictators had to go. That year 
turned out to be a critical test for the endurance of the caudillos and also for the ability of 
the embassies to maintain a balance between changing conditions and America’s long 
term interests. There were many failures that year. 
 
1. THE RISE OF EXPECTATIONS 
During the early thirties American diplomats had high hopes for dynamic Central 
American leaders like Ubico, expecting them to make “prosperous little countries” out of 
the republics under their stewardship. Even if their foresight was imperfect in other 
respects, the prewar diplomats were right on this point. At least, by the end of the war 
most Central American republics had recovered from the depths of the Depression. 
While it is impossible to estimate how much of the economic recovery was caused by 
government policy and how much by worldwide economic recovery, it is undeniable that 
the actions of the isthmian regimes had a profound impact on the social-economic 
makeup of their countries.8 
Depending on the book one reads on the subject, the caudillos have been 
portrayed as builders, modernizers, and invaluable contributors to the creation of 
centralized states in Central America, or as military thugs of anachronistic Liberal 
oligarchies. While no one will deny that the caudillos were socially conservative, or that 
their economic policies came at a considerable to cost to civil liberties, historians have 
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also emphasized their contributions to Central America’s economic and political 
development. Thomas Dodd, for example, concludes that “Carías laid the foundation for 
the growth of modern capitalism and development, expanding the state’s role in 
society”.9   
Other historians claim that, from a wider perspective, caudillismo was merely a 
holding operation for the obsolete liberal oligarchic system. Mario Argueta, for example, 
denies that Carías did much of anything to modernize the country: the latter’s rule, while 
nominally Nationalist and conservative, froze in time the precepts of classic Liberalism 
and Positivism while the world around Honduras was changing rapidly.10 Woodward 
concluded that “[i]n retrospect, these dictatorships appear to have been desperate, rear-
guard efforts to save the New Liberal oligarchies and foreign investments from the 
growing popular force of working people and youth”.11 
One can disagree, therefore, about the role the caudillos played in the 
modernization of the Central American state and economy: They might be viewed as the 
prime example of the Central American, Liberal builder and modernizer, but also as the 
last obstacle in the progression from nineteenth century liberalism to twentieth century 
social democracy. While they were probably both, every historian can agree on one thing: 
by the late 1940s, these rulers had outlived their usefulness and outstayed their 
welcome. 
During the war, new opposition movements against the dictatorships developed, 
but differently in each Central American country. Generally speaking, though, they were 
urban and middle class (professionals, students, and mid-level army officers); 
emphasized nonviolent protest (if possible) and the ideals of the Atlantic Charter; and 
counted an unusually large number of women among its activists. In Guatemala, the 
movement seems to have lacked formal organization, although, since historians have to 
rely on the archives of the American embassy for information, it is also possible that 
opposition organizations in that country were unusually well-hidden or were ignored by 
American diplomats.  
In El Salvador, attempts made to organize opposition under the banner of 
“democracy” (in the pro-allied, anti-Fascist sense), but such organizations were generally 
outlawed by the regime. However, a very careful reading of the embassy files does seem 
to suggest the existence of an informal or underground network or movement. For 
example, some former members of ADS appear to have found refuge with the editorial 
staff of a British propaganda periodical. The local press sometimes published articles 
which were pro-Ally in content, but which also contained implied criticism of the local 
dictatorship. Lastly, a small number of American businessmen of long residence in San 
Salvador appear to have sympathized with, and were perhaps involved in, opposition to 
the regime. These men formed a tenuous link between the U.S. embassy and local 
discontent.  
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In Honduras, democratically-inspired opposition to the Carías regime seems to 
have been associated with the traditional Liberal Party, although that organization was 
itself largely defunct. It is unclear, however, whether people who were dissatisfied with 
the regime associated themselves with the Party or whether the Party leadership 
attempted to associate itself with the new undercurrent of dissatisfaction (or both).  
Lastly, it seems highly probable, despite local variations, that there were some 
organized links between the nationally based opposition groups, forming a transnational 
network of sorts. The existing Central American Union Party (CAUP)—a political 
movement which pressed for the unification of Central American states—appears to 
have been an important element in bringing oppositionists from across Central America 
together. Again, it is not clear whether oppositionists associated with CAUP or vise versa. 
Moreover, the traditional leader of the Union Party, Salvador Mandieta, was closely 
associated with Anastasio Somoza, the dictator of Nicaragua, making his politics 
vulnerable to suspicion. Aside from CAUP, there was the continuous flow and 
intermingling of political refugees in Mexico and Costa Rica (and El Salvador and 
Guatemala, after the fall of the dictatorial regimes there) which likely stimulated 
international contacts. But such international coordination as there appeared to be 
between national opposition movements might also have been caused by ideological 
sympathy and convergence of interests rather than actual contact. 
There seems to have been no organized political opposition to the central 
governments in the Central American countryside, although urban opposition groups, the 
liberal governments that originated from the latter, and historians suggested that there 
was a connection between the new movements and the suppressed peons.12 This is not 
to argue that Central American Indian and/or peasant populations were not suppressed, 
or even that they accepted their lot passively. It simply implies that the interests, 
methods, and objectives of the rural populations differed from those of the urban 
populations in Central America. Thus, rural union organizations and strikes mushroomed 
from roughly 1944 onwards, but it was usually not directed at the overthrow of the central 
government or even in sympathy with the goals of the urban middle class. In other cases 
rural populations had found ways to protect their interests within the structure of 
dictatorial state and had no interest in subverting it. Recent research suggests, for 
example, that the Martínez government allied itself with the Indian populations of 
western El Salvador—the very same populations that had been subject to the Matanza 
in the early 1930s. Since the urban middle class populations, despite their liberal politics,  
shared many of the fears and prejudices toward Indians with the aristocratic classes, an 
alliance between those former groups was not easily established in any case. In some 
instances, the failing dictatorial regimes tried to evoke the urban dweller’s fear for the 
Indian by actually stimulating the rural populations to revolt or by transporting hundreds 
of peasants armed with machetes to the cities to hold pro-government demonstrations—
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thereby attempting to scare the middle classes into supporting their “peace and order” 
regimes.13 
 
2. THE EMBASSIES AND THE OPPOSITION 
The legations’ experience with the opposition before 1944 was not a happy one. Due to 
the demands of wartime work and close cooperation with the local regimes, the 
Americans had no real understanding of the growing feeling of discontent among the 
urban middle classes. Old prejudices on the lack of political maturity of Central 
Americans did not help the matter. Something of a dialogue did develop between the 
Legations and the middle classes, but it was characterized by mutual misunderstandings. 
Many local oppositionists did not want to keep their ideals and plans hidden from the 
Americans. Taking American propaganda in favor of the “democratic cause” at face 
value, some hoped that the embassies could be involved in their political ambitions and 
sent their manifestos to the ambassadors—yet when the Americans did not react 
favorably to these entreaties, they became ever more accusatory, rather than solicitous, 
in tone.  
 
2.1 Growing opposition in El Salvador 
After his experience with the suppression of ADS, Frazer remained aloof of the periodical 
expressions of discontent and focused his energies on the war-effort. In May 1942, 
another attempt was made to involve the minister in local politics by a newly founded 
organization of “anti-Fascist” writers—composed of journalists who hoped that they could 
avoid the regime’s censors by defining their activities in terms of the democratic cause. 
The organization quickly named Frazer its honorary president and informed the 
American legation that it would gladly follow its instructions, in effect surrendering itself 
to American protection. Frazer remained noncommittal, however. When the Martínez 
regime started to harass the anti-Fascist writers, the legation brushed it off as the latest 
episode of “political passions” that plagued the Latins. Likewise, when the legation found 
that the Salvadoran government had temporarily imprisoned political exiles from 
Honduras, Frazer would not confront the authorities about this because it was extremely 
“sensitive” to critique on its practice of keeping prisoners incommunicado and Frazer did 
not want to give “needless offence”.14  
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In early 1943, Frazer reached retirement age and left the service. Walter Clarence 
Thurston took charge of the Salvadoran post. Like Frazer—but markedly unlike his 
colleagues at the other Central American capitals—Thurston was a career diplomat with 
extensive experience in Latin American affairs and had an admirable grasp of the 
Spanish language. Born in the nineteenth century, Thurston was an “old school 
gentleman” who liked to quote Talleyrand and told his younger officers not to display “too 
much zeal”. The new minister was distinctly proud of what he claimed was his 
involvement in developing the Good Neighbor policy, particularly the non-intervention 
element. Thus, Thurston was both temperamentally inclined to remain aloof of politics 
and—unlike Frazer whose justifications for noninterference were somewhat uncertain—
entertained a sophisticated understanding of his diplomatic duties, based on the Good 
Neighbor principle.15 
Thurston was a serious looking man who, with his round spectacles and 
impeccably combed hair, looked more like a village school teacher than the tested 
diplomat that he really was. In 1939, he led the evacuation of the American legation near 
the Republican government of Spain, running a “gantlet of bombs” while Barcelona 
surrendered to Franco’s troops. Some years later, when distinctly unlucky Thurston was 
chargé d’affaires in the Soviet Union, he had to evacuate his post because German 
troops were quickly advancing on the capital. Neither was he a stranger to Latin 
American revolutions: in 1920, he was the American chargé to Guatemala during the 
overthrow of the dictatorial Cabrera regime. The Salvadoran assignment offered no 
respite to the new minister: the pressures of wartime diplomacy had not abated yet while 
local political tensions were coming to the surface. Thurston was to lead his post through 
yet another crisis.16 
While he had to devote much of his time to the war-effort, Thurston did seem to 
regret, however, that the normal, peacetime work of the legation suffered under the 
strain of war—needlessly so. Around March, the minister informed the Department that, 
as the real crisis of the war was abating, his post should not be burdened with the many 
required reports on wartime measures. Even more important, he felt that it was high time 
that the Department provide some guidance for its policy toward El Salvador.17 
By the time Thurston made this carefully worded complaint, there was a real need 
for policy guidelines concerning local politics, as opposed to wartime policies. Local 
politics were heating up as rumors spread that Martínez was preparing another 
                                                 
15 Henderson ADST interview; “Walter Thurston, former envoy to the Americas, is dead at 79, 
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“reelection”, this time for the 1944-1948 tenure. The Salvadoran president himself 
attempted to mentally prepare the minister for the continuismo campaign almost from the 
day he arrived at his post. He explained to Thurston, during the ceremonies surrounding 
the latter’s presentation of credentials, that “liberty” in El Salvador was not the kind of 
liberty that a North American might be used to.18 At the same time, the regime used 
every trick in the book to suggest that the United States supported the new continuismo 
campaign: In his weekly speeches, which were themselves inspired on Roosevelt’s 
fireside chats, Martínez regularly referred to wartime cooperation and the many 
American projects to improve roads, sanitation, and agriculture in Salvador—suggesting 
that his regime provided an irreplaceable link between Salvador and American 
largesse. 19  Complementing the government’s public propaganda was the tried and 
tested Central American tactic of the “whispering campaign”: a welter of planted rumors 
which suggested that the United States would never accept a change of regime during 
the war.20 Naturally, Martínez needed some more substantial signs of American support 
to back up his claims. So, on July 7, Thurston was officially invited to attend a banquet in 
Santa Anna in honor of Martínez, which turned out to be the official kick-off of Martínez’ 
reelection campaign. The embassy found out about the real purpose of the banquet 
when it was too late to decline the formal invitation outright without causing something of 
a diplomatic scandal.21 Even more deviously, the Salvadoran regime attempted to get a 
U.S. fiat for the constitutional changes that were necessary to keep Martínez in power by 
claiming that a review of the country’s first law was necessary anyway to allow for the 
expropriation and sale of “Axis” possessions in Salvador.22 
Continuismo had always been met with particularly stubborn resistance in El 
Salvador. During the 1943 campaign, that resistance was even more dogged than four 
years earlier. Much like the regime, the opposition aggressively sought American 
                                                 
18 Thurston to the Secretary of State, Despatch 1, January 14, 1943, PR El Salvador, Box 76, cl. 
123: Thurston. 
19  For example: Thurston to the Secretary of State, Despatch 214, March 23, 1943, PR El 
Salvador, Box 82, cl. 802.1: Executive Departments; Thurston to the Secretary of State, Despatch 
259, April 6, 1943, PR El Salvador, Box 82, cl. 802.1: Executive Departments; Thurston to the 
Secretary of State, Despatch 269, April 8, 1943, PR El Salvador, Box 82, cl. 802.1: Executive 
Departments; Thurston to the Secretary of State, Despatch 115, February 19, 1943, PR El 
Salvador, Box 82, cl. 803: Legislative Branch. 
20 Ellis to Thurston, September 9, 1943, PR El Salvador (SCF), Box 8, Vol. I, cl. 800: El Salvador. 
21 Gerhard Gade, (U.S. Chargé d’Affaires to El Salvador), untitled memorandum, July, 19, 1943, 
PR El Salvador, Box 82, cl. 800: El Salvador; Thurston to the Secretary of State, Despatch 624, 
July 19, 1943, PR El Salvador, Box 82, cl. 800: El Salvador; Thurston to Mauricio Callardo (Chief 
of Protocol of El Salvador), July 24, 1943, PR El Salvador (SCF), Box 8, Vol I, cl. 800: El 
Salvador; Thurston to the Secretary of State, Despatch 618, July 28, 1943, PR El Salvador (SCF), 
Box 8, Vol I, cl. 800: El Salvador. 
22 Thurston to the Secretary of State, Despatch 498, June 26, 1943, PR El Salvador (SCF), Box 8, 
Vol I, cl. 711.3: Proclaimed List; Acheson to Thurston, Instruction 259, July 27, 1943, PR El 
Salvador (SCF), Box 8, Vol I, cl. 711.3: Proclaimed List; Thurston to the Secretary of State, 
Despatch 966, November 16, 1943, PR El Salvador (SCF), Box 8, Vol I, cl. 711.3: Proclaimed List; 
Thurston to the Secretary of State, Despatch 1080, December 16, 1943, PR El Salvador (SCF), 
Box 8, Vol I, cl. 711.3: Proclaimed List; Thurston to the Secretary of State, Despatch 1119, 
December 29, 1943, PR El Salvador (SCF), Box 8, Vol I, cl. 711.3: Proclaimed List. 
SACRIFICES OF WAR 
 
229 
backing, although, unlike the regime, it seems to have been under the impression that 
the United States really did sympathize with its fight against dictatorship. Oppositionists 
lined up to speak with the ambassador, sent him their own propaganda leaflets, and 
initiated their own whispering campaign—always emphasizing the supposed analogies 
between the fight against European Fascism and Central American dictatorship. 23 
Toward the end of 1943, a local student organization, the Frente Democrático 
Universitario, attempted to involve the embassy more directly in its protests against 
continuismo: On December 4, the students presented a plan to Thurston to hold a 
parade on the anniversary of Pearl Harbor, supposedly to demonstrate their support for 
the Four Freedoms and Atlantic Charter and their solidarity with the American people. 
The parade would end at the American embassy and its climax would be the 
presentation of some sort of petition to the ambassador. Most probably, that text would 
be a veiled attack on the Martínez regime and its suppression of the Four Freedoms.24 
While Thurston lacked firm policy guidelines, or even the opportunity to do an in-
depth investigation of the local situation, his natural inclination as an experienced “Good 
Neighbor” was to avert all attempts to draw him into local politics—which he did with 
considerable skill. On the one hand, the ambassador discouraged the “scoundrels” of 
the regime to seek his help.25 Being unable to ignore the invitation to the government’s 
banquet in Santa Anna outright, Thurston convinced the organizers that pressing 
matters prevented his attendance and sent two lower ranking officers in his place.26 
Seeing through the regime’s ploy to involve the embassy in a reform of the constitution, 
the embassy informed authorities in no uncertain terms that the United States had 
requested no changes to the constitution; that Salvadoran laws enabling the prosecution 
of the war were deemed adequate; and that the government should make no attempt to 
convey the impression that the United States was in any way involved with the 
contemplated revisions.27 Perhaps Thurston’s most significant action was to cancel the 
shipment of 1,000 American sub-machineguns to the Salvadoran government. Navy 
                                                 
23 The 1943 files are replete with examples of this kind of activity. For a non-exhaustive sample 
covering the month of September, see: Gade to the Secretary of State, Despatch 714, September 
1, 1943, PR El Salvador, Box 82, cl. 800: Salvador; “El pueblo Salvadoreño” to Thurston, 
September 4, 1943, PR El Salvador, Box 82, cl. 800: Salvador; Maleady, Memorandum on Efforts 
of President Martinez to oust Certain Officials of Banco Hipotecario, September 9, 1943, PR El 
Salvador, Box 82, cl. 800: Salvador; “Asociacion Nacional Democrática” to Thurston, September 
21. 1943, PR El Salvador, Box 82, cl. 800: Salvador; “Frente Magisterial Democrático” to 
Thurston, September 28, 1943, PR El Salvador, Box 82, cl. 800: Salvador; Thurston to the 
Secretary of State, Despatch 801, September 28, PR El Salvador, Box 82, cl. 800: Salvador. 
24 Rafael Eguizábal h. et al. to Thurston, December 4, 1943, PR El Salvador, Box 82, cl. 800: 
Salvador. 
25 Thurston to the Secretary of State, Despatch 430, June 4, 1943, PR El Salvador, Box 82, cl. 
800: Salvador. 
26 Thurston to Callardo, July 24, 1943, PR El Salvador (SCF), Box 8, Vol. 1, cl. 800: El Salvador; 
Thurston to the Secretary of State, Despatch 618, July 28, 1943, PR El Salvador (SCF), Box 8, 
Vol. 1, cl. 800: El Salvador. 
27 Thurston, untitled memorandum, June 21, 1943, PR El Salvador (SCF), Box 8, Vol. 1, cl. 800: 
El Salvador; DVR, Memorandum on Projected Reform of the Salvadoran Constitution, June 29, 
1943, PR El Salvador (SCF), Box 8, Vol. 1, cl. 800: El Salvador. 
Chapter 7 
 
230 
intelligence had informed the legation that these weapons would probably be distributed 
to members of Pro Patria, to be used against the opposition in imitation of the 1932 
Matanza.28 
Having told off the president’s henchmen without confronting Martínez directly, 
Thurston felt that he had to take the same position in his dealings with the opposition.29 
Thus, the ambassador often received oppositionists personally and politely listened to 
their critique of the government, only to inform them that he was completely neutral in 
the matter.30 The case of the student demonstration offered something of a challenge 
since its purported intention was to support the allied cause. Initially, the ambassador 
informed the students that he appreciated their initiative, but that he could not receive 
their petition on December 8, as the anniversary of Pearl Harbor was an official holiday. 
Having no intention to give up that easily, the students informed Thurston that they 
would happily postpone their parade to December 11, the day that war was declared on 
Fascism. This time, Thurston could only offer the rather thin excuse that he wished all 
manner of celebration to be called off until final victory in the war was secure. Without 
the embassy’s patronage, the student parade, which had been intended to be a grand 
affair with much waving of the Salvadoran and American flags, turned out to be a modest 
gathering of some 400 nervous students (one sixth of whom, in the estimate of an 
embassy observer, were actually undercover policemen). While the government did not 
break up the supposedly pro-allied demonstration, some of the student leaders were 
spirited away by what oppositionists had come to describe as the Gestapo Martínista.31 
Thus it appeared, at first glance, that Thurston managed to steer clear of local 
politics. Incidentally, the private sympathies of embassy officials seem to have been 
somewhat at variance with their public stance. The Americans recognized that many 
oppositionists were conservative members of the professional classes, among whom 
were many friends and acquaintances of the embassy rather than the “communist” 
radicals described in government publications. Moreover, government suppression, long 
hidden from the public view, came out into the open with soldiers patrolling the streets 
and policemen lifting prominent lawyers and doctors from their beds and carrying them 
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off. The younger members of Thurston’s staff were sometimes unable to withhold their 
indignation over this situation from their official reports and it appears that even the 
ambassador himself, while trying to uphold his own maxim not to display “too much zeal”, 
had to make an effort not to let his personal views color his assessments. 
But whichever direction the sympathy of the embassy went, it maintained—
perhaps had no choice but to maintain—a cordial working relationship with the regime 
when wartime cooperation was concerned. Despite some indications in opposite 
direction, Thurston maintained the widely held conviction that the local dictators would 
survive the war. The embassy had no reliable indication of the extent of opposition to 
Martínez’ government. Furthermore, while Thurston’s adhesion to the nonintervention 
principle was beyond reproach when the traditional theatre of diplomacy was concerned, 
times had changed since the introduction of the Good Neighbor. Some fifteen years 
earlier, diplomats of Thurston’s generation had been in charge of small posts, with staffs 
of two officers and some clerks in the case of Central America. The chief of mission was 
generally able to put his stamp on all matters of diplomatic importance. Toward the end 
of the War, however, even the staffs of the small Central American posts had grown to 
include officers specialized in legal, cultural, intelligence, economic, and sanitary 
matters—bringing many spheres of local life into the field of one or another American 
embassy officer. While the “chief” coordinated the activities of these new officials, he 
generally limited his activities to diplomacy and rarely grasped the implications of his 
post’s increased activity in non-political matters.  
Mainly due to the efforts of a local American businessman who was in close touch, 
and obviously in sympathy, with local oppositionists from the professional classes, the 
embassy in El Salvador was most fully informed of the views that local discontents held 
of the War, United States policy, and the Martínez dictatorship. The businessman in 
question was Winnall Dalton, father to the famous Salvadoran poet and revolutionist 
Roque Dalton and grandfather to “Roquito” and Juan José Dalton, founding members of 
the F.M.L.N. While apparently little known to historians, the Dalton family’s tradition of 
opposition to right-wing terror began with Winnall, not Roque. Although the pater familias 
was considerably more conservative than his heirs, in the context of 1944 El Salvador he 
was a true revolutionary. And thanks to his position as one of the most successful 
American businessmen in Salvador, he had the attention of the American ambassador.32 
 Winnall’s first attempt to approach Thurston about the rising discontent among the 
professional classes was a letter which described the latter’s plight in detail. Dalton 
claimed that he merely wanted to know how to respond to questions from his Salvadoran 
friends, who observed that while the State Department would not intervene against the 
dictators, it had in fact intervened on many occasions during the War and therefore had 
a “moral responsibility” toward the Salvadoran opposition. The United States, Dalton’s 
friends said, had intervened to keep Nazi-sympathizers from being appointed to 
government offices; to deport Axis nationals and liquidate their property; to protect 
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American economic interests; to plant pro-Ally information in the papers; to supply lend-
lease weapons to the regime, etc. Furthermore, Minister Frazer had publically defended 
the Martínez regime and its cooperative stance during the war and had allowed the 
dictator to adopt the pro-democratic language of the war while he was in effect a “nazi-
fascist”. Aside from the political and economic angle… 
You intervened, with sincere sentiments we desire to believe, to give us 
sewers and modern slaughterhouses, swimming pools and bridges, 
highways and school-children feeding-programs. WHY? (…) We have had 
no voice in accepting these gifts you have brought. You have dealt with the 
illegal government your legation helped to perpetuate and your country has 
sustained by recognition. We resent this Good Neighbor program of yours – 
we do not want charity and you offend us by extending it. You are a great 
and powerful people – why do you give us sewers but aid in the denial of 
Human Rights?  
Dalton’s letters—too many and too long to deal with in full—represent the gap that had 
come to exist between the American conception of fighting a war for democracy and the 
Central American conception of living under a U.S. supported dictatorship. “Will it not be 
shameful for you Americans to see our people mowed down by your General Grant 
tanks? Could you not find a better and honorable use for them – or scrap them if you 
have too many?”, this letter pleaded, “To whom do you pretend to be a Good Neighbor? 
To the dictator or to the people of El Salvador?”33 
Initially, Dalton’s letters on behalf of the Salvadoran middle classes caught 
Thurston’s interest 34 and the ambassador counseled the Department that it might 
consider these sentiments in the definition of its post-war policy. Thurston summarized 
the views of the opposition, quite correctly it would seem, as follows: 
Our pronouncements such as the Atlantic charter and the Declaration of the 
Four Freedoms (the latter blazoned by us throughout El Salvador in the form 
of posters) are accepted literally by the Salvadorans as official endorsement 
of basic democratic principles which we desire to have prevail currently and 
universally, as is our assertion that the present war is a conflict between the 
forces of good and evil exemplified by the democratic doctrine and 
absolutism. It is difficult for them to reconcile these pronouncements with the 
fact that the United States tolerates and apparently is gratified to enter into 
association with governments in America which cannot be described as other 
than totalitarian – such as those headed by Getulio Vargas, General Trujillo, 
General Ubico, General Somoza, General Carías and, particularly, General 
Martínez. 
However, the ambassador reported, “a problem of this complex nature is not susceptible 
of ready solution and the most that should be attempted at this time is an empirical 
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search for improvements and careful study of plans for a revision of policy after the 
war”.35 
Despite his initial sympathy, Thurston was very distraught when it became clear 
that the opposition would not await the outcome of empirical searches and careful 
studies. As revolutionary ferment against the Martínez regime came out into the open 
and required some response from the embassy lest it remain on record as a supporter of 
the dictator, the ambassador became frustrated with the “unfair” interpretations of U.S. 
policy. Complaining that the Latin mind, which was often concealed beneath a “plausible 
appearance of cosmopolitanism”, could not wrap itself around U.S. policy, Thurston 
argued in June 1944 that from “our point of view (…) it would appear to be beyond 
further discussion that we have established and observed a policy of strict non-
intervention”. Parroting Dalton’s letters, the ambassador angrily noted after the fall of 
Martínez that  
“Prominent and seemingly intelligent Salvadorans have informed me with 
conviction that the road building activities, the activities of the Health and 
Sanitation Division, and other undertakings being conducted by us here 
constitute intervention. These “acts of intervention” were frequently cited to 
me as an argument for political intervention – “You are intervening in all 
these ways, why pretend that you cannot intervene to rid us of a dictatorship 
and prevent civil war?”36  
 
2.2 Growing opposition in Guatemala 
Already in 1941, Ubico legalized his continuance after 1944 by having the rubber-stamp 
congress review some “petitions” from “all over the country” which “demanded” that the 
President finish his good works. As in Salvador, local impatience with the Guatemalan 
regime increased in conjuncture with the new continuismo campaign, particularly 
because it occurred shortly after congress had approved a $200,000.00 “gift” to the 
President. This demonstrated that even Ubico’s much respected fight against official 
corruption was weaning. Government repression appears to have increased significantly 
during the war years, although the legation’s files are largely quiet on the matter—
possibly because it regularly confused suppression of local opposition and suppression 
of Nazi plots. Not less than 90 people were arrested for “talking against” congress’ 
generous gift to the president.37 Ubico himself began to show signs of increasing anxiety 
and his notoriously inflammable mood included increasingly violent impulses. While the 
regime had generally relied on exile and short imprisonments before the war, torture and 
execution became more common during the early 1940s, with Ubico reportedly joining in 
the former activity. Legation officials had to bear some of the brunt of Ubico’s temper as 
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the president’s diatribes against “communists” and the laxness of the American system 
increased.38 
The split among the ranks of Americans in Guatemala continued through 1943. 
Naval Attaché Frank June attempted at various points to get the legation in touch with 
dissatisfied elements, but, perhaps partly due to the personal friction between Des 
Portes and the attaché, the legation ignored June’s efforts.39  
The growing opposition toward the regime, combined with friction among legation 
officers and Ubico’s growing paranoia, caused an incident with far reaching 
consequences in 1943. Yet the details are sketchy because many of the legation files 
documenting it appear to have been destroyed. In that year, a [young] oppositionist from 
the Mirón family was arrested for plotting against the government. After interrogation and, 
probably, torture, Mirón named several accomplices, most of them young Guatemalan 
professionals like himself but also including several members of the diplomatic corps: 
Mexican ambassador Del Rio; Military Attaché June; Colonel Glass, the American 
director of the Guatemalan military academy; and Secretary Dunn of the American 
legation.  
While it is highly unlikely that these people were actually involved in a plot against 
the government, it seems probable that there was enough circumstantial evidence to 
compromise their standing with local authorities. All the individuals mentioned appear to 
have been good friends with some of the Guatemalan plotters. This was not surprising in 
itself, since they were of comparable age and social background and, in tiny Guatemala 
City, likely became acquainted at official or societal occasions. By piecing together 
several otherwise unrelated snippets of information from the legation’s files, it also 
seems probable that June, Glass, and Dunn shared a negative view of the local regime 
with their Guatemalan friends and ambassador Del Rio. June’s views are, of course, well 
known by now. The major made several references in his reports to the Mexican 
ambassador whom he seems to have held in high esteem (at one point, June reports to 
his department, perhaps as a intentional affront to Des Portes, that Del Rio was the 
“most forceful” diplomat in Guatemala). Del Rio shared his very low opinion of Ubico with 
June on several occasions and throughout his tenure tried to ingratiate himself with 
Guatemalan discontents.40 Glass appears to have joined June and Del Rio in several of 
these talks and may also have expressed an undiplomatic opinion about the Ubico 
government in public, since legation files refer to the colonel’s many “indiscretions”.  
June reported his suspicion that Ubico sent fake oppositionists to his office to hear 
him out on several occasions. He also suspected that Ubico kept an eye on the legation 
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and its officers. 41  It seems probable, therefore, that Ubico was well-aware of the 
unsympathetic attitude of several American officials. Whatever young Mirón did or did 
not “confess”, Ubico seems to have jumped at the opportunity to make life hard on his 
enemies in the diplomatic corps. Due to aforementioned gaps in the files of the American 
legation—in combination with the legation’s request to the Guatemalan government to 
have all references to the American legation removed from the government’s files on the 
Mirón case42—it is unclear how far Ubico took his protests or even what the nature of the 
allegations against legation officers was. What is clear, is that the legation set to work 
almost immediately to dissociate itself from all persons connected to the Mirón case. 
Although the link is undocumented, it is telling that shortly after the Mirón confessions, 
June, Glass, and Dunn were all transferred out of Guatemala. The Mexican government 
also withdrew Del Rio from the country. 
Some months later, Des Portes himself was transferred to Costa Rica because of 
the Department’s fear that the Guatemalan government would declare him persona non 
grata. This time, the incident seems not to be related to the Mirón case, but to an old 
vendetta between the minister and the Guatemalan minister of Foreign Affairs, Carlos 
Salazar. Always serious about the supposed Nazi fifth column, Des Portes had lobbied 
hard to have the assets of the economically very powerful and allegedly pro-Nazi 
[Nottebohm] family [expropriated/frozen/blacklisted]. Naturally, this Guatemalan-German 
family had very powerful connections, among them Salazar, the former attorney of the 
family. According to Des Portes’ own account regarding the circumstances surrounding 
his transfer, it was the intrigues of the “pro Nazi” foreign minister that discredited him 
with the Guatemalan authorities.43 Since Des Portes’ transfer occurred shortly after the 
Mirón case, one can speculate that Salazar, or other enemies of the minister, made their 
move in [late] 1943 because the Mirón case had demonstrated the Americans’ extreme 
sensitivity to the displeasure of the Ubico regime. 
 
Des Portes was replaced by Boaz W. Long, who went to Guatemala with some 
misgivings, as he had hoped to be named ambassador to one of the bigger Latin 
American republics. Despite his obsession with roads and his interest in the ruined 
Guatemalan city of Antigua, the restoration of which seems to have been one of Long’s 
new projects, the new ambassador’s capacity for work soon had the embassy up and 
running again since there was no time for a letdown while the war continued: “No 
American should lull himself asleep thinking that we have accomplished something very 
wonderful because there is a great deal of German influence left [in Guatemala], 
                                                 
41 June to Navy Intelligence Division, Serial 16-43, January 19, 1943, PR Guatemala, Box 69, cl. 
121: Naval Attaché.  
42 Drew, Memorandum on Subjects discussed by the American Ambassador, Mr. Boaz Long, with 
his Excellency, Licenciado don Carlos Salazar, July 16, 1943, PR Guatemala, Box 79, cl. 800.2: 
Cabinet; Long, Memorandum of Conversation with Carlos Salazar, July 16, 1943, PR Guatemala 
(SCF), Box 6, cl. 800. 
43 Drew to Des Portes, February 17, 1943, PR Guatemala (SCF), Box 7, cl. 123: Foreign Service 
Officers. 
Chapter 7 
 
236 
although it is not as openly manifest as in the past”.44 One of the first reports completed 
during Long’s tenure was an inventory of German activities and Guatemalan wartime 
cooperation. The new ambassador found that Germans were less confident about the 
outcome of the war than they had been before and Guatemalans who formerly 
sympathized with the Axis were now switching allegiance to the United Nations. A report 
on the stability on the regime was deemed unnecessary since the political situation was 
stable in Long’s assessment and had been so, with the exception of minor incidents, 
since the start of the Ubico administration.45 
With Ubico’s next term fast approaching, oppositionists tried to get the Americans 
on their side. Word on the street was that with the end of the war in sight, the Unites 
States was beginning to rethink its relationship to the Latin American dictators and some 
believed that Long had been send to replace Des Portes, assumed to be an old friend of 
Ubico, to prepare the country for such a move.46 They were soon disappointed. The first 
attempt by local oppositionists from the professional classes to get in touch with Long 
was a polite request from one Dr. Bianchi to talk with several “young gentlemen”, who, it 
was carefully implied, were out of tune with the present political situation. Long rejected 
the invite with equal courtesy, noting in his diary that “I thought it would be better not to 
receive groups of persons who might be unfriendly to the government, in view of our 
policy of not interfering in the internal affairs of other nations”. Again, the notion that the 
United States could remain entirely neutral in local affairs appeared outdated: Some 
months earlier, Ubico had told legislators that relations with the United States had never 
been better: The many public works that were being completed in Guatemala with 
American participation served to underscore the close ties, the caudillo claimed. As a 
symbol of the Guatemalan president’s closeness to his American counterpart, a new 
hospital was completed and dedicated “Hospital Roosevelt”.47 
In fact, Long appears to have been biased to the status quo in Guatemala. 
Calculations in his diary show that in the 122 years of Guatemalan independence, the 
country had been ruled by dictators more than half of the time. The ambassador 
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seemingly believed that this was the natural state for a Central American republic.48 This 
may appear to be an uncharacteristically fatalistic view for a man who was so single-
mindedly devoted to the uplift of Latin peoples, but in fact, Long’s desire to help 
backward peoples had always been directed at economic development, not the “moral” 
or political kind. When an American called Renwick visited Long in April 1944—they 
were old acquaintances from Long’s previous work in El Salvador—the former revealed 
to the ambassador a plan “for developing Central America, particularly for easing over 
the transition period from dictatorship to constitutional governments, which must 
inevitably follow the approaching (?) peace”. Eager to drop the subject, Long suggested 
to Renwick that he talk to Thurston about it. Privately, the ambassador felt that “it 
seemed doubtful that any one who was active in our Foreign Service would get very far 
by dropping into Washington and making proposals calculated to eliminate the dictators 
from the Central American Republics”. In the long run, “circumstances beyond our 
control could do this without our intervention”.49 
With some six months to go before Ubico’s downfall, the entire embassy staff was 
assembled to report on the local political situation at the request of the Department. 
“Relations between the United States and Guatemala are excellent”, was the general 
consensus: “the Government, under the direction of President Ubico, has cooperated 
wholeheartedly for the advancement of the common war effort”. Echoing older rumors 
and suspicions that several officers of the administration were in fact Nazi sympathizers, 
the report noted that “the policy of friendship and cooperation with the United States 
pursued by President Ubico more than nullifies any such sentiments within the 
Government”. As for the future of the regime: 
…the internal political situation of Guatemala is as stable as that of any 
country in Central and possibly South America. While it may be true that the 
Guatemalan people have lost a certain measure of freedom of speech and 
political activity under the administration of President Ubico, it is nevertheless 
true that the country as a whole has benefitted by stability and honesty in 
public administration. While there is an element of discontent in the country, 
the opposition of persons constituting this faction is based largely on 
dissatisfaction with lack of change rather than any specific complaint against 
the President or the administration. Such elements, furthermore, are 
disorganized and leaderless and are completely lacking in the physical 
means of bringing about an overthrow of the administration.50 
 
2.3 Growing opposition in Honduras 
For years, opposition to the Carías regime had been led by disgruntled presidential 
hopefuls and many “generals” from his own National Party and from the Liberal Party. 
Several armed incursions into Honduras from neighboring states were attempted by the 
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traditional oppositionists, especially around the 1936 continuismo campaign. Yet, being 
poorly coordinated, all expeditions were repulsed with relative ease by the central 
government, partly due to the rather formidable air force that Carías had built. 
Incidentally, the effect of Carías’ famed use of military airplanes (he was probably the 
first military leader in the world to use airpower against civilian targets) seems to have 
been largely psychological: one journalist estimates that throughout the 1930s, the 
Honduran air force claimed only two victims: one mule and one rebel general. 51 
Considering that there was no scarcity of generals in Honduras, the death of the mule 
was probably the greatest loss that Carías’ pilots inflicted on the enemy. 
Prewar opposition to Carías was characterized mostly by division. Angel Zúñiga 
Huete was the most well-known Liberal opponent of the caudillo, but there were 
dissidents within his own party and only a tenacious alliance was maintained with the 
rebellious Legalista wing of the National Party—consisting of former members of Carías’ 
party and led by the latter’s one-time vice presidential candidate, Venancio Callejas. 
Moreover, opposition leaders were scattered all over Central America and Mexico where 
they were often used as pawns in the diplomatic games between the caudillos, who, 
according to the expediency of the moment, either helped or harassed the Honduran 
exiles. It was difficult for the exiled leaders to communicate securely and secretly, which, 
together with their very different political backgrounds, partly explains why they never 
managed to agree on a strategy to oust Carías: some preferred armed invasions, others 
wished to employ legal measures, while yet a third group managed to reconcile itself 
with the Cariato over time. 
As in other Central American countries, new opposition to the regime gained 
strength inside Honduras during the war. Like those in neighboring states, the Honduran 
variant was middle class, urban, inspired by the war against Fascism, and could be 
roughly divided into a military wing and a civilian wing. But there were also important 
differences between developments in Honduras and in the rest of Central America. For 
one, Carías, the former militia general, had resisted all pressures in favor of the 
professionalization of the Honduran army.52 Only his air force and “honor guard” were 
well-trained and equipped. Contact between Honduran troops and American troops 
during the war were kept to a minimum and the caudillo were very reluctant to send 
officers abroad for training. Hence, the professional cadre of young officers that played a 
significant role in the 1944 revolutions in Salvador and Guatemala was much smaller 
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and weaker in Honduras. Furthermore, Honduras was economically the most backward 
of all Central American countries. The exploitation of its main export crop, bananas, was 
in the hands of American companies which had formed an enclave economy in the north 
of Honduras. The rate of urbanization was correspondingly low in Honduras: 
Tegucigalpa was the largest city with some 70,000 inhabitants. The second largest city, 
San Pedro Sula, was far behind with roughly 20,000 inhabitants. Thus, the urban middle 
class of Honduras was also much smaller than the (in itself relatively insignificant) middle 
classes of neighboring states.53 
 
The National-Liberal divide had been a fixture of Honduran political life for two or three 
decades. The Liberal Party was divided between an exiled community and a group of 
Liberals that was still resident in Honduras itself, although it kept a low profile to avoid 
harassment. It was convenient for the regime to focus on the Liberal Party as a readily 
identifiable enemy. The Liberals were easily linked to other enemies of the moment, 
particularly Mexican “communists” and German “Nazis”, thus maintaining a 
straightforward divide between “good” (Nationalist) and “evil” (Liberal) which offered the 
necessary flexibility. 
Minister Erwin never met any of the opponents of Carías. Zúñiga Huete and 
Callejas had left Honduras in 1932 and 1936 respectively, well before Erwin took charge 
of his post. Therefore, much of what Erwin knew about the traditional opposition, he 
learned from the Carías government itself. During the war, as the legation and the 
regime cooperated closely, Carías and his underlings aggressively pushed an image of 
the old Liberal Party as being a crypto-Fascist organization, an image that Erwin came to 
adopt and convey to Washington. Erwin seems to have overlooked the development of 
discontent among new social groups entirely. With the exception, perhaps, of minister 
[…] Stewart in Nicaragua—who was reportedly so beholden to Somoza’s wishes that the 
caudillo himself sardonically referred to the diplomat as “my steward”—Erwin became 
one of the most despised American diplomats among Central American oppositionists. 
During the early years of the war Erwin adopted Carías’ claim that the Liberals had 
a working relationship with Nazi agents54, despite the fact that other diplomatic posts 
reported on several occasions that proof for the connection was nonexistent.55 Rather 
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than substantial evidence, the idea that the political “outs” were opportunistic and would 
welcome any alliance of convenience was persuasive enough to establish a link 
between Liberals and Nazis in Erwin’s mind. More than anything else, the demonization 
of the Liberal Party cemented the legation’s support for the local regime—acting on the 
assumption that the choice in Honduras was between a benign traditional dictatorship 
and an opposition backed by totalitarian allies.  
Throughout September, 1943, for example, the Carías regime was on edge due to 
an elaborately planned revolution involving Zúñiga Huete’s Liberals, which turned out a 
spectacular failure. The regime hit back hard against Liberals in the San Pedro Sula 
area, arresting at random many known Liberals. Interestingly, the American consulates 
in the area reported, around the same time, that American naval vessels visited the area 
affected by the revolution and that navy airplanes made overflights of Honduran territory 
in “a gesture of firm control”. While the young consuls seem to have been at a loss to 
explain the presence of the U.S. navy, Erwin must have known—perhaps even 
requested—that the U.S. navy was to visit the area. Days before the first ships arrived 
on the horizon, the minister reported to Washington that the United States should help 
Carías keep the country stable in the interest of wartime cooperation.56 
About one year later, another plot against the government was discovered—this 
time it did not involve the Liberals but appeared to foreshadow the 1944 revolutions in El 
Salvador and Guatemala. The men behind the 1943 plot, which involved an attempt on 
Carías’ life, were young army officers who were professionally trained abroad (some at 
the Guatemalan military academy which eventually turned against Ubico), but who did 
not have any opportunity for advancement in their own country because the old Carías-
men dominated the upper ranks of the army. The plot was uncovered before it was 
executed because Guatemalan spies picked up rumors and Ubico gave Carías a timely 
warning. The result was another wave of arrests, not aimed solely against those directly 
involved in the plot, but also against the community of Liberal opponents inside the 
country.57 
The American legation was taken completely by surprise. Part of the reason for the 
oversight was probably the earlier conflict between Erwin and Military Attaché Austin—
who had been transferred out of Honduras—since one of the plotters was an old 
informant of Austin and might have kept the attaché informed had the latter still been at 
his post. More important, both the government and the legation were obsessed with the 
Liberal/Nazi threat. As the legation had to admit, the military plot did not involve Liberals 
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or Nazis—not even Communists! Somewhat shaken by an uprising where none was 
suspected, Erwin congratulated Carías on his near escape from death. The minister 
even reassured the President that, had the plot succeeded, the United States would 
have never recognized the revolutionary regime. Where Erwin got that idea is unclear. 
The legation’s archives or a history book are the likeliest candidates since the non-
recognition policy had been dead for nearly ten years. Not surprisingly, the Department, 
while expressing its commendation for Erwin’s prompt reporting on the plot, immediately 
informed its minister that it had no policy of holding back recognition—adding somewhat 
acidly that Erwin might wish to consult some books on international law.58 
 
The 1943 murder plot, coming from such an unexpected corner, shook up the legation’s 
evaluation of the opposition. Since the German threat also appeared less formidable in 
1943 than it did before, the importance of the Liberal/Nazi connection receded to the 
background, although Erwin continued to focus on the traditional Liberal opponents of 
Carías, arguing that the “desire to bring about his downfall is not widespread and is 
confined to political cliques dominated by disappointed seekers for the presidential 
office”.59 On the Department's request, the embassy reported in 1944 that there were no 
more totalitarian subversive movements in Honduras (either Nazi or Communist). 
Revolutionary attempts against the President were an "old fashioned Latin American 
affair”:  
As Latin American dictators go, President Carias is fairly good—far better 
than most, perhaps less enlightened than some. His record should be viewed 
in perspective, and with regard to local conditions. Most of the people he 
governs are illegitimate (54.5 percent) and illiterate (74.5 percent). When he 
assumed office, he was faced with substantially the same problem met and 
overcome by James I in Scotland and Cardinal Richelieu in France—the 
establishment and maintenance of order. James I (1394-1437) smashed the 
semi-independent chiefs (...); Richelieu (1585-1642) smashed the feudal 
power of the Rohans and Montmorencys; and Carias smashed the guerilla 
generals. James and Richelieu fought and beheaded; Carias merely 
imprisons or exiles. His measures are often arbitrary, and there are 
occasional cases of personal injustice, but, by and large, the system is fairly 
sound; like his great predecessors, President Carias will leave this country 
more civilized and otherwise better off than he found it eleven years ago.60 
 
3. SPRINGTIME IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
By January 1944, the middle levels Department of State became aware of the growing 
opposition against dictatorial regimes in Central America. Although Washington 
realistically assumed that discontent on the isthmus could lead to changes in the 
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leadership in that region, its estimate was that such changes were still a distant 
eventuality. Considering the reports it received from the embassies in Central America, 
this was a logical conclusion.  
Therefore, a change in policy was not necessary at the time. The Department did 
council its posts to be careful not to get drawn into politics, however: 
In view of the particularly delicate situation existing at the moment, the 
Department wishes to reiterate its injunctions against any avoidable act of 
omission or commission which might be interpreted as reflecting on the local 
political situation. Excessive public friendliness toward the Administration in 
power or the participation of United States officials in pro-administration 
meetings of a political nature would be [sic.] almost as undesirable as the 
identification of the Embassy with opposition to the existing Administration. It 
is to be remembered that there is bitter open and covert opposition to 
virtually all of the administrations in power; that it is almost inevitable that this 
opposition will eventually come to power in some countries; and that the rule 
of non-interference in internal politics applies even to those regimes which, in 
seeking to perpetuate themselves in power, have gone out of their way to 
emphasize their friendship for the United States. The respective missions will 
doubtless find it very difficult to define the line where friendliness toward the 
government of an allied sister Republic ends and friendliness toward a 
particular political regime begins, but the Department is confident that they 
will handle this problem with particular discretion.61 
A particularly interesting aspect in the Department’s standpoint is its continued trust in 
the noninterference principle. As far as local perceptions of American policy were 
concerned, that policy was dead. The American ambassador could not very well argue 
that the United States had no interest in local affairs while the War Department delivered 
tanks; the Sanitation Division built sewers; the Justice Department trained local law 
enforcement units; the Coordination Committee plastered walls with posters demanding 
victory for democracy; etc, etc. After three years of total war, the policy that was so 
successful in the 1930s just did not apply anymore. 
Of further interest is that Department believed that Central Americans would 
accept the philosophical argument that friendliness to a certain government did not equal 
friendliness to a particular regime. The embassies would learn that this divide was 
meaningless in practice, but it did allow the officers in the Department to avoid difficult 
questions. As long as the illusion was entertained that the United States could maintain 
friendly relations with any government despite changes in the particular regime, the 
State Department did not have to reevaluate its policy and could continue with business 
as usual—which, in early 1944, meant the prosecution of the war in Europe and Asia. 
The Department was confident that its officers on the spot could work within these 
guidelines, as long as they maintained an attitude of particular discretion. The reality was 
often different. 
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3.1 One down 
To his annoyance, Thurston received an official invitation to the inauguration of Martínez’ 
new term on March […], just days before the event was to take place. The ambassador 
knew that this was no simple oversight: the invitations were sent to all foreign diplomats 
in the capital at the very last minute to prevent them from consulting their own 
departments. Trouble was brewing in the capital and the presence of the entire 
diplomatic corps at the inauguration ceremonies could be interpreted as foreign support 
for Martinez’ continuismo. The absence of any one diplomat would be regarded as a 
sign of disapproval. To attend or not was, therefore, an important policy decision with 
potentially far-reaching consequences. Policy—at least when local affairs were 
concerned—was not the Department’s strong point in this period. Just days after the 
inauguration, Thurston send the Department a slightly vexed telegram, asking to be held 
up to date about policy decisions and announcement; as the embassy relied on the 
American press for that sort of information. It was not just the Department that was 
negligent, however: reports coming from the embassies in Central America in the 
previous year painted a picture of stable regimes, despite some rising discontent.62 
It was up to Thurston to decide what to do with the invitation, but options were few. 
Thurston explained to his colleague the Mexican ambassador, who seems to have been 
willing to snub Martínez, that an ambassador was just an agent and not the maker of 
policy. In the absence of instructions, Thurston said, the best thing was to follow 
diplomatic protocol and ceremony so as to prevent insulting the host government and 
thereby embarking on a new policy. Thus the diplomatic corps polity sat through the 
inauguration ceremonies, a decision that met the general anger and indignation of 
oppositionists.63 
 
Martínez’ third term was to be his shortest. On April 2 shooting broke out in San 
Salvador while the president was in Santa Anna. Initially, things went well for the 
opposition, which sent two trucks of armed men to Santa Anna to apprehend Martínez. 
By some inexplicable coincidence or oversight, however, the armed convoy of 
oppositionists going to Santa Anna passed the armed convoy of the president going to 
San Salvador without noticing each other. By April 3, Martínez was firmly entrenched in 
the capital’s police barracks and leading the defense of his government. The opposition 
was reluctant to bomb Martínez’ position because political prisoners were held at the 
barracks. By late afternoon, many oppositionists had decided that to save their own 
skins: the failure to capture or kill Martínez had been very disheartening and many rebel 
leaders deserted their companions to seek the safety of foreign embassies.  
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The American embassy had its own brush with revolutionary upheaval when an 
American lend-lease tank passed in front of the chancery several times, spraying the 
surrounding streets with machine gun fire while no enemy seemed near. Eventually, the 
driver of the tank parked his machine on the front lawn of the chancery, disembarked, 
and applied for political asylum. As it turned out, the tank driver was one Colonel Tito 
Calvo, the military leader of the revolution. Why he chose the American embassy to 
apply for asylum is unclear, as the United States did not recognize the right to political 
asylum. Thurston informed the officer of that fact and also told him that he would have 
no choice but to hand him over to the authorities. The ambassador also hinted that if 
Calvo wanted to escape, there would be ample opportunity for him to do so, especially 
since he had arrived in a tank. It seems that Calvo had lost his nerve however and would 
not budge from the embassy. A short time later, government troops arrived to take him 
prisoner, although Thurston managed to extract the unlikely promise that his guest would 
not be harmed. Some ten days later, the official newspaper reported that the colonel had 
been executed. 
Clearly then, the April revolution was a spectacular failure. Some 500 people lost 
their lives and an entire city block was destroyed. The failure seems to have been the 
result of bad planning and coordination, especially between the civilian and the military 
element of the opposition. The military oppositionists were even divided amongst 
themselves: Calvo was one of the most hated officers of the army—a former Nazi-
sympathizer in the assessment of the embassy—and many officers and soldiers 
deserted the revolution when they heard who its leader was. But despite the collapse of 
the April 2 uprising, San Salvadorans did not return to business as usual. The city 
remained in a state of tension until a new revolt broke out. 
In the mean time, the embassy had to come to terms with the April events. While 
the revolution was an obvious tactical loss for the opposition, the Martínez regime 
showed some very significant weaknesses. The President had called on Pro Patria and 
the Guardia to protect him. Both these organizations were considered firm pillars of the 
regime. Both neglected to come to its aid. So while the government was less secure than 
anticipated, it also turned out to be less benign than previously thought. While the usual 
reaction to a failed plot was to punish the ringleaders with relatively short jail sentences, 
often followed by exile, the April revolt was followed by wholesale torture and execution. 
The executions only led to more opposition. The soldiers of the Guardia Nacional, who 
were tasked with the executions, often refused to follow orders. Many of the killings had 
to be performed with machine guns by higher officers—veterans of the Matanza. The 
torture and executions also alienated the civilian population. The students of the National 
University were particularly indignant because many of the young officers who fell victim 
to Martínez’ vengeance were also part-time students. While the president, due to his 
active interest in theosophy, was always been regarded as somewhat of an eccentric, 
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the general consensus after the failed revolution was that he had gone “completely off 
the deep end”.64 
For a month, the atmosphere in San Salvador remained dark. Martínez did not 
show himself in public without heavily armed guards and rumors of executions 
proliferated. The president obviously failed to restore peace and calm to the city and his 
severe handling of the uprising only made things worse. To protest the executions 
specifically and the regime general, a new revolution broke out around the start of May. 
This time, the cowed and thinned out military faction was hardly involved. The revolution 
started with a student “strike”, which spread first to the professional groups and later to 
shopkeepers, railroad workers, etc., gradually paralyzing the city. Remembered as the 
huelga de los caídos brazos (strike of the broken arms) the protests were a successfully 
executed campaign of non-violent, passive resistance against state terror. Initially, 
Martínez tried to strike back by bringing armed peasants to the city. The strain of the 
past month, however, had been too much for most of his cabinet ministers and advisors, 
who managed to convince the president not to let the situation escalate. A climax 
occurred on May 8 when student protesters rejected Martínez proposition to step down 
after he named a successor. Instead, the students bluntly told Martínez that he was to 
leave the presidency by 9 A.M. the next day. Amazingly, the president announced his 
retirement over the national radio on May 9, handing over power to a provisional 
government under the leadership of minister of Defense Menendez. The opposition, 
which was not entirely satisfied by Menendez’ appointment, kept up the pressure for 
some days, until Martínez fled to Guatemala and the interim government announced that 
it would govern “according to the norms of the most ample democracy, guaranteeing the 
Four Freedoms proclaimed by Mr. Roosevelt.65 
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3.2 Two down  
The fall of Martínez caused quite a stir in the Guatemalan presidential palace. No one 
had expected that the neighboring regime might fail. Now that it had happened, doubts 
arose about the stability of the Guatemalan government. Ubico ordered the press to stop 
reporting about the Salvadoran revolution and at the same time tried to ingratiate himself 
with local students and soldiers, a very unusual step for the increasingly reclusive and 
obstinate dictator. The president’s henchmen, who could be relied upon to serve as 
astute political “weather vanes”, were getting uneasy. One of Ubico’s right-hand men, 
General Anzueto, was transferring funds to foreign bank accounts. Frederico Hernández 
de León, owner of the semi-official newspaper Nuestro Diario, put in a good word for the 
opposition in his editorials—an obvious attempt to spread his bets. Word on the street 
was that Ubico accepted the political asylum of Martínez, whom he heartily disliked, only 
because he might find himself in a similar situation in the future.66The regime’s self-
confidence declined in inversed proportion to the opposition’s rising optimism. Long, 
however, remained certain that the trouble would be temporary. He believed that events 
in Salvador only effected a “minority [which was] usually so silent”. Almost two 
generations older than the typical oppositionist, Long talked disdainfully about the 
“uneasy youngsters” who normally did not dare raise their voices. The more intelligent 
Guatemalan, the ambassador believed, would be satisfied with the “more liberal policy” 
and “reasonable change” that Ubico was now instituting to assuage the people.67 
Both regime and opposition started to petition the embassy for help. Around the 
end of June, with rumors of an impending strike increasing, the government issued new 
directives against subversive Nazi and Fascist elements, but the embassy recognized 
this as a ploy to “lower the value of the opposition in our eyes”. Meanwhile, Guatemalan 
students tried to obtain American flags from the embassy for use during a demonstration, 
explaining that they were enthusiastic supporters of the Atlantic Charter, but they were 
politely turned down. While students were already marching through the streets, Long 
reported to the Department that “although this movement may have serious 
consequences due to its deviation from the general trend of the perfectly-dominated 
Ubico regime, the situation in no way parallels the recent movement in El Salvador”. 
Thus the possibility of the overthrow of Ubico was “not considered great at this time”.68 
It is true, perhaps, that the student parades wouldn’t have caused Ubico’s downfall 
by themselves, but to Long’s surprise, they did spark demonstrations by a much larger 
group of Guatemalan citizens, especially after the regime formally suspended the (in fact, 
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non existent) constitutional guarantees and tried to restore order by force. Long now 
reported that “there is a large and wide-spread body of public opinion hostile to 
President Ubico, even among those who recognize that he has given the country an 
efficient and reasonably honest Administration”. As if reporting some entirely novel 
notion, the ambassador added that Ubico was now being accused of “ruthless 
suppression of civil liberties and the exercise of despotic repressive measures for his 
perpetuation in office”.69 
Tense days of demonstrations, sit-in strikes, and marches followed, sometimes 
answered by random shooting and, at one point, a violent outburst of “hoodlums” who 
had been brought into the city by the government to intimidate the opposition. Long was 
involved in the conflict as the Acting Dean of the diplomatic corps, which attempted to 
mediate collectively between the opposition and the regime, but eagerly handed over 
that function when the Nuncio of the Holy See, and actual Dean, returned from a trip 
during the demonstrations. Yet, all eyes were constantly focused on the U.S. embassy 
which managed to make enemies on both sides with its non-intervention attitude. Carlos 
Salazar, the minister of Foreign Affairs, informed Long with diplomatic bitterness that it 
was “hard to escape the impression that [the government] was not receiving support, in 
one form or another, from a country which should be friendly”. On the other hand, many 
oppositionists felt that the embassy remained silent while people were being shot in the 
streets, because it was grateful that Ubico had helped expropriate German holdings 
during the war. The general impression was that the embassy had enough influence with 
Ubico to at least force him to moderate the violence.70 
“Ya no quiero más”, a visibly disheartened Ubico told Long on June 30. Somewhat 
to the disgust of the American, the macho General was “almost to the point of weeping”. 
Apparently unbeknownst to the embassy, opposition to Ubico’s continuance (under the 
prevailing conditions, at least) had reached the president’s immediate circle of former 
supporters. Ubico suggested to Long that General Anzueto might take over the 
presidency, but Long advised against it, feeling that the general was too closely 
associated with Ubico and, most importantly, had been under suspicion of being a 
Fascist sympathizer.71 Thanks to historians who interviewed some of Ubico’s former 
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advisors, it is known how Ubico eventually selected a successor: The Guatemalan army 
structure was rather top-heavy, counting dozens of generals for an army that could get 
by on one or two of such officers. Many “surplus” generals, having nothing better to do, 
gathered every day in the anteroom of Ubico’s office to accept whatever chore the 
president might have for them, serving, in effect, as very high-ranking errand boys. 
When Ubico decided to step down and hand over power to the army, one of his advisors 
walked into the anteroom of the president’s office where, due to the early hour, only 
three generals had collected to play some cards or exchange the latest gossip. These 
three, Generals Buenaventura Pineda, Eduardo Villagrán Ariza, and Frederico Ponce 
Vaides, were appointed the ruling junta of Guatemala on the spot.72 
Initially, the transfer of power was greeted as a victory by the opposition—not in 
the least because the Junta, which was led by General Ponce, declared its intention to 
organize free and fair elections.73 Long, on the other hand, was skeptical. He had not 
sympathized with the protesters, whom he deemed too young and fanatical to be 
involved in politics. The very visible role of Guatemalan women in the anti-Government 
parades annoyed him and his employees most. Later acknowledging his mistake to get 
involved in local politics, secretary Drew reported that he had lectured a group of 
oppositionist women who came to the embassy during the demonstrations about the 
effects of “unnecessary” agitation without a “direct motive”. One of the women showed 
signs of “mental instability”, according to the officer. Likewise, Long had strongly advised 
another group of “fanatical women” to stay away from political manifestations. He called 
their purported willingness to die to get Ubico out “crazy”. When the demonstrations 
achieved their first goal, the removal of the president, Long commented that “[t]heir 
willingness to die to secure the removal of Ubico suddenly fell flat, as he resigned 
without killing any of them. This should have deflated some, but on the contrary chests 
swelled and hundreds took credit for it”.74  
After Ponce’s takeover, the political situation in Guatemala remained tense and 
Long was not sure what to make of the new political situation. The ambassador initially 
believed that Ponce would be a middle-of-the-road president who could unite different 
classes and interest groups under a more liberal government than Guatemala had 
known before. Besides, the new government appeared to meet all the requirements for 
recognition under international law and could not be tied to Axis influence. Now 68 years 
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old, Long’s optimistic evaluation of Ponce was definitely colored by his disdainful attitude 
toward the “younger element”, which kept up agitation against the government. The 
ambassador did not like the student’s noisy parades or their “inappropriate” behavior in 
the National Assembly, where they shouted comments from the public galleries. At one 
point, a group of students visited the embassy to demand that the United States help it 
overthrow Ponce. If help was not forthcoming, they would turn to the Mexican 
ambassador who had always shown himself a supporter of the opposition. Not inclined 
to be bullied by youngsters who were “too immature to be taken seriously”, Long 
reported that he “had only to explain [to the students] our established policy in a fatherly 
fashion and the interview ended”.75 
Events in the following weeks cast doubts over Long’s initial observations, 
however. First of all, more and more “responsible” and conservative men of Long’s own 
age and class came forward with criticism of the Ponce regime. Ponce himself began to 
harbor plans to continue his rule and stepped up repression against critics. Around mid 
September a prominent newspaperman was shot and killed in front of his home by 
government toughs. While the embassy considered his newspaper “moderate”, the 
regime regarded it as too critical. Even more upsetting was Ponce’s tactic of hauling 
Indians “of known fighting qualities” to the capital to intimidate opponents. According to 
Long, the government had made dangerous “socialistic” promises to the Indians in return 
for their support.76 
Throughout, the embassy did its best to maintain an appearance of 
nonintervention. After the assassination of Cordova, for example, Long cabled General 
Brett, Commander of the U.S. Special Service Squadron in Panama, to cancel the 
latter’s planned visit to Guatemala: "it was felt that anything that might conceivably be 
construed in the public mind as approval of, or even indifference to, anything in the 
nature of political assassination should be avoided". Such modest steps were hardly 
adequate to influence public opinion, however. “On all sides one hears the remark”, the 
embassy’s [legal attaché] reported, “How can the United States continue to recognize an 
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unconstitutional government by assassins in their own hemisphere when hundreds of 
thousands of their best men are dying to fight it elsewhere”.77 
 
Despite his disregard for physical hardships, Long put in a request for sick leave in 
September, 1944. Some sort of “bug” had him down, he explained in a personal letter to 
president Roosevelt. “Bugs”, probably referring to some sort of infection to the intestines, 
were the nemesis for many Americans who stayed in Guatemala for extended periods of 
time. They had immobilized Des Portes and Cabot for some time too. It wasn’t surprising 
that they should get the best of the aging ambassador. In a note to Norman Armour, 
Long explained that he could safely leave the embassy at this time because, in his 
assessment, the real strain, “if any”, would come just before the elections in December. 
And since many people were contacting the embassy to plead for support during the 
campaigning season, the ambassador’s absence might actually be beneficial in the light 
of the non-intervention principle. Because the embassy’s most experienced officer had 
been transferred to Algiers a short time before, Long left his post to the charge of young 
William Affeld.78 
On October 20, as Affeld made ready to celebrate his birthday, heavy fighting 
broke out in Guatemala City. After having restrained his son from joining the 
revolutionaries with his toy pistol, the young chargé was almost immediately drawn into 
conflict by both sides. Ponce called the embassy to ask for fresh ammunition, which 
Affeld refused, and later that day a revolutionary Junta appeared on the front step of the 
Embassy with a request to use the embassy’s telegraph to communicate the terms of 
surrender to the government, a request that was granted by the chargé. Although very 
intense, fighting in the capital was over quickly. The Ponce government capitulated some 
12 hours after the start of the revolution. While the military faction that led the revolution 
had armed many volunteers from the civilian population, the relatively swift victory was 
mainly due to involvement on the side of the rebels of the presidential honor guard—the 
only army division armed with tanks and other heavy weapons, courtesy of the lend-
lease program. The Department later commended Affeld for having enabled the 
government and the revolutionaries to negotiate the terms of surrender, which ensured a 
quick end to hostilities. This was the primary short-term objective for the Department, 
considering the importance of peace and stability in the Hemisphere during the war.79 
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How the new Guatemalan regime would fit into the post-war objectives of the United 
States was, of course, a different question. For the moment however, the State 
Department was not overly concerned with the end of the Ubico era.  
 
3.3 Two to go 
Up to 1944, Central America was ruled by four caudillos and one fairly liberal regime in 
Costa Rica. With the fall of Martínez and Ubico, the demand rose among oppositionists 
in all countries to eliminate caudillismo from the isthmus entirely. The two remaining 
dictators were Tubircio Carías in Honduras and Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua. Both 
proved more resilient than their northern neighbors. Somoza, the most junior caudillo 
and a brilliant political tactician, hung on by his fingernails. Throughout the late forties, 
he employed conciliatory and violent measures to divide and defeat his opponents. 
Carías, now the most senior caudillo, never had to face the kind of powerful opponents 
that Somoza did and managed to maintain his presidency until 1948. 
Several attempts were made against the Carías regime throughout 1944. One 
front of opposition was the exiled community. After the fall of Martínez, Honduran exiles 
“flocked” to El Salvador and it seems that even Somoza, who for a while thought that 
Carías’ days were numbered and he might as well get on the good side of his opponents, 
allowed Honduran exiles to organize in Nicaragua.80 Thus the exiles had direct access to 
the Honduran border for the first time in many years and made the most of the 
opportunity by lounging several armed excursions into the country from bases in 
Salvador and Nicaragua. Internal opposition, inspired by wartime propaganda and the 
fall of Martínez and Ubico, was also on the rise. Major protests were organized in the 
urban centers of Tegucigalpa and especially San Pedro Sulla—which was an old Liberal 
bulwark and a traditional center of opposition against Carías.81  
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Interestingly, representatives of the American military in Central America also felt 
confident enough to express their anti-dictatorial standpoints after the fall of Martínez 
and Ubico. General George Brett, commander of the Caribbean Defense Command and 
the Army’s Panama Canal Department, conveyed his determination to avoid any action 
to “help the dictator Carías”, provoking Erwin to denounce the General’s “lack of 
judgment” and “bad taste”.82 Military attaché Smith told Erwin that “we cannot have a 
democracy in Guatemala and a dictatorship over here [in Honduras]”. The former’s 
assistants were reporting to their department that the dictatorships in Central America 
were planning to destroy the new democracies. Again, Erwin was livid, claiming that the 
military men allowed themselves to be misled by the “pseudo-democratic” opponents of 
Carías and instructing the State Department to ignore such reports, as Carías’ only wish 
was to be left alone.83 
Carías’ wish was not granted. Aside from several rebel incursions, which caused 
some alarm in the Presidential Palace but generally turned out to be ineffective, 
Honduras’ tiny middle class was stirring. July 1944 witnessed demonstrations by women, 
students, and professionals very similar to those in Salvador and Guatemala. According 
to embassy observers, the demonstrators used slogans such as “¡Viva la democracia!”; 
“¡Viva la libertad!”, and “¡Viva Presidente Roosevelt!”, demonstrating the effects of 
wartime propaganda, but leaving the embassy unimpressed. Rather than democratic 
ideals, the embassy believed that the crowds in Honduras were motivated by guaro: a 
local liquor, “one drink of which is said to embolden a rabbit to fight a bulldog”.84 Carías 
managed to sit out the protests by a combination of conciliation, a refusal to be provoked, 
and downright terror. Instead of the army or the police, which were kept away from the 
demonstrators to prevent incidents, unofficial militias roamed the streets, led by Carías 
nephew Calixto who, according to old legation reports, was many times a rapist and 
killer.85 
More serious protests, with graver consequences, were held in San Pedro Sula. 
Oppositionists there obtained a permit to demonstrate around the beginning of July, 
either because they had tricked the authorities into believing that it would be a parade in 
honor of American Independence Day, or because the government hoped that the city 
would quiet down after blowing off some steam. As it was, both sides were intent not to 
provoke the other. Carías had sent minister of Defense Galvez to San Pedro Sula to 
make sure that no rash actions were undertaken by either the local commandante or the 
oppositionists. But whatever Galvez’ exact role in the following events was, his mission 
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was a failure. During the demonstration which took place on July 6, some sort of incident 
took place which provoked either a soldier, a demonstrator, or perhaps even an entirely 
unrelated person to fire his pistol. Thinking that the demonstration had turned violent, 
soldiers stationed nearby opened fire: “The firing, from both rifles and sub-machine guns, 
lasted from 8 to 10 minutes. There were no means of escape; alleys leading off the main 
street were blocked by armed soldiers who fired on any and all that attempted to escape 
(…) Twenty-two, consisting of men, women and children, are said to have been slain 
before the firing ceased and scores wounded”.86 
Typically, the embassy did not report on the details of this incident. Such matters 
were apparently regarded as an inappropriate subject for political reports. Thus, for a 
sense of the brutish reality of the slaughter in San Pedro Sula, one has to consult the 
eye-witness accounts collected by the nearby American vice consulate:  
…a young lady of about 22 years of age, was literally sawed in two by sub-
machine gun fire. When the firing ceased, one of the soldiers rushed up to 
the girl, [illegible] her of two rings, a small money bag and a necklace, lifted 
up her dress and, in a most coarse manner, spoke of her legs and the 
probabilities of her virginity. Another eye-witnessed story was told by a 
doctor who, upon learning of this outrageous slaughter, rushed to Hospital El 
Norte to help receive the wounded. He related that dump trucks were 
delivering the victims in an unbelievably heathenish fashion. The trucks 
drove up to the hospital, backed to the receiving door and with hydraulic 
dump truck lifters, dumped the victims to the ground. The doctor frantically 
enquired as to why they were using such a barbaric method and was bluntly 
informed by the drivers that they had so many to move off the streets that 
they had no time for courteousness. When the doctor stated to the drivers 
that they were hastening the deaths of the wounded, he was met with a 
disinterested shrug of the shoulders. These are but two of many stomach-
turning happenings as told to me by actual witnesses.87 
While the State Department seems not to have been aware of the exact details of 
the events in San Pedro Sula, Erwin was—or at least could have been. He took the 
position that a formal diplomatic protest, an action suggested to him by the British 
chargé, would constitute “intervention”. While the killing of unarmed civilians was 
“unfortunate”, no British or American citizens were involved. Somewhat more darkly, 
Erwin reminded the chargé that “rioting and illegal parading had been suppressed on 
Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington D.C. a few years ago by Federal Soldiers (the so-
called bonus marches) with several casualties; that killings had occurred in Ireland, India 
and other British possessions in an effort to ‘maintain order’”.88  
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4. DOORS OPENED AND DOORS CLOSED 
December 1944 found the State Department’s division for American Republic Affairs in 
an apologetic frame of mind. While the Department continued to uphold the Good 
Neighbor policy—which, it was widely believed, had created the conditions in which an 
inter-American alliance against Fascism could be formed—it was also aware of many 
new problems that had to be addressed. High on the list was what the Department 
defined as the “support democracy vs. nonintervention theses”: the opposing demands 
that the United States should both support a liberalization of politics in the south and at 
the same time continue its policy of not interfering in local politics. A Departmental memo 
to Assistant Secretary Nelson Rockefeller noted that, on the one had, Latin American 
dictators were dissatisfied because the United States had intervened by introducing 
democratic ideals to the region but had refused to intervene to help keep failing dictators 
in power. On the other had, the Department recognized, the opposition and “the masses” 
in Latin America were disillusioned with the United States because it had provided lend 
lease aid, money, and other types of support to the dictators during the war. These 
people now demanded to know why the United States had not actively supported 
democracy on the American continent, as it had purported to do in Asia and Europe. In 
the Department’s own assessment, wartime policy was wise and prudent considering 
that the United States had had to walk an extremely thin line between two evils: 
We were bound by solemn obligation not to intervene. But in any case, it 
would have been monstrous to have given the dictators active support 
against the people. It would have been folly to have aided the alleged 
democratic elements against constituted governments; at best this would 
have resulted in chaos at a crucial moment, and it might well have furnished 
the enemy a foothold in this hemisphere.89 
In the Department’s estimate, therefore, the policy of nonintervention proved its 
usefulness during the war. But many Central Americans did not share this view. On the 
one hand, they witnessed the close cooperation between the United States and the local 
regimes during the war. The dictatorships made sure to advertise every aspect of such 
cooperation and presented themselves as highly-valued, irreplaceable friends of the 
powerful Americans. The American embassies tended to ignore entreaties by opposition 
groups while modern lend-lease weapons were delivered for use of the government. At 
the same time, pro-democratic propaganda spread throughout the isthmus while the 
United States seemed to demonstrate a very real concern for the lot of the common man 
in Central America with programs to build roads, hospitals, and schools. These actions 
made sense from the perspective of fighting a total war on a global scale. In the Central 
American context, they made no sense at all. The only obvious fact for local observers 
was that the United States was intervening. On who’s behalf was a matter of confusion.  
The existence of middle class, urban opposition to the isthmian dictatorships went 
unacknowledged by the American embassies for a long time. When this new group 
                                                 
89  Cabot to Rockefeller, Memorandum on Certain Unfavorable Factors in our inter-American 
Relations, December 13, 1944, Lot Files, General Memoranda, Box 9, folder marked November 
to December, 1944. 
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finally came out into the open, it was almost impossible for its members to strike up an 
intelligible dialogue with the Americans. The embassies were unable to accurately 
assess the strength of the new opposition; unable to appraise its devotion to the 
democratic principles of the war; and unable (or unwilling) to understand its arguments 
about the United States’ moral obligation to help it. Under these circumstances, it is not 
surprising that the democratic movements of Central America and the United States 
never became close, despite a shared political ideology. Some members of the 
American Foreign service tried to correct this situation after 1945, but their task was 
made very difficult by the mutual misunderstandings that existed from the start.   
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THE POST-WAR CONJUNCTURE 
The embassies and the democratic opening, 1944-1947 
~ The Postwar Conjuncture ~ 
 
 
 
The principal defect of a policy of non-
intervention accompanied by propaganda on 
behalf of democratic doctrines is that it 
simultaneously stimulates dictatorships and 
popular opposition to them. 
 
~ Ambassador Walter Thurston, 1944 1 
 
 
 
Ambassador Walter Thurston was in a unique position to qualify the paradoxes in 
American foreign policy as it affected Latin America toward the end of the Second World 
War: He was a career officer whose experience in Latin American affairs dated back for 
decades; he claimed a role in the development of the non-intervention principle; he was 
stationed in El Salvador where opposition to caudillismo first manifested itself in 1944; 
and thanks to, among others, Winnall Dalton, he was fairly well-acquainted with the 
ideas and ambitions of the new opposition groups. Furthermore, he had seen it all before: 
In 1920, Thurston was the American chargé d’affaires in Guatemala during the revolution 
that ended the 22 year rule of Manuel Estrada Cabrera. Remembering his earlier tenure 
in Guatemala, Thurston reported to the Department in 1944 that: 
Members on duty in Latin America during and immediately following Word 
War I may recall the profound impression created by many of the 
pronouncements of Woodrow Wilson – and in particular by his advocacy of 
the right of self-determination. [I] was in Guatemala at that time and 
observed with interest that this doctrine – undoubtedly enunciated by 
President Wilson [sic.] with respect to European problems – was seized upon 
by those in opposition to the dictatorship of Manuel Estrada Cabrera as 
being a call addressed directly to them to make effective their own right to 
self-determination. 
The ambassador considered this development as something of a handicap – the 
misrepresentation of American ideals as applying to Latins interfered with a proper 
execution of the nonintervention principle. Thus, throughout the final years of the War, 
Thurston found himself to be the subject of reproach among oppositionists who 
                                                 
1 Thurston to the Secretary of State, Despatch 1154, January 8, 1944, PR El Salvador, Box 98, 
vol. XIII, cl. 800: Salvador. General. 
Chapter 8 
 
258 
demanded that the United States back up its lofty words with action against the local 
dictatorships.2 
It was certainly inaccurate, even somewhat fatalistic, of Thurston to believe that 
nonintervention and democratic propaganda caused dictatorship and opposition to it, as 
suggested in the opening quotation. Putting the problem in those terms at the same time 
exaggerates the role of the United States in local politics and underestimates the ability 
of the United States to determine how its words and actions are perceived by Latin 
Americans. In fact, Washington had for years been rather careless in word and action: 
On the one hand, it continued to pay lip-service to the Good Neighbor and 
nonintervention while war measures touched almost all aspects of the lives Latin 
Americans. On the other hand, it spread the gospel of democracy while it cooperated 
with the dictators. Whereas such paradoxes might have gone unnoticed at other times, 
they seriously undermined the credibility of U.S policy around the end of the war when 
the old dictatorships faced the challenge of democratically inspired opposition. Thurston 
accurately gauged that situation when he reported that “by according dictators who seize 
or retain power unconstitutionally the same consideration extended to honestly elected 
presidents we not only impair our moral leadership but foment the belief that our 
democratic professions are empty propaganda and that we are in fact simply guided by 
expediency”.3 
Considering that previous policy had been careless—at least as far as the subject 
of democracy vs. dictatorship was concerned—Thurston’s advise, as related in the 
previous chapter, to subject that policy to “an empirical search for improvement and 
careful study of plans for revision” was basically sound. The only problem was that the 
Central American opposition movements made their move before anyone at the 
Department had a chance to look into the problem. The result was that—aside from the 
careful planning of such postwar projects as the United Nations, Organization of 
American States, World Bank, etc—the American policy with regard to political 
developments in Latin America maintained a quality of trial and error for some years 
after the end of the war. In the end, solving the dilemma between—again, in Thurston’s 
words—reverting to the “folly of intervention” or ignoring the “evil of dictatorship” became 
the responsibility of the practitioners of diplomacy: the Foreign Service. 
 
1. THE CONJUNCTURE 
The end of the Second World War was a historical watershed for Europe and East-Asia, 
which were directly affected by the war and the following peace treaties. The same is 
true for South Asia, the Middle East, and parts of Africa, where anti-colonial movements 
were revived. Though Latin America had been touched by war only indirectly, that region 
also experienced a period of profound changes and turmoil between roughly 1944 and 
                                                 
2 Thurston to the Secretary of State, Despatch 1990, September 7, 1944, PR El Salvador, Box 93, 
cl. 124: Records. Correspondence. 
3 Thurston to the Secretary of State, Despatch 1154, January 8, 1944, PR El Salvador, Box 98, 
vol. XIII, cl. 800: Salvador. General. 
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1948—that is, between the end of the World War and the beginning of the Cold War. As 
in other parts of the world, this period was initially characterized by the growing strength 
of social democratic forces. But unlike the situation Western Europe and Japan, for 
example, this development was short-lived. More conservative groups would eventually 
regain power in most Latin American nations.    
Characterizing this so-called post-war conjuncture, Leslie Bethell and Ian 
Roxborough note that during the final year of the war and the first year after the war 
democracy was strengthened in the liberal states of Costa Rica, Colombia, and Chile; 
significant moves in the direction of democracy were made in Ecuador, Cuba, Panama, 
Peru, Venezuela, and Mexico; and a transition from military rule to democracy was 
accomplished in Guatemala, Brazil, Argentina, and Bolivia. Furthermore, the dictatorial 
regimes in El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Paraguay 
encountered serious opposition from the democratic left.4 
According to Bethell and Roxborough, the momentous changes of the postwar 
years originated both in a “strong Liberal tradition” in Latin America that dated back to 
the late 19th century and on the growing strength and importance of the middle and lower 
classes, which were spurned to action by wartime inflation. But the editors also ascribe a 
large role to international developments and the role of the United States therein. The 
“principal” factor in the developments of 1944 to 1946, according to Bethell and 
Roxborough, was the Victory of the allies: 
As it became certain that the allies would win the war (…) and as the nature 
of the postwar international political and economic order and the hegemonic 
position of the United States within it became clear, the dominant groups in 
Latin America, including the military, recognized the need to make some 
necessary political and ideological adjustments and concessions. 
 Such signals as the United States was emanating about the “nature” of the “postwar 
order”, however, were probably not intended for Central American audiences. Bethell 
and Roxborough argue that it was the “extraordinary outpouring of wartime propaganda 
in favor of U.S. political institutions” that attuned local leaders to the need to make some 
“ideological adjustments” and that stimulated oppositionists to press their case.5 
Though agitation for more popular participation and democracy was successful up 
to about 1946, old elites and new, professional army groups managed to take back the 
                                                 
4 Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough, “The postwar conjuncture in Latin America: democracy, 
labor, and the Left”, in: idem eds., Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold 
War, 1944-1948 (New York 1992) 1-32, there 3-6. The case for the existence of a postwar 
conjuncture in Latin America was first made in: Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough, “Latin 
America between the Second World War and the Cold War: Some reflections on the 1945-8 
conjuncture”, Journal of Latin American Studies 20 (1988) 167-189. A more detailed account, by 
the same author, of the role of the United States in this period is: Leslie Bethell, “From the 
Second World War to the Cold War, 1944-54”, in: Abraham F. Lowenthal ed., Exporting 
democracy: The United States and Latin America (Baltimore 1991) 41-71. Though not directly 
relevant to the current text, the articles collected in David Rock ed. Latin America in the 1940s. 
War and postwar transitions (Berkeley et al. 1994) rivals Bethell and Roxborough’s analysis by 
their focus on internal, rather than international developments. The book rarely discusses Central 
America, though. 
5
 Bethell and Roxborough, “The postwar conjuncture”, 6-7. 
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powers they lost in nearly every Latin America country after that date except, perhaps, 
Guatemala. Again, internal developments lie at the root of this development: Bethell and 
Roxborough note that the old elites were never really defeated by the new forces, they 
merely lost their nerve temporarily. Moreover, the middle and lower classes never 
formed a single front, divided as they were both by their class interests and by racial 
antagonism. Again, the United States had a role to play in the reassertion of 
authoritarian rule in the south. On the one hand, the refusal of the United States to 
extend any form of aid to Latin America and the Truman administration’s insistence that 
the neighboring republics attract private investments from the north gave the old ruling 
elites an economic incentive to move against labor activities, which were assumed to 
repel American investors. On the other hand, the increasingly belligerent, anticommunist 
rhetoric emanating from Washington at least legitimized a turn to the political right in 
Latin America. Bethell and Roxborough maintain, however, that anticommunist ideology 
had long been a factor in Latin American culture, so the United States’ Cold War stance 
did not necessarily cause its southern neighbors to return to authoritarian modes of 
government. In fact, Bethell and Roxborough do not provide a conclusive answer on the 
question of whether or not the United States had a role to play in the demise of 
democratic fervor in Latin America.6 
 
As in previous chapters, the current chapter will focus on the perceptions of American 
diplomats “on the ground” and on how these informed their reaction to the “conjuncture”. 
Therefore, this chapter rivals the analysis that Thomas M. Leonard set out in his book 
The United States and Central America, 1944-1949: Perceptions of Political Dynamics. 
As the subtitle of the book indicates, it also deals with American perceptions of the 
events in this period, specifically those of the embassies. Although this chapter and the 
work of Leonard are similar in many details, they are based on widely different 
assumptions. Like many works of the 1980s, Perceptions deals with the events of the 
1940s from the standpoint of the Central American Crisis: “Greater awareness of the 
pressures for change between 1944 and 1949 contributes to a better understanding of 
the contemporary crisis”, as Leonard puts it. 7  And as the introduction of his book 
indicates, it basically regards the 1930s and 1940s as an extension of prewar 
imperialism and postwar Cold War policies. The current chapter rather assumes that the 
experience of the late 1930s and World War was multifaceted and included both 
measured opposition to- and cooperation with the isthmian dictatorships. In 1944, it was 
all but clear which one of these roads would be taken in the future.   
As we shall see, there was at least one influential “paladin of democracy” in the 
Department in 1945: assistant secretary Spruille Braden. Curiously, Leonard neglects to 
devote much attention to Braden’s so-called “policy regarding dictatorships and 
disreputable governments”, stating only that: “Braden expressed interest in encouraging 
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 Idem, 16-23. 
7  Thomas M. Leonard, The United States and Central America, 1944-1949: Perceptions of 
Political Dynamics (Tuscaloosa 1984) ix. 
THE POST-WAR CONJUNCTURE 
 
 
261 
democracy throughout the region, but the limitations of the U.S. nonintervention policy 
provided only the opportunity to express support for Central American 
constitutionalism”.8 In line with his neglect of the Braden policy, Leonard also ignores 
much, if not all, of the discussion on that policy in the American Foreign Service. As an 
example, Leonard does not even offer passing mention of Simmons’ resistance to the 
diplomatic recognition of Aguirre, or to the latter’s efforts to define Castañeda—subjects 
that will be discussed at some length in this chapter.9  
 
By 1945, the Department of State in Washington was well-aware of the growing 
democratic fervor in Latin America and would eventually develop a policy to match it.10 
With its “policy regarding dictatorships and disreputable governments”, the United States 
publically denounced the most notorious dictators of the Hemisphere: Perón in Argentina, 
Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, and Somoza in Nicaragua. With regard to the latter, 
the State Department began to express its disappointment with continued authoritarian 
rule in Nicaragua directly following the war by withholding military aid and other types of 
assistance to Somoza. The real test, however, came in 1947: facing urban, middle class 
opposition similar to that in other Central American countries, Somoza tried to assuage 
the opposition by stepping down and having an uncle of his “elected” to the presidency. 
When the uncle in question presumed to fare an independent course and tried to oust 
Somoza as chief of the Guardia, the latter committed a military coup and had another 
uncle appointed to the presidency. At this point, the United States decided that Somoza 
had gone far enough and withheld diplomatic recognition from the new puppet 
government. This might appear to be an ill-conceived action in the light of Martínez’ 
successful defiance of non-recognition, but from the late 1940s perspective it is an 
understandable choice since political developments in the region seemed to be 
favorable to democratic change and Somoza was facing internal opposition. Not 
recognizing his government might just tip the balance in favor of the liberal opposition 
without committing the United States to more drastic acts. 
As it turned out, however, the forces of reaction were gaining strength around 1947 
and Somoza, perhaps one of the most talented political tacticians his country ever knew, 
managed to keep his opponents divided and his hold on power unrelenting. Because of 
Somoza’s successful defiance in the context of a general return to ultra-conservative 
politics in the region, combined with a wish to promote Latin American solidarity in the 
counsels of the OAS and the UN, the United States decided to abandon its attempts to 
oust Somoza in 1948. In that same year at the inter-American conference in Bogotá, the 
American Republics jointly adopted the principle of continuance of diplomatic relations 
whenever government leadership changed, putting a definite halt to the use of non-
recognition as a diplomatic weapon. While it would take a while before Somoza was 
back into the good graces of the American government, the recognition of his regime 
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signaled the end of American policy of discouraging dictatorship. Around the same time, 
the threat of the Soviet Union became an issue in inter-American relations. For the next 
forty years or so, the specter of Communism was one of the most important 
determinants of American policy toward Central America.11 
Despite the rather inglorious end to the American attempt to elbow out Somoza, 
historians have since debated the significance of that brief episode. “[These] actions 
were the strongest argument to date against those who claim that the United States 
always supported the Somoza regime”, according to Paul Coe Clark, “it demonstrated 
the administration’s sincerity regarding its policy of supporting democratic governments 
in Latin America [and] it had special meaning when applied to a dictatorial regime long 
associated with the U.S.”. Andrew Crawley agrees that “the sense of affinity that the 
United States felt with rulers whose authority derived from popular consent helped bring 
Somoza’s government to an end. This was not simply an end result; it was the State 
Department’s specific intention”. While his focus is on internal dynamics, Knut Walter at 
least acknowledges that U.S. opposition was the main reason for Somoza not to enter 
the presidential elections.12 On the other hand, Leonard has argued that the postwar 
policy of opposition to dictators was merely a case of paying lip service to high ideals 
while the Truman administration focused on Europe. The fact that Somoza was 
eventually recognized supports that line of analysis, according to Leonard. Bethell 
appears to second this argument with the observation that U.S. support for democracy 
was merely rhetorical after 1946 and direct support for democracy before that time was 
highly ineffectual. Schoultz believes the Braden policy was really completely out of step 
with general thinking in the State Department, which stressed that Latins were unfit for 
democracy. In a reinterpretation of the conjuncture from a Latin American perspective, 
David Rock argues that: “The support of the United States for democratic change in 
Latin America in 1945was mainly due to a desire to establish client states that could be 
used to support the United States in the United Nations.13 While the current chapter will 
not solve the debate specifically around U.S. policy in Nicaragua, it will address the 
question of the nature of U.S. policy toward dictatorship during the conjuncture. 
 
2. BULL IN THE CHINA SHOP 
Last week the U.S. Senate turned loose a bull in the Latin American china 
shop. He was Spruille Braden, now confirmed as Assistant Secretary of 
State for Latin American Affairs, a big, jolly, working democrat whose object 
was to smash the Western Hemisphere's dictatorial bric-a-brac.14 
                                                 
11 Paul C. Clark, Diplomatic Relations between the United States and the Somoza Garcia Regime, 
1933-1956 (Tuscaloosa 1988) chapters 10 and 11; Knut Walter, The Regime of Anastasio 
Somoza, 1939-1956 (Chapel Hill 1993) 129-163; Eduardo Crawley, Dictators never die. A Portrait 
of Nicaragua and the Somoza Dynasty (London 1979) 101-109. 
12 Clark, Diplomatic relations, 326-327 and 342; Crawley, Somoza and Roosevelt, 232; Walter, 
The regime, 144-145. 
13 Leonard, Search for stability, 122-123; Bethell & Roxborough, Latin America, 28; Schoultz, 
Beneath the United States, 316-331; Rock, Latin America, 5-6. 
14 “Latin America: Democracy’s Bull”, TM (November 5, 1945). 
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Such, at least, was Time Magazine’s assessment of the new Assistant Secretary in 
1945—and it was not far off the mark. Spruille Braden, a Montana mining engineer with 
the diplomatic inclinations of a cowboy, had been a political appointee to the Foreign 
Service during the War. Considering himself an “anti-Nazi paladin”, he had battled 
supposed Nazi’s and their local sympathizers in and out of official circles in Colombia, 
Cuba, and Argentina.15 Only during the War, when old principles of nonintervention were 
put aside for the cause of the allies, could a man who took such liberties with other 
states’ sovereignty become ambassador. And only right after the War, when democratic 
fervor was running high, could he have become Assistant Secretary. Braden was both 
one of the most colorful characters of his time and an exponent of it. 
Naturally, Braden would not have accomplished much while Cordell Hull and 
Sumner Welles, who had built their diplomacy around the nonintervention principle, were 
in charge of Latin American policy. However, many personnel changes occurred at the 
top op the Department around the end of the War. Sumner Welles was forced into 
retirement by his enemies within the Government in 1943 and his supporters fell victim to 
a similar fate shortly thereafter. Cordell Hull, who had in fact been instrumental in Welles’ 
downfall, retired due to failing health in 1944. After a brief interlude when the State 
Department and its Latin American division were led by Edward Stettinius and Nelson 
Rockefeller respectively, James Byrnes became the Secretary of State in 1945. It was 
the latter who was ultimately responsible for bringing Braden into the Department. 
Braden was stationed in Cuba when he first captured the attention of the State 
Department. From his Caribbean post he submitted new policy recommendations that 
were supposed to be in line with the progressive revolutions that were occurring all over 
the region. The ambassador argued that the United States could only thrive in an 
environment with “like-minded, friendly, and sympathetic neighbors and a high degree of 
hemispheric solidarity”. This condition could only be created when democracy prevailed 
in Latin America. The United States could further the cause of democracy in Latin 
America by showing “warm friendship for the democratic and reputable governments” 
and it should discourage dictatorship and “disreputable” governments by “treating them 
as something less than friends and equals”. This proposal was not a real departure from 
previous policy, the ambassador claimed, but the culmination of it. Calling to mind 
Roosevelt’s description of a “Good Neighbor” as one who “resolutely respects himself 
and, because he does so, respects the rights of other”, Braden argued that the United 
States could not retain its self-respect or the respect of others if it maintained friendly 
cooperative relations with dictatorships. In practical terms, this meant that no “special 
consideration” (medals, state visits, favorable mentions, etc), economic, or military aid 
should be given to the dictators.  
Braden recognized that the non-intervention principle of the Good Neighbor could 
conflict with his proposals, if the United States were to dictate to others the kind of 
government they could have. However, argued the ambassador, while the United States 
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could not intervene in other countries nor tell them what kind of government would be 
appropriate for them, it was under no obligation to accept “as equals and friends those 
governments which are the embodiment of principles and practices which we abhor, 
distrust, and to which we are irrevocably opposed”. Anticipating critics who would argue 
that many countries in Latin America were not yet ready for democracy, Braden claimed 
that that situation was changing rapidly and that the United States should recognize the 
direction of current political developments of the region. Latin Americans themselves 
were demanding more openness and freedom, but the paradoxes of American policy—
fighting dictators in Europe and cooperating with them in its own hemisphere—confused 
the southern neighbors. This situation could ultimately persuade them to reject the 
American example: “If…we fail to sustain and augment the enthusiasm for the practice of 
democratic ideals, the void will be filled by pernicious ‘isms’ imperiling our way of life”. 
Since Braden developed his ideas while serving as the U.S. ambassador to Cuba, 
it should not be surprising that his policy recommendations ascribed a large role to the 
Foreign Service, even though that point is often glossed over by historians. In Braden’s 
own words:  
I would underscore that all of my observations are presented in full 
recognition of the fact that in this, as in all other matters, the success or 
failure of our policies will largely depend on the competency and judgment of 
our representatives abroad, and that it is almost impossible either to draw 
any hard and fast rule for their decisions and action in a given case or to 
replace the practical working out of these problems in the field 
On the one hand, American ambassadors needed to be on good terms with people “of 
all classes” in the countries to which they were accredited—not just with the 
governments. In that way, the “understanding and respect” of others could be cultivated 
even while the United States maintained formal diplomatic relations with the dictators 
that governed them. On the other hand, the policy was highly dependent on accurate 
information on local conditions. While Braden neglected to propose a “hard and fast rule” 
by which to distinguish the “reputable” governments from the “disreputable” kind, he did 
stress that the former should be based on “general popular support”. Whether such was 
the case—and especially where new governments were concerned—was 
“frequently…purely a matter of opinion and open to debate”. Especially in the case of the 
recognition of a new government, the United States should move with deliberation and 
reach a decision “only when we are so sure as possible that our decision is accurate and 
in keeping with the will of the people concerned”.16 
The “Proposed Policy Respecting Dictatorships and Disreputable Governments in 
the Other American Republics” was disseminated among the Latin American field posts 
for comments in May 1945. Why the Department felt that its Foreign Service officers 
should be involved in policy making in this particular case is not altogether clear. It might 
be due to the inclination of Assistant Secretary Nelson Rockefeller, former chief of the 
                                                 
16  Hussey, Ambassador Braden’s proposed policy respecting dictatorships and disreputable 
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Coordinating Committee, to seek consensus and to prefer coordination over a top-down 
approach. Other factors may be the many practical issues related to the suggested 
policy, as set forth by Braden himself, or the preference for democratic procedures of the 
main supporters of such a policy. Whatever the case, comments were collected in June 
and July and digested in a report by the Department’s Division of Research for American 
Republics (DRA). 
The eventual 30 page report on the suggested policy was prepared by Roland D. 
Hussey, assistant chief of DRA. It offers a unique insight into the Foreign Service’s 
crusading spirit, or lack thereof, shortly after the momentous victory of democracy over 
Fascism. While the faith in America’s ability to spread its political culture and institutions 
to other countries had probably not been this strong since the end of the First World War, 
and would not be as strong until the introduction of the Alliance for Peace, the Foreign 
Service was still divided over the issue. To start with, Hussey himself was adamantly 
opposed to the policy and not shy about it. A former history professor at the University of 
California, Hussey had joined the Department as a consultant in 1944. Approaching the 
problem from an abstract angle, he found it impossible to relate to Braden’s proposals 
which were the result of years of practical experience with both Latin American 
dictatorship and the effects of American pro-democratic propaganda in the hemisphere.  
According to the chief, the concepts of democracy and dictatorship, or 
“disreputable governments”, were so ill-defined in Braden’s proposal as to be 
unworkable in practical situations. Moreover, it would obviously lead to intervention in 
countries that had a government the United States disapproved of—no “ingenuity in 
semantics”, as Hussey characterized Braden’s attempts to get around this subject, would 
long deceive the American republics. As it was, the United States was already leaning 
dangerously over the brink toward intervention with its many wartime projects in Latin 
America and Hussey clearly feared that Braden’s suggestions would be the deathblow 
for the Good Neighbor. Hence, the report on comments from the field, which was drafted 
under Hussey’s direction, showed a clear bias toward the opponents’ views. Or, as 
Hussey himself wrote in the preface: “The report is meant to be solely an objective 
analysis of the various comments although the conclusions unavoidably reflect the 
judgment of the author as to the proper weights to attach to the arguments advanced”.17 
In all, comments from 12 different posts were collected and cited in the report; 
some other reports came in later. As Hussey himself summarizes: 
Of the replies from the twelve missions received so far, seven are 
fundamentally in agreement with the recommendations of Ambassador 
Braden, although three contain reservations. Of the remaining five, three can 
be described as definitely in disagreement. The remaining two are more 
sympathetic but indicate that the difficulties in the way of applying the policy 
render it impractical. 
                                                 
17 Hussey to Dreier, January 25, 1946, Lot Files, Deputy Assistant Secretaries, 1945-1956, Box 2, 
folder marked Dictatorships, 1945-1946. For Hussey’s own evaluation of the policy: Hussey to 
Boal, September 2, 1945, Lot Files, Deputy Assistant Secretaries, 1945-1956, Box 2, folder 
marked Dictatorships, 1945-1946. 
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Later reactions from Guatemala, Argentina, and Nicaragua were all in general 
agreement with Braden, although the ambassador in Nicaragua entertained some 
reservations. It could be said, therefore, that there was a consensus in favor of Braden’s 
proposals, but Hussey argued in the conclusion that the favorable replies were “lacking 
in strong arguments” and stressed the counterarguments. 
The answers from the field posts were strongly dependent on the idiosyncrasies of 
the local ambassadors or specific local conditions. For example, ambassador Orme 
Wilson, who was stationed in Haiti, felt that allowance should be made for the country’s 
extreme backwardness and low levels of literacy, education, and political “maturity”. 
Since Haiti also shared the island of Hispaniola with “an aggressive and ill willed dictator”, 
Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, the United States ought not to punish the 
country for its lack of democratic practice. John Erwin, who wrote a very fulsome critique 
of Braden’s policy, agreed with Wilson that some countries were just too backward to 
expect them to be anything but authoritarian, but also inserted something of an 
emotional argument in the debate when he noted that any action against the Carías 
dictatorship would result in a charge of ingratitude against the United States since the 
regime in question had, according to Erwin, provided cooperation to the limit of its ability 
when Washington needed it most: during the War. 
On the other hand, Braden’s proposals were enthusiastically received by those 
officers who served in relatively liberal countries. The ambassadors in Costa Rica and 
Uruguay reported, for example, that “liberals [in those countries] are frequently baffled 
and discouraged by the failure of the United States to make any distinction between their 
democracy and the dictatorship of other countries. Clearly the policy proposed would be 
welcomed” there. The most enthusiastic endorsement came from the mission in Chile, 
where ambassador Claude G. Bowers was stationed. Bower had served in Spain for six 
years during the rise of General Franco.18 Having witnessed Franco’s authoritarian mode 
of government and his attempts to drive a wedge between the Americas and the United 
States, Bowers was in “complete agreement” with Braden’s proposal to discourage 
dictatorship in the Western Hemisphere. The ambassador had always been skeptical of 
the Department’s practical distinction between Fascism and traditional dictatorship, 
arguing that “the liberty of speech, the freedom of the press, the right to assemble [and] 
to petition for the redress of grievances are no more tolerated [under a military 
dictatorship] than under the systems of Hitler, Mussolini and Franco”. Furthermore, the 
conditions for such a policy were favorable, in Bowers opinion, because the people of 
Latin America were themselves making impressive progress toward democracy while the 
United States was in a strong position due to the effectiveness of its Good Neighbor 
policy and its achievements during the war: “[If] the friends of democracy do not 
                                                 
18 Claude G. Bowers, My mission to Spain: Watching the rehearsal for World War II (London 
1954). 
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aggressively advocate their system the enemies of democracy will certainly make it their 
business to implant their particular ideology”.19 
As the responses from the Latin American field posts indicate, there was no 
consensus in diplomatic circles on the wisdom of Braden’s proposal regarding dictatorial 
and disreputable governments. In fact, there were more than enough vociferous critics of 
the proposal. Within the State Department, however, policy was not determined by a 
plurality of votes or even by the weight of arguments in favor or against, but by the 
distribution of proponents and detractors across the bureaucratic hierarchy. It so 
happened that in 1945, Braden had enough backers in the right places—and, just as 
important perhaps, there were enough doubters in the right places—to be able to put his 
ideas in practice. In May he was transferred to—“released upon”, as some would have 
it—Buenos Aires, where he clashed almost immediately with the supposedly Fascist 
inclined, and definitely disreputable government of Edelmiro Farrell and his ambitious 
Vice President Juan Perón. Braden’s sojourn to Argentina has been adequately 
described and analyzed in numerous studies. Suffice it to say that he took great liberties 
with the noninterference principle of the Good Neighbor to be able to support what he 
thought were the regime’s democratic opponents. Despite Braden’s ultimate failure to 
bring down the “Fascist-minded” clique in Argentina, and despite stiff criticism from the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and other apostles of the Good Neighbor policy in 
and outside the United States, Braden was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for 
inter-American Affairs in October 1945 in recognition of “his accurate interpretation of the 
policies of this Government in its relations with the present Government of the 
Argentine”.20 
In his function of Assistant Secretary from 1945 to 1947, Braden applied his recipe 
of “formal aloofness”, that is, the absence of military and economic aid, to all Latin 
American governments thought to be “disreputable”. Moreover, several Latin American 
dictators, most notably Perón, but also notoriously brutal Trujillo and infamously greedy 
Somoza, were singled out by the Department for persecution. Braden’s example also 
elicited imitation from American ambassadors who were inclined to exert the power of 
the United States in favor of the actual advancement of democracy—as opposed to the 
mere disapproval of dictatorship. In Brazil, which had been ruled by Getúlio Vargas since 
the 1930s, ambassador Adolf Berle decided “after much sweating (…) that the only way 
to have democracy was to have it, and that the United States was beginning to be 
expected to express a view”. Concurrently, Berle took the very unusual step of 
publicizing his support for Vargas’ recent pro-democratic policy in the form of a speech 
for the benefit of the Brazilian audience. In the context of the time, the speech was not 
simply a friendly gesture to the current government, but a warning to Vargas that he 
                                                 
19  Hussey, Ambassador Braden’s proposed policy respecting dictatorships and disreputable 
governments in the other American Republics, October, 1945, Lot Files, ARA Analysis and 
Liaison, Box 16, folder marked Analysis and Liaison, September to November, 1945. 
20 Wood, The Dismantling, 14-131; Schoutz, Beneath the United States, chapter 16. 
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better follow through on his promise to hold fair and free elections rather than continuing 
himself in office—which was rumored to be the president’s real intention.21 
There were several problems with the approach of Braden and his followers 
however. On the level of “high policy”, a discrimination against “disreputable” 
governments in the hemisphere clashed with the ongoing effort to built an inter-American 
community of nations—an effort that was redoubled after the war with the founding of 
the Organization of American States (OAS) and with the American desire to lead a solid 
block of American votes (representing 20 of a total of 50 votes) in the United Nations. 
Such a community would never materialize if its “disreputable” members faced, or were 
threatened to face, ostracism.  
A further problem was the definition of “disreputable”. As one of the detractors of 
Braden’s policy had asked, rhetorically: “What wise man or wise group of men is going to 
decide which governments are reputable and which are disreputable?”. Due to their 
international unpopularity and cynical disregard for widely accepted norms of political 
behavior, men like Somoza and Trujillo were easily singled out. But there were other 
leaders and governments in Latin America who were not so easily classified. Particularly 
in those case, the Department tended to defer policy decisions to the chief of mission in 
question. In effect, the execution of American policy toward hard-to-classify governments 
would be dependent on the idiosyncrasies of the local ambassador. As the discussion of 
Braden’s original proposal would suggest, this led to a rather varied assortment of 
responses to local conditions: ranging from Berle’s veiled threats against the Brazilian 
regime to Erwin’s praise for Carías.  
 
3. A BULL FOR EVERY CHINA SHOP? 
All the disagreement and inherent problems and paradoxes of Braden’s policy were 
present in U.S.-Central American relations after the War. The region witnessed several 
democratically inspired revolutions in 1944 and would witness countercoups in the future. 
On the face of it, therefore, the Central American situation offered a good opportunity for 
Washington to take a stand, which it did in the case of Somoza. However, the American 
ambassador in Guatemala showed only a passing interest in politics and American and 
Guatemalan definitions of what democracy should mean eventually became 
irreconcilable. In El Salvador, the ambassador basically agreed with Braden’s 
standpoints, but the political realities in that country eluded easy definition according to 
the standard of “reputability” and American policy wavered. Erwin, the longest serving 
ambassador in Central America, refused to embrace the new policy guidelines. While he 
continued to observe Department instructions to the letter, his close relationship to the 
Carías dictatorship blunted Washington’s efforts to dissociate itself from the Honduran 
regime. 
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3.1 Friend of the Americas 
A festive, optimistic mood prevailed in Guatemala after the October revolution. The ruling 
junta promised fair elections and actually carried them out (the former is the usual 
practice for revolutionary governments; the latter is a rare occurrence). Winner of the 
election was Juan José Arévalo, a liberal-minded university professor who set in motion 
land reform and education programs which were moderate by international standards, 
but revolutionary in the Central American context. People in Guatemala anticipated a 
brighter future, a hope that was doubtlessly strengthened because the Guatemalan 
experiment in democratic governance seemed to be part of wider, international 
developments in favor of democracy—including the downfall of several longstanding 
tyrants in Latin America and the defeat of European Fascism and Asian militarism.  
Observing the atmosphere in Guatemala, even grumpy old ambassador Long had 
to admit that “the unbounded enthusiasm of the young patriots is admirable”. Long 
entertained some reservations about the supposed lack of experience by the new rulers, 
noting that the "history of Guatemala is undoubtedly going to be affected by the almost 
complete elimination of people beyond middle age and their replacement by youngsters 
who run from 22 to 40 years". At the same time, however, everyone around him was 
optimistic: “I…was told by many people what a marvelous blessing the new 
administration was”. The Mexican ambassador opined that the junta was a “dream” of 
good government and the American colony took the political changes in good humor—
the manager of the American-owned railroad assured Long that “everything is 
satisfactory as far as the railroad people are concerned”. The openness and friendliness 
of the new rulers offered a stark contrast to the gloomy secretiveness of Ubico’s final 
years in office. Having attended a banquet in honor of the new Junta, Long confided to 
his diary that it “was quite a grand affair and completely free from all of the stilted 
reservations which had affected previous government parties under Ubico".22 
The State Department, which interpreted events in Guatemala in the context of its 
new pro-democratic policy in Latin America, initially welcomed the revolution. 
Department studies presented Guatemala as an example of the “genuine” and 
“authentic” democratic movement that seemed to engulf Latin America.23 Throughout the 
first years of the Arévalo administration, Washington’s policy of “aloofness” to the 
dictatorships and friendliness toward the democracies expressed itself in benign 
tolerance for the unsettling effects that the Guatemalan revolution had in neighboring 
countries. The remaining dictatorships in the isthmus complained that the new Arévalo 
regime was Communistic and invited the United States to join them in an anti-
                                                 
22 Long, diary entries of June 1, June 2, June 3, October 27, and December 22, 1944, Long 
Papers, Box 66, Folder 334: Diaries and Long, diary entries of January 10, January 12, and 
March 16, 1945, Long Papers, Box 66, Folder 335: Diaries. 
23 Cochran to Rockefeller, n.d. (March, 1945), Lot Files, General Memoranda, Box 10, folder 
marked January to May, 1945; Hussey, Report on the Current Situation in the other American 
Republics, January 13, 1945, Lot Files, Analysis and Liaison, Box 15, folder marked December, 
1944, to February, 1945; Hussey to Butler, August 23, 1946, Lot Files, Analysis and Liaison, Box 
16, folder marked May to September, 1946. 
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Communistic alliance against the threat. At the time, this argument did not affect thinking 
in Washington. A Department memorandum noted that "the definition of 'Communism' in 
Central America is flexible and suited to local purposes". In this case it was merely a 
cover, the Department recognized, for the dictatorships’ hostility toward Arévalo. 
"Inasmuch as the Government of President Arévalo is one of the most nearly democratic 
that any Central American country has recently had, we should lend no support to any 
movement of his neighbors that may possible be hostile to him".24  
Another token of Washington’s sympathy for the new Government in Guatemala 
was the appointment to that country of ambassador Edwin J. Kyle, a Texan educator 
and agriculturalist. If Braden, with his “bull”-like approach to diplomacy, presented one 
end of a spectrum, Edwin Kyle might present the other side. Known as “Dean Kyle” 
among admirers due to his former position as the head of the School of Agriculture at 
Texas A&M, ambassador Kyle was a gentle, friendly, academic type of man in his early 
70’s.  
Considering the fact that Guatemala’s first democratic president, Juan José 
Arévalo, was himself an educator and the fact that his administration took a keen interest 
in the improvement of agriculture and education, the appointment of Kyle to Guatemala 
was a felicitous choice. However, the new ambassador was not easily adopted into the 
Service itself. Political appointees were not particularly popular among the career officers 
and Kyle himself made a point of not being a “traditional” diplomat. The somewhat 
malicious gossip among Kyle’s secretaries was that the trustees of Texas A&M had 
pushed for the Dean’s nomination to an embassy because the latter was an obstacle for 
the trustees’ choice for a new university president. Kyle’s secretaries were also a bit 
cynical about their new chief’s enthusiasm for inter-American friendship. As one of his 
secretaries remembered: 
I found one of these little desk ornaments put out by Pan American Airlines, 
which had a sort of ark-like wooden base with holes for the flags of all the 
American republics. I had a little brass plate made to put on the base saying: 
To Ambassador Edwin J. Kyle, Friend of the Americas, and gave it to him. 
He took this quite seriously. It was really kind of a prank on my part because 
I was just pandering to his ego. He was very proud of this, and he put it in a 
prominent place on his desk as Ambassador.25 
One of the first tasks that Kyle had waiting for him when he arrived at his post was 
to give his comments on the suggested policy against dictatorships and disreputable 
governments. His eventual report offers a glimpse of the new ambassador’s generous 
idealism and, consequently, a complete blind spot for cultural relativity or nuance with 
which his colleagues of the career rank were so liberally imbued. Kyle not only supported 
Braden’s suggestions, but argued that the United States go further and take a firm stand 
against dictators. He felt that the dominant position that the United States had acquired 
                                                 
24  Wise to Woodward, Briggs, Braden, and Acheson, April 25, 1947, Lot Files, General 
Memoranda, Box 13, folder marked May to June, 1947..  
25  Interview with Woodward, ADST. The exact wording was “His Excellency Edwin J. Kyle, 
Ambassador of the United States of America and friend of the American Republics”. 
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as a result of the war justified this more assertive attitude and, as a “friend of the 
Americas”, he felt confident to speak for the “large majority of the best people in these 
countries” who, in the ambassador’s assessment, demanded such an attitude of their 
powerful neighbor:  
In my judgment we have not fully asserted our rights which this power and 
this position among nations gives us. We should above all things be fair, just, 
and charitable to all peoples and all nations, but at the same time we should 
be firm and we should assert our rights which have come as the result of 
saving the world from ruthless dictators twice in a single generation, and thus 
become the greatest defender of democratic principles of all times.26 
Even despite Kyle’s idealism, the honeymoon between the American diplomatic 
establishment and the new Guatemalan government lasted only three years. After 1947, 
it became evident the two had different conceptions as to the meaning of democracy. In 
fact, Washington policymakers would come to define the Guatemalan revolution as a 
front for Communist infiltration and in 1954, the Eisenhower administration ordered the 
CIA to topple the government of Jacobo Arbenz—the successor of Arévalo and one of 
the original revolutionists. The breakdown of relations between the United States and 
Guatemala during the late 1940s has been the subject of several historical studies, due 
to interest in the 1954 intervention. No single factor could explain the growing animosity 
that American policy makers developed against Guatemala—unless the Cold War, with 
all its complicated causes and effects, is taken as a single factor.27  
Even if there had not been a Cold War, the patience of the Department might have 
been severely stretched because Guatemalan ambitions were at variance with the 
American conception of democratic governance. As different elements in above-quoted 
Departmental and Embassy reports indicate, American diplomats conceived of the 
movement towards a more democratic world as a respectable political affair in which the 
United States—the champion of democracy—rightly took a leading role. The 
Guatemalan idea of democracy was broader and more militant: It included social and 
economic reform and assigned to Guatemala a role as a revolutionary vanguard. In the 
local context, where many supposed voters were dirt-poor and illiterate and where the 
whole experiment was threatened by reactionary landlords and dictatorial neighbors, this 
could hardly be otherwise. 
From the start, the Guatemalan government agitated against its dictatorial 
neighbors and vice versa. While the State Department initially sympathized with 
Guatemala’s position in the international shouting match between democrats and 
dictators, the conflict took on a more troublesome aspect when actual fighting broke out. 
Throughout the late 1940s, political exiles from all over the Caribbean area organized 
military campaigns against the surviving dictatorships of Somoza, Carías, and Trujillo. 
While the American press came to refer to the impromptu armies involved in this activity 
                                                 
26  Hussey, Ambassador Braden’s proposed policy respecting dictatorships and disreputable 
governments in the other American Republics, October, 1945, Lot Files, ARA Analysis and 
Liaison, Box 16, folder marked Analysis and Liaison, September to November, 1945. 
27 See chapter 9, pages 301-305 and 325-330. 
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as the “Caribbean Legion”, a truly coordinated campaign against the dictatorships never 
materialized. Unconnected groups of “patriots, politicians, and soldiers of fortune” 
launched several military campaigns against the dictatorships, but none of those were 
very effective or successful. It was clear however, that the Arévalo government 
sympathized with the so-called legion and provided it with a safe-haven in Guatemala 
and probably with arms and planes.  
The contrast between the Department’s anti-dictatorial policy and that of the 
Arévalo administration could not be greater. Braden’s proposals were confined to 
symbolic and diplomatic acts that would not interfere with inter-American solidarity and 
cooperation. The actions of the Guatemalan-backed “Legion”, while ineffectual in terms 
of actually spreading democracy, provoked countless international conflicts between the 
democracies and the dictatorships in the Caribbean. The situation caused considerable 
embarrassment for the State Department, because it could not mediate the conflicts 
without appearing to favor one side over the other. Eventually, Washington chose to 
employ the newly created Organization of American States as a front to investigate the 
Caribbean conflicts and to chide supposed perpetrators on both sides. By 1950, the 
crisis subsided due to the OAS’ actions, the Legion’s own incompetence, and a return to 
authoritarian politics in many Caribbean countries. But by that time the damage to U.S. 
Guatemalan relations had already been done: the State Department would not forgive 
Arévalo for putting it on the spot in the fight between the democracies and the tyrannies 
of the Caribbean.28 
Another major difference between the American and the Guatemalan conception 
of democracy was the question as to the social-economic implications of that political 
doctrine. Due to the progressive (but by no means radical) Labor Code instituted by 
Arévalo, relations between his government and the American-owned United Fruit 
company, the largest employer of the region, soured. Apart from Ubiquistas and other 
reactionary Guatemalans, UFCO was probably the first to raise the issue of Communist 
infiltration of the Guatemalan government. The company employed a small army of very 
effective lobbyist who received a sympathetic hearing, ironically, from Assistant 
Secretary Spruille Braden. In 1945, the latter had put a stamp of American approval on 
Arévalo’s election by personally attending the inauguration of the Guatemalan president.  
But aside from being a “practical democrat”, Braden was also a former businessman with 
considerable assets in Latin America and, as his behavior in Argentina indicates, a 
vehement opponent of everything smacking of Totalitarianism—be it from the left or the 
right. While it would take many years for the break between Washington and Guatemala 
to become irreversible, UFCO’s introduction of the Communist specter around 1947 was 
a definite step in that direction.29 
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Caribbean Legion, passim. 
29 Braden, Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. John L. Simpson, Mr. Tennyson (International 
Railways of Central America) and Mr. Pollan (Vice President, United Fruit Company), November 
29, 1946, Lot Files, General Memoranda, Box 12, folder marked November 18, 1946 to January 
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Throughout this period, Edwin Kyle managed to uphold his image in Guatemala of 
a respectable educator and agriculturalist. The Guatemalan government appreciated 
Kyle’s friendly interest in these fields, which manifested itself in the form of educational 
exchange programs, the translation in Spanish of American books on the newest 
developments in agriculture, and numerous study trips of Guatemalan agricultural 
engineers to the United States and vice versa—all made possible by the Dean’s 
involvement. But gentle Kyle had no interest in the international conflicts involving the 
Caribbean Legion and his concern for the improvement of agriculture did not include 
labor laws or other social matters. In his own, patronizing way, he sympathized with 
Guatemalan efforts to modernize its agriculture, but he also admired the enormous, well-
ordered and scientifically managed plantations of UFCO.30 Basically, Kyle’s interest in 
local politics ended with his somewhat abstract defense of Guatemalan democracy in 
1945. He did not play a real part in the issues surrounding the Caribbean Legion or the 
Labor Code—except as the Department’s voice in Guatemala. If the ambassador had 
taken an effort to gauge Guatemala’s standpoint in these matters, communication 
between Washington and Guatemala might have been improved. Instead, UFCo was 
allowed to put a definite stamp on the Department’s conception of events in Guatemala. 
When compared to Erwin’s spirited and persistent defense of Honduran authoritarianism 
or Braden’s attacks on Argentine “totalitarianism”, one cannot help but conclude that 
Kyle could have played a much more forceful—and perhaps positive—role in his function 
as American ambassador to Guatemala. 
In 1945, the State Department considered it appropriate to send an agriculturist to 
Guatemala. In 1948—when 72 year old Kyle was definitely up for retirement—the 
changing mood in Washington was expressed by its decision to send one of the very first 
“Cold Warriors”, Richard C. Patterson Jr., to Guatemala. While Patterson was also a 
political appointee, the attitude of an American embassy toward the local government 
probably never changed as much as when Patterson took over from Kyle. A former army 
officer and businessman, Patterson did not have the patience, gentleness, and 
intellectual ability that made Kyle a successful teacher and scholar. Rather, Colonel 
Patterson was overbearing and arrogant and tended to reduce complex issues to 
straightforward dichotomies. 31  Patterson’s previous assignment was to Yugoslavia, 
where his experience with Marshall Tito had not been a happy one. However, being the 
officer to have served “behind” the Iron Curtain longest (in 1947), made Patterson 
something of a recognized expert in Communist tactics, a role which he appears to have 
cherished. His transfer from Communist Yugoslavia to Guatemala was in itself a sign 
that the Truman administration was not pleased with the direction which Arévalo’s social 
experiments were taking. Guatemalans of a reactionary bend where quick to pick up on 
that message and to seek out Patterson. General Miguel Ydígoras-Fuentes, former 
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Ubico crony and future president of Guatemala, for example, commended Patterson on 
his “brilliant performance in Jugoslavia” and added that the new ambassador must “know 
perfectly well all the tricks of International Communism”. “Indeed, yes” Patterson 
answered, “I feel that I know many of the tricks of international communism”. And, 
ominously, “my three years of experience with Marshal Tito should be helpful in my 
future work”.32 
 
3.2 Caught in the middle 
Around 1941, second secretary Overton G. Ellis had an informal talk with Augustín 
Alfaro, a prominent Salvadoran civil engineer and a revolutionary leader in 1944. While 
steering clear of any concrete comment on the local regime, Alfaro discussed in general 
terms the failure of the constitution to clearly define the voter. Assuming that the 
conversation was going to continue on an abstract plane, Ellis responded with some 
local truisms about “the illiteracy and lack of any political education or consciousness of 
the masses” which made them “easy prey for any demagogue”. Betraying, perhaps for 
the fist time, his practical interest in politics, Alfaro rebuked the secretary’s fatalism with 
the straightforward observation that “We learn to walk by walking”.33 
After the fall of Martínez, it was time that Salvadorans learned how to walk. Under 
the right circumstances they might have succeeded, but the democratic experiment that 
started in May was cut short by a military coup in October. It is hard to say why 
Salvadorans failed where Guatemalans succeeded, at least for the time being, in setting 
up a relatively liberal government. Granted, the Provisional President after the fall of the 
old regime, General Andrés Ignacio Menéndez, was a former collaborator of Martínez 
and had been a figurehead president on the latter’s behalf once before in 1931. However, 
Menendez seems to have been genuinely interested in the democratic experiment of 
1944 and was doubtlessly encouraged in this by his much more forceful and liberally-
minded wife who—being only 26 years old at the time—was a new arrival on the 
Salvadoran political scene.34 In the end, it was not the many political leftovers from 
Martínez’ days who ended the experiment, but the Salvadoran army. 
The position of the Salvadoran army after the revolution was entirely different from 
that of the Guatemalan army. Since Ponce was removed by the army, the power and the 
prestige of the Guatemalan armed forces remained intact. In fact, with two officers in the 
ruling junta and a new revolutionary aura, the position of the army was better than ever. 
In Salvador, however, the army lost much of its standing in the botched April uprising 
and nearly all of its political influence when the civilian element singlehandedly bested 
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Martínez. So in Salvador, many army officers felt that they could only regain their 
standing at the expense of the revolution while their Guatemalan colleagues could 
flourish within the revolution. 
The Salvadoran brush with democracy lasted for only four months, but was 
characterized by feverish activity. Some ten political parties were formed—or came out 
into the open—in the two months after Martínez’ downfall. Some were radical, some 
reactionary, most centered around a charismatic leader rather than a principle, but all 
referred in some way or another to the democratic ideology of the War. 35  New 
newspapers were published while existing newspapers began to express editorial 
comments freely.36 Lawyers organized themselves in a professional organization and 
forced the Martínez appointees from their positions in the judicial branch.37 The sessions 
of the national legislature, still made up of Martinistas, were thoroughly dominated by the 
spontaneous—and somewhat disorderly—contributions from the public in the galleries.38 
While there was something of an anarchic quality to all this activity, the Salvadoran 
revolution also had a hero from the start: Arturo Romero. Romero was a young physician 
who was one of the early leaders of the anti-Martínez movement. He came to personify 
the revolution much like Arévalo would in Guatemala—partly, perhaps, because the 
dramatic scar of a machete blow to the face served as a constant reminder of his 
personal sacrifices during the uprising. Judging from the information in the archives of 
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the American embassy, there was a good change that the disfigured young doctor would 
be elected president had the planned elections taken place.39 
The American embassy was clearly impressed by the optimism prevailing in San 
Salvador throughout May and June. Although it was sometimes regretted that the young 
revolutionaries lacked a sense of decorum, the American diplomats also recounted, with 
barely suppressed glee, how Martínez’ old cronies in the legislature were cowed into 
submission by enthusiastic crowds in the galleries, or herded into the front row of a 
celebratory parade and “made to like it”. 40  Thurston also seems to have been 
sympathetic to Romero, although the embassy’s secretaries, who were of comparable 
age and social background, were even more impressed with the doctor. One of 
Romero’s first acts as a politician was to visit the American embassy to profess his pro-
Americanism and distaste of the radical factions in the revolution. The young man also 
appears to have been under the impression that the embassy had played an important 
role in Martínez downfall and was very grateful for that.41 Toward the end of May, the 
embassy furnished a visa to Romero so that he could undergo plastic surgery at the 
famed Mayo clinic and study the social laws of the United States. Around the same time, 
secretary Ellis reported that Romero was pro-democratic, pro-American, and pro-
capitalist and added that the doctor was one of the few who would be able to unite all 
classes in El Salvador.42 The embassy’s bias for Romero was apparently so strong that it 
became public knowledge and Thurston felt it necessary to inform the government in 
August that the United States did not, in fact, prefer any candidate for the presidency 
over another.43 
Although the army kept a low profile for a while and the younger officers actually 
showed some careful support for the Romero campaign, the older officers who had 
made their careers under the Martínez regime began to stir by late June. Increased 
rumors about communist agitators which were followed, ironically, by bloody riots 
induced by reactionary agitators set the tone for the month of August.44 It seems likely 
that these latest “communist uprisings” were the work of the local chief of police, colonel 
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Osmín Aguirre (y) Salinas.45  The chief was a leftover from the Martínez days who, 
according to the embassy, was pro-Nazi and anti-American—“the prototype of the Indian 
militarist steeped in the old Central American traditions of the right of the military cast to 
rule”.46 Rumor had it that Aguirre had led a platoon of machine gunners during the 
Matanza and during the 1944 uprisings he had apparently counseled Martínez to break 
up the strikes with the help of Indian fighters and then shoot the Indians as 
communists.47  
On October 21, secretary Maleady of the embassy was at the police station to 
interview Aguirre about recent shootings throughout the city when a group of army 
officers barged into the office and, not having noticed the American, bowed very low to 
Aguirre and said: “Ya está, mi Coronel, ya está arreglado el asunto”. 48  Somewhat 
embarrassed, the chief shooed the officers out of his office and proceeded to inform a 
now very skeptical Maleady about the utter incapability of the Menendez government to 
establish order. As it turned out, the military men had come to tell Aguirre that they had 
forced Menendez resign and the Congress to appoint the police chief president. All of 
this had been done, of course, to save the country from communistic agents.49 
It so happened that the embassy was without an ambassador during the military 
coup. Thurston was transferred some two weeks earlier. The young secretaries at the 
legation decided after the coup not to see Aguirre or to take any other action that might 
imply recognition of his regime, which they considered reactionary to the point of being 
Fascist inspired. Only five days later, while the political situation had not yet stabilized, 
the new ambassador, John Farr Simmons arrived at his new post. The State Department 
could have decided to delay the arrival of the new ambassador to demonstrate its lack of 
sympathy for the coup or at least until the local situation had straightened out, but it was 
apparently deemed more appropriate to have a senior officer assess the situation. Non-
recognition, which was officially abandoned in the 1930s, was considered strong 
medicine, not to be applied carelessly. However, after just a few hours at his new post 
Simmons decided not to present his credentials or to talk to any government official, 
“pending instructions from the Department”. As the Department was slow to act, the 
“policy” that was initiated by the secretaries of the embassy on October 21 remained in 
force. Explaining his decision, Simmons reported that: 
…the present crisis in El Salvador has a significance far greater than the 
confines of this country, or even Central America. Here we have a growing 
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liberal movement among an increasingly enlightened and articulate people. 
This movement had, earlier this year, made orderly and decent progress. 
Free and fair elections for January 1945 had been guaranteed. Suddenly this 
progressive tendency has been cut short by violent methods. The eyes of 
other countries and people are directed on what action the United States 
may now take towards recognition of the new regime. I believe that we 
should take very careful thought before giving encouragement to a forcible 
and apparently illegal assertion and assumption of power such as has taken 
place in El Salvador. I believe that our action in this matter will be a pattern, 
and perhaps an inspiration, to the decent and moderate liberals throughout 
the world.50 
The next couple of weeks the situation in El Salvador remained in the balance. The 
Aguirre regime, while originating from an army/police coup, did not have full support from 
all army factions. Being made up of officers from the middle ranks (captain to colonel), 
the regime faced opposition from the more liberal younger officers on one side and the 
more reactionary general officers on the other. At the same time, the middle sectors of 
the capital, those who had removed Martínez, refused to submit to the new military 
regime. No week went by without a strike against the government, although the 
movement did not regain the strength on which it had ousted Martínez: Strike funds were 
depleted and, with the coffee picking season at hand, the upper classes no longer 
smiled upon disruptions in the labor and financial markets. The liberal opposition 
suffered a major defeat in December: restless Romeristas who had fled to Guatemala 
after the coup staged an ill-planned military invasion which was quickly routed by the 
Salvadoran army—thus eliminating the most militant wing of the opposition and 
prompting Romero to retire the leadership of his exiled party.51 
Although Aguirre managed to stay in power in the face of civilian and army 
opposition, this appears to have been due to the weakness and dividedness of his 
opponents, rather than the innate strength of his own government. A most worrisome 
development—or lack of development—in this context was the complete silence of the 
United States. While the State Department did not formally distance itself from the 
Aguirre coup, it did not formally acknowledge its existence either. Simmons was careful 
not meet or associate with anyone in the Aguirre faction. In November 1944, Berle had 
informed the embassy that although it was not the function of the U.S. government to 
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spread democracy, it “naturally” felt greater sympathy for such government. This line of 
policy, even if it was very vague, probably encouraged Simmons to maintain the 
embassy’s distance from the new regime. His reports on the insecure position of Aguirre 
and his supposed Nazi sympathies—while not constituting valid reasons to break 
diplomatic relations according to international law—probably convinced the Department 
to adopt a wait-and-see attitude. Throughout the last quarter of 1944, and first months of 
1945, the Department claimed that it was “consulting” with the other American republics 
on the question of recognition for the Aguirre government.52  
In the early 1930s, Martínez held out in the face of U.S. non-recognition for two 
years, but he enjoyed full army support at the time and, especially after the Matanza, 
ruled over a cowed population. Since Aguirre faced at least passive resistance from all 
layers of the population, lack of U.S. recognition was a much bigger problem for him and 
he decided not to follow in Martínez’ footsteps. In November, the Aguirre government 
announced that free and fair elections for the presidency would be held in January, 1945. 
Undoubtedly, the object was to have a puppet president elected, but the very slim basis 
of support that the regime enjoyed, combined with the need to find a candidate who 
could placate moderate Liberals as well as the State Department, disqualified any 
candidate from among Aguirre’s immediate retinue. After much searching, the regime 
decided to back the candidature of Salvador Castañeda Castro, a moderately 
conservative army officer and one time Minister of the Interior under Martínez. 
Castañeda seemed both pliable and able to garner the support of the important coffee 
planting interests, while he was unobjectionable for moderate Liberals who longed for 
peace and quiet after the upheavals of 1944.53 
With the help of Aguirre’s army supporters and the conservative coffee planting 
association (and probably some creative redacting of voting results) Castañeda 
managed to garner a landslide victory. No one had expected the outcome to be different 
because the Romeristas boycotted the elections while the only two remaining candidates, 
both of the caudillo type, dropped out of the race right before the elections to protest 
supposed fraud. Probably to Aguirre’s considerable dismay, however, Castañeda turned 
out to be his own man. Even before all the votes were counted, Castañeda broke with 
Aguirre over a dispute concerning the selection of future cabinet members. Aguirre 
naturally wanted to fill the cabinet with his own appointees, but Castañeda was bent on 
“national conciliation”, his campaigning theme, and wanted to reunite the country by 
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inviting both Liberals and Conservatives to join his government. Over the next couple of 
weeks, the time remaining before the official inauguration of the new government on 
March 1, Aguirre and Castañeda were locked in a power struggle that would determine 
who was to be the real leader of El Salvador.54 
The embassy followed that power struggle with great interest. Even if Castañeda’s 
election was not of the democratic type, his program of conciliation, if practiced 
conscientiously, would put Salvador back on track toward a more open and Liberal 
society. Considering the fact that Aguirre was a Matanza veteran and a former Nazi-
sympathizer, he fell squarely in the “disreputable” category. The power struggle between 
him and Castañeda thus presented a good context for action under the purportedly pro-
democratic policy of Washington. Considerations of “inter-American solidarity” took 
precedence, however: A conference of American Foreign Ministers was to take place in 
Mexico in March and the U.S. State Department wished all nations of the hemisphere to 
be represented there. The official invitation could not be extended to El Salvador, 
however, as long as its government remained unrecognized. Washington felt that it could 
not wait until March 1, the inauguration of Castañeda, with the invitation and was 
therefore considering to extend recognition to Aguirre—reasoning that it was a “lame 
duck” government anyway. 55  Simmons vehemently opposed the idea. Arguing that 
recognition would “give Aguirre a tremendous prestige just at the moment of his waning 
power (…) would encourage him to take some extreme political action”, the ambassador 
further noted that: 
It is also believed significant that comment among liberal circles in this 
country indicate that many liberal groups would understand it perfectly if we 
were to extend our recognition to Castaneda after March 1, realizing that the 
withholding of recognition cannot be continued indefinitely and that every 
opportunity has been given to the opposition to assert itself over a period of 
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several months. Liberal opinion, however, would be profoundly shocked in 
this country were we to extend recognition to the Aguirre regime prior to 
March 1.56 
It is obvious then, that American recognition of Aguirre would have a significant 
symbolic importance in El Salvador. The State Department felt, however, that a practical 
solution to the problem could be found. First of all, some way was found to pressure 
Aguirre into letting Castañeda select the delegates to the conference. Next, the 
Department tried to get Guatemala on board for its plan to recognize the Salvadoran 
government in February. Since the Guatemalan revolutionary regime enjoyed enormous 
prestige with liberals in Salvador, its participation would indicate that diplomatic 
recognition of Aguirre did not imply approval of his regime.57 Unfortunately, and to the 
considerable annoyance of the Department, the Guatemalan government flatly rejected 
to recognize Aguirre together with the United States. It even turned out to be difficult to 
get the Guatemalans to attend the conference at all, since its delegates were unwilling to 
negotiate with Salvadoran representatives who, while informally selected by Castañeda, 
would bear letters of credence signed by Aguirre. In the end, the Department decided 
that the Guatemalans “confused” the matter of recognition and the conference with 
ideological matters, while the real issue was a “common front” during the war. The new 
leaders of Guatemala were, after all, “young, inexperienced and idealistic”. In the end, 
Washington recognized the Salvadoran government on February 19. Guatemala 
followed suit only when it considered that Castañeda had validated his rhetorical 
commitment to conciliation—almost two months later.58 
The fact that Salvadoran delegation to Mexico was made up of Castañeda’s men 
seems not to have made a big impression on Salvadoran public opinion. The fact that 
the United States recognized Aguirre, while liberal neighbors such as Guatemala did not, 
made a more profound impact. In the days and weeks after recognition, the embassy in 
San Salvador received hate mail in such quantities that a separate file marked “protests 
against recognition” was created in the archives. Many letters accused the United States 
of fascist policies; some contained more traditional denunciations of “Yankee 
imperialism”; at least one letter was accompanied by a picture of Franklin Roosevelt 
adorned with swastikas.59 While the fact that the Salvadoran opposition, as an organized 
body, never regained its old strength must have played a role in the development, it is 
noteworthy to observe that throughout the following years there was very little contact 
between the American embassy and oppositionists. 
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Eventually, the recognition of Aguirre had no lasting impact on political power 
struggle inside El Salvador and Castañeda was duly inaugurated on March 1. Simmons 
was initially optimistic about Castañeda’s promises about national conciliation. While the 
President was not elected by fair means, at least he had been elected, the ambassador 
opined, and if Castañeda followed up on his pledge to invite liberal civilians into the 
government and to extend a general amnesty for those driven into exile by Aguirre, El 
Salvador might yet take some careful steps in the direction of more democracy.60  
That this was not to be was due in part to the extreme polarization of Salvadoran 
politics. Like a classic zero-sum game, every concession that Castañeda did to the 
liberal civilians was considered a defeat by the army and the conservatives and vice 
versa. Thus, in Simmons’ conception of the situation, Castañeda tried to please 
everyone but ended up pleasing no-one. Conservatives were concerned that the most 
important members of the Aguirre cabinet were left out of the government and that 
Castañeda sought a rapprochement with the Arévalo government. Liberals were 
disappointed that none of their leaders were invited into the new government and that, 
despite an amnesty decree, Castañeda refused to allow supposed Communists back 
into the country. Both factions came to interpreted conciliatory moves made by the 
President as concessions wrung from a weak government, rather than grand gestures 
made by a strong one. On the one had, the Liberal press forced Castañeda, after a very 
bitter newspaper campaign, to adopt the popular constitution of 1886. On the other hand, 
minor plots from both sides forced Castañeda to rely more and more on army and police 
support and to rule under a state of siege for much of his time in office.61    
Thus Simmons found himself in a considerably more ambiguous situation then his 
colleagues in neighboring countries. While Guatemala could be considered a real 
democracy—especially in comparison with the previous regime and when seen through 
the eyes of an ambassador as charitable as Kyle—and while Honduras was still under 
the control of a 1930s caudillo, the new regime in El Salvador eluded definition. With the 
advantage of hindsight, historians regard the government of General Castaneda as an 
integral part of the military and often authoritarian rule that characterized Salvadoran 
politics between the early 1930s and the middle 1980s. But Simmons lacked the broad 
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view that hindsight offers and, more importantly, did not know in which direction the 
government in particular or the political climate more generally would develop. Thus, for 
the ambassador in San Salvador, the policy against dictatorships raised the very basic 
question as to “the type of government which exists in this country”: 
[T]here is at least the question as to whether the present government of 
President Castaneda should or should not be classed as a dictatorship. 
Certain aspects of the Castaneda government might support the thesis that 
he is not a dictator and that he should be considered as a President elected 
by due constitutional processes and legally functioning as the chief of state 
of a democracy. 
On the other hand, the ambassador argued, Castañeda’s election was due only to the 
support of Aguirre and the army. Summarizing several other characteristics of the 
government, Simmons could not offer a real conclusion as to what type of government 
he was dealing with. And although he agreed with most of Braden’s points, he studiously 
avoided any mention of how they would affect relations with El Salvador. 
Simmons did betray some optimism about Castaneda’s conciliation policy. Even 
though it was discouraging that the army had great influence over the president, the 
ambassador believed that the army itself was divided and this might offer Castaneda a 
change to involve the Liberal opposition in his government. The ambassador still 
considered that last group of “forward-looking liberals, small in number but strongly 
influenced by Jeffersonian concepts of democracy”, to be the best hope for Salvador’s 
future. It was fortunate that the Liberals in El Salvador were “more articulate” than in any 
other Central American countries and that they patterned their “ideals upon the 
democratic processes of our country”. However, their “liking and respect for the United 
States [suffered] a severe setback at the time of our recognition of the Aguirre regime on 
February 19, 1945, nine days before President’s Castaneda’s inauguration”. If the United 
States was serious about its intention to encourage a development towards more 
democracy, Simmons argued, the Liberal element in El Salvador “should be given every 
encouragement [because] in the long run, [it] is our greatest hope for the future in the 
gradual establishment in this country of what we understand as the democratic process”. 
As to how this last objective should be accomplished, Simmons offered no 
concrete ideas. He regretted to admit that: 
A justified criticism of our diplomatic service in the past [years], and even in a 
limited way at present, is the tendency often shown by our diplomats to limit 
their association and contacts to a certain international set or certain types of 
individuals whom they consider to possess known influence and importance. 
This tendency has in the past often prevented the development of the wide 
contacts, so necessary in this modern age, between our representatives and 
the representatives of all phases of the economic and cultural life of the 
country concerned. It has too often be the case in the past that the liberal 
and progressive elements in the country (…) have failed to gain contact with 
out representatives and that the latter have thus tended to obtain a distorted 
picture of the whole life of the country. 
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But while Simmons expressed his devout hope that this situation would change in the 
future, his only contribution to the realization of that ambition was to suggest that “the 
Department may find it possible to draft a policy instruction along these lines”62  
In terms of long term policy, Simmons advised the Department to limit arms 
deliveries to Salvador because the army was a “bulwark of the non-progressive and 
reactionary elements here”. Also, the United States should make sure that El Salvador 
always employed an American military officer to direct its military school so that the latter 
could “indoctrinate the cadets with the democratic character of our military tactics”. On 
the issue of U.S. aid programs in the country, Simmons saw great opportunities for a 
literacy program: “From the point of view of gradual democratic development this 
illiteracy problem is virtually the whole problem”.63 
In terms of short term policy, the ambassador remained unsure how he might 
entice the liberal classes in El Salvador to play a bigger role in future political 
developments. There is no evidence to suggest that he improved his network of personal 
contacts. In fact, his reports over the next few months suggest that, in the face of 
growing army influence, the active Liberal opposition went underground and the 
ambassador lost touch with it. He also began to loose confidence in Castaneda who, 
despite his continued rhetorical dedication to “conciliation”, became entirely dependent 
on the support of the conservative Generals to ward of coups by younger officers and to 
suppress food riots and increasingly militant labor protests against the government’s 
meandering social policies. The plunging morale of Castaneda’s government also 
manifested itself in increased cynicism, petty intrigues, and graft. This situation took on 
such extreme forms that Simmons eventually decided to advise against extending more 
aid or loans to El Salvador, despite the promises of such aid for the country’s future 
development.64 
A crisis occurred in September 1946, when a general strike broke out in San 
Salvador and steadily gained momentum throughout the month. The reason for this 
development was the Government’s procrastination in the institution of promised labor 
laws. Some months earlier, the administration had created the new cabinet position of 
Minister of Labor, but subsequently neglected to appoint someone to that post. Also, a 
committee of “outstanding citizens” had been working on a new and badly needed Labor 
Code for some time, but in the end, the President rejected the committee’s proposals 
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without apparent reason. These actions alienated both labor and middle class liberals 
who initially joined forces in the September strike. The situation got out of control, 
however, when the police fired randomly at a peaceful student demonstration—killing 
four and wounding twenty, some of whom were innocent bystanders. In response, the 
strike turned violent as its moderate supporters were scared away by police brutality and 
only the militant participants remained. While the Castañeda government had initially 
been paralyzed by the opposing demands of Liberals and Conservatives, who 
respectively demanded surrender to and suppression of the strike, it now turned to the 
army. Martial law was decreed on September 24, allowing the police and the army to 
break up the strike—an objective that was accomplished some three days later. As a 
consequence, real power in El Salvador was now definitely in the hands of senior army 
officers responsible for the suppression of the strike, although the civilian government of 
Castañeda was allowed to remain as a front.65 
In the absence of a concrete context for action—even the hope for slow progress 
through American aid became dim due to increasing government corruption—Simmons 
became disillusioned with political situation in El Salvador over the course of his tenure 
in that country. Summarizing Castañeda’s accomplishments toward the end of 1946, 
Simmons reported that the former’s position was now more stable than ever. However, 
this did not imply that he was good presidential material. His term of office was 
characterized by a “policy of expediency and undignified compromise”. The ambassador 
opined that Castañeda’s “political surrender” to a faction of senior army officers that was 
only concerned with its own political ambitions was “almost pathetic”. Attempts at 
conciliation were completely abandoned under army pressure and the administration 
was now “settling down into the more usual Central American patterns of the past”.66 
Simmons’ disillusionment now also extended to the Liberals who in the past had 
demonstrated, the ambassador believed, a complete lack of willingness to comprise with 
Castañeda’s conciliation policy and were distressingly apathetic about the abuses of the 
government. In October, 1945, for example, a cabinet crisis had offered an opening for 
president Castañeda to invite more Liberals into his government. And while the president 
did extend an invitation to several men from this group, they had refused to join the 
government unless the popular and liberal constitution of 1886 was reinstated—
something that Castañeda was unable or unwilling to do at that particular time. Simmons 
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chided the Liberals for foregoing this “golden opportunity” to increase their influence and 
work towards a “greater degree of democracy and popular participation”.67 
Beginning in 1947, the Department of State acknowledged that Simmons’ “recent 
fear that the Castaneda Government was drifting toward the usual pattern of Central 
American military dictatorship” had become a reality. Recent elections for the National 
Assembly, executed under the state of siege that had been in effect since the strike of 
1946, represented a “new low” in Salvadoran politics. The Government had not even 
bothered to “go through the motions” of democratic procedure and many voters did not 
know that elections had taken place until the results were published. In February, the 
embassy reported that the administration of El Salvador “has reached an all-time low for 
corruption, cynicism and venality; that the cabinet is weak; [and] that the government has 
ceased to govern”. Finally, the government of Castañeda, which had eluded definition 
two years earlier, could be classified: “It surely is not the democratic government that 
one had hoped it would be in the early stages”.68 
 
3.3 Utopia Inc. 
John Erwin would serve a total of 13 years, divided over two tours of 10 and 3 years 
respectively, in Honduras—an unusual length of time, as the average was 3 to 4 years. 
A political appointee and former journalist, Erwin initially attacked the widespread 
government corruption he encountered in Honduras in the muckraking tradition that 
earned him some modest fame during his previous career. 69  Throughout the War, 
however, Erwin developed a very close working relationship with the Carías regime and, 
as his years of residence in Tegucigalpa accumulated, the ambassador settled in for a 
more comfortable life and assumed the complacent attitude of an American retiree in a 
tropical country. From the early 1940s onward, Erwin began to refer to Tegucigalpa 
affectionately as “our town” and adopted the perspective of foreign businessmen with 
long residence in Honduras who appreciated the years of peace and calm Carías had 
provided them: 
Honduras is really a wonderful country and (…)  it is a pity that it is not more 
appreciated: no volcanoes, no earthquakes, no tornadoes, no army, no navy, 
no revolutions, no elections, no Communists, no labor unions, no wage or 
social security laws, no income tax, no doubt about who is boss!70 
Neither the Department nor the Administration showed an interest in replacing 
Erwin: Career officers had no interest in a post as dull as Tegucigalpa and traditionally 
                                                 
67 Simmons to the Secretary of State, Despatch 502, October 10, 1945, PR El Salvador (SCF), 
Box 11, Vol. II, cl. 800: Salvador. 
68 Simmons to the Secretary of State, Despatch 1292, January 17, 1947, PR El Salvador (SCF), 
Box 14, cl. 800: Salvador, January to June; Williams to Newbegin, December 31, 1946, Lot Files, 
Individual Countries, Box 46, folder marked El Salvador, 1940-1947; Williams to Wise and 
Newbegin, January 23, 1947, Lot Files, Individual Countries, Box 46, folder marked El Salvador, 
1940-1947; Williams to Newbegin, January 28, 1947, Lot Files, Individual Countries, Box 46, 
folder marked El Salvador, 1940-1947. 
69 See chapter 1, pages 47-48. 
70 Erwin to the Secretary of State, Despatch 1442, November 2, 1944, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 
19, Vol. 7, cl. 800: Honduras, August to December. 
THE POST-WAR CONJUNCTURE 
 
 
287 
regarded appointment to that country as punishment duty. The Truman administration 
never took an acute interest in the region and could not very well fool its political 
appointees into thinking that the Central American backwater was somehow an 
important or interesting area—as was the case at the height of the Good Neighbor policy 
when Erwin was appointed. But while the top of the executive branch had no problem 
with Erwin’s loitering in Tegucigalpa, his colleagues of the career rank in the middle 
positions of the Department and Service were thoroughly fed up with him around the end 
of the war. Officers at the American embassy in San Salvador cynically referred to 
Erwin’s post as “Utopia Inc.” and the Central American desk officer in Washington 
complained to Spruille Braden about the “rather nauseating ‘Carias can do no wrong’ 
attitude of Tegucigalpa”.71 
If even his colleagues were loosing their patience with Erwin, it should come as no 
surprise that the Central American Liberal factions regarded him as a dupe of the local 
regime. Erwin’s refusal to meet oppositionists or even to accept their written manifestos 
gave cause to gossip that he was on Carías’ payroll. It was widely believed that Erwin 
never fully informed Franklin Roosevelt—who was still regarded as a foremost champion 
of democracy—about the reality of Carías’ tyrannical rule. When it was rumored in late 
1944 that Roosevelt found out about Erwin’s duplicity and decided to withdraw the 
ambassador, people in Tegucigalpa flocked to the churches to give thanks to God.72 
They would be disappointed: Erwin was not even halfway through his tenure as 
ambassador to Honduras. 
With Erwin remaining in his utopian “Shangri-La”73 and Braden in charge of Latin 
American affairs in Washington, policy toward Honduras developed a character that 
could only be described as schizophrenic.  
Even before Braden came in, the Department was purposefully negligent of Carías. 
Throughout 1945 at least, Central American revolutionaries of all nationalities were 
roaming the isthmus and, flush with the successes experienced by the anti-dictatorial 
movements in Salvador and Guatemala, were busily planning (and sometimes executing) 
armed expeditions against the remaining tyrants. Some members of this “Caribbean 
Legion” found refuge in Guatemala where the Government was sympathetic to their 
cause; weapons could be obtained relatively easily; and hideouts in the rugged terrain 
along the Honduran border were plentiful. Since some armed excursions from 
Guatemalan territory into Honduras did materialize in 1945, Carías complained loudly 
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that his northern neighbor was neglectful of its international duties and told Erwin more 
discreetly that the military campaigns against him were actually coordinated by the 
Guatemalan government, which was itself a proxy of Mexican communism. Although 
Carías’ fabrications did not illicit much interest from the Americans in the political 
environment of 1945, Erwin did take Carías’ side in reporting to Washington that the 
caudillo only wanted to be left in peace and that the Guatemalans should get a firm 
dressing down from Washington for their failure to prevent revolutionary activity against 
friendly governments. Since Kyle reported from Guatemala City that the Arévalo 
government only wanted to be left in peace and that the Hondurans should get a firm 
dressing down from Washington because of the malignant rumors they were spreading 
about a friendly government, the Department could let its own sympathies decide the 
matter. As the general attitude of the division of American Republic Affairs was to go 
easy on the democracies and to be demanding of the dictatorships, Carías’ complaints 
were ignored while Washington was uncharacteristically tolerant of the disorderly 
situation along Guatemala’s borders. The Department’s attitude in the matter may have 
inspired Carías to seek a rapprochement with his neighbor, which he did by declaring his 
support for Guatemala’s territorial claims on British Honduras (Belize) toward the end of 
1945, effectively ending the friction between the two country’s, for the time being.74  
It was prudent of Carías to keep a low profile in international matters, because the 
Department’s attitude toward him cooled down further in the next two years or so. 
Despite the fact that Carías was traditionally considered the most “benign” of the four 
original isthmian caudillos, Braden’s formula of cool politeness but no aid for 
“disreputable” governments was applied to him as well—perhaps because the Honduran 
president was always mentioned in one breath with the more tyrannical regimes of Ubico, 
Martínez, and Somoza. In any event, the Honduran ambassador to Washington, Dr. 
Julían Cáceres, found that his job became very difficult with Braden in charge of Latin 
American affairs. The bone of contention during the next two years was the status of 
U.S.-Honduran military cooperation. In Braden’s conception of the policy toward 
disreputable governments, the delivery of military materiel to dictatorships or unstable 
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governments was decidedly out of the question. Since Carías was a dictator, he was not 
to benefit from the stream of surplus weapons going to Latin America after the War. 
Other countries that were barred from such deliveries were Argentina, Bolivia, the 
Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Paraguay. In the case of Honduras, the policy 
was first applied, discreetly, toward the end of 1945, beginning of 1946, when the 
Department tied up in red tape the delivery of military type airplanes to Honduras. When 
the Honduran government approached Canada for the delivery of airplanes, the 
Department also managed to prevent that sale.75 
For the better part of a year, the Department maintained a very dubious attitude 
toward Honduras, however. Perhaps because of Carías’ very low profile, as opposed to 
that of the megalomaniacal president of the Dominican Republic, Generalissimo Rafael 
Trujillo, the Department did not come out to declare outright its disapproval for the 
Honduran regime. In March 1946, Byrnes informed the embassy in Tegucigalpa, again 
discreetly, that Carías was not to receive a birthday greeting that year and that the 
embassy itself should be careful not to show undue regard for the local regime.76 Two 
months earlier, when the Honduran ambassador visited the Department to explain that 
Honduras was a democracy, but of a “different nature” than Americans might be 
accustomed to, he was told that the “only way to learn democracy was to practice it”. 
And although the Department expressed its satisfaction at Carías’ intention to leave the 
presidency in 1948, it did not directly inform the Hondurans that special restrictions on 
weapons deliveries applied in the meantime.77 Only toward the end of 1946, as the 
Honduran ambassador in Washington became particularly insistent that the delivery of 
military airplanes to his country should be expedited, did Braden tell Cáceres directly that: 
 …this Government [has] a more friendly feeling and a greater desire to 
cooperate with those Governments which [are] based on the periodically and 
freely expressed will of the people (…) There had been no such elections in 
Honduras since 1933 and (…) this fact influenced our approach to the 
question of military cooperation.78 
It is doubtful that this carefully worded message ever reached Carías, as the Honduran 
ambassador later admitted that he “had not been able to inform his government in writing 
of this conversation (…) because of its delicate nature”.79 Fearful of losing his plush job 
in Washington, Cáceres probably decided to tell his chief that the delay in weapons 
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deliveries was due to administrative complications, rather than American disapproval of 
his regime. 
Meanwhile, Erwin did an even better job of obscuring U.S. policy and of 
representing the peculiar nature of “democracy” in Honduras than Cáceres did. Given 
the number of years available to the ambassador to study the question, he managed to 
develop a thorough and sophisticated justification for authoritarian rule in Honduras 
which combined the best features of the local variation of Comte’s Positivism (but purged 
from the Specerian notions of race with which upper class Hondurans had enriched it) 
and American anthropological notions of “national character”. When secretary John B. 
Faust, who was something of amateur historian, joined the embassy in 1942, Erwin’s 
reports on the local dictatorship were augmented with a historical perspective which 
gave his ideas a breath and depth comparable to later modernity theory: 
Recorded history has few examples of democracy developing directly from 
chaos; the usual sequence has been chaos, strong-man dictatorship, and 
then a gradual softening towards democracy. Since President Carias is at 
least moving in the same direction, and as nothing better is in sight, I would 
be derelict in my duty if I did not suggest that the Department reconsider the 
view [that the Carías regime is disreputable]. President Carias is a great and 
patriotic Honduran, entirely without ambitions beyond his own frontiers. He 
deserves more sympathy than has been given him up to now.80 
Though it is impossible to discuss the full corpus that the embassy in Tegucigalpa 
produced on this subject, some of the more significant points might profitably be quoted. 
The embassy’s basic argument was that chaos reigned before Carías and would return if 
the General stepped down. Therefore, the choice in Honduras was not one between 
dictatorship and democracy, but one between dictatorship and chaos. In this light, the 
embassy alleged, Carías’ practice of arresting and jailing oppositionists without recourse 
to the law was an improvement on the situation existing before 1931, when local 
caudillos could freely plunder the countryside. Surely, during those bygone days many 
more Hondurans had their “human rights” violated by the rebel leaders and chieftains 
who were now subdued by Carías. Furthermore, there was no record of Carías ever 
executing or torturing his opponents, generally allowing them to go into exile after short 
jail terms. And Washington should not imagine that those political prisoners who were 
now in jail were “snowy-white devotees of liberty and democracy”. Many of them (or at 
least the two examples out of 600 political prisoners that the embassy came up with) 
were former warlords who had committed many outrages during the civil wars of the 
1920s. That they were now in jail for crimes of which they were “possibly” not guilty was 
beside the point, as they should have been punished for their earlier crimes a long time 
ago. 
 On the plus side, the embassy noted that there was no “effective” opposition to 
Carías; that he had put the country on a “pay-as-you-go basis” without recourse to 
“screwball economics”; Tegucigalpa was experiencing a building boom and many streets 
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now boasted working sewers and paved surfaces; and, finally Carías attended “strictly” 
to his own business in international affairs. There was, therefore no reason for the 
Department to object to Carías’ rule, according to the embassy. Only Carías’ decision to 
change the constitution and continue himself in power was somewhat objectionable. But 
since this happened first in 1936, Erwin (quite reasonably) told his superiors that “it 
seems a bit late to object now”.81 
Despite Erwin’s very persistent opposition to Department policy on disreputable 
governments, he assured his superiors that “the officers of this Embassy recognize that 
policies [illegible] in Washington rather than in the field and that our first responsibility is 
to carry out the Department’s policies; in conformity with this principle, we have faithfully 
adhered to every written instruction from the Department”. 82  This was no major 
commitment, as written instructions had ventured no further than to demand that the 
embassy did not take “any action which might be construed as support of the Carias 
regime or which Carias might use to extend his term in office”.83 Definite as these words 
sounded, they were practically meaningless in the Honduran context. Erwin was locally 
known as a long-standing friend of the regime and anything but his recall or some other 
active denial of support would not change this impression. True, the Department denied 
weapons deliveries, but this was a very discreet policy and considering Cáceres deceit, 
perhaps even unknown in Honduras. The only possible source of anxiety to the Carías 
regime might have been the public denunciations of Latin American dictatorship made 
by men like Braden in Washington. But as long as no concrete action followed, the 
caudillo could breathe easy. As the American Military Attaché in Tegucigalpa described 
the perspective from Honduras: 
The attitude of the United States remains the big imponderable which it is 
[sic.] impossible to evaluate from this end. Towards the end of 1946 various 
statements by Asst. Secy. of State Braden, Secy. of State Byrnes and Pres. 
Truman were interpreted to mean that the United States was ready to 
abandon the Roosevelt policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of 
Latin American countries. However, no such intervention occurred during 
1946 and developments during the year tended to support the theory that the 
United States would not take any action to force the resignation of Pres. 
Carias…84 
While it is true that the Department made no attempt to intervene in Honduras, the 
American ambassador would have had considerable leeway to express opposition the 
local regime at this point in time. If someone of Braden or Berle’s temperament and 
ideological inclinations had been the American ambassador to Tegucigalpa during the 
late 1940s, the Carías regime would most probably have been exposed to U.S. 
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democratic fervor. Considering the American ambassador’s very prominent position in 
Honduras (as opposed to Argentina and Brazil, where Braden and Berle had been 
stationed) and also considering the wave of anti-dictatorial sentiment in Central America 
and the Caribbean, U.S. opposition might well have ended the Cariato.  
Astonishingly, the State Department allowed Erwin to linger in Honduras. Being 
known as a good friend of Carías, the continued presence of Erwin served to symbolize 
Washington’s unwillingness to enforce its anti-dictatorial policy. When Erwin was finally 
withdrawn in 1947, the Department’s motives for that move were entirely extraneous. At 
the time, Tennessee Democratic Senator Kenneth McKellar was adamantly opposed to 
the administration’s selection of David E. Lillienthal to head the Atomic Energy 
Committee. According to newspaper reports, Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson, 
who was a big supporter of Lillienthal, wanted to punish McKellar for his opposition to 
the nomination by firing Tennessee’s senior diplomat: John Erwin.85 
Erwin was just one year short of witnessing the end of Carías’ presidency. The 
Honduran chief survived the revolutionary upheavals of 1944, but he was politically 
astute enough to realize that the era of continuismo was over. Thus he decided to “step 
down but not out”, in the words of a biographer, when his term ended in 1948. Unlike 
Ubico or Martínez, Carías did not have to flee his country or even leave politics 
completely. He would remain as the chief of his Nationalist Party after 1948 and his 
administration skillfully orchestrated the election of Juan Manuel Gálvez Durón as 
president and Julio Lozano Díaz as vice-president. Both men were members of the 
Nationalist Party and former members of the Carías cabinet: The regime would survive 
without Carías and Erwin. 
 
4. A CERTAIN IMPATIENCE 
Neither Braden nor the Department ever set an objective or timeframe for the policy on 
disreputable governments. Was the whole hemisphere to become democratic or was a 
certain measure of democracy in some countries also acceptable? And what did 
democracy mean? The absence of dictatorship, respect for human rights, the right to 
vote for everyone? Assuming that Braden and his supporters had some idea of where 
their policy would lead, it is unclear how much time they believed it would take to obtain 
tangible “results”. Would these be accomplished within a couple of years, within their 
lifetimes, within several generations? While an answer was never admitted to paper, it is 
fair to assume that some paybacks were expected within a few years. During the late 
1930s it was not certain that democracy would survive at all, but after victory over 
Fascism, its spread seemed rapid and unstoppable. Former enemies like Germany, Italy, 
and Japan turned away from dictatorship, European colonial empires disintegrated, and 
popular revolutions swept the Western Hemisphere—all within the span of some five 
years. Was it not reasonable to expect that with a few more years and the help of the 
United States the waves of democracy would have swept most of the world? 
                                                 
85 “Furious debate on Lillienthal rages in Senate”, Chicago Daily Tribune (March 25, 1947) 11; 
“Would consider stopgap aid to Greece: Truman”, CDT (March 27, 1947) 16; “J. Erwin”, CT. 
THE POST-WAR CONJUNCTURE 
 
 
293 
The advance of democracy stalled—even reversed—around 1947. It became clear 
that neither the Soviet Union, most of the old colonial empires, or the economic and 
military elites would tolerate popular sovereignty. In Latin America, popular revolutions 
were reversed by reactionary army officers in Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, and El 
Salvador. Military dictators who were previously considered to be relics of the past, 
Peron, Trujillo, Carías, and Somoza, managed to hold on—even in the face of U.S. 
opposition. Democracies like Guatemala went astray with their “screwball economics”.  
As Bethell and Roxborough indicate, the move to the right in Latin America was a 
consequence of internal developments and, as such, it is questionable whether any 
action on the side of the United States could have prevented it. It is certain, however, 
that the Braden policy was of little assistance to liberal factions in Latin America. While 
the most notorious dictators of the Hemisphere were singled out for persecution, there 
was no real policy to deal with less obnoxious dictators such as Carías. The Department 
made known its dissatisfaction with the Honduran regime on various occasions, but at 
the same time allowed its own embassy in Tegucigalpa to blunt its modest endeavors.  
Policy wavered in the case of hard-to-classify governments such as that of Castañeda, 
which gradually turned to the right without a hint of concern from Washington. The best 
opportunity, from a diplomatic angle, to influence the direction of political developments 
came with the Aguirre coup. While the Department initially snubbed the latter’s military 
regime, it allowed its international policy of building hemispheric solidarity to take 
precedence over concern for internal developments in Salvador when it prematurely 
recognized Aguirre in stead of waiting for Castañeda to take over the presidency.  That 
action was met with disappointment and anger by Salvadoran liberals and probably 
made it much harder on Simmons to stay in touch with the civilian opposition.  
While initially sympathetic to the Guatemalan democratic experiment, the State 
Department’s patience for its revolutionary aspects—as manifested in foreign adventures 
and domestic social reform—wore thin all too quickly. While Kyle was rather popular in 
Guatemala for his friendly interest in the country’s agriculture, he was only interested in 
the technical aspects of that endeavor while the local government was increasingly 
preoccupied with social conditions on the countryside. Furthermore, the only time that 
the ambassador expressed his support for a pro-democratic policy, he betrayed an 
America-centered perspective, stressing the “rights” of the United States “which have 
come as the result of saving the world from ruthless dictators twice in a single 
generation” and made it “the greatest defender of democratic principles of all times”. 
Thus, while it cannot be said that Kyle actively opposed Guatemalan actions, there was 
no reason to assume that he would understand the revolutionary fervor or economic 
nationalism which was evident in that country. 
The changing mood in Washington was represented most completely in a 1950 
article written by Louis Halle at the behest of the Department and published in Foreign 
Affairs. Halle used the pseudonym “Y” for the article: an obvious reference to Kennan’s 
“X” article. The article was supposed to define for the public the groundwork of American 
foreign policy toward Latin America—much like Kennan’s article with regard to the Soviet 
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Union. While the article has been characterized as signaling the abandonment of 
Braden’s policy, Halle probably considered it a refinement. He starts out by observing “a 
certain impatience” among Americans with the progress of democracy in Latin 
America—a reference to the recent public outcry against right-wing military coups in 
Venezuela and Peru. Somewhat ironically—considering the article’s stress on the 
“political immaturity” of Latin American countries—Halle chides Americans for their 
tendency to react like a “stern father” towards “his children” whenever political 
developments in Latin America are not to their liking. “But is the relationship of the 
United States to the Latin American nations in fact paternal? Or is it fraternal?”, Halle 
asks his readers—rhetorically.86 
The rest of the article argues firstly that the “historic drive” of the other American 
republics is “in the direction of the orderly practice of democracy”. This is clear from the 
fact that dictatorships are fewer than they were some 12 years ago—with Ubico, 
Martínez, and Carías (among others) all gone. Also, the public outcry against 
government abuses is greater than it was some time ago and even the remaining tyrants 
present themselves as men of the people and show greater respect for human rights. 
This is not to say that dictatorship has vanished completely, but “in the alteration that so 
many countries experience between elective and arbitrary government, the periods of 
former appear to be growing longer, those of the latter shorter”. 
Hence, the United States should be patient with this process, because it will be 
marked by ups and downs: “perhaps in obedience to something like the Hegelian 
principle of action, reaction and synthesis”. Also, this development toward democracy is 
achieved by “evolution rather than revolution”. It will not be attained just by the 
revolutionary overthrow of dictators. Examples abound, Halle argued, of nations that 
overthrew their tyrants, only to fall prey to chaos followed by yet another dictatorship 
because it was not yet “mature” enough for democracy. Since “democratic government is 
the outward and visible sign of (…) inward and spiritual grace” it cannot  be “assumed by 
a people as one puts on an overcoat”. It must be carefully nurtured “over the 
generations”: 
Consequently, the realistic approach to the promotion of democracy, 
regarded as something positive, must endeavor to provide the opportunity 
and the inspiration for growth. That done it is still necessary to maintain 
patience with the slowness of the process. 
This observation leads Halle to the second part of his argument, regarding the role 
of the United States in nurturing the trend toward democracy in Latin America. In the 
recent past, that role was assumed by “paternalistic” interventionists: 
Almost invariably, national self-righteousness is dominant in the breast of the 
interventionists or quasi-interventionists who advocate forcing the Latin 
Americans to live up to our concept of political democracy. It is outspoken 
among those who would have us turn our backs on the other American 
republics because they are unworthy of us. 
                                                 
86 Y (Louis Halle), “On a certain impatience with Latin America”, Foreign Affairs: An American 
Quarterly Review 28:1/4 (1949-1950) 565-579. 
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The way forward, according the Halle, was not for the United States to turn its back on 
“unworthy” governments in Latin America, but to offer positive assistance and to nurture 
those developments that appeared to promise evolutionary advance toward democracy. 
Two realistic options were to invite the American Republics to participate equally in the 
councils of the OAS, thus promoting their sense of responsibility, and to hold up the 
“moral example” of U.S. domestic politics. “Active cooperation for economic 
development”, however, was the most promising policy to make a “practical contribution 
to the growth of democracy”. Assuming that “extreme economic and social misery, and 
inadequate education are obstacles to the growth of democracy”, Halle believed that aid 
by the Export-Import Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (in which the U.S. was the principle stockholder), combined with the active 
dissemination of American technical know-how through the new Point IV program would 
stimulate Latin American political progress.  
The two points of Halle’s argument combined—patience and aid—entailed that the 
United States would no longer discriminate between supposed democracies and 
dictatorships. The proposition that all Latin American countries were moving toward 
more democracy slowly and by ups and downs implied, after all, that the United States 
could provide aid to any dictatorship and still maintain that it was promoting democracy 
in the long run. Besides, “it is a popular misconception that you can divide them [the 
American republic], as they stand today, between those that are immaculate 
democracies and those that are black dictatorships. All of them are shades of grey”. 
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Chapter 9 
 
THE MIDDLE MEN 
The Cold War comes to Central America, 1947-1954 
~ The Middle Men  ~ 
 
 
Sing a song of quetzals, pockets full of peace! 
The junta's in the palace, they've taken out a lease.  
The Commies are in hiding, just across the street;  
To the embassy of Mexico they beat a quick retreat.  
And pistol-packing Peurifoy looks mighty optimistic; 
For the land of Guatemala is no longer Communistic. 
 
~ Betty Jane Peurifoy, 1954 1 
 
 
 
The “ten years of spring”, as the Guatemalan experiment with liberal government is 
known, started out under the sympathetic observance of gentle Ambassador Edwin Kyle 
and ended with the active intervention of Ambassador John Peurifoy—or “pistol-packing 
Peurifoy”, undoubtedly one of the more unusual men in the Foreign Service. Peurifoy’s 
appointment to Guatemala by the Eisenhower administration signaled the end of an era: 
the appointment of the dynamic and thoroughly anti-communist ambassador was a clear 
indication that the Eisenhower government disapproved of Guatemala’s social and 
political experiments and intended to do something about it. Indeed, Peurifoy was 
selected for that particular post because he was thought to have the right qualifications 
to coordinate the coup that Eisenhower was planning against the Guatemalan 
government. And Peurifoy was not alone: in fact, the new administration also replaced 
the supposedly placid ambassadors in Honduras and El Salvador with proven cold 
warriors. Only Thomas Whelan, also a thorough anticommunist and a good friend of 
Anastasio Somoza, was allowed to remain in Nicaragua for much of the 1950s. Thus, 
Peurifoy’s appointment spelled the end of the nonintervention principle and extended the 
front of the Cold War to Central America. Eisenhower’s direct interference with the 
appointment of envoys to Central America are indications both of the more direct 
executive control over American foreign policy during the Cold War and of the 
importance that the new administration ascribed to the ideological inclinations and 
practical methods of its individual ambassadors.  
As for Peurifoy, he had a grand time in Guatemala. His task was to coordinate the 
CIA coup against Arbenz, Arévalo’s successor, in Guatemala City in 1954—a task that he 
executed with abandon. At one point, the ambassador guided a group of perplexed 
American journalists through Guatemala City waving a pistol while bombs dropped on all 
                                                 
1 “People”, Time Magazine (July 6, 1954). 
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sides. Only Peurifoy knew that the bombardments and coup were mainly a CIA- 
orchestrated show—neither he nor the journalists he was leading around were in any 
real physical danger. If only in personal style, Peurifoy could hardly have been more 
different from the diplomats of the Good Neighbor era. It is somehow fitting that this 
study on the perceptions of individual American diplomats should end with the 
appointment of a man of his character. If nothing else, it indicated that the era of Good 
Neighborliness, for all its inconsistencies, had definitely come to an end. For the next 
years at least, both Washington and its embassies in Central America believed 
themselves to be in the midst of a life-and-dead struggle against Soviet communism. 
 
1. A SHIFT TO THE RIGHT 
The question of when the Cold War “started” has occupied many historians. It could be 
said that the conflict became manifest in March 1947, when Harry Truman announced 
that the United States would send economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey to 
prevent those countries from falling prey to Soviet machinations. But had an open clash 
between east and west been inevitable before that time? Were the United States and the 
Soviet Union set on a collision course as far back as 1917? The question of when the 
Cold War “came” to Central America would be equally difficult to answer. The 1954 CIA 
coup in Guatemala definitively set the tone for the next decennia, but “red scares” 
followed by violent suppression, which sometimes involved the United States, went as 
far back as the 1920s. 
Historian Melvin Leffler found a straightforward answer to the larger question of 
when the Cold War started—or at least became inevitable. Before the Second World 
War, he argues, an ideological conflict existed between capitalist America and 
communist Russia, but the two were still able to work together if it suited there common 
interests—the alliance during the World War being an obvious example. Thus, 
ideological differences are a necessary, but in themselves not sufficient explanation for 
the Cold War. Only when the spheres of influence of the United States and the Soviet 
Union came to overlap in Central Europe as a direct consequence of the War did 
ideological differences combine with the realities of power politics to produce the conflict 
known as the Cold War.2 
In the case of U.S. Latin American policy, historians have found hints of a “first” 
Cold War or of a tradition of “containing” labor activity and economic nationalism in the 
region dating back to the early 20th century.3 Also, the purported American support for 
anti-communist dictators is supposed to form a connection between pre-War and Cold 
War policies. It is undeniable, of course, that American diplomats in the pre-War period 
shared their disdain for the (Indian) lower classes with the local aristocracy and were 
                                                 
2 Melvyn P. Leffler, The Specter of Communism. The United States and the Origins of the Cold 
War, 1917-1953 (New York 1994) especially 64-65. 
3  Greg Grandin and Gilbert M. Joseph eds., A Century of Revolution. Insurgent and 
Counterinsurgent violence during Latin America’s Long Cold War (Durham 2010) Part I: The First 
Cold War, especially the article by Jeffrey L. Gould. 
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occasionally swept along in the hysteria of local red scares. But to argue that this 
situation should be defined in terms of a “war” or that it was somehow akin to the later 
Cold War, that latter term has to be stretched to include any signs of class or racial 
antagonism. As long as indigenous communism or radicalism was not combined with the 
outside threat of a rival superpower, the United States was still able to transcend its 
inordinate fear of social revolutions and work with local forces as they were. The early 
Good Neighbor policy is one example, while Braden’s diplomacy implied a tolerance for 
local change and social experimentation that was unthinkable ten years later. Only when 
the Soviet Union was widely perceived to be a direct threat in Latin America did old 
prejudices combine with real power politics to reproduce the Cold War in the Western 
Hemisphere. This happened some years after superpower rivalry had become a fact of 
life in Europe and Asia. 
Historical studies that emphasize the parallels between 1930s diplomacy and Cold 
War diplomacy tend to downplay the importance of the intervening World War. The War 
introduced new concepts, such as the “fifth column” threat, and new procedures, such as 
the development of “fifth column” capabilities in the form of intelligence agencies, that 
would come to characterize the Cold War period. As far as U.S. Latin American policy 
was concerned however, the Cold War did not seamlessly follow the World War. 
Towards 1945, there was the question of what kind of superpower the United States 
would be. Would it spread its own economic system and political culture or merely 
prevent the spread of totalitarian ideologies? Since Washington quickly became 
preoccupied with Soviet threats in Europe and Asia, the Division of American Republic 
Affairs under Spruille Braden enjoyed enough leeway to experiment with the first variant. 
The spread of communism was not considered a major concern at that time.  However, a 
local backlash against liberal experiments combined with bad policy definition and 
execution on the American side closed that particular route. 
There was no way back to the situation that had existed before the War either: the 
principle of nonintervention was thoroughly perverted during the fight against the fifth 
column in Latin America. New American agencies meddled in everything from sewer 
building to military training. The diplomatic corps itself took on a new role in the 
management of American assistance programs and in the sphere of political defense 
against ideological threats. The self-imposed limits of the Good Neighbor policy were 
most definitely a thing of the past, even if the term itself continued to be used. On the 
Central American side, the age of the traditional caudillos came to an end. Even where 
they were succeeded by military regimes that appeared superficially similar, training 
under U.S. supervision during and after the War had imbued the local armies with a new 
sense of professional mystique, which, in combination with older military traditions on the 
isthmus, was “anti-political” and devoted to national “progress”.4 
Roughly between 1948 and 1953, the political leaders of Washington together with 
the Europeanist professionals in the State Department extended their influence over the 
definition of Latin American policy. Initially, the developing “culture” of the Cold War had 
                                                 
4 See pages 315-316 below. 
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little effect on the embassies. It could be argued, though, that the general shift to the 
right in the political thinking of both Central America and Washington left its marks in 
political reports: Political groups that were earlier defined as “liberal” came to be 
regarded as “leftist” while “reactionaries” were now dubbed “conservatives”. A most 
illustrative internal memo, dated December 31, 1948, can be found in the archives of the 
embassy in El Salvador. Analyzing the political factions that made up a military junta at 
the time, someone at the embassy decided to redact the political labels that were used 
in the original memo:  
The danger of a split in the Junta is based now largely upon a conflict 
between the conservative moderate element led by Osorio and the liberal 
leftist element led by Cordova.5 
For the time being, however, the region was assumed to be safe from Soviet threats 
because it was not “modern” enough to be susceptible to communism; because it was 
physically separated from the front lines of the Cold War by two oceans; and because 
U.S. influence was considered to be so large there.6 
While the American policy toward Guatemala after 1948 exemplified Cold War 
thinking, the political reporting from El Salvador presents a more representative picture 
of the shift to the political right that was taking place within Central America. Around 
1948, the American ambassador, Albert Nufer, noted a shift to the political right in El 
Salvador. Even mild critique on the country’s social structure was now regarded as a 
mark of communism and “many of the reported communists or fellow travelers in El 
Salvador would probably be considered merely left of center in other countries”.7 Even 
traditional bastions of conservatism, such as the Catholic Church, were not free from 
suspicion: An edict by the Salvadoran Bishop that took note of the “disproportionate” 
divide in the allocation of wealth in the country so incensed the coffee barons that they 
accused the Church of “aligning” with communism.8 In this context, former President 
Aguirre, whose recognition by the United States was met with general anger and 
disappointment in El Salvador a few years earlier, was now making a comeback: 
It appears to be quite likely now that Colonel Aguirre will be supported by 
many persons who in 1944 repudiated him as a totalitarian-type dictator. 
With his famous record in the suppression of El Salvador’s “communist” 
uprising in 1932, Colonel Aguirre can probably make today, a most 
respectable appeal as a veteran in the currently popular anti-communist 
crusade.9 
                                                 
5 Williams, Memorandum on Dangers of Split in Junta, December 31, 1948, PR El Salvador 
(SCF), cl. 800: Salvador, September to October. 
6 Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America. The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism (Chapel 
Hill and London 1988) chapter 1. 
7 Nufer to the Secretary of State, Despatch 162, April 30, 1948, PR El Salvador (SFC), Box 15, cl. 
800: Salvador. 
8 Nufer to the Department of State, Despatch 201, June 3, 1948, PR El Salvador (SCF), Box 15, 
cl. 800: Salvador. 
9 Nufer to the Secretary of State, Despatch 348, August 19, 1948, PR El Salvador (SCF), Box 15, 
cl. 800: Salvador. 
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While Nufer did not remain unaffected by the anti-communist milieu in El Salvador, 
he was skeptical about the acuteness of the threat from the left. Recognizing that most 
supposed “communists” were actually only somewhat left of center, the Ambassador 
also reported that conservative politicians were using the growing red scare to enhance 
their own popularity. Building on his anticommunist credentials, Aguirre and his 
supporters were known to spread rumors about sinister communist plots. President 
Castañeda, who was considering “reelection”, also encouraged existing fears for the 
communist specter in the hope that the upper classes would seek the protection of a 
“law and order” regime.10  
What this vignette of American reporting on Salvadoran politics suggests is that 
local politics were undergoing significant changes well before the local embassy was in 
the grip of the Cold War. This is not to say that U.S. Cold War policies had no effect on 
the local situation. Doubtlessly, reactionary groups in El Salvador felt encouraged by 
anti-Communist rhetoric emanating from Washington or by contacts with other American 
agencies such as the CIA or the Army. But as far as the late 1940s are concerned, it 
appears that most Foreign Service officers felt that Central American politics had taken a 
sharp turn to the right. While this made some conservative politicians appear moderate 
and some left-leaning politicians seem radical by comparison, the Foreign Service 
perceived a need for moderation. 
 
2. GOING DOWN THE MIDDLE OF THE ROAD  
The introduction of communism or “leftist” ideologies in the political mix lead to a 
reevaluation of local political actors by American diplomats: Parties and people who 
would have been considered conservative or even reactionary some years earlier, were 
now considered quite acceptable. In fact, with the memories of the fascist danger still 
rather fresh in the memory and new dangers looming on the political left, American 
diplomats developed a definite preference for the so-called “middle-of-the-road”. Much 
like in the 1930s, when American diplomats had preferred leaders who could protect 
their countries against anarchy and social upheaval without reverting to out-and-out 
dictatorship—a preference which led to initial support for men like Ubico and Carías—the 
diplomats of the late 1940s supported men who were assumed to hold the middle 
between the extremes of reaction and communism. 
 
2.1 The extremes: Nicaragua and Guatemala 
The Department’s attempt to dislodge Somoza from power using non-recognition turned 
out to be a failure. The explanation for the American defeat in this case is basically 
similar to the explanation for Martínez’ successful defiance in the early 1930s: Within the 
                                                 
10 Nufer to the Secretary of State, Despatch 173, May 6, 1948, PR El Salvador (SCF), Box 15, cl. 
800: Salvador; Nufer to the Secretary of State, Airgram A-91, April 16, 1948, PR El Salvador 
(SCF), Box 15, cl. 800: Salvador; Nufer to the Secretary of State, Despatch 389, September 30, 
1948, PR El Salvador (SCF), Box 15, cl. 800: Salvador, September to October; Nufer to the 
Secretary of State, Despatch 368, September 9, 1948, PR El Salvador (SCF), Box 16, cl. 800.B: 
Communism. 
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confines of his own private hacienda, as Nicaragua was sometimes called, Somoza was 
just too powerful to be threatened by mere diplomatic action against him. On May 30, 
1948, the United States reestablished diplomatic relations with the regime of General 
Somoza. 
The fact that Washington and Managua were back on speaking terms did not imply 
that all was well between the two. The Department’s attitude toward Somoza remained 
cool for some time after the non-recognition debacle. Meanwhile, the attitude of the 
General himself was anything but cool. The Nicaraguan delegates to the OAS and the UN 
consistently and unconditionally supported American propositions and Somoza was one 
of the few Latin American leaders who warmly welcomed American action in Korea, 
promising  to send troops to that theatre if the United States so desired. Additionally, an 
economic upturn during the late 1940s caused Nicaragua to be relatively prosperous 
and stable. This situation somewhat obscured the authoritarian nature of the local 
regime, which was characterized by rather extreme graft and nepotism and did not recoil 
from violence in times of violence. The American ambassador to Nicaraguan in the early 
1950s, Thomas Whelan, a political appointee of the Truman administration, was so 
taken in with Somoza that he told his superiors that, “despite the widespread impression 
to the contrary”, the General was not “a dictator in the true sense of the word”.11 
Aside from his developing friendship with Whelan, a friendship that would last 
some ten years, Somoza scored some other minor victories throughout Truman’s 
second administration. Around 1952, Somoza apparently managed to convince the CIA 
to send him weapons, which he would use to topple the left-leaning Arbenz government 
in Guatemala. However, the operation, known as FORTUNE, was killed by the State 
Department, which found out about it at the last moment. During the same year, the 
General also managed to impose himself on Truman, leading to an unofficial lunch 
appointment at the Whitehouse. But taken over the whole, the Department kept Somoza 
at arm’s length, consistently refusing to reestablish a military mission and arms deliveries 
to Nicaragua. Even Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who came in with the 
Eisenhower administration in 1953, initially worried that his plans to fight communism in 
Latin America were only supported by “the Somozas” of the hemisphere. Only after the 
1954 CIA coup against Arbenz, in which Somoza managed to play a leading role, did the 
General become persona grata in Washington. 
While the Department remained careful to dissociate itself from the most 
reactionary leaders of the hemisphere, relations with one of the most progressive 
governments, that of Guatemala, soured. Patterson’s transfer from communist 
Yugoslavia to Guatemala was one indication of Washington’s growing concern about 
labor activity and social legislation in that country. For the moment, however, the Truman 
administration believed that the Western hemisphere was relatively safe from communist 
                                                 
11 The Ambassador in Nicaragua (Whelan) to the Department of State, Managua, March 6, 1953, 
FRUS IV, 1375-1377. On Whelan’s relationship with Somoza, consult: Paul C. Clark, The United 
States and Somoza, 1933-1956. A revisionist look (Westport, CT, and London 1992) 190-191 and 
Bermann, Under the Big Stick, 242-243. 
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infiltration and Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs Edward Miller carelessly 
blamed the social revolution in Guatemala on President Arévalo, who was a “wooly 
head”. Indeed, it would appear that the State Department hoped that some carefully 
applied outside pressure, combined with the supposedly inherent weakness of Arévalo’s 
policies, would eventually lead to the end of social experimentation in Guatemala.  
In 1950 Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán was elected to the Guatemalan presidency. 
Initially, the Department believed that Arbenz would at least slow down the tempo of 
social change, because he was an army man and a landowner. However, Arbenz was 
one of the original leaders of the Guatemalan revolution and, if anything, felt that 
Arévalo’s policies on land reform had not gone far enough. While Arévalo had distributed 
land formerly belonging to German landlords, Arbenz openly prepared to nationalize and 
redistribute fallow lands of other large landowners, including that of the American United 
Fruit Company. While it was not Washington’s primary objective to protect UFCO’s 
interests, Guatemalan threats against American interests were taken to be an indication 
of Guatemala’s flirtations with communism. Therefore, the Department stepped up the 
pressure against the Central American republic by discontinuing financial aid for the 
construction of the Guatemalan section of the inter-American highway and by stopping 
arms deliveries to the Guatemalan army. In the words of U.S. Ambassador Rudolf Emil 
Schoenfeld, the purpose of these actions was: 
…to bring the Guatemalans to the realization that they were dependent upon 
the United States and that if they expected assistance or consideration from 
the United States it behooved them to adjust their actions vis-à-vis the United 
States accordingly. 
But even though agencies such as the CIA appeared ready to act against Arbenz, the 
Department under Truman went no further than this—as the killing of operation FORTUNE 
indicates. Only after Eisenhower settled in the White House did this situation change. 
 
A good illustration of Department perceptions of Central America is a good-will trip to the 
region by the Assistant Secretary Miller. The trip was very carefully planned and 
considered in the Department, because every move Miller made was going to be 
interpreted as a sign of support or opposition by local political factions. Since all regimes 
in Central America were of a different political color, the amount of time spent in each of 
these nations was probably going to be interpreted as an American mark of approval or 
disapproval for the particular brand of government in that country. Even more important 
was the question of where Miller would celebrate the Fourth of July, as that holiday 
would coincide with his trip to Central America. Due to the special place this day 
occupied in the celebration of American history and values, the presence of a high-
placed American officer like Miller in one of the Central American capitals during the 
Fourth of July would give off some of the brilliance of American power and prestige on 
the local regime. 
Somoza was dying to have Miller visit Managua on Independence Day. The 
Nicaraguan ambassador to Washington, Dr. Sevilla Sacasa, made a point of visiting the 
Department during the preparations of Miller’s trip to spread the Somocista gospel. He 
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was politely received, but his eulogies left the Americans unimpressed. Under the 
sardonic heading “The happy people”, Miller recounts how Sevilla Sacasa “waxed lyrical 
over the recent elections in Nicaragua”, which confirmed Somoza’s power, 
…and the prosperity at home and peace abroad which he foresees as their 
inevitable results. He described the people of Nicaragua as being filled with 
alegría [joy] both during and after balloting, to the extent that their 
enthusiasm had erupted in a nation-wide celebration. He declared that 
Nicaraguan democracy and elections are not to be compared with those of 
other states; but an objective analysis in the light of Nicaraguan history, 
traditions and current conditions would undoubtedly prove that Nicaraguan 
elections are fully the equal of those of (…) other countries.12 
The tone of this memorandum of conversation alone demonstrates that the Department 
was exasperated with the Ambassador’s pipedreams. In any event, no one was willing to 
associate the Fourth of July with the transparent charade that Somoza was performing 
for the benefit of the yanquis.  
A logical choice—at first sight—was for Miller to celebrate the Fourth of July in 
Guatemala. That, at least, was the largest and arguably most influential country of the 
region. Some years earlier Spruille Braden had visited Guatemala City on the occasion 
of Arévalo’s inauguration to indicate American satisfaction with the liberal experiment in 
that country. But times had changed. The new American ambassador in Guatemala, 
Richard C. Patterson Jr., vehemently objected to any hint that Miller would even visit the 
country. Patterson claimed that such a visit could only be an “appeasement mission”. 
The Department did not agree with Patterson’s alarmist views, but did consider it wise to 
limit the length of Miller’s visit to Guatemala and his exposure to the local government. 
By the early 1950s, the Department had come to consider the Arévalo government as 
too radical and did not want Miller’s visit to Guatemala to convey the impression that “all 
is well in our relations”. In fact, presidential elections were just around the corner in 
Guatemala, so this was a particularly bad time to put a stamp of approval on Arévalo’s 
reformism. Hence the visit to Guatemala would be low-profile: “turkey to be talked with 
the President and the call on the Foreign Minister to be pure protocol”.13 
To the Department, Somoza and Arévalo represented two extremes. Both leaders 
presented their governments as democratic, but both were flawed in the eyes of 
Washington. Somoza was obviously reactionary, but Arévalo was too radical for comfort. 
Neither regime was a good translation of American values to the Central American 
situation—which is what Miller’s choice of location for the Fourth of July was supposed to 
convey. Instead, except from “Tegucigalpa which will already have been visited, San 
Salvador, barring political troubles, would be the best place to spend the 4th of July with 
its celebrations. It would be preferable to be there rather than in either Managua or 
                                                 
12 Miller, Memorandum of Conversation with Ambassador Sevilla Sacassa of Nicaragua, May 19, 
1950, Lot Files, Office of Middle American Affairs (Entry 1144), Subject File, Box 2, Folder 
marked Memoranda, January to June, 1950. 
13 Bennett to Mann, Barber, and Miller, May 18, 1950, Lot Files, Entry 1144 , Box 2, Folder 
marked Memoranda, January to June, 1950. 
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Guatemala”.14  At this time, El Salvador was no longer ruled by Castañeda. Having 
survived in office much longer than might have been expected, the President confused 
lack of active opposition with a position of power and had concurrently attempted to 
continue himself in office in the 1930s tradition. This act, of course, provided the different 
factions that had grudgingly accepted his rule with a good reason and justification to 
rebel. Presenting themselves as guarantors of the Salvadoran constitution, a faction of 
young, professional army officers took control of the state after an almost bloodless coup 
in December 1949. Being neither liberal nor reactionary and neither lower class nor 
aristocratic, the military faction that came to power presented itself as middle-of-the-road. 
It rejected Somocista dictatorship, but had little sympathy for social experiments of the 
Guatemalan type. It pronounced a fundamental need for democratic, economic, and 
social change and progress, but SLOWLY. By 1950, this was exactly what the Department 
had in mind for its southern neighbors. Careful, responsible, and evolutionary progress 
was the way to go if the isthmian republics wanted to follow the path that the United 
States had taken after 1776.  
 
2.2 The middle of the road in Honduras 
In 1948, the Carías regime engineered the election of Galvez and Lozano to executive 
power. Both men were widely recognized as talented and relatively honest 
administrators. Lozano especially had long been regarded by American envoys as the 
brains behind Carías’ successful, conservative financial policy. 15  So Carías left his 
country with the most professional, capable, and honest administrators his Party had on 
offer (which is not, of course, to say that they were entirely professional, capable, and 
honest). 
Aside from the inherent merits of the Galvez-Lozano ticket, which was particularly 
attractive to the influential commercial classes because it promised six more years of 
predictable administration, the successful transfer of power was doubtlessly aided by a 
favorable economic climate, skillful—though not too blatant—manipulation of the election 
results, and the weakness of the Liberal Party. With regard to the latter factor, Angel 
Zúñiga Huete managed to capture the presidential nomination of his divided Party in 
1947. Therefore, the Liberal ticket was nothing more than a—in the words of the 
American embassy—sixteen year old, warmed over dish, since Zúñiga Huete had been 
the Liberal presidential candidate in every campaign, free or otherwise, since the early 
1930s. While of a different political color than Carías, he represented the same 1930s 
caudillo politics. And while Galvez’ reputation was tinged by his presence at (if not, 
perhaps, role in) the 1944 San Pedro Sula massacre, Zuniga Huete was remembered 
(accurately or otherwise) for personally “machine-gunning” Carías-voters in the streets of 
Tegucigalpa in 1923. Eventually, Zúñiga Huete did not even bother to measure himself 
against the administration: in true 1930s style, he denounced the government for 
                                                 
14 Bennett to Mann and Hughes, April 19, 1950, Lot Files, Entry 1144, Box 2, Folder marked 
Memoranda, January to June, 1950. 
15 See chapter 2, page 93. 
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imposition even before voting started; called for a revolution; and went into hiding. While 
this meant that Galvez would be “elected” unopposed, and thus could not claim electoral 
victory, it also meant that his opponents could not convincingly claim that he had been 
elected by fraud, as no fraud was necessary. In the end, and with the help of a 
Honduran law which obliged the electorate to either cast a vote or face a hefty fine, 
Galvez garnered some 300,000 votes (against some 200 who obstinately voted for 
Zúñiga Huete and some thousands of voided votes) which still allowed him to claim a 
popular mandate.16 
While the recall and retirement of Erwin one year previous was not the result of a 
change in American policy and the “election” of Galvez not a fundamental departure from 
the Carías era, these changes together did lead to a smoothening of U.S.-Honduran 
relations. Galvez’ election and his subsequent conciliatory policies eliminated Honduras 
as an obvious target for the anti-dictatorial movement in the Caribbean area, which 
focused on the older dictatorships of men like Somoza and Trujillo. Erwin’s departure 
and eventual replacement with an experienced career diplomat eliminated grounds for 
rumors that the American embassy in Honduras was an active supporter of the local 
dictatorship.  In its international affairs, Honduras, which was traditionally the battlefield 
of the isthmus due to its central location, successfully focused on being the least 
conspicuous and objectionable country in the region. While the neighboring countries of 
Guatemala and Nicaragua were showing alarmingly revolutionary and reactionary 
tendencies, respectively edging toward communism and fascism, Honduras became the 
eye in the storm of Central American politics. It was exactly the kind of peaceful and 
friendly country that the State Department liked to deal with.   
In Tegucigalpa, American diplomatic representation after Erwin’s somewhat 
irregular dismissal was performed by Paul C. Daniels for a while. Daniel’s appointment 
appears to have been a stop-gap measure as he was already slated to become Director 
of American Republic Affairs at the Department and left Honduras after some months. 
Next was Herbert S. Bursley, an experienced career officer like Daniels who had been 
assistant chief of the Division of American Republic Affairs from 1938 to 1942. Daniels 
and Bursley were both born around 1900, had joined the Foreign Service around the 
time that it was professionalized by the Rutgers Act of 1924, and reached the level of 
secretary of legation—thus introducing them to the political work of their posts—during 
                                                 
16 Bursley to the Secretary of State, Telegram 51, May 17, 1948, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 39, cl. 
800: Honduras II; Bursley to the Secretary of State, Despatch 235, October 9, 1948, PR 
Honduras (SCF), Box 40, cl. 800: Honduras III; Bursley to the Secretary of State, Despatch 241, 
October 15, 1948, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 40, cl. 800: Honduras III; Bursley to Daniels, 
November 1, 1948, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 40, cl. 800: Honduras III; Bursley to the Secretary 
of State, Despatch 246, October 19, 1948, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 40, cl. 800: Honduras III; 
Bursley to the Secretary of State, Despatch 236, October 11, 1948, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 40, 
cl. 800: Honduras III; Bursley to the Secretary of State, Despatch 237, October 11, 1948, PR 
Honduras (SCF) Box 40, cl. 800: Honduras III. Actually, both the Department and the Legation 
noticed a curious gap in the files about the 1944 massacre and Galvéz’ role therein: Reid to 
Bursley, July 2, 1948, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 39, cl. 800: Honduras II; Bursley to Reid, July 14, 
1948, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 39, cl. 800: Honduras. 
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the 1930s, when nonintervention was dogma. Both reintroduced a high degree 
professional detachment from local affairs to the embassy’s political reports, effectively 
ending the “Carías-can-do-no-wrong” attitude of Erwin, and opened the embassy’s doors 
to callers who were members of the political opposition. But while both Daniels and 
Bursley continued to pay lip service to the American interest in the spread of democracy, 
neither took the “Braden approach” of charging the china shop. They both represented 
the more measured approach presented in the “Y”-article, sympathizing with local 
initiatives which were understood to embody careful steps toward more liberal 
governance, but religiously maintaining the appearance of American neutrality in local 
affairs. When the Honduran ambassador in Washington carefully inquired whether 
Braden’s replacement with Daniels as Assistant Secretary implied a move away from the 
former’s pro-democratic policy, he was told that the only change would be a “difference 
in approach”.17 
Daniels and Bursley’s tenures in Tegucigalpa are representative of this “difference 
in approach”, which held the middle ground between Braden’s crusade and Erwin’s 
appeasement. First of all, both Daniels and Bursley reopened the dialogue with 
members of the opposition, who had long been unwelcome at the embassy. After one 
month in Honduras, for example, Daniels reported that opposition to Carías was more 
widespread and friendlier to the United States than Erwin had suggested in his reports.18 
Bursley also reported, in a somewhat sympathetic vein, that oppositionists in Honduras 
were “professional men of far better than average intelligence who seem to have strong 
and even bitter convictions”.19 Daniels started to receive oppositionists to the embassy 
and to answer their written missives and Bursley went so far as to invite both 
government officials and representatives of the opposition to the yearly Fourth of July 
reception at the embassy. In that way, the American Ambassador hoped to express his 
“ideas of the democratic spirit”. While both Daniels and Bursley ended the overly 
optimistic reports on the Caríato and courteously engaged the opposition, they were 
careful to suppress the impression that U.S. sympathies had swung from the Nationalists 
to the Liberals. It was made clear to any representative of the opposition that the 
embassy would not be drawn into local politics.20 
Daniels and Bursley showed careful, sympathetic interest in the presidential 
elections of 1948, which were nominally free and determined who Carías’ successor 
                                                 
17  Newbegin, Memorandum of Conversation with Cáceres, October 24, 1947, PR Honduras 
(SCF), Box 34, Vol. V, cl. 800: Honduras. 
18 Daniels to the Secretary of State, Despatch 2861, July 18, 1947, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 34, 
Vol. V, cl. 800: Honduras. 
19 Bursley to the Secretary of State, Despatch 138, July 8, 1948, PR Honduras (SCF), box 39, cl. 
800: Honduras II. 
20 Daniels to the Secretary of State, Despatch 2847, July 1, 1947, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 34, 
Vol. V, cl. 800: Honduras; Daniels to the Secretary of State, Despatch 2861, July 18, 1947, PR 
Honduras (SCF), Box 34, Vol. V, cl. 800: Honduras; Daniels (Director of the Division for American 
Republic Affairs), Memorandum of Conversation with Dr. Zuñiga Huete, Honduran Opposition 
Leader, December 30, 1947, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 34, Vol. V, cl. 800: Honduras (continued); 
Bursley to Reid, June 11, 1948, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 39, cl. 800: Honduras II. 
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would be. Bursley believed that a peaceful test of strength, in the form of elections, was 
the only way to dilute political tensions in Honduras and to avert an armed contest 
between government and opposition. How fair the elections were and who won was 
considered secondary to the fact that elections did take place. The embassy would be 
careful to remain on the sidelines during the campaigning season and the elections, 
unless government imposition was “so cruel as to shock humanity”. 21  Indeed, the 
embassy was fairly certain that “some” official fraud did take place during the elections. 
But Daniels expressed “concern” over their course only once, after a known follower of 
Carías emptied his revolver on the Zúñiga Huete residence. From Washington, where 
Daniels had already taken up his new tasks, he wrote that the Department took a “dim 
view of [such] gangster activities”. It was quickly determined, however, that the shooting 
had been a private initiative without official involvement.22 
One reason why the embassy showed little interest in who won the elections was 
that it recognized few fundamental differences between the contending parties—it 
believed that both lacked real substance. “While there is much talk about ideals and all 
the rest of it, I am very much afraid that except in the case of a few individuals the 
struggle is simply the old one between the ‘ins’ and the ‘outs’”, Bursley reported to the 
Department. 23  This view fitted the more general cynicism toward Latin politics that 
characterized American views after the failed post-War experiments with democracy. 
Bursley reported in July, 1948, that local politics should not be viewed through “rosy 
glasses”: Both Liberals and Nationalists had been guilty of fraud and abuses in the past 
and there was little indication that either had changed its ways in that regard.24 Embassy 
reports on the campaign platforms of Galvéz and Zúñiga Huete were to the effect that 
there were few significant differences between the two and that neither should be taken 
too seriously.25 According to the embassy, the real issue of the elections was not which 
party won, but whether a civilized contest could be held at all in Honduras. 
Bursley’s reaction to the election results, which showed a clear majority for Galvéz, 
underscored that perspective: By U.S. standards, the Ambassador reported to the 
Department, the election was a “pathetic travesty”. On the one hand, Bursley chided the 
government for weighing the dice in favor of Galvez, but on the other hand, Zúñiga 
Huete had not won the Ambassador’s sympathy by withdrawing from the race 
                                                 
21 Bursley to Willard Barber (Chief of the Division of Central American and Panama Affairs), 
September 30, 1948, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 40, cl. 800: Honduras III. 
22  Daniels to Montamat, March 3, 1948, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 39, cl. 800: Honduras I; 
Montamat to Daniels, March 8, 1948, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 39, cl. 800: Honduras I; 
Montamat to Daniels, March 11, 1948, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 39, cl. 800: Honduras I. 
23 Bursley to Gordon S. Reid (Division of Central American and Panama Affairs), July 14, 1948, 
PR Honduras (SCF), Box 40, cl. 800: Honduras. Zuniga Huete. 
24 Bursley to Reid, July 14, 1948, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 39, cl. 800: Honduras. 
25 On the platform of the National Party, secretary Montamat commented that it was basically 
sound but would be observed more in breach than in practice: Montamat to the Secretary of State, 
Despatch 56, March 12, 1948, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 39, cl. 800: Honduras I. On the program 
of the Liberal Party, the embassy commented that it would mean very little if that party managed 
to obtain the presidency: Montamat to the Secretary of State, Despatch 73, April 1, 1948, PR 
Honduras (SCF), Box 39, cl. 800: Honduras I. 
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prematurely. However, Bursley found that by local standards, the fact that elections were 
held at all and had not relapsed into violence was “a vast improvement and a significant 
step forward to an eventual day which may bring a more truly democratic life for this 
struggling country”. 26  Ironically, the American legation’s commentary on the 1931 
elections, which had brought Carías to power, was almost identical.27 
It is difficult to say whether the Galvez election would have been acceptable to the 
U.S. some three years earlier, when Braden directed policy, but it coincided with the 
generally low American expectations of Latin politics in 1948. In that context, Galvez’ 
policies after his inauguration as president came as a pleasant surprise. Neither Galvez 
nor Lozano, Bursley reported, were “dictator-minded”. 28  Indeed, Galvez adopted an 
explicit policy of “conciliation”, intended to mend relations with moderate Liberals after 
the bitter fighting and campaigning of recent years. The new President also entertained 
the somewhat abstract notion that Honduras should eventually develop toward a 
democracy, although that process would be evolutionary rather than revolutionary and 
the Honduran people would have to undergo many years of political education before 
the ideal could be realized.29 In the meantime, Galvez took no actions that had the 
potential to undermine Honduran social and economic hierarchy or to involve the lower 
strata of peasants and Indians in politics. He did, however, release political prisoners 
and invited political exiles back to the country. The repression that had characterized the 
Caríato was relaxed, a change symbolized by the fact that the police in the capital 
started carrying batons instead of rifles.30 
Since the Galvez administration relaxed political control, as compared with the 
Carías administration, it was easy for the embassy to imagine that it represented a “step 
forward”: A progressive move along the continuum that ranged from totalitarian state to 
democracy. Some decades after the fact, it is more difficult to see the Galvez 
administration in that light, since it did not represent a fundamental move away from 
elite/army control over Honduran politics; did not address the social injustices implied in 
the wide gap between upper and lower classes; and did not renounce the right to strike 
out against the opposition. As Carías himself admitted to a supporter in July of 1949, the 
policy of “democratization” under Galvez was a carefully controlled experiment and the 
government would only allow it to run its course as long as Hondurans showed 
themselves worthy of their increased freedoms and did not revert to the chaotic behavior 
in evidence before the Caríato. During the second half of the twentieth century, many 
successors of Galvez did find it convenient to put a stop to the supposedly democratic 
experiment initiated in the late 1940s.  
                                                 
26 Lt. Col. Isaacson (U.S. Military Attaché to Guatemala) to the Military Intelligence Division, 
Report 42-48, May 6, 1948, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 39, cl. 800: Honduras II. 
27 See Chapter 2, page 91.  
28 Bursley to Daniels, November 1, 1948, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 40, cl. 800: Honduras III. 
29 Isaacson to the Military Intelligence Division, Report 42-48, May 6, 1948, PR Honduras (SCF), 
Box 39, cl. 800: Honduras II. 
30 Bursley to the Secretary of State, Airgram A-27, January 29, 1949, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 
42, cl. 800: Honduras I. 
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Lacking the ability to look into the future and inclined to interpret the progression of 
Honduran history in terms of slow Progress, Bursley came to see the Galvez 
government as a step forward in the general direction of modernity. While Carías had 
undoubtedly been a dictator, the Ambassador reported in June 1949, he had done the 
“hard and dirty work” of pacifying Honduras, thus laying the necessary foundations for 
current progress. 31  In time, and if not provoked by violent opposition, the Galvez 
administration would improve further and would be much more democratic than the 
previous one, the Ambassador opined.32 While Bursley was not blind to the authoritarian 
aspects of the new administration, he did appear to believe that as it represented a small 
step in the political development of Honduras, the United States could support the semi-
authoritarian Galvez regime while still supporting the long-term goal of democracy for 
Central America. Therefore, he recommended that the State Department provide friendly 
attention to Honduras if it was threatened from the North or the South (the Left or the 
Right in political terms) by Arévalo or Somoza.33 In the context of the late 1940s at least, 
Honduras had become middle-of-the-road.  
Bursley’s feeling that Galvez deserved friendly attention did not translate into 
concrete American support for the new government. Instead, with an optimistic 
prognosis for Honduras’ political future and with its economy also in good shape, the 
State Department decided that it was safe to ignore the country in the late 1940s in favor 
of the pressing demands of the Cold War. Bursley himself was confronted by this attitude 
from Washington when he noticed that none of his reports and requests for policy 
guidelines on local political matters elicited a response from the Department. In 
November 1948, he reported his surprise—and not a small amount of bitterness could 
be detected in his report—that the Department neglected to answer a query of his as to 
the appropriateness of holding an embassy reception for the new Honduran president. 
More disturbing, Bursley noticed that the elections in Honduras were not even 
mentioned in the Department’s internal publications (the Weekly Review of Latin 
American Affairs) while the Ambassador himself thought that it was “certainly more 
newsworthy than some of the alarmist stuff which was published”.34 
 
After the excitement of elections, the political situation in Honduras returned to its 
traditionally slow pace. Even Bursley became somewhat dissatisfied with the general 
“dullness” of his post: Only the periodical “regurgitation” of the long-standing boundary 
dispute with Nicaragua offered some diversion for the Ambassador. 35  When it was 
Bursley’s time to be transferred to another post, the State Department decided to give 
                                                 
31 Bursley to the Secretary of State, Despatch 111, April 7, 1949, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 42, cl. 
800: Honduras I. 
32 Bursley to the Secretary of State, Despatch 13, January 10, 1949, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 42, 
cl. 800: Honduras I. 
33 Bursley to Reid, November 1, 1948, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 40, cl. 800: Honduras III. 
34 Idem. 
35 Bursley to the Secretary of State, Joint Weeka 5, August 3, 1950, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 46, 
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the Honduran mission to the only man who ever showed any active interest for it: John 
Draper Erwin. Since the Lillienthal case, Erwin had persistently lobbied for 
reappointment and he managed to obtain the support from the Tennessee Senatorial 
delegation again. The administration was probably well-satisfied to humor the 
Tennesseans by reappointing Erwin to a post as quiet and unimportant as Honduras. 
The appointment did not present a real vindication for Erwin, though, since he had 
indicated a desire to be promoted to Chile. He settled for Honduras however. There was 
some agitation against Erwin along the North Coast and in San Pedro Sula, where the 
old Ambassador was still remembered for his failure to recognize the tragedy of the 1944 
massacre. Both the embassy and the Galvez administration shrugged off the criticism as 
radical and even leftist.36 
The reporting of the Honduran embassy quickly returned to the familiar “Utopia 
Inc.”-style of Erwin’s previous tenure: Everything was well and there was no opposition 
to the powers that be.37 There was no denying, however, that some things had changed. 
Unofficial labor organizations were now active on the North Coast where United Fruit 
operated and Galvez’ conciliation policy, while very conservative by international 
standards, at least allowed the possibility that social legislation might be considered, 
perhaps, sometime in the future—a radical departure from Carías’ standpoint. For Erwin, 
whose romanticized image of Honduras was constructed around its supposed isolation 
from the modern world with its unions, social legislation, class conflict, etc, etc, this was 
too much to bear. 
Three years earlier, Bursley had reported that the increased activity of labor on the 
North Coast was largely a normal phenomenon: 
It seems quite natural that after many years of the Carías regime during 
which a dictatorship, frequently benevolent, existed, that the lethargic giant 
[labor] should begin to stretch a bit and to sense a need and right for a 
measure of emancipation.38 
The Ambassador was even somewhat impatient with those who claimed that labor 
activity was caused by communist agitation. Bursley was polite but noncommittal when 
UFCO managers warned him that communist agitation was out of control on the North 
Coast. The Ambassador pointedly asked them whether the activities they were 
describing were not, in fact, “promotional activities looking to [the] establishment of 
workers’ unions in line with the well defined trend in so many parts of the world”.39 When 
                                                 
36 Erwin to President Truman, February 15, 1946, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Official Files, Box 
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the Department informed Bursley that certain unnamed individuals within the American 
government (most probably CIA agents) insisted that there “must” be dangerous 
communists in Honduras, the Ambassador calmly answered that there was “nothing to 
worry about”. Further reporting on the matter was delegated to secretary Maleady, who 
thought that Departmental thinking on the matter was “disturbingly disjointed if not 
downright idiotic”.40 
Erwin was not quite so tolerant of labor activity. Relying completely on information 
provided by the anti-labor vice-president, Julio Lozano, and by the American manager of 
the railroad, Erwin reported several incidents of supposed communist agitation, 
instigated by migrant workers from Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Evidence for a 
communist connection was extremely thin in all instances: A workers’ petition against a 
particularly stern American superintendent was thought to be inspired by the typical 
communist “line”; a failed plot to hold up a United Fruit train was thought to be 
masterminded by well-known labor agitators who would have used their loot for future 
labor campaigns; some sub-rosa labor organizations were thought to be communist 
“fronts”.41 There was no obvious reason for Erwin to take these alarmist rumors seriously, 
except for the fact that he thought Galvez’ policy too indulgent: 
The fruit company and rightist National Party elements are impatient of 
Galvez’ temporizing, but he has insisted on continuance of his conciliation 
policy, at least until he is convinced that a clear and present danger to the 
stability of his Government exists. The miracle is that communist activity and 
unrest have been as slow in taking advantage of the freedom of the last two 
and one-half years, since Honduras is a fertile field for agitation, particularly 
in view of its proximity to virulent communist groups of Mexico, Guatemala 
and Salvador. 42 
While Erwin’s reports from Honduras must have added to a general impression of 
communist activity in Central America, he was not the prototype of a “Cold Warrior”. 
Highly conservative and unable to believe that anyone could be dissatisfied with the 
Honduras that he knew, Erwin reflexively blamed outsiders for any trouble in his Shangri-
La. A return to fatherly policies of the Caríato would be sufficient, however, to set things 
straight. Meanwhile, the Ambassador kept the door to the outside world firmly shut: 
American intelligence agencies, which would supposedly help local governments fight 
communists, were not welcome in Erwin’s bailiwick.43  It is not surprising, then, that 
                                                 
40 Reid to Bursley, january 27, 1949, PR Honduras (SCF), Box 44, cl. 350.21; Bursley to Reid, 
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despite his hostility toward communism, Erwin was quickly replaced by the incoming 
Eisenhower government. The new administration wished to use Honduran territory as a 
springboard for its CIA operations against Guatemala and Erwin, a leftover from the 
1930s, did not fit into those ambitions. 
 
2.3 The middle of the road in El Salvador 
While Simmons reported on the travails of the Castañeda regime with some interest and 
optimism at first, the Ambassador became disillusioned with it over the years. Several 
assaults on the government form both rightist and leftist factions forced the President 
into the arms of the army and security forces. From 1946 onwards, the country was 
under a permanent state of siege. Even if Castañeda was serious about his promises for 
reconciliation and more progressive government at the start of his tenure, nothing came 
of it. For all practical purposes, El Salvador was a military dictatorship by 1948, be it for 
the fact that the government was obliged by the constitution to hold presidential elections 
in that year.  
Due to the state of siege, the fractious nature of the opposition, and the promise of 
elections, El Salvador was superficially calm for a while and Castañeda or his supporters 
may have been under the impression that they could extend their reign without too much 
opposition. Thus, in true 1930s continuismo style, Castañeda had himself secretly 
reelected for a second term by the National Assembly in December 1948. It turned out to 
be a big mistake: Almost as soon as the “reelection” became known, a faction of young 
army officers committed a coup and took over the reins of government under a five-man 
junta. These young officers did not represent the only opposition group, perhaps not 
even the most powerful one. Opposition to the Castañeda regime ranged from ex-
President Aguirre and his reactionary friends among the coffee elites on the extreme 
right to student factions and labor organizations on the extreme left. Several opposition 
groups of different political leanings could be found in between. The young officers who 
took control in 1948 were simply in the best position to act on the news of continuismo 
quickly: These men had been organizing coups since the failed attempt against Martínez 
in April 1944. After four years of frustrated attempts to gain more power and influence, 
they were ready, able, and willing to act on every opening.44 
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During the months preceding the army coup, Albert Nufer was in charge of the 
American embassy in San Salvador. A careful and unassuming career officer like 
Simmons, Nufer’s relationship with the local Castañeda regime and its opposition was 
complex and ambiguous. The embassy held no brief for either camp. It was well aware 
of Castaneda’s intentions to remain in power, either officially as president or officiously 
as the power behind the throne of a puppet government. The fraudulent elections for the 
National Assembly of January 1948, a major victory for the President of course, left little 
doubt on that count. On the other hand, Nufer and his colleagues knew that Castaneda’s 
position was far from secure and that there were plenty of opposition groups. Most of 
these groups, the embassy reported, felt confident that they enjoyed enough popular 
support to win the presidential elections that Castaneda was supposed to organize. 
Hence, if Castaneda were to act on his intentions to scrap elections and continue in 
power, the embassy believed that many opposition factions would feel that the President 
had cheated them out of their legitimate ascent to power. The result could only be civil 
strive, which was the embassy’s greatest fear.45 
In this charged and insecure atmosphere, Nufer felt that the best that could be 
done, from the standpoint of U.S. interests, was to stay on reasonably friendly terms with 
all factions while not showing undue regard for any of them. Halfhearted attempts were 
made by the embassy to convince Castaneda to hold genuinely free elections, but 
overall, it tried to stay out of politics. While the embassy respected the progress that the 
Castaneda regime made in the fields of education, health, and sanitation during the last 
couple of years, these accomplishments were only possible due to the assistance of U.S. 
agencies. Besides, the President’s will for power threatened to upset the country and to 
undo any material progress that had been made. At the same time, the embassy was 
very pessimistic about the nature of the opposition. Nufer hardly ever mentioned the 
ideologies that were supposed to inspire the different opposition groups—although he 
did acknowledge that there were dangerous fringe groups on both the left and the right. 
The names of the different political groups, nearly all of which made a claim on 
“democratic” ideals, meant very little, the Ambassador reported. Under the existing state 
of siege, only those groups who could obtain the backing of conservative army factions 
stood a chance to gain the presidency. In a word, the general picture painted in the 
embassy’s reports was one of cynical power politics.46 
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A report by Nufer on one of the very few politicians in El Salvador who could be 
regarded as a genuinely honest man with popular support and liberal ideals is revealing 
in this regard. Minister of Culture Ranulfo Castro, the man in question, could not hope to 
become president under existing circumstance, because:  
[His] greatest strength is his most obvious political weakness. He is an 
honest man. His name is yet to be linked with graft, political compromises or 
deals. He is friendly, sincere and efficient. These merits, which might be 
expected to qualify him highly for a role as Chief of State, contrast sharply 
with the strength, power and ruthless action which have been considered 
normal attributes of most Central American presidents (...) To the army, the 
coffee planters and the urban capitalists, Dr. Castro may appear as a man of 
too great a heart to guarantee a continuation of a system which grants to the 
few, the much, and to the many, the little. 
At that point, July 1948, Nufer believed that Ranulfo Castro was the most likely man to 
win honest elections, because he had the support of the lower classes (except for the 
“communist fringe”).47  But Salvadoran politics were heartless and Nufer focused his 
political evaluations on the power brokers—the men with money and arms. 
These were the conditions that determined the American embassy’s reaction to the 
army coup of December, 1948. No-one at the embassy was sorry to see Castaneda go 
and no opposition group was thought to have a legitimate claim on the presidency. The 
fact that the December coup was quick and painless was welcomed. Under the 
circumstances, the new junta was the best that could be had for El Salvador: It was 
neither reactionary nor revolutionary; neither ruthless nor weak-kneed. In fact, the army 
groups that came to power in 1948 were a new factor in Salvadoran and Central 
American politics and were at least partly a legacy of U.S. interference in the region, 
although the embassy did not recognize that fact at the time.  
Before the Second World War, Central American “armies”, aside from the 
American trained Guardia Nacional in Nicaragua, were mainly irregular militias led by 
local caudillos. Although there was a trend toward army professionalization, results were 
meager up to the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, which is when the United States 
began to take an active interest in the standardization of army training and equipment 
across the continent. After the War, the newly professionalized army’s began to take an 
interest in politics and they did not like what they saw. Observing the poverty, 
backwardness, and instability that characterized many American Republics, professional 
militaries developed “anti-political” ideologies which blamed Latin American problems on 
politicians and provided a rationale for military intervention in national administration. 
The Salvadoran junta of 1948 was a local exponent of this new trend in the development 
of the Latin American military. According to Walter and Williams, the junta “sought to 
legitimize its existence via a new political rhetoric and new ways of ruling. The bywords 
of the regime of Hernandez Martínez and his immediate successors reflected their 
approach to politics: duty, tranquility, peace, order (…) Although democracy was never 
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mentioned, its dangers were implied in the usual criticism of factions, parties, disorder, 
and anarchy”. Thus, the military junta and its later successors welfare programs and 
literary campaign, but at the same time initiated an enormous expansion of the armed 
forces and, despite its theoretical support for democracy, kept tight control over elections 
and opposition parties.48 
Perhaps the one thing that Nufer did not grasp entirely—or, under prevailing 
conditions in El Salvador, was willing to gloss over—was the danger of an ideology that 
combined claims on constitutionality and observance of democratic procedures with de 
facto military rule. As far as the Ambassador was concerned, the 1948 coup and 
subsequent governments were not refinements in the military’s claim and hold on 
power—which, from the longer historical perspective, they were—but controlled steps in 
the direction of stable, progressive, and more democratic governance. As Nufer reported 
to the Department, one of the first acts of the military junta was to end the state of siege 
that Castaneda had put into effect in 1946. While the constitution was briefly abrogated, 
it was reinstated almost immediately, except for those articles dealing with the 
Presidency and the Assembly (which obviously did not apply while the junta was in 
power). The junta also declared that in time, free and fair elections would be organized. 
Until that time, civilians of liberal persuasion were invited into the de facto government; 
freedom of the press was allowed; and extremist groups on both the left and the right 
were suppressed so as not to be able to interfere with democratic processes. The 
reaction of the public at large, as Nufer was careful to point out, was favorable: The 
lifting of the state of siege was a generally popular move; liberals were assuaged by the 
institution of freedom of the press and the inclusion of civilian members in the junta; the 
moderate coffee planters, military officers not included in the junta, and labor unions 
were willing to give the new rulers a chance as long as they did not veer too much to the 
left or the right. In all, Nufer believed that the new government was inspired by “high, 
democratic idealism”.49 
To the Ambassador’s considerable dismay, however, the Department neglected to 
recognize the junta. While all seemed well on the ground—i.e. from Nufer’s 
perspective—events in Salvador happened to coincide with right-wing military coups in 
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Venezuela and Peru. To observers in the United States (both inside and outside of 
government) the sudden burst of military coups was a disconcerting development, 
especially since those in the bigger, more important countries appeared to be fascist-
inspired. Nufer was livid that events in his country were being compared with entirely 
unrelated actions elsewhere, but to the political top in Washington and to the American 
press, El Salvador was just too small and insignificant to warrant close scrutiny.50 For the 
time being, only the middle echelons of the Department sympathized with the 
Ambassador’s position: Apologetically, officer Zengotita of the Division of American 
Republic Affairs assured Nufer that the Division was well aware of the differences 
between the Salvadoran coup and those in Venezuela and Peru. The order to put a 
brake on recognition, Zengotita wrote, came from the “highest levels”. The recent 
splurge of coups had alarmed the administration and by “delaying” recognition, it wished 
to discourage further activity along those lines.51 But while the political top was not ready 
to recognize the new junta, Zengotita ensured Nufer that the Department’s thinking 
paralleled his:  
We are impressed with the fact that the revolt was touched off by what, after 
all, can only be considered unconstitutional and dictatorial measures taken 
by Castaneda. We are impressed also by the popular support that rallied to 
the junta, by its appointment of civilian junta members and a civilian cabinet, 
by its lifting of martial law, and by what in general appears to be a desire to 
organize along the lines of civilian rather than military administration of the 
country.  
Zengotita does note that the Department would have to wait and see how the situation 
develops and whether the junta "will or will not depart from the traditional Latin American 
military pattern". Nufer was instructed to continue to report on "the measures taken by 
the junta to hold elections and restore constitutional government, in the democratic or 
non-democratic outlook and philosophy of its military members, on the base of the 
junta's support, etc."52 
In the end, recognition was not dependent on the junta’s success in restoring 
constitutional government. Indeed, the United States had signed the Declaration of 
Bogotá, article 35 of which basically denounced the use of nonrecognition as a political 
weapon, only some months earlier. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the 
recognition of El Salvador was only stalled because of the public outcry against 
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supposedly “fascist” coups in the larger Latin American countries (public opinion did not 
differentiate between the coups in El Salvador, Venezuela, and Peru).53 After the junta 
had been recognized by the United States and its neighbors, it started to prepare for the 
elections it had promised to organize. Preparations actually took a full year and, aside 
from the admittedly complex technical issues that had to be solved, involved a lot of 
political infighting and clearing the field for the eventual official candidate. The most 
important military leaders of the junta jockeyed for power over a period of several 
months, a contest which led to the rise of Major Oscar Osorio as the leader of that 
body.54 Osorio is a very difficult man to qualify in traditional political terms, although that 
is exactly what the American embassy tried to do. On the one hand, the Major had been 
suspected of fascist sympathies during the War; maintained some sort of liaison with the 
exiled Martínez, apparently his mentor; and was at one point the favored presidential 
candidate of the conservative coffee interests. On the other hand, Osorio counted many 
liberals and even radicals among his political entourage; discouraged Martínez from 
returning to El Salvador; and religiously observed constitutional procedures during the 
1949 election campaign and his eventual presidency. The man only makes sense in the 
context of the professional mystique of the Salvadoran army officer, which was 
somewhat like fascism in the sense that it proscribed a major role to the army and 
vehemently rejected socialism, but also adopted parts of the post-War liberal agenda in 
its respect for constitutional procedures and its adoption of social legislation in an overall 
drive to modernize the national economy.55 
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Against the background of Salvadoran politics, both Nufer and his direct successor, 
Ambassador George Price Shaw, described the Osorio government as moderate and as 
democratic as might be expected.56  In regional politics, which were still punctuated 
occasionally by stirrings of the “Caribbean Legion” and high words between the 
“democracies” and the “dictatorships, Osorio vowed to assume the role of mediator—
thus presenting El Salvador as an island of peace amid the Central American imbroglio. 
In domestic politics, the President was careful to keep the middle ground between 
reactionary landlords and reformist-minded intellectuals and labor organizations. This 
was not an easy matter since militant fringes on both sides of political spectrum opposed 
the government. Coup attempts by one side were followed by government suppression 
against both sides. Thus, when a reactionary plot was discovered in March, Osorio had 
its leaders arrested and deported together with an equal number of known leftist radicals. 
In Salvador’s polarized society, this was apparently the only policy by which the 
President could remain on speaking terms with both left and right.57 
Much more important, in the embassy’s assessment, than Osorio’s attempts to 
dissociate his government from the political fringes, was his purported attempt to offer a 
way forward. The Salvadoran President was thought to be a democrat and a reformer, 
but not a visionary or experimenter: A measure of press freedom, unionism, and political 
organization was allowed, but only under strict government supervision so that 
“irresponsible” and “radical” elements did not take advantage of it. The regime 
suppressed “fascist” and “communist” organizations without reverting to out-and-out 
dictatorship: Instead, representatives of all factions—army officers, landowners, labor 
leaders, and intellectuals—were adopted into the government apparatus. A careful policy 
of “modernization”, including limited social reform, under military management was 
supposed to undercut the appeal of extremist ideologies.58 
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Nufer reported from the outset that the ruling junta under Osorio’s leadership 
included former fascists and communists, liberals and conservatives: “In fact, the rightist 
and leftist elements within the new government seem so well balanced that it would be 
difficult to state at this time whether the government is right or left of center”.59 After 
some weeks in power, the Ambassador could more confidently report that the provisional 
government was “seeking a middle course”: 
The Cabinet is not looking for spectacular changes or quick success in its 
tasks. Responsible Ministers realize that they have a patriotic duty to carry 
out their work between the pressures of the right and the left. One of the 
Under Secretaries remarked to a member of my staff this week that the 
Cabinet had to move cautiously and “educate the Army”. At the same time 
the Cabinet has to stand out against the intrigues of radical extremists who 
clamor that it is not moving fast enough. Despite the extremists, I believe that 
the public at large continues to be favorably impressed with the 
Government’s work and is still disposed to lend its support.60 
One of the more important tasks to be tackled, according to Nufer, was to provide a 
minimum of economic and social security for the landless masses: “informed persons” 
realized, the Ambassador reported, that 1932 could repeat itself today unless 
“substantial progress is made in improving the lot of the laboring masses”. Luckily, 
Osorio was wise to the situation and his government would “endeavor to effect social 
progress”.61 
In September Osorio formally left the junta together with one of the civilian 
members, Galindho Pohl, to set up a joint campaign for the presidency. It was a 
remarkable combination because Osorio was known to have played around with fascist 
ideas in his youth, while Pohl was a “wild-eyed idealist and half-baked leftist individual” in 
Ambassador Shaw’s assessment.62 However, the combination seemed to work—for the 
moment—and Shaw recognized that Osorio and Pohl’s party, the Partido Revolucionario 
de Unificacion Democratica (PRUD), was “middle of the road” by “United States political 
standards”, because it advocated social reforms without “threatening the capitalist 
structure of the nation”.63 Even though Osorio was recognized as having the backing of 
the ruling junta, and even though the latter could be said to have “tweaked” the eventual 
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presidential elections in his favor, the race turned out to be fairly competitive. In the end 
the Osorio/Pohl ticket beat the sole challenger by 345,139 over 266,271 votes. It was the 
first election in Salvadoran history in which women and soldiers were allowed to vote 
and, in Shaw’s opinion, it was so free as to revert to “license” at times. But the outcome 
was met with “moderate general enthusiasm”.64 
The State Department and the American embassy met Osorio’s election with the 
same moderate enthusiasm. The fact that Osorio was elected in a somewhat free 
competition; that his government enjoyed some popular support; that it included both 
military and civilian members of different political leanings; and that it promised to reform 
the Salvadoran economy and social structure were all appreciated by the United States. 
It was recognized that the Osorio government was not a “real” democracy, but it did fit 
into the slow progress toward better government described in the “Y” article. Compared 
to the leftist Guatemalan regime; the rightist Somoza regime; and the fascist-inspired 
coups in Venezuela and Peru, the situation in El Salvador was actually rather promising. 
Both the embassy and the Department were also quite willing to “help” the Salvadoran 
government to stick to the middle of the road.  
American efforts to manipulate the direction of the Salvadoran “revolution”, as the 
junta described its coup, dated back to 1949—before Osorio was elected. American aid 
programs, private loans, and Point IV technical assistance might have been modest 
when compared to Marshall Aid to Europe, but in a small nation like El Salvador, such 
programs offered the Americans enough leverage to encourage the local regime to 
adjust its political and economic policies to U.S. preferences. Thus, a possible loan from 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) to build a 
hydroelectric plant in Salvador offered enough incentive to the junta to hold elections so 
that the loan could be approved by a legally elected Assembly and signed by the 
President.65 After Osorio’s election, American “assistance” focused on the nature and 
direction of the developmental and social policies of the government. While Osorio was 
deemed trustworthy enough, Galindho Pohl’s influence was thought to draw the 
government too much into a radical direction. As the new president of the National 
Assembly, Pohl directed efforts to formulate a modern constitution for El Salvador. 
According to the embassy, Pohl’s plans for the new constitution were disconcertingly 
nationalistic—including, among others, a proposed article that would extend Salvadoran 
borders to 200 miles from its coasts. Shaw reported at the time that he commented 
“informally” to friends of the embassy that “I personally consider this draft [of the 
constitution] as extremely nationalistic and an excessive restriction on free economic, 
political, and social intercourses between El Salvador and the United States”. According 
to the Ambassador, the Department should also express its opinion to the Salvadoran 
embassy in Washington that there were “undesirable features” in Salvador’s draft 
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constitution. “I am sure the effect of merely mentioning this matter at such a time would 
not be lost upon either Major Osorio or [Salvadoran ambassador to the United States] 
Castro”.66 To back up this stance, Shaw advised the Department to freeze all financial 
assistance until a new constitution was published. Indeed, none of the controversial 
articles made it to the eventual constitution of El Salvador. While this must have been 
due partly to the influence of Salvador’s own ultra-conservative coffee interests, 
American meddling in the matter is sure to have had a major influence. In terms of 
politics, it is also likely that such meddling strengthened the hand of Osorio and the so-
called “moderate” faction while it blocked the ambitions of Pohl and other leftist in the 
government. 
The State Department showed itself to be generally appreciative of Salvador’s 
mode of government. The election that brought Osorio to power were characterized as 
the most free that the country enjoyed since the 1931 election of Araujo. While “Leftists 
have attacked it for being to moderate and the Rightists have attacked it for being too 
radical”, the Osorio government was holding its own. In May 1951, El Salvador and the 
United States signed their first Point IV agreement for technical assistance, thus 
declaring their joint interest in the modernization of the El Salvador.67 
 
The last ambassador to be appointed to Central America before the Eisenhower 
administration came in was Angier Biddle Duke. On the face of it, Duke was an extreme 
caricature of the political appointee. A scion of two wealthy families, the Biddles and the 
Dukes, Angie led a privileged and sheltered life as a child and young adult: His days 
were spent at elite schools, his weekends by the pool or at the beach, and his vacations 
with hunting trips to Africa and Asia. Having no need to worry about money, a job, or the 
future in general, young Angie lacked direction or ambition. At 22 he dropped out of Yale 
and spent some years toying with unsuccessful business plans. Exactly the type of 
playboy, one might think, whose wealthy and influential father got him appointed to an 
embassy so that his loafing at Southampton Beach would not embarrass the family. 
But this was not exactly what happened. Duke was still leading a relatively easy 
life when the War broke out in Europe. In January 1941 he volunteered for duty and, in 
the army, Angie found discipline and direction. While not serving in combat, Duke did 
climb the ranks from private to major in Air Force intelligence and went overseas in that 
capacity. At the end of the War, he was assigned as an escort officer to a congressional 
committee which was to visit Buchenwald very shortly after its liberation. The visit to the 
concentration camp turned out to be “the 48 most harrowing and horrifying hours” in 
Duke’s life and left a lasting impression. Noticing that many inmates of the camp had not 
yet left even though they had been “liberated” two days previous, Duke realized that “the 
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inmates had been there many of them so long that they didn’t want to leave. It was just 
so horrifying, so pathetic to see these beaten human beings, beaten into a way of life 
which they had gotten so horribly accustomed to that when the gates were thrown open, 
they couldn’t – couldn't leave”. After the War, Angie devoted many years of his life to 
helping those who were beaten and downtrodden by their governments and, quite 
naturally, he developed a lasting terror for the dehumanizing nature of totalitarianism.68 
After the War, Duke went back into business for a while, but with some help and 
urging from a family friend who happened to be the U.S. ambassador to Argentina, 
ended up applying for and getting admitted to the Foreign Service. After two years as 
embassy secretary in Argentina and Spain, Angie attracted the interest of a 
Congressional Committee inspecting relations with Spain and was appointed 
ambassador to El Salvador at age 36—the youngest American chief of mission up to that 
time. Angier Duke was one of several political appointees appointed to Latin America 
toward the end of Truman’s second term. Their task was not so much in the political field 
of representing U.S. policies to the Southern governments, but in “selling” the Point IV 
Program. The program, which in itself was a continuation of wartime aid programs, was 
aimed at developing the economies of the Third World with technical assistance so that 
they would be less susceptible to “radical” programs of a nationalist or communist bent.  
It turned out that Angier Duke was particularly well-suited for the work. First of all, 
he did have a sincere desire to help those less fortunate than himself, but his conception 
of aid did have an quality of noblesse oblige—both in the sense that he believed that the 
wealthy United States had an obligation to help less developed countries and in how he, 
as a wealthy American, positioned himself toward underprivileged Salvadorans. In one of 
his many public speeches as the ambassador to El Salvador, Duke noted that the United 
States had world leadership “thrust upon it” and that this position entailed great 
responsibilities. One was to convince others of the vitality of the American economic 
system and the “real practical hope” it offered for the betterment of Salvadorans’ lives. 
Only by accomplishments in this sphere could the hope of democracy be made manifest 
“to draw to it the faith of the unlettered and the underprivileged”.69 
Second, Angier turned out to have a knack for public relations and he spend most 
of his time as ambassador traveling, giving interviews, inaugurating public works, and 
attending parties to “illustrate the interest of the United States in the development of El 
Salvador”. His good looks, natural charm, and talent for dramatic gestures made him the 
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darling of the Salvadoran press. An exemplary incident that illustrates his style and 
attitude occurred when Duke asked an ordinary cook to dance with him at a formal ball. 
The Ambassador later claimed that the gesture was unplanned, but it turned out to be a 
great P.R. coup: Salvadoran newspapers lauded his egalitarian attitude and his friendly 
interest in the uplift of “simple” Salvadorans. 
While Ambassador Duke quickly won over Salvadoran opinion for himself and for 
the Point IV program that he advertised in all of his many public appearances, President 
Osorio knew how to win the diplomat for himself. Days after Duke presented his 
credentials, Osorio invited him on a tour through a valley that had been struck by an 
earthquake two years earlier. Arriving in an impeccable blue suit on the morning of their 
appointment, the young Ambassador was somewhat embarrassed to see Osorio in an 
army style “open neck khaki shirt and trousers”. Having “piled” three cabinet ministers in 
the back of a “rather beat up Buick sedan”, Osorio told Duke to “hop in” and settled 
behind the wheel himself. Remembering the ensuing road trip some months later, Duke 
noted that: 
It was quite a day. In fact it was the best kind of introduction to this beautiful 
country and its friendly democratic people. He [President Osorio] showed me 
the reverse side of the coin too: the aching poverty, the potbellied children in 
miserable ugly tumbledown country towns; dirty filthy houses with no 
windows, no water. We talked of the social unrest that wells up from such 
situations of squalor, and the possible avenues to bring hope to such pitiable 
conditions of despair (...) The magnitude of the task to which President 
Osorio and his ministers had set themselves soon became clear. I got the 
point.70 
Later in his life, during the Central American “crisis”, Duke visited El Salvador 
several times for government and human rights organizations and came to recognize the 
road taken during Osorio’s military rule. In a 1989 interview, Duke noted that back in 
1952 General Osorio “was the undisputed leader of the military, which maintained an 
uneasy but working alliance with the so-called oligarchy, the land-owning, coffee growing 
class. This kept the country on, let us say, a politically peaceful and economically 
productive course but one that was stratified dangerously in terms of class structure”. In 
the early fifties, however, Duke and Osorio, while being from radically different 
backgrounds, managed to find common ground in their objective to reform the 
Salvadoran economy from above with a Salvadoran public works programs and 
American technical aid—thus “bringing hope” to common Salvadorans and preventing 
“social unrest” like they discussed during their road trip. Whether either one of them truly 
wished to change the “dangerously stratified” social structure is not clear. Duke himself, 
in any case, thought that Point IV could have brought “social reform”, but after 1953, the 
Eisenhower administration allowed the program to “dry up” and, incidentally, fired 
Ambassador Duke. Thus, according to Duke, “in those eight years after Harry Truman I 
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believe that the seeds of discontent were successfully sown making inevitable the reform 
and revolutionary movement that started in 1980”.71 
 
3. EPILOGUE: THE CASTILLO ARMAS SOLUTION 
The general assumption among historians is that by ending the Guatemalan years of 
spring, the United States wanted to reinstate the 1930s “Somoza solution” in Central 
America.72 The comparison with the early 1930s is indeed informative, but only in the 
manner in which that period was presented in chapter 2.  
In 1953, the CIA picked an obscure Guatemalan colonel, one Carlos Castillo Armas, 
to lead the “liberation army” which was supposed to topple Arbenz. The advance of the 
army, which was a rather rag-tag bunch of exiles and mercenaries, on the Guatemalan 
capital was a ruse for the diplomatic offensive and psychological warfare that eventually 
got the better of Arbenz. Since Castillo Armas and his army did not play the leading part 
in the CIA coup against Arbenz, his selection as main liberator was a practical choice 
which initially did not imply American support for his eventual rise to the presidency. As it 
turned out, however, the U.S. embassy in Guatemala was not able to find a satisfactory 
successor to Arbenz among the country’s existing officer corps and eventually settled for 
Castillo Armas, who was inaugurated as president on July 8, 1954.73 
The Castillo Armas experiment combined recent and older American assumptions 
about- and historical experiences with Central America. The idea that a firm leader 
backed up by friendly American advise could set his country on track towards modernity 
dated back at least to Whitehouse’s experience with Ubico or Lay’s support for Carías. 
The more recent failure of liberal experiments in Guatemala and El Salvador 
undoubtedly reinforced the notion that Central Americans could not be left to their own 
devices. The successful experience of the fight against Nazism during the Second World 
War supplied the reasoning to get around the still popular nonintervention principle. 
Moving still closer up to the time of the coup itself, by the early 1950s the most 
successful local government was thought to be the “middle-of-the-road” type which 
combined careful liberalization with strong military influence in politics: The kind of 
government prevalent in El Salvador and Honduras (both of which were closely involved 
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in the execution of the coup). Only as a result of Somoza’s active and, it would seem, 
partly unsolicited support for the coup in Guatemala was the latter welcomed back in the 
fold of reputable nations in the region after 1954.74 
Since Washington was solely responsible for lifting Castillo Armas from the 
obscurity of exile and turning him into the “liberator” of his country, the new President 
was considered as something of a blank slate: To be filled in as the Americans saw fit. 
So, what sort of leader did Washington desire Castillo Armas to be? The model was not 
Ubico, as some historians have suggested. In fact, among the reasons for Castillo 
Armas’ selection as libertador were his credentials as a supporter of the conservative 
branch of the Guatemalan revolution. The Colonel had fought bravely in the 1944 
uprising against Ubico’s successor Ponce and he had been a supporter of Fransisco 
Arana, the most conservative member of the revolutionary junta and, later, Arévalo’s 
chief of staff, who was gunned down on a country road outside Guatemala city in 1949—
probably because he had been a threat to the more liberal wing of the revolutionary 
movement headed by Arbenz. It was a conservative evolution toward modernity—as 
opposed to a radical reaction or revolution—that the Eisenhower administration preferred. 
While it was expected of Castillo Armas that he would break the supposed power of the 
communists in Guatemala—and he did, in fact, have over 2,000 “communists” arrested 
during the first days of his tenure—the State Department also stressed that “U.S. action 
[should] prevent Guatemala from reverting to a dictatorship (…) [I]f this happened we 
would suffer serious propaganda loss”.75 
Though this element in American policy of the time has generally been ignored, 
every official in the foreign policy establishment, from the Ambassador up to the 
President, regarded the Castillo Armas government as an exciting experiment in the 
formation of a perfect little proto-capitalist state—the sort of experiment that would later 
be called nation-building. As Ambassador Schoenfeld had put it already in 1952: 
Guatemala represent in miniature all of the social cleavages, tensions, and 
dilemmas of modern Western society under attack by the communist virus. 
Conditions will worsen considerably before we can improve them, and we 
should regard Guatemala as the prototype area for testing means and 
method of combating communism.76 
The post-coup experiment in Guatemala was to be a shining example to the rest of the 
world: In the first country ever where the people had ousted its communist oppressors 
(as the official line ran), irrefutable evidence of improvement in the political, social, and 
economic spheres had to be readily discernable.  
Thus, the Americans initially believed that Castillo Armas had “overwhelming 
popular support” in Guatemala and told him that “in the not-to-distant future, say six 
months from now, you should hold free and democratic elections” to confirm that fact. 
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Naturally, the ambassador in Guatemala told him that he would “do all in my power to 
help you” achieve that goal.77 At the same time, Washington would financially support 
the economic rebuilding of Guatemala under Castillo Armas (channeling almost half of 
American direct support for Latin America to Guatemala between 1954 and 195778). The 
reason was that: 
A prosperous and progressive Guatemala is vital to a healthy hemisphere. 
The United States pledges itself not merely to political opposition to 
communism but to help to alleviate conditions in Guatemala and elsewhere 
which might afford communism an opportunity to spread its tentacles 
throughout the hemisphere.79 
Undeniably, however, Washington was aware of, condoned, and even supported 
harsh measures against Castillo Armas’ opponents—who were, of course, Soviet agents. 
Almost immediately upon his arrival in Guatemala city, Castillo Armas had 2,000 people 
arrested and, due to a lack of prison facilities, interned in concentration camps. That 
initial action was only a foretaste of Castillo Armas’ dictatorial mode of government over 
the next three years. As Richard Immerman has noted:  
In addition to utilizing Gestapo-like tactics, Castillo Armas initiated a series of 
political changes that codified the authoritarian nature of his rule. His 1956 
constitution institutionalized the 1954 statute that insured that there would be 
no organized opposition to his governing party. Returning to the caudillo 
tradition, he replaced almost all the local administrators and magistrates with 
his personal representatives and disenfranchised over two-thirds of the 
population.80 
From the outset, Washington supported harsh measures against the allegedly 
communist opponents of Castillo Armas. But this was imagined as a temporary situation: 
A regrettable but necessary transition period during which communist influence needed 
to be weeded out. As the Council on Foreign Relations argued about one year after the 
coup: “The suppression of political freedoms that had characterized the Arbenz rule in 
Guatemala led many to the easy assumption that President Castillo Armas would at 
once install a fully democratic order [yet] determined as it was to prevent any renewal of 
the communist threat, the new government demonstrated great caution in permitting 
freedom of activit[y]”.81 
The unprecedented success of the CIA-organized coup against Arbenz fostered the 
belief that the United States could continue to control events in Guatemala after 1954. 
The most dangerous and, as it turned out, fatally flawed element in this assumption was 
that Washington could steer Castillo Armas through an initial period of dictatorship to 
exterminate the communists and then have him make a u-turn to lead the liberalization 
and modernization of his country. High and low officers of the State Department 
continually reminded Castillo Armas of his role as an example to the “free world” and his 
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concurrent obligation to give his country the best possible administration. At the 1956 
Panama Conference, Secretary of State Dulles told Castillo Armas that “Guatemala was 
the only example of a country in which people have been able to free themselves after a 
Communist Government had been in power and (…) the world was watching Guatemala 
carefully and therefore it was important that an example be given to the free world of the 
success of a people recovering after a period of Communist rule”. The next day, Henry 
Holland, the Assistant Secretary for American Republic Affairs, took the Guatemalan 
President under his wing, telling the latter that the communists were “doing their best to 
force him [Castillo Armas] into a position of a ‘government of force’.” While Guatemalan 
troops had opened fire on peaceful demonstration barely a month before, Castillo Armas 
assured Holland that he would not allow the communists to do so. Somewhat ill at ease 
with the Guatemalan President’s easy promises, Holland notes in his report of the 
conversation that: “I congratulated him as warmly as I could and told him that the 
objective of the communist party was to drive a wedge between him and his people. If 
they could persuade his people that he had become a dictator, then the breach would be 
opened”.82 
Castillo Armas continually backtracked on his promises to hold free elections or 
even to liberalize his regime, telling his American allies that it was “very difficult at times 
to maintain democratic processes when those at the other side [i.e. the communists] 
were free of such restrictions”.83 Despite good progress in the American-backed efforts 
to modernize the Guatemalan army and reconstruct its economy, the State Department 
eventually acknowledged that progress on the political plane lagged behind. Already in 
1956, the embassy in Guatemala reported that “President Castillo now appears 
committed to a policy of stronger action against opposition elements, in contrast to his 
former moderate position to which (…) it will be most difficult for him to return (…) His 
communist and other enemies may be expected to take full advantage of this situation to 
the probable detriment of his prestige with the Guatemalan people”. 84  The State 
Department came to a similar conclusion several months later, when it acknowledged 
that Castillo Armas had at most been partially successful in his supposed objective to 
“provide positive, visual proof that life in Guatemala under a democratic government is 
preferable to life under a communist-dominated government”.85 
So why did Washington continue to tolerate, even support, Castillo Armas’ 
dictatorial practices. The Eisenhower administration was obviously not averse to 
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intervention if it suited its interests. Why not stop aid to Guatemala or take even harsher 
measures to force Castillo Armas to comply with Washington’s pipedreams about a 
controlled anticommunist experiment in Guatemala? The answer is, of course, that the 
Colonel had come to control his American allies at least as much as Americans 
controlled him. In building up the Guatemalan President as a great anticommunist and 
democrat; having provided him with modern armaments and hard cash; after one New 
York ticker tape parade, 2 state visits, and 3 personal meetings with Eisenhower, all in 
the context of battling communism86, the administration could hardly manhandle the 
colonel without being accused of aiding the cause of the enemy: 
It is in line with our objectives in Guatemala to do all we can to assure the 
success of the Castillo Government, to minimize the possibility of any return 
to communism, and to protect ourselves from charges that should the latter 
occur it did so because we failed to continue economic aid. If we are to be 
realistic, we must appreciate the fact that Guatemala’s record as the only 
country in the world so far to have rid itself of a communist-dominated regime 
weighs heavily with the U.S. public and Congress. If conditions appreciably 
worsened in Guatemala, no amount of explaining by the Department could 
justify our failure to provide a comparatively small amount of aid to that 
country while we continue to do so to countries which are at best neutrals in 
the Cold War.87 
Instead of guiding Guatemala to a brighter future, the Eisenhower administration had 
tied the direction of its Central American policy to the vagaries of a petty colonel who 
was simply more accustomed to the straightforward discipline of the army barracks than 
to the complexity of nation building. 
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~ Conclusion  ~ 
In 1948 someone at the American embassy in El Salvador edited a memorandum of 
conversation and decided that the words used to describe local political actors were out-
of-date. He crossed out “conservative” and “liberal” and replaced them with ”moderate” 
and “leftist” respectively.1 In hindsight, this simple revision was one of the first symptoms 
of the approaching Cold War: a dramatic restructuring of “us” and “them”, friends and 
foes. In terms of causality, it is hard to determine whether this change of nomenclature 
preceded or followed developments in the political field. In all probability, their 
relationship was mutually enforcing. It is certain, however, that the U.S. diplomatic posts 
played a central role in the international transfer of information and the transnational 
contest for meanings. How that is so, is a central question of this text and the answers 
will be reviewed in these concluding remarks. 
In an attempt to bridge theoretical gaps existent in the field of International 
Relations, political scientist Alexander Wendt hypothesized in a 1992 article that “people 
act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meaning that the objects 
have for them”. A preexisting mantra in constructivist social theory, Wendt applied it to 
international affairs: 
States act differently toward enemies than they do towards friends because 
enemies are threatening and friends are not. [The Neorealist conceptions of] 
anarchy and the distribution of power are insufficient to tell us which is which. 
U.S. military power has a different significance for Canada than for Cuba, 
despite their similar ‘structural’ positions (…) The distribution of power may 
always affect states’ calculations, but how it does so depends on the 
intersubjective understandings and expectations on the ‘distribution of 
knowledge’, that constitute their conceptions of self and other.2 
How useful Wendt’s hypothesis is for his fellow political scientists is a question far 
beyond the framework of this text to answer. For diplomatic historians, however, these 
seemingly straightforward observations should be of considerable interest. 
Indeed, the question of identity, of ascribing “meaning” to other actors based 
“conceptions of self and other”, is one that has occupied (implicitly or explicitly) many 
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diplomatic historians. In this context, Lars Schoultz’ straightforward observation that 
there is a fundamental differences in the relationship between the United States and 
various weaker states—the policy toward Peru being characterized historically by 
condescension, while that toward Denmark being characterized by polite respect—
illustrates the limitations of a purely Realist approach.3 But for historians, there is often 
an additional dimension to this question of meaning. The question of what the past 
“means” for “us”, the contemporaries of the historian, can sometimes impose itself with 
particular intensity. Regarding the current subject, this “triangulation” in the production of 
meanings—those that derive from the interplay of historical actors and those that derive 
from the interplay of historian and history—is one of the most interesting aspects. 
As was already observed in the introduction and as was referred to in several 
following chapters, the history of U.S.-Central American relations—especially when it 
concerns the right-wing military regimes of the region—is a subject that is often dealt 
with in terms of what that history means for the nature of the United States and its 
foreign policy. At least since the late 1970s, while the meaning of Vietnam was still busily 
debated and new imbroglios developed in America’s backyard, the historiography of 
U.S.-Central American relations has been dominated by the project of “exposure”: to 
expose U.S. imperialism; to expose U.S. racism; to expose U.S. support for brutal 
dictatorships. For the historians who were engaged in this “project”, it was a meaningful 
venture, as it addressed contemporary issues of American foreign policy. But for the 
subjects of study, historical actors such as Sheldon Whitehouse, Matthew Hanna, Julius 
Lay, etcetera, the terms used in historiographical debates were not necessarily relevant. 
As historian Andrew Crawley stated in a very similar context, the historiography of U.S. 
Central American affairs has long been “hostage to [contemporary] politics [while a]n aim 
of writing history must be to present the past in the context of its own concerns, not in 
the context of ours”.4 
The purpose of this text is not to “whitewash” United States actions in Central 
America. Indeed, its role in the history of isthmian societies was often tragic—as has 
been observed at several points in the foregoing chapters. However, to suggest that the 
United States “propped up” or consistently and knowingly supported dictatorships in 
Central America is misleading. It obscures the actual workings of foreign policy and of 
international relations by ascribing an artificial coherence and single-mindedness to the 
American foreign policy establishment while it also obscures (even belittles) the role of 
Central American actors. 
By “reducing” the diplomatic relations between the United States and Central 
America to a human scale and focusing it on this contentious issue of dictatorship, this 
text aspires not only to offer a “thick description” of certain historical events and 
developments, which can be an interesting exercise in itself, but also attempts to reveal 
the all too human confusion and the paradoxes that often accompanied the pursuit of 
U.S. foreign affairs. It also aims to be sensitive to the role that local, Central American 
                                                 
3
 See introduction. 
4
 Crawley, Somoza and Roosevelt, 3 and 5. 
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actors played in the eventual form that this policy took. This is not, of course, a study in 
Central American diplomacy. Due especially to the abundance of U.S. archive materials, 
as opposed to the scarcity of Central American sources, this could hardly have been 
otherwise unless the domain of the research were drastically reduced to a single country 
or to a smaller time scale. However, the role of Central American actors is certainly more 
visible in a study of embassy-level foreign affairs than it is in a study focused on 
Washington politics. Lastly, and most fundamentally perhaps, this is a study into the 
importance of information, in the sense of meanings and identities, in the pursuit of 
foreign policy. 
However, the construction of meaning in the context of inter-state relationships is, 
of course, intimately tied up with the relative power of the states concerned. It is obvious, 
for example, that the United States determined what the conceptual framework of U.S.-
Central American relations would be. Whether, in other words, that relationship would be 
based on understandings of “Peace and Amity”; the “Good Neighbor”; the “United 
Nations”; or the “free world” was largely up to policymakers in Washington. Moreover, 
American policymakers and diplomats were never quite comfortable with the conceptual 
framework of politics in Central America, as witnessed, for example, by the association 
made by American diplomats between continuismo and Fascism. This does not mean 
that some “meanings” could not be shared. Whitehouse and Ubico seemed to agree that 
“backward” countries such as Guatemala needed a “firm hand” to guide them to a better 
future. Likewise, Simmons seemed to share some of the democratic aspirations of the 
Salvadoran middle sectors shortly after the war. 
While Washington policymakers defined the framework of the international 
dialogue, they could not completely control its contents. Despite their power, they were 
not, after all, omnipotent. On the one hand, Central American actors had some leeway in 
determining what abstract concepts would mean in the day-to-day reality of local life. 
They might seek to appropriate certain meanings and negotiate the details of others. 
During the late ‘30s, the Honduran Liberal Party attempted to define Carías as a Fascist. 
Central American Liberals of the early ‘40s tried to convince Americans that the United 
Nations’ war aims implied a moral obligation on the part of the United States to rid the 
region of caudillos. But in the end, it was the caudillos themselves who were most 
successful in cultivating concepts such as the “Good Neighbor” or the specter of 
Communism, because they wielded most power in their respective bailiwicks.  
Definitions had the power to determine the difference between “us” and “them”; 
dictatorship and democracy; Fascism and freedom; moderate and radical; modern and 
backward. Definitions mattered because they determined who got the money and the 
arms; who had credit to waste and who did not; who was in power and who was out. But 
the interplay between definitions and power was a two-way street. Those with power, be 
it, for example, military dominance on the U.S. side or censors and secret police on the 
Central American side, always enjoyed greater opportunity to determine or appropriate 
meanings than those with less or no means of power. 
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On the other hand, it is clear that American diplomats outside Washington, at the 
posts in Central America, did not always understand or agree with the abstract concepts 
cooked up in Washington. Neither did Washington policy makers always understand 
what their plans would come to mean in the very different countries of the isthmus. The 
most obvious example would be that the State Department felt obliged to remove 
Charles Boyd Curtis from his assignment to San Salvador in 1931, because he had 
completely misunderstood and misrepresented central policy guidelines. At the same 
time, however, Washington underestimated Martínez’ ability to stay in power and garner 
local and international support on a national sovereignty platform, while American policy, 
based on the “Peace and Amity” Treaty, turned out to be bankrupt. In fact, only hostile 
neighbors such as Ubico wished to uphold the treaty because the latter regarded 
Martínez as a threat to his regional ambitions. The only truly Liberal state of the isthmus, 
Costa Rica, sympathized with Martínez’ stance. Clearly then, American “progressive” 
policies such as the 1923 Treaty had lost its appeal to the supposed Liberal allies of the 
United States while only the reactionary regimes cynically acknowledged its usefulness 
for unintended purposes. 
The U.S. legations and embassies often found themselves squarely in the middle 
of the competition over power and definition. As the official channel of information 
between the State Department and the Central American capitals, the embassies 
negotiated between and at times gave practical meaning to information coming from 
different directions. In fact, more than mere “channels” of information, the diplomatic 
posts and their officers were themselves important actors in that great contest of 
definition. The backgrounds, experience, ideals, and loyalties of Foreign Service officers 
left their marks on information flowing from North to South and vice versa. 
 
Going back to early 1930s, to what we now know was the genesis of modern, military 
dictatorship in Central America, it becomes immediately apparent that the terms in which 
historians tend to speak of that time, the start of the “era of tyranny”, is far removed from 
the experience and understanding of contemporary actors. The rise to power of Ubico 
and Carías, both by some form of election it should be remembered, was interpreted by 
Whitehouse and Lay in the context of the simultaneous elections of Araujo and Sacasa. 
Defined as the “Ubico solution”, U.S. diplomats welcomed the rise of these leaders 
because they seemed to share their progressive ambitions for the future of Central 
America. Also, the new generation of Central American statesmen seemed to have at 
least something of a popular mandate and they were receptive to American advice. If the 
ambitions of the American legations seem to us paternalistic and elitist, that is simply 
because they are an extension of worldview of these gentleman diplomats—the latter 
being the only factor to give a semblance of consistency to American policy in the 
different isthmian republics: Washington provided limited guidelines which tended to be 
contradictory. At any rate, there was no conspiracy or intention to “prop up” dictatorships. 
In terms of long-term developments, what should also be mentioned about this 
particular period is that progress, order, governmental stability, and limited social reform 
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were highly valued by U.S. diplomats, but not primarily as an antidote to Communism. 
Especially when compared to the Cold War period, this ideology was not considered a 
great or chronic danger. The diplomats did sometimes get caught up in local red scares, 
but this did not influence their overall assessment of Central American politics. Rather 
than a negative fear of Communism, the value of progress, order, etcetera lay in the 
modernization of local societies, the increased opportunities for American business, and 
the necessity for local and hemispheric U.S. leadership as opposed to the influence of 
the major South American and European countries. 
In that context, it is clear that Martínez’ coup and consequent slaughter of some 
10,000 “Communists” could never have been considered as consistent with U.S. policies 
in the region. It was Martínez’ defiance of the United States, his unworthiness in the 
words of Francis White, that ultimately dominated the American view of the General. 
What was on the line was not the local threat of Communism, the plight of the 
Salvadoran peasant, or even the de facto obliteration of the republican form of 
government in El Salvador. These were all minor inconveniences as compared to the 
fact that Martínez’ hold on power made a mockery of the Treaty of Piece and Amity, 
which had provided a sense of direction to U.S. Central American policy for over 10 
years.  
From the standpoint of U.S. involvement, the real tragedy of the 1932 massacre 
was not that American warships stood by to assist, as Chomsky and others claim, but 
that it hardly registered with the American diplomatic personnel. McCafferty was 
doubtlessly concerned about the rumors about “lustful atrocities” committed by savage 
“communistic” Indians, but he also told Martínez that communism was a dead issue as 
soon as the crisis was over. As in Gabriel Garcia Marquez’ fictionalized account of a 
massacre of banana workers, the events of 1932 simply disappeared from American’s 
historical recollections once the diplomatic correspondence on the event had been 
neatly bound and archived. Only some 15 years later, and probably through the lens of 
the World War, the Nuremberg trials, and the post-War hostility against “disreputable” 
governments, did embassy officials remember that Osmín Aguirre had led a machine 
gun squat during the Matanza. But while this represents the first time that the massacre 
became meaningful in diplomatic parlance, time had taken off the sharp edges of that 
event. The exact date and death toll could not even be remembered with precision. 
The continuismo campaigns challenged U.S. diplomats’ perception of the local 
rulers as simply “strong” men who had come to power with the explicit or implicit consent 
of the people. After about 1936, there was no question that these rulers were dictators. 
This proved to be difficult to accept for the American ministers. Most, if not all, of them 
assumed that continuismo would not meet with the approval of the State Department.  
However, the State Department valued its policies of non-intervention and the Good 
Neighbor far too highly to be willing to discard it in favor of supporting honest elections in 
Central America. This was not always easy to understand for the local diplomats who 
were as yet innocent of the rigidity of the nonintervention principle, as indicated most 
clearly by Lane and Corrigan’s advocacy of a “responsible” Good Neighbor. The 
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conclusion must be that continuismo and the more permanent establishment of 
dictatorship in Central America was accepted for reasons of hemispheric policy, not 
because the U.S., let alone its representatives, had any sympathy or even use for these 
regimes. 
In the context of the local continuismo campaigns and growing concerns about the 
threat of Fascism—a concern that developed earlier and was more acute among the 
foreign service establishment than it was among the general population—U.S. diplomats 
reported with increasing frequency on the rise of corruption and nepotism in Central 
America and their rising fears that the local regimes secretly sympathized with Fascism. 
What makes this period confusing is that Washington’s interest in Central America 
reached an all time low. Local legations received (almost) no guidance from the 
Department and it is very hard to say if their reports had any effect on their seniors, who 
were focused on European affairs. It is also in the context of the threats emanating from 
Europe that the caudillos themselves found new ways to make themselves useful to the 
Americans. By redefining their regimes in terms of continental solidarity in the face of an 
international crisis, they managed to turn the tables on local oppositionists who 
attempted to brand them as Fascist stooges. Thanks to their diplomatic acumen, they 
secured the legitimacy of their rule in American eyes before the start of the Second 
World War. 
Relations between the United States and the Central American republics during 
the War itself represented both the culmination of developments since the 
implementation of the Good Neighbor policy and the harbinger of future developments. 
On the one hand, the nonintervention principle was elevated to religious dogma and the 
U.S. supported the dictatorships unconditionally in the interest of the war effort while the 
dictatorships unconditionally supported the U.S. in order to be illegible for lend-lease aid, 
flexible trade and financial agreements, and prestigious United Nations status. This is 
how the period is often characterized in the relatively scarce historical research. And 
while it is not a false image of U.S.-Central American relations during the war, it ignores 
the many momentous changes that were going on at the same time—leading many 
historians to underestimate the importance of the War in the history of U.S.-Central 
American relations and to overestimate the lines of continuity between the 1930s and 
the Cold War.  
First of all, the period leading up to and including the first years of that war brought 
some major practical changes in U.S. policy toward Latin America. For the Foreign 
Service, this meant a major change of pace, functions, and objectives in the daily 
management of legations and embassies in the other American Republics. The 
demands that the State Department made on its embassies in Central America had two 
important consequences: First of all, the increased workload and demand for speedy 
action meant that the embassies became highly dependent on the local regimes for 
prompt and favorable action, as indicated by Erwin and Des Portes’ spirited defense of 
the cooperative attitude of Carías and Ubico. Considering the rewards that the local 
regimes might expect for such cooperation (as noted above), none of them hesitated to 
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help. Due to this close cooperation, the embassies were far more favorably impressed 
with the local regimes than they had been right before the war. A second consequence 
of the increased demands that the State Department made on its Foreign Service due to 
the war, was that the embassies did not have half as much time to investigate local 
political developments as they had before the war. Consequently, many otherwise astute 
political observers in the Foreign Service reverted to a rigid, clichéd image of Central 
America as being basically static. Dictatorship in general and the contemporary regimes 
in particular were assumed to stay in power at least for the duration of the war. The 
possibility or desirability of political change was completely ignored up to (and including) 
1944. 
Second, the war years witnessed the hollowing-out and redefinition of non-
intervention. Especially during the late thirties, there was a fair amount of consensus 
among both Americans and Central Americans on what non-intervention meant. 
Basically, a broad definition, the absence of all forms of interference as opposed to the 
mere absence of armed intervention, had become the norm. During the early years of 
the war the State Department and Foreign Service, partly under pressure from war-time 
needs, completely (although to some degree unconsciously) redefined non-intervention 
until only the narrow definition (absence of overt military action) was left. Close relations 
were established between the embassies and the local military regimes in the fields of 
economic warfare and anti-subversive activities. Through a system of blacklists for Axis 
companies and the founding of local economic coordinating committees the U.S. 
embassies acquired an important coordinating role in Central American economies. The 
long-term importance of this redefinition of non-intervention, aside from the short-term 
support for local regimes, was that it mentally prepared American Foreign Service 
officers for more far-reaching intervention in Central America during the Cold War. 
Aside from a redefinition of non-intervention, the construction of an image of what 
the Nazi –threat could mean for Central America, mentally prepared American diplomats 
for the Communist threat after the war. There is an important difference between the 
Communist threat as it was perceived before and after the war. The turning point seems 
to have occurred during the World War. During the 1930s, there was no ongoing concern 
about Moscow-directed communist activity that was aimed at overthrowing local 
governments and establishing a Soviet sphere of influence. There were periodical red 
scares in Central America, as in El Salvador in 1932, which started among local society 
and could influence the American embassies. Thus, any researcher who wants to find 
evidence of a concern for Communism among US diplomats in Central America can do 
so, but taken as a whole, the sources do not indicate a continuous concern with 
communism before World War II.  
After the war, a fundamentally different concern for communist influence 
developed. Aside from the ideological antagonism toward communist or other leftist 
organizations, a real fear for Soviet power developed and it was assumed that such 
power reached Central America. During the war the embassies and the Department 
developed the language that allowed them to imagine a monolithic, centrally organized 
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movement against American interests that manifested itself in local political 
organizations, unions, cultural movements, etc. This was the language of Nazi 
“subversion” and “fifth column” activity—quite unknown before the war. There are very 
striking similarities between the description of Nazi subversive activity and Soviet-
communist activity, while there is a striking contrast with the description of communist 
activity before the war. In short, U.S. diplomats developed the language which allowed 
them to imagine the presence of Soviet-Communist power in Central America. The stage 
was set for the start of the Cold War, but it did not follow the World War directly. 
The first observation to make about the final years of the World War is that the 
Foreign Service was taken completely off guard by the popular revolutions of 1944. The 
short term cause is, as noted before, that at least up to 1944, the Foreign Service was 
immersed in war related work and had little opportunity to investigate the momentous 
political developments in Central America. Some rare instances of contact between the 
American Foreign Service and discontented Central American citizens are Nugent’s talk 
with and unidentified laborer and Thurston’s liaisons with Dalton. The long term cause is 
that American diplomats had long thought that Central Americans were politically 
“immature” and thus unable to grasp the liberal ideas required for a democratic 
revolution unless they could depend on American assistance. Thus, Long had 
preoccupied himself with the uplift of Latins for decades, but was completely oblivious to 
the developing democratic resistance against Ubico before 1944. 
Ironically, U.S. war time propaganda against Fascism and for democracy had 
stimulated the growth of liberal ideology in Central America. Furthermore, pro-
democratic propaganda in combination with an increased US role in Central American 
life had caused the Liberal opposition to think/hope/wish that the US would eventually 
intervene in Central America to topple the dictatorships and bring democracy. This, after 
all, was the professed objective of the war. But while U.S. intervention did in fact 
increase during the war (as described above) the Foreign Service continued to subscribe 
to, or pay lip service to, the credo of non-intervention. To Central American Liberals, this 
was hopelessly inconsistent: “Why do you give us roads, hospitals, and sewers while 
you allow the tyrannies to continue in power?”. The inability of the Foreign Service to 
anticipate this question or deal with it when it arrived caused bitterness on both sides. 
In Guatemala and El Salvador, where the downfall of the dictators was very 
sudden and the embassies were basically confronted with the fait accomplit of Liberal 
governments, the US chiefs of mission were actually carefully optimistic about the new 
regimes. But Erwin, who was particularly close to Carías, resisted the idea that more 
liberal regimes were possible or desirable. The ambassador basically reverted to early 
1930s justifications for dictatorial rule in Central America—a justification that had been 
fortified by three to four years of smooth wartime cooperation. Thus, the Foreign Service 
in Central America represented in miniature an important split in American thinking on 
democracy versus dictatorship in Central America after the war. 
Some officers in the State Department and the Foreign Service, presumably due to 
the ideological constructs underlying the fight against Fascism, wanted to continue the 
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fight against dictatorship after the defeat of the European dictatorships. Spruille Braden 
and his supporters were the major proponents of the fight against dictatorship and for 
democracy. For a while, Braden and his collaborators had immense influence in the 
State Department and their crusading spirit led to the US rejection of the Péron 
(Argentina), Somoza (Nicaragua), Trujillo (Dominican Republic), and to a lesser extent 
Batista (Cuba), and Carías (Honduras) dictatorships. 
It seems obvious that if the U.S. decided to fight dictatorship, it should support 
democracy. And even though everyone agreed on this point in principle, there was 
considerable disagreement over what constituted true democracy in Latin America and 
how it should be supported. In dictatorial countries, support for democracy meant that 
the U.S. had to ally with the forces of discontent and revolution. In the newly established 
liberal countries, support for democracy meant a tolerance for political experimentation 
and social reform that was not easily acceptable for U.S. observers. Thus, there was 
considerable discussion in the State Department over the post-war pro-democratic policy. 
As stated before, the Central American embassies represented this discussion in 
miniature, with the Guatemala and Salvador embassies basically supporting Braden and 
the embassies of Honduras and Nicaragua being in disagreement with his idea. The 
embassy of Honduras was especially vehement in its opposition to Braden’s ideas and 
its arguments carried great weight in the Department. 
Aside from the abstract discussions on the merits of an anti-dictatorial/pro-
democratic policy, there was the issue of practical, day-to-day diplomacy in the context 
of this discussion.  While it is generally accepted that the U.S. briefly had a pro-
democratic policy during the post-war years, it is actually very hard to find any trace of it 
in practical diplomacy. That is to say, an anti-dictatorial policy clearly manifested itself 
when a concrete, limited problem presented itself. For example, when Somoza of 
Nicaragua gave in to local and U.S. pressure and organized elections only to commit a 
coup against the popularly elected government, the United States acted decisively and 
broke diplomatic relations with the Somoza regime. However, in countries were matters 
were not as clear cut, the embassies had to make do with very vague instructions and 
apply them to ambiguous situations. This is especially apparent in El Salvador, where 
experiments with more liberal government were halting and uncertain, or in Honduras, 
where a relatively benign dictator hung on to power by his fingernails. In the embassies 
in these countries the ambassadors had to fall back on their own assumptions about 
Central American politics and the U.S. position therein. Also, they had to deal with 
superiors who were very uncertain on whether they were committed to the overthrow of 
dictatorships and the spread of democracy, especially in the absence of an acute crisis 
such as that in Nicaragua.  
In short, whether the US had an anti-dictatorial policy in countries like Honduras 
and Salvador mainly depended on the views of men like Erwin, Long, Thurston, 
Simmons, and Kyle—all men of very different experience and temperament. This 
situation created great uncertainty both in the embassies and among Central Americans 
who traditionally looked to the United States for signs of (dis-)approval. In the end, this 
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could only lead to mutual suspicions and disappointments. Especially in Salvador, where 
the embassy was carefully sympathetic to the liberals, Simmons grew impatient with the 
haphazard progress of Liberalism while Salvadoran Liberals grew disappointed with the 
inconsistent policy of the United States. In Honduras, the Erwin was quite firmly behind 
the dictator and refused to take local Liberals seriously. In the mean time, politically 
astute caudillos reasserted their authority everywhere and basically solved the 
dictatorship vs. democracy discussion by demonstrating their continued ability to provide 
peace and stability in Central America. They were of course assisted by the advent of 
the Cold War. 
This development coincided with acute disappointment in the progress of 
democracy in Central America after 1947, which, it would appear, was an independent 
development. In El Salvador, the landowning classes and military caste gradually 
reasserted their power, while social reforms in liberal Guatemala went beyond what was 
considered appropriate by U.S. diplomats. Embassy personnel blamed these events on 
the weakness or immaturity of the Liberal movement in Central America and gradually 
concluded that they could not help people who could not help themselves. In this context 
of a perceived Communist threat combined with a perceived lack of strength and ability 
on the side of the Liberal factions, American diplomats placed their trust in the “middle 
men”: populist leaders with a military background like Osorio who cultivated a language 
of ideological moderation and economic progress. 
As has been remarked before, it is fitting for a text that focuses on the American 
Foreign Service officer to end with Eisenhower’s wholesale replacement of chiefs of 
mission in Central America in 1953. The new president acknowledged the importance of 
the background and world view of his emissaries and believed that the old hands were 
too “soft” to execute his plans for the “liberation” of Guatemala. But while the style of an 
ambassador like Peurifoy differed greatly from the previous “Good Neighbors”, some 
degree of continuity was also in evidence. Taken over the whole, one can note a 
tendency among American diplomats to favor “middle men”: leaders who were neither 
too liberal nor too authoritarian (at least in the view of the Americans), but who held the 
middle ground between the two. Reigning pessimism about the nature of Central 
American politics stimulated American diplomats to support presidents who ruled with a 
firm hand, but who were also beholden of American advise. From Whitehouse to 
Peurifoy, and from the “Ubico solution” to the “Castillo Armas solution”, the envoys 
believed that they could steer the middle men away from authoritarian rule and toward a 
brighter, perhaps even more democratic, future. They were mistaken. 
 
While this text has attempted to portray American foreign policy in Central America on a 
human scale, a current trend in the historiography is to answer Big Questions as to the 
nature of America’s position in the world. This has been true for some time now and is 
not surprising since America’s existential enemies of the 20th century—Nazis and 
Communists—have all ended up in the dustbin of history. Throughout the century that 
the United States was faced with rival powers and ideologies, thinking on America’s 
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place in the world focused on defense of the free world or at least of the national interest. 
After the break-up of the Soviet Union, historians grappled with the question of whether 
there was not some affirmative or positive tradition of American foreign affairs: a tradition 
that was not merely defensive (let alone isolationist) but that existed independently of 
foreign threats. During the 1990s—that is, after the Cold War had been “won”—so-called 
“triumphalism” provided an answer: The United States was the instigator, agent, or at 
least benefactor of a general trend toward more liberal democracy and an “open door” 
trade network. 
Events around the turn of the millennium demonstrated, however, that liberal 
democracy was not about to engulf the world; that a capitalist economy did not 
necessarily show an upward trend; and that not everyone around the world appreciated 
the role that the United States had played over the last decades. Triumphalism, therefore, 
faded to the background and in the setting of the war on terror and the invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the question arose as to whether the United States played a much 
more sinister role in the world. Was the United States not, in fact, an Empire like so 
many others that had existed throughout human history?5  
In the context of this debate the question arises as to whether the ministers and 
ambassadors discussed before fit into a larger interpretive framework which defines 
United States actions in the world as “imperial”. In other words, were they mere 
diplomats who, while forcefully asserting the interests of their government, did not 
demand nor receive special privileges from the governments to which they were 
accredited? Or were they more like the proconsuls of older empires who acted like and 
were locally accepted as provincial governors sent from the metropolis. Were the military 
dictatorships with which they dealt most of the time compliant “treaty princes” like the 
Indian Rajas under the British Empire? Or were they cunning politicians who used the 
American ambassador as just another pawn in the local game of power politics? 
From the outset, it should be noted that any of the diplomats discussed above 
would be abhorred at the mere suggestion that they were agents of an empire. Such 
accusations were not uncommon, though. The assertive role that the United States 
played in the Caribbean after the Spanish-American War and into the 1920s certainly left 
the impression that it was an imperial power. It was this impression that both Hoover and 
Roosevelt tried to take away with a nonintervention policy and, later, the Good Neighbor 
policy. Sensitivity to any sign of Yanqui Imperialismo did persist, however, regardless of 
the definite improvement of inter-American relations during the 1930s. Despite attempts 
to woo the Yankees, it is also likely that the authoritarian rulers of Central America would 
violently reject the accusation that they were subservient to the American empire. As has 
been described in some political biographies of these leaders, they were proud and 
nationalistic if nothing else. 
                                                 
5 For an open-ended treatment of this question, see Maier, Among Empires. Not everyone agrees 
that an American empire is necessarily a “sinister” force in world affairs. Boot, Savage wars of 
peace, claims, for example, that U.S. imperial interventions across the globe have had the effect 
of ending bloody conflicts.   
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While one might detect a considerable amount of self-delusion or even outright 
hypocrisy in the self-definition of both diplomat and dictator, it is indeed questionable 
whether “Empire”, as an interpretive framework, illuminates more than it obscures. Some 
of the more “fashionable” queries in the contemporary empire debate—“whether [it] is a 
new imperialism or business as usual, whether the United States should be properly 
called imperial or hegemonic, whether it is benevolent or self-interested, whether it 
should rely on hard power or soft power, whether this empire most closely resembles the 
British Empire or the Roman, and whether it is in its ascendancy or in decline”6—are of 
little relevance to the narrative of the past 300 pages.  
This is not to say that contemporary research based on this inquiry into 
Imperialism is useless. Indeed, Kaplan herself made a potentially important and certainly 
thought-provoking contribution to the field of diplomatic history by demonstrating how 
porous the borders between “domestic” and “foreign” really are—an accomplishment that 
has eluded many of her peers in the aforementioned field. Also, the concept of 
“creolization”, which has been proposed as a addendum the study of empire, has in a 
broad sense inspired some of the observations in the foregoing text. However, and this 
is something that current historians of U.S. imperialism tend to forget, the use of the term 
“imperialism” goes back a long, long way in the history and historiography of the United 
States and Latin America. Whether it is populist political leaders of Latin America 
deriding “yanqui imperialismo”; American historians denying that imperialist ventures in 
the Caribbean were anything but a “grand aberration”; or theorists of dependency and 
World System analysis on both sides of the Rio Grande, U.S. imperialism has been a 
contested issue perhaps as far back as 1898. Can a historian of U.S.-Latin American 
relations use a term with such a long and painful history and still make a claim to 
objectivity?  
Again, this text makes no attempt to whitewash American actions. But considering 
the sensitivity of the term empire specifically in the context of U.S.-Latin American 
relations, it would seem that its use conceals more than it exposes. Despite a larger 
international context characterized by large discrepancies in power between Central 
America and the United States, it should be born in mind that the U.S. foreign policy 
machinery was not a bureaucratic behemoth created for the sole purpose of colonial rule. 
Neither were Central Americans remotely subservient if their own vital interests were 
involved. Instead, the U.S. Foreign Service was surprisingly chaotic while local actors 
were entirely independent—at least compared to much of what has been written on this 
subject. Therefore, a wholesome approach to the future study of the history of U.S.-Latin 
American affairs emphasizes the diversity of actors and competing interests over 
monolithic structures and local encounters over centrally directed policy—even if the 
ultimate conclusion must be that it is a tragic history indeed. 
 
                                                 
6 Amy Kaplan, “Violent Belongings and the Question of Empire Today. Presidential Address to the 
American Studies Association, October 17, 2003”, American Quarterly 56:1 (March 2004) 1-18, 
there 2. 
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Samenvatting 
 
van  
 
The Middle Men 
The American Foreign Service and the dictators of Central America, 1930-1952. 
 
door 
 
Jorrit van den Berk 
 
 
 
 
Dit proefschrift is een analyse van de rol van het Amerikaanse diplomatieke korps in de 
Amerikaanse internationale betrekkingen door middel van het thema dictatuur. De 
introductie toont aan dat zowel historici als politicologen de buitenlandse politiek van de 
Verenigde Staten vaak weergeven als een proces dat wordt vormgegeven door 
onpersoonlijke krachten als staat, economisch belang, of machtspolitiek. Deze 
aannames treden vooral naar de voorgrond wanneer de Amerikaanse relatie met 
buitenlandse dictators besproken wordt en leidt in dat geval geregeld tot normatieve en 
monocausale verklaringen waarbij het Amerikaanse beleid, naar gelang de voorkeur van 
de onderzoeker, als “realistisch” of “imperialistisch” bestempeld wordt. Daar deze 
benaderingen geen recht doen aan de complexiteit en historiciteit van het onderwerp, is 
er in dit proefschrift voor gekozen om de Amerikaanse buitenlandse politiek te 
onderzoeken op het niveau van het diplomatieke corps en de individuele diplomaat in 
plaats van het niveau van de staat. 
De keuze om het Amerikaanse diplomatieke korps in Centraal Amerika (of, 
specifieker, Guatemala, El Salvador en Honduras) in de periode 1930 tot 1952 te 
bestuderen, is gebaseerd op verschillende overwegingen. Ten eerste vonden er in deze 
periode belangrijke veranderingen plaats in de structuur en organisatie van het 
diplomatieke korps. Enkele van deze veranderingen, zoals de uitbreiding van het 
takenpakket van Amerikaanse ambassades, vonden voor het eerst plaats in de Latijns 
Amerikaanse landen tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Daarbij vertegenwoordigen de 
decennia rondom de Tweede Wereldoorlog een belangrijke overgang in het zelfbeeld 
van de Verenigde Staten op het gebied van hun positie in de wereld, vooral als het gaat 
om de verhouding met dictatoriale en totalitaire staten. Centraal Amerika was in deze 
periode één van de weinige regio’s waarmee de Verenigde Staten continue contact 
onderhielden en bovendien maakte deze regio haar eigen ontwikkelingen door op het 
gebied van dictatoriale overheersing. Ten laatste is er in de historiografie sinds de 
jaren ’80 veel debat geweest over de aard van het Amerikaanse beleid ten opzichte van 
Centraal Amerikaanse dictatuur in de jaren ‘30—een debat dat op een abstract niveau 
belangrijke implicaties heeft voor de waardering van de Amerikaanse rol in de wereld. 
Samenvatting 
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Dit proefschrift hoopt op deze punten een bijdrage te leveren aan de wetenschappelijke 
discussie.  
In het eerste hoofdstuk wordt de sociale achtergrond alsmede het professionele 
milieu van het Amerikaanse diplomatieke korps in Centraal Amerika tijdens de jaren ’30 
en ’40 gereconstrueerd. Hieruit komt naar voren dat er drie generaties van diplomaten te 
onderscheiden zijn in de genoemde jaren: allereerst een generatie van diplomaten van 
elitaire komaf en paternalistische overtuigingen; ten tweede een generatie van New Deal 
diplomaten, door Franklin Roosevelt benoemd en gekenmerkt door een betrekkelijk 
progressieve instelling; en ten laatste een naoorlogse generatie van professionals met 
een terughoudende opvatting van hun persoonlijke rol in buitenlandse zaken en, 
noodzakelijkerwijs, meer oog voor het management van hun ambassades. 
De chronologische bespreking van de ervaringen van het Amerikaanse 
diplomatieke korps begint in Hoofdstuk 2. Elk volgend hoofdstuk is georganiseerd rond 
een historiografisch vraagstuk betreffende het Amerikaanse beleid ten opzichte van 
democratie en dictatuur in Centraal Amerika. Hoofdstuk 2 gaat terug naar het begin van 
de jaren ’30, een periode waarin, zo weten wij nu, een nieuwe generatie van militaire 
dictators aan de macht kwam in Centraal Amerika. Maar dit hoofdstuk maakt duidelijk 
dat de termen waarin historici schrijven over deze periode, als zijnde het begin van een 
“era van tirannie”, ver verwijderd is van de ervaring en het begrip van contemporaine 
actoren. De Amerikaanse gezanten Sheldon Whitehouse en Julius Lay interpreteerden 
de opkomst van Jorge Ubico in Guatemala en Tiburcio Carías in Honduras, die beiden 
de geschiedenisboeken zijn ingegaan als militaire dictators, in de context van de 
gelijktijdige verkiezing van gematigd progressieve leiders als Arturo Araujo in El 
Salvador en Juan Bautista Sacasa in Nicaragua. Amerikaanse diplomaten 
verwelkomden de opkomst van al deze staatshoofden, omdat verondersteld werd dat zij 
hun opvattingen over een progressievere en wellicht democratischer toekomst van 
Centraal Amerika deelden. Daarbij leek deze nieuwe generatie van leiders een breed 
populair mandaat te genieten en stond zij niet onwelwillend tegenover advies van de 
Amerikaanse legaties. Als de opvattingen van de Amerikaanse gezanten uit deze tijd 
ons elitair en paternalistisch lijken, is dat eenvoudig te verklaren door de aristocratische 
achtergrond van deze gentlemen diplomats. Hun sociale achtergrond en professionele 
ervaring waren de enige factoren die in deze periode een gelijkenis van consistentie 
verschaften aan het Amerikaanse beleid ten opzichte van Centraal Amerika: Washington 
verschafte slechts vage richtlijnen die bovendien met elkaar conflicteerden. Er was in 
ieder geval geen sprake van een Amerikaans complot om plaatselijke dictators aan de 
macht te helpen, zoals sommige historici die schrijven over het era van tirannie wel 
aannemen.  
Hoofdstuk 3 maakt duidelijk dat de militaire coup en de daaropvolgende slachting 
van zo’n 10,000 Indiaanse “Communisten” in El Salvador in 1932 niet consistent was 
met het Amerikaanse buitenlandse beleid, zoals wel beweerd is in de historiografie. Het 
was de obstinate houding van El Salvador’s nieuwe militaire leider, Generaal 
Maximiliano Hernandez Martínez, die de Amerikanen zorgen baarden. Martínez’ greep 
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naar de macht en zijn deskundige manipulatie van de Amerikaanse gezanten in El 
Salvador vormden een diplomatieke nederlaag voor Washington en berokkende veel 
schade toe aan het Amerikaanse prestige in de regio. Vanuit het standpunt van de 
Amerikaanse betrokkenheid bij de genocidale slachting onder inheemse Indianen die 
volgde op Martínez’ coup, was de werkelijke tragedie dan ook niet dat Washington de 
Salvadoraanse Generaal hielp om een communistische opstand neer te slaan, zoals 
sommige historici hebben geopperd, maar dat deze gebeurtenis nauwelijks aandacht 
kreeg van het Amerikaanse diplomatieke korps. Herinneringen onder Amerikaanse 
gezanten aan de opstand en slachting vervaagden zodra de correspondentie hierover 
netjes ingebonden en gearchiveerd was. Pas 15 jaar later, en dan door de lens van de 
holocaust, de Neurenberg rechtzaken en het naoorlogse antidictatoriale beleid, 
herinnerden Amerikaanse ambassade medewerkers zich dat de toenmalige 
Salvadoraanse president, Osmín Aguirre, een grote rol had gespeeld in de genocide van 
1932. Maar dit was de eerste keer dat de Matanza, zoals de slachting bekend is, 
betekenisvol werd in een diplomatieke context.  
Hoofdstuk 4 zet het historische narratief voort met een bespreking van de 
“continuismo” campagnes die medio jaren ’30 plaatsvonden in Centraal Amerika. Deze 
politieke manoeuvres, die tot doel hadden de lokale staatshoofden een nieuwe 
ambtstermijn te verschaffen, dwongen het Amerikaanse diplomatieke korps om hun 
gematigd positieve opvattingen over leiders als Ubico en Carías bij te stellen, aangezien 
zij in strijd waren met plaatselijke grondwetten. Na ongeveer 1936 kon er onder 
diplomaten geen twijfel over bestaan dat veel van de Centraal Amerikaanse presidenten 
die een paar jaar eerder middels verkiezingen aan de macht waren gekomen dictatoriale 
regimes hadden opgezet. Dit bleek een moeilijk te accepteren feit voor het diplomatieke 
korps. Vele gezanten gingen ervan uit dat van hen verwacht werd dat zij zich tegen deze 
nieuwste ontwikkelingen zouden verzetten. Maar het ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 
in Washington hechtte te veel waarde aan haar nieuwe non-interventiebeleid om het op 
te offeren ten behoeve van vrije verkiezingen in Centraal Amerika. Dit was niet makkelijk 
te accepteren voor de diplomaten ter plekke, zoals duidelijk wordt uit het pleidooi van 
Arthur Bliss Lane en Francis Patrick Corrigan voor een “verantwoordelijke” Good 
Neighbor.  
In de context van de continuismo campagnes en de groeiende angst voor de 
dreiging van het fascisme kregen Amerikaanse diplomaten tegen het eind van de jaren 
dertig meer oog voor de corruptie, het nepotisme en de andere dictatoriale aspecten van 
Centraal Amerikaanse regimes, zoals besproken wordt in hoofdstuk 5. Wat deze periode 
verwarrend maakt, voor zowel de historicus als voor Amerikaanse gezanten in Centraal 
Amerika, was dat de interesse die Washington toonde voor ontwikkelingen in de regio 
een nieuw dieptepunt bereikte. De legaties ontvingen in deze periode nauwelijks 
informatie of beleidsrichtlijnen vanuit Washington, waar de aandacht hoofdzakelijk 
gericht was op de internationale crisis in Europa. In de tussentijd trachtten de Centraal 
Amerikaanse staatshoofden de sympathie van de Amerikanen te herwinnen door hun 
regimes te presenteren als bolwerken tegen de verspreiding van de fascistische 
Samenvatting 
 
356 
ideologie en niet, zoals de lokale oppositie beweerde, bolwerken van fascistische 
ideologie. Dankzij hun diplomatieke behendigheid wisten de dictators al voor het 
uitbreken van de Tweede Wereldoorlog de legitimiteit van hun regimes te herstellen in 
de ogen van Amerikaanse diplomaten  
Hoofdstuk 6 omschrijft de relatie tussen de Verenigde Staten en de Centraal 
Amerikaanse dictaturen tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog. De drie belangrijkste gevolgen 
van de Oorlog die in dit hoofdstuk geïdentificeerd worden, zijn: (1) de verstrekkende 
veranderingen in de structuur en de functies van het diplomatieke korps waardoor de 
legaties (ambassades vanaf 1943) in grotere mate afhankelijk werden van de 
coöperatieve houding van de lokale regimes en hun oog voor lokale ontwikkelingen 
verloren of deze alleen nog in de context van internationale gebeurtenissen 
interpreteerden; (2) de uitholling van het non-interventiebeleid, ondanks de lippendienst 
die aan dit principe gedaan werd, als gevolg van de verregaande samenwerking tussen 
de Amerikaanse staten die tijdens de oorlog bereikt werd; (3) de adoptie, door de 
Amerikaanse ambassades en het Amerikaanse ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, van 
een taalgebruik dat een monolithisch, centraal georganiseerde en subversieve 
bedreiging tegen Amerikaanse belangen kon duiden. Dit was de taal die zich vormde 
rondom de overdreven angst voor Nazi spionage en de Vijfde Colonne. Deze 
ontwikkelingen vormen tezamen een belangrijke oorzaak voor de vorm die de Koude 
Oorlog aannam in Centraal Amerika, in de zin dat de Tweede Wereldoorlog het 
Amerikaanse diplomatieke korps leerde samenwerken met autoritaire regimes; een 
nauwe definitie van non-interventie tot gevolg had; en een nieuwe conceptie van 
totalitaire dreiging introduceerde. 
Maar dat de Koude Oorlog geen noodzakelijk gevolg was van de Tweede 
Wereldoorlog wordt duidelijk gemaakt in hoofdstukken 7 en 8. In hoofdstuk 7 wordt 
allereerst een ingrijpende gebeurtenis in de laatste fase van de Tweede Wereldoorlog 
geanalyseerd. Vanaf 1944 vonden er in Centraal Amerika populaire revoluties plaats die 
het Amerikaanse diplomatieke korps compleet verrasten vanwege haar focus op 
oorlogsgerelateerde zaken. Ironisch genoeg was het ondermeer de Amerikaanse 
propaganda tegen het fascisme dat onder de Centraal Amerikaanse middenklasse een 
antidictatoriale beweging in gang had gezet. Daarbij had deze propaganda onder 
dezelfde middenklasse de indruk gewekt dat de Verenigde Staten haar politieke 
aspiraties steunden. Het verdrijven van dictators en verspreiden van democratie was 
tenslotte het doel van de oorlog. Maar zolang de oorlog woedde in Europa hield het 
Amerikaanse diplomatieke korps vast aan haar uitgeholde en inconsistent toegepaste 
non-interventiebeleid en bleef het de zittende regeringen van Centraal Amerika steunen. 
Voor de lokale middenklasse was dit een hopeloos tegenstrijdige stellingname en het 
onvermogen van het diplomatieke korps om dit in te zien leidde tot frustratie en 
verbittering aan beide zijden.  
Na afloop van de Tweede Wereldoorlog bepaalde een antidictatoriale factie binnen 
het Amerikaanse ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken korte tijd de richting van het inter-
Amerikaanse beleid, zoals omschreven in hoofdstuk 8. Washington verbrak de 
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diplomatieke banden met de meest beruchte alleenheersers van het continent—
waaronder twee regimes in Centraal Amerika. Maar niet iedereen binnen het 
diplomatieke korps kon zich vinden in dit beleid. In Guatemala en El Salvador, waar de 
plaatselijke dictators waren afgezet door de eigen bevolking, vertoonden de 
Amerikaanse ambassades voorzichtige steun voor het antidictatoriale beleid, maar de 
ambassade in Honduras, waar Tiburcio Carías nog altijd aan de macht was, verzette 
zich er tegen op grond van de nauwe samenwerking met het plaatselijke regime tijdens 
de oorlog. Daarnaast ontstond er onenigheid binnen het diplomatieke korps over de 
koers die de Verenigde Staten na de Oorlog moesten varen wat betreft het stimuleren 
van democratie (niet slechts het bestrijden van dictatuur).  
In zoverre als de Verenigde Staten naast hun antidictatoriale beleid ook een pro-
democratisch beleid hadden in Centraal Amerika was het hoofdzakelijk afhankelijk van 
de persoonlijkheid van de Amerikaanse ambassadeurs in die regio. In landen waar geen 
concrete context voor een pro-democratisch beleid bestond, moesten de Amerikaanse 
ambassades vage richtlijnen vanuit Washington toepassen op ambigue situaties. Dit was 
bijvoorbeeld het geval in El Salvador waar democratische experimenten van een 
gematigd liberale overheid onzekere en niet altijd succesvolle uitkomsten opleverden. Of 
de Verenigde Staten een pro-democratisch beleid voerden, was daarom afhankelijk van 
diplomaten als Erwin, Long, Thurston, Simmons, en Kyle—personen van uiteenlopende 
achtergrond en temperament. Deze situatie leidde onder zowel de ambassades als 
onder Centraal Amerikanen tot onzekerheid en, uiteindelijk, wederzijdse verdenking en 
teleurstelling. Uiteindelijke waren het de tactisch behendige leiders van rechtse facties 
en regeringen die het beste gebruik wisten te maken van deze situatie door in vele 
Centraal Amerikaanse landen, behalve Guatemala, de macht te grijpen en zo in 
praktische zin een einde te maken aan de discussie over de toekomst van democratie 
en dictatuur in de regio.  
Terwijl rechtse facties de macht overnamen in Centraal Amerika, ontwikkelde zich 
een Koude Oorlog tussen de Verenigde Staten en de Sovjet Unie. Zoals hoofdstuk 9 
vaststelt, vielen deze ontwikkelingen samen met de teleurstelling die Amerikaanse 
diplomaten ervoeren met betrekking tot de uitkomsten van democratische experimenten 
in zowel de Amerikaanse buitenlandse politiek als de binnenlandse politiek in veel 
Centraal Amerikaanse landen. In El Salvador konden liberale facties bijvoorbeeld niet 
voorkomen dat het leger de macht greep, terwijl sociale hervormingen in het liberale 
Guatemala veel verder gingen dan de Amerikanen wenselijk achtten. Het Amerikaanse 
diplomatieke korps, blind als het bleek te zijn voor haar eigen tekortkomingen met 
betrekking tot een pro-democratisch beleid, besloot dat deze ontwikkelingen te wijten 
waren aan de politieke onvolwassenheid van Centraal Amerikanen zelf en concludeerde 
dat mensen die zichzelf niet konden helpen geen hulp van de Verenigde Staten konden 
verwachten. In deze context van een toenemende angst voor de communistische 
dreiging gecombineerd met grote teleurstelling in de liberale partijen van Centraal 
Amerika, wendden Amerikaanse diplomaten zich na 1947 tot een nieuw machtsblok dat 
in de Amerikaanse perceptie het politieke centrum in de regio vertegenwoordigde: 
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populistische leiders met een militaire achtergrond zoals de nieuwe president van El 
Salvador, Oscar Osorio, die de retoriek van ideologische gematigdheid combineerden 
met een sterke drang naar economische vooruitgang. 
Een epiloog wijst, aan de hand van President Eisenhower’s beleid ten opzichte 
van Guatemala, op het feit dat de continuïteit van het Amerikaanse beleid in Centraal 
Amerika tussen de jaren ’30 en de jaren ’50 niet zozeer gekenmerkt wordt door het 
bewust en doelgericht steunen van plaatselijke dictators, maar door de tragische 
misvatting dat militaire leiders die zich, zo veronderstelde men, in het midden van het 
politieke spectrum bevonden door de plaatselijke ambassades gemanipuleerd en 
gestuurd konden worden. De conclusie van het proefschrift benadrukt aan de hand van 
voorbeelden uit de voorgaande hoofdstukken het belang van een benadering die de 
nadruk legt op historiciteit en op de sociale constructie die diplomatieke actoren aan de 
wereld om hen heen oplegden en signaleert tevens mogelijke gevaren van een methode 
waarbij vooronderstellingen over bijvoorbeeld de “Realistische” of “Imperialistische” aard 
van het Amerikaanse buitenlandse beleid een rol spelen.   
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